oxford studies in metaethics volume iii aug 2008

[...]... that it is gin, then Williams thinks that the internalist should recognize no reason to drink the stuff in the glass and a reason not to drink it But then the agent’s internal reason not to drink the stuff in the glass will not explain his actual drinking of the stuff in the glass On the other hand, we might loosen the link between reasons for action and motivation and explanation, requiring only that... her welfare or well-being, her self-interest, her quality of life, and, on some views, with her happiness.³ We might link these evaluative notions with rational concern as follows Something is (intrinsically) good for X just in case it is (intrinsically) rational to care about or pursue it for X’s own sake Call this the Reason–Well-being Link.⁴ As with the Reason–Value Link, this link does not prejudge... 20 David O Brink under certain conditions, then our view would be non-reductive, insofar as these emotional responses involve constitutive normative judgments about something being valuable or involving wrongdoing Alternatively, our idealization might be implicitly normative For example, David Wiggins proposes that something is valuable just in case it is such as to produce approval in the appropriate... appeals to something like a resonance constraint in motivating his own desiderative conception of well-being It does seem to me to capture an important feature of the concept of intrinsic value to say that what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would find in some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware It would be an intolerably alienated... Morality’’ reprinted in his Moral Luck, esp 14 The Significance of Desire 15 things as intrinsically good—including beauty itself—independently of any contribution that such goods make to a person’s good.¹³ But we might well doubt whether Moore’s intrinsic goods, understood as impersonal goods, would satisfy the resonance condition.¹⁴ They certainly would be correlated with external, rather than internal,... desiderative model of well-being is that it attaches significance to satisfying desire without in any way constraining the content of desire But most of us think that people can be satisfying their deepest desires and yet lead impoverished lives if their desires are for unimportant or inappropriate things For instance, we are unlikely to view the life of someone devoted to collecting lint as a richly valuable... interdependent If, for instance, I make a life’s project out of pursuing a cure for AIDS or fighting poverty, then it is more plausible to treat the satisfaction of such projects as contributing to my own well-being Scanlon makes a similar point by distinguishing between informed desires and rational aims, and using the latter, rather than the former, to inform his conception of well-being See Scanlon, What... of perception in theoretical reason and the role of desire in practical reason For, on his view, it is the perceiveds, rather than perceivings, that figure as the starting point for perceptual reasoning, whereas it is desirings, rather than the desireds, that figure as the starting points for practical reasoning (‘‘The Authority of Desire,’’ 335–7) I remain somewhat unclear about the bearing of this disanalogy... acquiesce in and indeed embrace intellectually and emotionally limited lives that are liberally seasoned with mood-altering drugs.³³ Deltas and Epsilons lead contented lives precisely because they are satisfying their chief desires They’ve got what they want It’s their desires that are frightening We do not (in general) increase the value of our lives by lowering our sights, even if by doing so we increase... of well-being that might be like this results from accepting the Reason–Well-being Link but treating reasons for concern as explanatorily prior to well-being I am sympathetic to this view, but it strikes me as a conceptual proposal about how to understand the interdependence of reason and value, rather than a substantive conception of well-being Moreover, insofar as it grounds well-being in rational . y0 w0 h0" alt="" OXFORD STUDIES IN METAETHICS This page intentionally left blank Oxford Studies in Metaethics VOLUME 3 Edited by RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS · OXFORD 1 Great Clarendon. his ideas in this area; the reader can find his intringuing remarks at various places within hiscorpus.Baldwindoesustheserviceofdrawingourattentiontothese scattered writings, and determining whether. to drink it. But then the agent’s internal reason not to drink the stuff in the glass will not explain his actual drinking of the stuff in the glass. On the other hand, we might loosen the link