oxford studies in metaethics volume 1 jul 2006

[...]... overcome his inhibitions against playing his proper part in social policing and discipline, nor can he escape his feelings of cruelty and shame when he does in ict punishment What are we to say about the Ed’s conduct? (a) Is Ed’s behavior in failing to denounce others and in refraining from full engagement in social punishment intentional conduct? Yes, albeit the upshot of conflicting motives (b) Do internalized... deems them in any way more choiceworthy—rather, simply because this particular Appalachian setting is where she grew up, her social 15 Kant writes: ‘Respect (reverentia) is, again, something merely subjective, a feeling of a special kind, not a judgment about an object that it would be a duty to bring about or promote’ (19 96: 6 402) 16 Contrast Christine Korsgaard’s remark: In the end, nothing can be... relative hierarchical standing: feelings of respect for those he admires (by comporting himself toward them as he would someone higher in social ranking), and fellow-feelings for those he views as equals (by placing a hand on the back rather than the shoulder, waiting for the right moment rather than presuming to interrupt at will) Indeed, thanks to this widely internalized norm, Hal in his radical days was... Compare the discussion of being in the grip’ of a norm in Gibbard (19 90: 58– 61) Normative Guidance 29 What explains Ed’s behavior and feelings, despite the strength of his commitment to the community and to its rules? Ed grew up in a family in which the parents had a strong principle against punishing or berating children in front of their siblings or friends Punishment should be respectful, he was... foundationalist An agent can start with certain presumptive grounds, reasons, or values taken for granted, and then begin judging, endorsing, choosing, acting, and, over time, revise her starting point according to what she thereby has learned from life thus far An agent conceived as beginning such a learning process with no presumptive normative ‘priors’ of this kind would, however, be at a loss to make... suggest that we begin somewhere else, taking as our life -studies everyday human activity involving the most ordinary of norms Using examples, I will explore some central features of normative guidance, the mental states that underwrite it, and its relationship to our reasons for feeling and acting Normative Guidance Caught in the Act Martha and Rick Martha and Rick are walking and talking together as... think, as well as what each thinks the other sees and thinks, and by a sense of how the moments before class time are ticking away They freely begin a sentence without knowing how it will end, coordinate small changes in their shared trajectory through subtle body language, and communicate their intentions to oncoming pedestrians, cars, and bicycles by tiny eye and head movements Similarly coordinated... those involved Hal, a long-time egalitarian, would not endorse a hierarchical norm governing contact and interruption Yet in virtue of having internalized it, and belonging to a community where others have internalized it as well, he has been able in the various stages of his career not only to comport himself in ways appropriate for his position in the hierarchy 26 Peter Railton at the time, but also in. .. the relevant differences in thought and action But what is it to accept or fail to accept a norm?8 We might simply point to a role-characterization such as (5), and treat it as supplying the ‘job description’ of norm-acceptance: for A to accept N just is a matter of N ’s playing a (5)-like role in shaping A’s individual actions However, inquiring minds will want more insight into A’s psyche than this... do, think, or feel that brings this about? In the paradigm of norm-acceptance, A reflectively considers norm N and freely decides to treat it as action-guiding or reason-giving Explicit acceptance of this kind has the virtue of offering the beginning of an account of a norm N ’s authority for the agent She herself has decided to treat an act’s conformity with N as counting in favor of performing that . alt="" OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS This page intentionally left blank Oxford Studies in Metaethics VOLUME 1 Edited by RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD 1 Great Clarendon Street, Oxford. by Biddles Ltd., King’s Lynn, Norfolk ISBN 0 19 –92 918 8–8 978–0 19 –92 918 8–5 ISBN 0 19 –92 918 9–6 (Pbk.) 978–0 19 –92 918 9–2 (Pbk.) 13 57 910 8642 Contents Notes on Contributors vi Introduction 1 1. Normative. CUF Lecturer in Philosophy, University of Oxford Introduction Russ Shafer-Landau This is the inaugural volume of Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Thisseries is devoted exclusively to original philosophical