The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.

The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.The impact of agency cost on firm performance a comparison between stateowned and nonstateowned enterprises listed on Vietnam stock market.

MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS HO CHI MINH CITY Le Hoang Yen Khanh THE IMPACT OF AGENCY COST ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN STATE-OWNED AND NON-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES LISTED ON VIETNAM STOCK MARKET DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ECONOMICS Ho Chi Minh city - 2022 MINISTRY OF EDUCATION AND TRAINING UNIVERSITY OF ECONOMICS HO CHI MINH CITY Le Hoang Yen Khanh THE IMPACT OF AGENCY COST ON FIRM PERFORMANCE: A COMPARISON BETWEEN STATE-OWNED AND NON-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES LISTED ON VIETNAM STOCK MARKET Major: Finance and Banking Reference: 9340201 DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN ECONOMICS ACADEMIC SUPERVISORS: Dr Pham Phu Quoc Dr Tran Phuong Thao Ho Chi Minh city - 2022 (this page is intentionally blank) i ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I acknowledge that this submission is my own work and except for the reference, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by other authors This thesis does not contain material pressed out from a thesis or document presented for any degree or diploma at University of Economics Ho Chi Minh city or other educational institutions This research is not the work of mine only but to complete this thesis, I have been benefited from the following people: Firstly, the most important people who set the light on my research from the beginning are my advisors – Dr Pham Phu Quoc and Dr Tran Phuong Thao They are always by my side to support me from initial ideas and then develop the thought into the final research Secondly, I would like to express my gratitude to my family members who nurture my passion of higher education, especially, my parents and beloved husband who assist in taking care of me from pregnancy and our newborn baby to accomplish this study And the last but not least, my managers always stay with me when I have problem and get stuck They never leave me but provide me with useful solutions to finish my research Le Hoang Yen Khanh January 2021 ii TABLE OF CONTENT ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS………………………………………….… …………….i TABLE OF CONTENT…………………………………………………….… ………ii LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………… ………… vii LIST OF TABLES…………………………………………………… ……… …….viii LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………… ………xi ABSTRACT…………………………………………………………………………… xii CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 INTRODUCTION 1.2 PRACTICAL RESEARCH CONTEXT 1.3 RESEARCH MOTIVATIONS 1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND QUESTIONS 11 1.5 DATA, METHODOLOGY 13 1.5.1 Data 13 1.5.2 Methodology 14 1.6 CONTRIBUTIONS 15 1.7 STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 15 CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW 26 2.1 INTRODUCTION 26 2.2 AGENCY COST AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 27 2.2.1 Agency cost in business operation 27 2.2.2 Impact of agency cost on firm performance 31 2.2.3 Different relationship between agency cost and firm performance in SOEs and non-state-owned-enterprises 38 2.2.3.1 Agency cost and firm performance in SOEs 39 2.2.3.2 Agency cost and firm performance in non-state-owned enterprises 45 2.2.4 Hypotheses for the comparison of agency cost in SOEs and non-stated owned enterprises 49 2.2.5 Hypotheses for different relationship between agency cost and firm performance.52 2.3 STATE-OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE: THEORY AND EVIDENCE 55 2.3.1 The role of state ownership 55 2.3.2 State involvement in listed firms 57 iii 2.3.3 2.4 Hypotheses for the relation between state ownership and firm performance 62 CHAPTER SUMMARY 65 CHAPTER 3: DATA AND METHODOLOGY 69 3.1 INTRODUCTION 69 3.2 DATA 69 3.2.1 Type of data 69 3.2.2 Sample 70 3.2.3 Data collection 71 3.3 VARIABLE DEFINITION 74 3.3.1 Proxies for agency cost 74 3.3.2 Measures of firm performance 76 3.3.3 Measure of state ownership 78 3.3.4 Measure of control variables 78 3.3.4.1 Internal factors 78 Capital structure 79 Sales growth 79 Profit growth 80 Investment opportunity 80 3.3.4.2 External factors 80 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate 81 Consumer Price Index (CPI) 81 Country investment growth rate 81 3.4 MODEL SPECIFICATON 83 3.4.1 