[...]... inference to the best explanation Suppose that the total evidence one has supports one theory (which might be as small as a single proposition) over all rival theories, but that evidence is not sufficiently strong that one knows the theory to be true on the basis of that evidence; at best, one can know that the theory is very likely to be true Many will say that that evidence might nevertheless be strong... (Although not as many as there might appear, I argue in the second chapter.) Perhaps, then, I am the next worst thing to a philosophical skeptic Readers might wonder if I really believe the views defended here I assure them that I do That, it should be clear by now, is a very strong commitment indeed (I believe that the details merely have an even chance of being correct.) 1 1.1 The View Introduction... reasons the basis, in large part, for the common claim that knowledge was traditionally defined as justified, true belief However, it is not at all clear that such philosophers took themselves to have an understanding of the notion of good reasons that was independent of, and conceptually prior to, their understanding of the notion of knowledge itself If they intended their remarks as a definition, they... nevertheless be strong enough to justify belief in the winning theory whether it is true or false (Although of course it need not be strong enough to justify belief; the evidence might be too weak in either quantity or the degree to which it outweighs evidence for rival theories to do that.) One who believes a proposition p on the basis of an inference to the best explanation that falls short of providing... are in fact justified—that is, they constitute knowledge The concept of probability will be employed heavily throughout the book, and I should say something about its employment Probability will function as something of a primitive for me—but not a metaphysical primitive I will not talk about probability “out there in the world,” but probability as it occurs in the mind—in the content of beliefs This... case against other notions of justification, but, taken together, the arguments have enough persuasive force to rule out an evaluative notion of warrant On the other hand, the notion of warrant is considerably less intuitive than a more orthodox notion of justification.18 The unknown unknown beliefs, which provide intuitive support for the orthodox notions, do not provide intuitive support for the notion... obligations, at least if divorced from the notion of blame, are perfectly compatible with externalism about justification, and further with the identification of deontological justification and knowledge There might well be other, equally good, ways to explicate the deontic facts that are compatible with externalism I commit myself simply to the claim that deontic facts exist and that there is no reason to think... sometimes even evidence that there is at least a small chance that h, depending upon the circumstances in which the assertion of evidence is made We should, however, distinguish these phenomena even if no existing sense of ‘evidence’ does so, and we need to introduce a new sense of the word in terms of which more standard uses of the term can be defined Evidence for a hypothesis in the strict (and possibly... next chapter Indeed, undermining the intuitive support for the claim that there are justified beliefs that do not constitute knowledge is at least as important as the arguments themselves I start that project in this chapter and return to it with greater force after presenting the arguments in the next chapter 1.2 Two Kinds of (Allegedly) Justified but Unknown Belief There are two classes of beliefs... are nevertheless justified: I will call these classes 8 Chapter 1 the unknown unknown and the known unknown for reasons that will become apparent (It is a solecism to call a belief that does not constitute knowledge an ‘unknown belief’ I hope that the convenience of the term outweighs its incorrectness.) Many, if not most, philosophers take there to be justified beliefs that are not members of these two . class="bi x0 y0 w0 h0" alt="" Without Justification Without Justification Jonathan Sutton A Bradford Book The MIT Press Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England © 2007 Massachusetts Institute of. sales promotional use. For information, please email special_sales@mitpress .mit. edu or write to Special Sales Department, The MIT Press, 55 Hayward Street, Cambridge, MA 02142. This book was set. themselves to have an understanding of the notion of good reasons that was independent of, and conceptually prior to, their understanding of the notion of knowledge itself. If they intended their