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ConsCiousnessRevisited Michael Tye FRank JaCkson, depaRtment oF philosophy, pRinCeton univeRsity Consciousness, Color, and Content Consciousness Revisited alex ByRne, depaRtment oF philosophy, mit; Co-editoR oF Disjunctivism ConsCiousnessRevisited Consciousness Revisited Ten Problems of ConsciousnessConsciousness, Color, and ContentConsciousness and Persons 978-0-262-01273-7 ConsCiousnessRevisitedTye ConsciousnessRevisited Representation and Mind Hilary Putnam and Ned Block, editors For a list of the series, see page 231. ConsciousnessRevisitedMaterialismwithoutPhenomenalConcepts Michael Tye A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England 6 2009 Massachusetts Institute of Technology All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or informa- tion storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher. For information on quantity discounts, email special_sales@mitpress.mit.edu. Set in Times New Roman and Syntax on 3B2 by Asco Typesetters, Hong Kong. Printed and bound in the United States of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tye, Michael. Consciousnessrevisited : materialismwithoutphenomenalconcepts / Michael Tye. p. cm. — (Representation and mind series) ‘‘A Bradford book.’’ Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-262-01273-7 (hard cover : alk. paper) 1. Consciousness. 2. Phenomenology. 3. Materialism. I. Title. B808.9.T943 2009 126—dc22 2008030920 10987654321 for Lauretta, Margie, Dorothy and Jim Contents Acknowledgements ix Introduction xi 1 PhenomenalConsciousness 1 1.1 Preliminary Remarks 2 1.2 PhenomenalConsciousness and Self-Representation 4 1.3 The Connection between PhenomenalConsciousness and Creature Consciousness 8 1.4 Consciousness of Things 10 1.5 Real-World Puzzle Cases 18 2 Why Consciousness Cannot Be Physical and Why It Must Be 25 2.1 What Is the Thesis of Physicalism? 25 2.2 Why Consciousness Cannot Be Physical 29 2.3 Why Consciousness Must Be Physical 33 3 Physicalism and the Appeal to PhenomenalConcepts 39 3.1 Some Terminological Points 39 3.2 Why Physicalists Appeal to PhenomenalConcepts 42 3.3 Various Accounts of PhenomenalConcepts 44 3.4 My Earlier View on PhenomenalConcepts 51 3.5 Are There Any Phenomenal Concepts? 56 3.6 PhenomenalConcepts and Burgean Intuitions 63 3.7 Consequences for A Priori Physicalism 74 4 The Admissible Contents of Visual Experience 77 4.1 The Existential Thesis 78 4.2 The Singular (When Filled) Thesis 80 4.3 Kaplanianism 83 4.4 The Multiple-Contents Thesis 86 4.5 The Existential Thesis Revisited 88 4.6 Still More on Existential Contents 91 4.7 Conclusion 94 5 Consciousness, Seeing, and Knowing 95 5.1 Knowing Things and Knowing Facts 95 5.2 Nonconceptual Content 103 5.3 Why the Phenomenal Character of an Experience Is Not One of Its Nonrepresentational Properties 109 5.4 Phenomenal Character and Representational Content: Part I 112 5.5 Phenomenal Character and Representational Content: Part II 115 5.6 Phenomenal Character and Our Knowledge of It 116 6 Solving the Puzzles 123 6.1 Mary, Mary, How Does Your Knowledge Grow? 123 6.2 The Explanatory Gap 133 6.3 The Hard Problem 144 6.4 The Possibility of Zombies 145 7 Change Blindness and the Refrigerator Light Illusion 155 7.1 A Closer Look at the Change-Blindness Hypotheses 158 7.2 The ‘‘No-See-Um’’ View 164 7.3 Sperling and the Refrigerator Light 168 7.4 Phenomenology and Cognitive Accessibility 171 7.5 A Further Change-Blindness Experiment 174 7.6 Another Brick in the Wall 176 8 Privileged Access, Phenomenal Character, and Externalism 183 8.1 The Threat to Privileged Access 183 8.2 A Burgean Thought Experiment 185 8.3 Social Externalism for Phenomenal Character? 187 8.4 A Closer Look at Privileged Access and Incorrigibility 188 8.5 How Do I Know That I Am Not a Zombie? 191 8.6 Phenomenal Externalism 193 Notes 201 References 217 Index 227 viii Contents Acknowledgements I have a general debt to Mark Sainsbury for discussion and helpful criti- cism. I have been influenced by conversations with my student Derek Ball, whose doctoral dissertation is on phenomenal concepts, and I have had much worthwhile feedback from the members of my graduate class at UT/Austin to whom I presented the main ideas in this book in fall 2007. I also recall the following individuals as having made useful remarks at colloquia and elsewhere: John Bengson, Ned Block, Ray Buchanan, Alex Byrne, David Chalmers, Jonathan Cohen, Tim Crane, Maite Escuardia, Enrico Grube, Dan Korman, Fiona Macpherson, Aidan McGlynn, David Papineau, Adam Pautz, Susanna Siegel, Tim Schroeder, Dan Simons, Malte Willer, Briggs Wright. I am especially grateful to Margie Venieri for giving me her house on Mykonos to use for the summer of 2007. Her generosity made it possible for me to com- plete a full draft of the book earlier than I would have been able to man- age otherwise and to do so in a very beautiful setting. Nearly all of the material in this book is new. Section 5.2 draws on my ‘‘Nonconceptual Content, Richness and Fineness of Grain,’’ in Percep- tual Experience, ed. T. Gendler and J. Haw thorne (Oxford University Press, 2006). Section 8.6 contains several pages from my ‘‘Phenomenal Externalism, Lolita and the planet Xenon,’’ forthcoming in a volume of essays in honor of Jaegwon Kim (MIT Press). Chapter 4 is taken with very few changes from my paper ‘‘The Admissible Contents of Visual Ex- perience,’’ forthcoming in Philosophical Quarterly. [...]