General model specification 83 3.4.2 Methodology for comparison of the agency cost of state-owned firms and nonstate-owned enterprises 86 3.4.2.1 Model for the comparison of agency cost of two groups of enterprises 86 3.4.2.2 Estimation method 86 3.4.3 Methodology for the different impact of agency cost on firm performance of two groups of enterprises 87 3.4.3.1 Model for the different impact of agency cost on firm performance of two groups of enterprises 87 3.4.3.2 Estimation method 88 3.4.4 Methodology for the relationship between state-ownership and firm performance89 3.4.4.1 Model for the relationship between state-ownership and firm performance 89 3.4.4.2 Estimation method 90 iv 3.5 ROBUSTNESS TESTS 93 3.5.1 Different proxies for agency cost 93 3.5.2 Alternative measures for firm performance 94 3.5.3 Other method of estimation 94 3.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY 95 CHAPTER 4: EMPIRICAL RESULTS 96 4.1 INTRODUCTION 96 4.2 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND CORRELATION TEST 96 4.2.1 Descriptive statistics 96 4.2.2 Correlation analysis 100 4.3 COMPARISON OF AGENCY COST OF TWO GROUPS OF ENTERPRISES 102 4.3.1 Comparison of agency cost of two groups of enterprises 102 4.3.1.1 Graph illustration 102 4.3.1.2 Independent sample T-test and Wilcoxon signed-rank test 103 4.3.1.3 Results 104 4.3.2 Summary for the comparison of agency cost of two groups of enterprises 105 4.4 DIFFERENT IMPACT OF AGENCY COST ON FIRM PERORMANCE OF TWO GROUPS OF ENTERPRISES 107 4.4.1 The negative relationship between agency cost and firm performance 107 4.4.1.1 Pooled OLS regression 107 4.4.1.2 Fixed and random effect regression 110 4.4.4.3 Results 113 4.4.2 The different impact of agency cost on firm performance of two groups of enterprises 114 4.4.2.1 Pooled OLS regression 114 4.4.2.2 Fixed and random effect regression 117 4.4.2.3 Results 121 4.4.3 Summary for the different impact of agency cost on firm performance of two groups of enterprises 122 4.5 THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE OWNERSHIP AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 124 4.5.1 The negative relationship between state-ownership and firm performance 125 4.5.1.1 Pooled OLS regression 125 4.5.1.2 Fixed and random effect regression 129 4.5.1.3 Results 135 4.5.2 The non-linear relationship between state ownership and firm performance 135 v 4.5.2.1 Pooled OLS regression 135 4.5.2.2 Fixed and random effect regression 138 4.5.2.3 Results 142 4.5.3 Summary for the relationship between state ownership and firm performance 143 4.6 RESULTS FOR CONTROL VARIABLES AND ROBUSTNESS TESTS 144 4.6.1 Results for control variables 144 4.6.2 Robustness tests 146 4.6.2.1 Different proxy for agency cost 146 4.6.2.2 Alternative measure for firm performance 156 4.6.2.3 Other estimation method 160 4.7 CHAPTER SUMMARY 166 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 168 5.1 INTRODUCTION 168 5.2 REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND DISCUSSIONS 168 5.2.1 Comparison of agency cost of state-owned and non-state-owned enterprises 170 5.2.2 Different impact of agency cost on firm performance of two groups of enterprises 171 5.2.3 Relationship between state ownership and firm performance 173 5.3 IMPLICATIONS 174 5.4 LIMITATIONS 180 PUBLICATIONS………………………………………………………………… …182 REFERENCE…………………………………………………………………………183 APPENDIX A - PRE-ESTIMATION DIAGNOSTIC TESTS…………………….209 A1 ANALYSIS OF THE MULTICOLLINEARITY AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES – VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR (VIF)…………………… ….209 A2 TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION IN PANEL DATA…………… 210 A3 TEST FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY IN PANEL DATA…………………… 210 APPENDIX B – THE DEFINITIONS OF TWO TERMS “STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES” AND “NON-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES”………… ….211 B1 STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES……………………………………………… 211 B2.NON-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES………………………………………….213 APPENDIX C: OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH CONTEXT……………………….215 C1 VIETNAM ECONOMY……………………………………………………… ….215 vi C2 PRIVATIZATION PROCESS………………………………………………… …217 LIST OF ABBREVIATION vii BOD : Board of Director CPI : Customer Price Index FEM : Fixed Effect Model FCF : Free Cash Flow FDI : Foreign Direct Investment GDP : Gross Domestic Product GFC : Global Financial Crisis G&A : General and Administrative GMM : Generalize Method of Moments HOSE : Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange HNX : Hanoi Stock Exchange Non-SOEs : Non-state-owned Enterprise NPV : Net Present Value OLS : Ordinary Least Squares OTC : Over the counter OECD : Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development POE : Private-owned Enterprises REM : Random Effect Model ROE : Return on Equity ROA : Return on Asset RQ1 : Research question RQ2 : Research question RQ3 : Research question SOE : State-owned Enterprise Upcom : Unlisted Public Company Market VND : Vietnam Dong LIST OF TABLES 208 Zhu, J J & Tse, C H., 2019 Unfolding China’s state-owned corporate empires and mitigating agencyhazards: Effects of foreign investments and innovativeness Journal of World Business, 54, 191-212 Zikmund, 2003 Business Research Method Zikmund 8th edition 209 APPENDIX A PRE-ESTIMATION DIAGNOSTIC TESTS This appendix provides pre-estimation diagnostic tests, including analysis of the multicollinearity in Section A.1, tests for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in Sections A.2 and A.3, respectively A1 ANALYSIS OF THE MULTICOLLINEARITY AMONG INDEPENDENT VARIABLES – VARIANCE INFLATION FACTOR (VIF) Table A1 shows the VIF value of all independent variables in this study of under 10, which, according to Hair et al (1995), the maximum acceptable level of VIF is 10, because a VIF value over 10 is a clear signal of multicollinearity Therefore, it can be concluded that there is no multicollinearity phenomenon in this model Table A1: VIF analysis Variable VIF 1/VIF CPI 1.55 0.643265 Country.Invt 1.38 0.722815 GDP 1.20 0.836579 A.Turn 1.02 0.979956 GA.Exp 1.02 0.984718 Pro.Gro 1.01 0.991342 Stateown 1.01 0.993881 Cap 1.00 0.997344 Invt.Op 1.00 0.998357 Gro.Op 1.00 0.998375 Mean VIF 1.10 210 A2 TEST FOR AUTOCORRELATION IN PANEL DATA Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data H0: no first order autocorrelation Table A2 Test for autocorrelation F( 1, 99) Prob > F 49.798 0.0000 Source: Compiled by the author It can be concluded that there is autocorrelation in the panel data A3 TEST FOR HETEROSKEDASTICITY IN PANEL DATA Table A3 Test for heteroscedasticity OLS FEM REM Test Breusch-Pagan Wald Breusch and Pagan Lagrangian Chi2 210.74 40326.37 470.79 Prob > chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 Result Heteroskedasticity Heteroskedasticity Heteroskedasticity Source: Compiled by the author In conclusion, all estimators, including OLS, FEM, and REM, have heteroskedasticity Therefore, the GMM estimator, besides dealing with drawbacks such as autocorrelation or heteroskedasticity, can also overcome endogenous issues, which are prevalent in many research models As a result, in order to confirm the findings and ensure their reliability, this study employs instrument variable GMM estimators in addition to traditional estimation methods such as pooled OLS, FEM, and REM 211 APENDIX B THE DEFINITIONS OF TWO TERMS “STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES” AND “NON-STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES” B1 State-owned enterprises The term "state-owned enterprise" in this study is used to refer to originally stateowned companies (Equitized SOEs) that underwent the equitization process according to Decree 126/2017/NĐ-CP on November 16, 2017 to transfer stateowned companies and one-member limited companies with 100% state-ownership and get listed on the stock market with significant privileges from the state (Shleifer, 1998; Xiaowen Tian, 2007; Hai & Nunoi, 2008; Wei Huang, 2011; Karen & Xiaoyan, 2020) Distinguished from their peers in SOEs, the state maintains a high proportion of these companies with representatives on the Board of Directors, where one is voted to become the CEO of the company (Mc.Gee, 2009; Weihuang, 2011; Xiaohong, 2018) Furthermore, as defined by the Vietnamese law, SOEs are used for enterprises with state ownership of at least 50% of the voting shares according to provision number 88 of Enterprise Law No 59/2020/QH14 dated 17th June 2020 Furthermore, provision 145 of Enterprise Law No 59/2020/QH14 states that attendance of shareholders representing at least 50% of total voting shares is required for a first annual meeting to proceed If the company is unable to hold the first meeting due to a lack of shareholder attendance, a second meeting can only be held if at least 33 percent of shareholders attend As a result, if a single shareholder holds at least 33 percent of voting shares, he or she can theoretically veto or pass any important issues raised at the second annual meeting Generally, in SOEs, the CEO