... the door I leave it to the reader to judge Consciousness Revisited 1 PhenomenalConsciousness At the very heart of the mind-body problem is the question of the nature of consciousness It is consciousness, and in particular phenomenal consciousness, that makes the mind-body relation so deeply perplexing Many philosophers agree that phenomenalconsciousness (Pconsciousness, for short) cannot be reductively... of a higher-order thought that the subject endorses (a thought to the e¤ect that the subject is having such-and-such an experience).3 Some philosophers maintain that it is a mistake to hold that higherorder consciousness and phenomenalconsciousness can be separated in the above way In their view, phenomenal states always involve awareness of themselves 1.2 PhenomenalConsciousness and Self-Representation... philosophers, is conceptually separable from higher-order consciousness We are sometimes conscious of our phenomenally conscious states, or at least we are sometimes conscious that they are occurring But there is no conceptual barrier to phenomenally conscious states’ occurring without higher-order consciousness This is the case, moreover, whether higher-order consciousness 4 Chapter 1 is construed on the... of our own phenomenal states via introspection On this view, it is not the case that phenomenal states are sometimes accompanied by higher-order states in virtue of which their subjects are introspectively aware of those PhenomenalConsciousness 5 phenomenal states Awareness of a phenomenally conscious state is not a matter of there being a quasi-perception of the state (as on the view of consciousness. .. sometimes conscious of my own phenomenally conscious states This is creature consciousness Intuitively, phenomenalconsciousness requires creature consciousness But what exactly is the connection? Evidently a creature cannot undergo phenomenally conscious states without being conscious But might a creature have a phenomenally conscious state that is about some entity without being conscious of that... specifically to what might be called ‘‘the phenomenal- concept strategy’’ for defending materialism This strategy has it that we are possessors of a range of concepts for classifying the subjective aspects of our experiences concepts very di¤erent in how they function from concepts applied elsewhere These concepts permit us to think of our experiences in a first-person, subjective way even though the aspects... that respects transparency and that has ´ no need of the recherche device of self-reference or self-representation 1.3 The Connection between PhenomenalConsciousness and Creature ConsciousnessPhenomenal consciousness, as introduced above, is a feature of mental states, for it is mental states that are phenomenally conscious But we also use the term ‘conscious’ with respect to ourselves and other sentient... together with my previous work on phenomenalconsciousness (suitably modified to allow for the new proposals), it provides for a comprehensive theory that, in my view, does a better job of handling the data than any other In chapter 1, I introduce the notion of phenomenal consciousness, discuss various hypotheses about the relationship of phenomenalconsciousness to other sorts of consciousness, and make a... subject to a representation that represents soand-so when I undergo such-and-such an experience?’’ with the question ‘‘Do I experience so-and-so?’’ or the question ‘‘Am I conscious of so-andso?’’ The first question is certainly empirical But it is a mistake to slide from empirically based conclusions about the richness of non-conscious or pre-conscious visual representation, for example, to conclusions about... is important to point properly (2002, p 206) How, then, should we point properly to P -consciousness? Block answers as follows: Well, one way is via rough synonyms As I said, P -consciousness is experience Pconscious properties are experiential properties P-conscious states are experiential states; that is, a state is P-conscious just in case it has experiential properties The totality of the experiential . of America. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tye, Michael. Consciousness revisited : materialism without phenomenal concepts / Michael Tye. p. cm. — (Representation and mind series) ‘‘A. Persons 97 8-0 -2 6 2-0 127 3-7 ConsCiousness Revisited Tye Consciousness Revisited Representation and Mind Hilary. ix Introduction xi 1 Phenomenal Consciousness 1 1.1 Preliminary Remarks 2 1.2 Phenomenal Consciousness and Self-Representation 4 1.3 The Connection between Phenomenal Consciousness and Creature Consciousness