typically holds a dual position, with minor shares while representing a large proportion of state ownership (Shleifer & Andrei, 1986; Shleifer, 1998; Minh & Walker, 2008) Thus, owing to the detachment between the control rights and cash flow rights of the person representing the state but holding insignificant shares, he is 212 not stimulated to optimize investors’ wealth and firm efficiency, which results in agency problems In SOEs, there are double agency problems, including "vertical agency problems" both between the executives and state owners (in fact, the public in general) and between the agent and other shareholders in the company, together with "horizontal agency problems" between state and non-state owners (Zhu et al 2019) Table B1: Summary of Evolution of Law regulating SOEs in Viet Nam Year of Issuance 1995 Name of Law Main Content Definition Remarks Law 1995 39_Law on State-owned Enterprises SOEs were defined as economic organizations that are capitalized, established, organized, and managed by the government The law also divided SOEs into two categories: (i) state business enterprises, which operate profitably and without government subsidies, and (ii) state public service enterprises, which operate in accordance with the government's social and security policies and are eligible for government subsidies SOEs include not only enterprises with 100 percent state capital, but also joint-stock and limited liability companies with a dominant state share (greater than 50 percent) The Law on SOEs, on the other hand, only applied to enterprises with 100 percent state capital Other types of SOEs, such as joint stock or limited liability companies, are governed by the Enterprises Law of 1999 SOEs are defined as enterprises in which the government owns more than half of the charter capital SOEs took the following corporate forms: one member limited liability company (i.e., an SOE whose capital is owned entirely by the State); jointstock company; and limited liability company with more than one member State-owned enterprises are now defined as "fully owned by the State," rather than "more than 50% owned by the State," as previously There is no mention of the proportion of stateowned capital in total enterprise capital 2003 Law 14/2003/ QH11 on State-owned Enterprises 2005 Law on Enterprises 60/2005/QH11 2014 Law on Enterprises 68/2014/QH13 It is now easier to determine the proportion of stateowned capital in total enterprise capital However, there is a distinction between which type of SOE (exactly 100 percent or less than 100 percent) is governed by which law This law specifies that an SOE can only be 100 percent stateowned, which has a 213 Year of Issuance 2020 Name of Law Law on Enterprises 59/2020/QH14 Main Content Definition Remarks Furthermore, the 2014 Enterprise Law imposes stricter corporate governance requirements on SOEs The Law requires SOEs to conduct periodic and extraordinary disclosures of various information SOEs are defined as those “fully owned by the State”; “more than 50% of registered capital or total voting shares owned by state” significant impact on the number of SOEs in the country Source: Compiled by the author B2 Non-state-owned enterprises This study uses the term "non-state-owned enterprises" to mention listed enterprises besides SOEs with no state ownership, coming from the private sector with no governmental involvement The majority of privately owned businesses are small or are owned by "insiders," often family members While state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are frequently managed by government officials under close state supervision, private firms are largely run by family members as controlling shareholders (Hai & Nunoi, 2008; Wei Huang, 2011; Karen & Xiaoyan, 2020) With companies of small or medium size, the owners assume a CEO duality position in running, managing, and supervising the business operation Therefore, taking the place of the owner-manager, they a good job and work in favor of their business, meaning it is in their personal interest to get rid of the agency problem (Shleifer, 1998; Xiaowen Tian, 2007; Wangfeng & Lihong, 2016) However, when companies expand in size and get listed on the stock market to mobilize capital from the public, the cost of running a big company is beyond the capacity of the owner Therefore, outsiders are employed to make operational decisions on behalf of the owners Nevertheless, unlike SOEs, only an interest conflict between the agent and other shareholders arises in these companies Furthermore, the owner can internalize all monitoring costs as well as hire and fire managers at his or her discretion, resulting in lower agency costs when compared to 214 SOEs Since the monitoring costs suffered by SOEs cannot be internalized, they must rely on outside organizations such as auditing companies, banks, and financial institutions Both types of listed companies operate under the Enterprise Law 59/2020/QH14 dated June 17th, 2020 and Degree No 71/2017/N-CP dated June 6th, 2017 on corporate governance for public and listed companies This study categorizes two groups of listed enterprises for the purpose of examining the agency cost and its different influences on firm performance from the perspective of comparison, in order to clarify the three research questions and other supporting hypotheses Therefore, the terms "state-owned listed enterprises" and "non-state-owned listed enterprises" are used for the purpose of this research only 215 APPENDIX C OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH CONTEXT Transitional economies are countries in which they are undertaking macroeconomic reforms in an effort to alter the ways in which their economies are managed This, traditionally, implies that the country is making a structural adjustment from a staterun economy toward a more market-led mechanism However, unlike other transitional countries in the world, Vietnam distinguishes itself as a transitional country within a socialist orientation C1 VIETNAM ECONOMY Vietnam’s economy is classified as a transition economy from centrally-planned to a market economy under socialist orientation At its Sixth National Congress in 1986, the Vietnam Communist Party approved a program of "Renovation", known as "Doi moi" in Vietnamese, with the official conclusion of "Building and developing the economy into a system of multi-sectors market economy with government regulation." In the new era, the state still plays a dominant role in the economy, but the emerging private sector has proved its valuable contribution to the country since the nation’s integration policy into the world to attract foreign investment and foreign trade Vietnam has successfully controlled the entire economy, allowing for economic development with high growth rates, poverty reduction, and reduced inequality., the "Renovation" policy in 1986 has paved the way for economic and social development The government has implemented a variety of measures to provide a transparent business environment as well as increased investment in nongovernmental sectors such as private companies, cooperatives, and foreign-funded enterprises However, it is required to reform state-owned enterprises for better 216 competition in the economy since in Vietnam, SOEs still play a dominant role and make up over half of total industrial production, excluding oil and gas corporations, in the economy (Quach, 2016) Therefore, reorganization and privatization of these enterprises are of urgent need to make a great contribution as well as offer significant transformation to the whole economy Unlike other transitional and developing countries, Vietnam conducted the transition under "socialist orientation" with the domination of state-owned enterprises, which distinguishes Vietnam’s transition process from other countries and makes the country deserving of a single study to investigate its eminent financial characteristics Following its innovation program in 1986, since then, the Vietnamese economy has displayed splendid performance for the economy’s industrialization and modernization In 2007, Vietnam officially became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which enabled the nation to embark on noticeable accomplishments in macroeconomic stability, inflation control, and foreign trade growth Figure C1 Vietnam’s GDP growth rate in the past 10 years Source: Data.worldbank.org 217 Shortly, Vietnam's economy has been industrialized and modernized to boost GDP growth rate, put inflation rate under control, attract foreign direct investment (FDI), and restructure all economic sectors for more intensive global integration Therefore, it has been approved that Vietnam has made a considerable contribution to the regional and global economies' development C2 PRIVATIZATION PROCESS The process of SOE reform in Viet Nam is divided into three major stages: 19801986, 19862001, and 2001 to the present The period from 1980 to 1986 is regarded as a pilot period for Viet Nam's Doi Moi period, during which SOEs and other forms of business underwent fundamental changes to serve the goal of transitioning the Vietnamese economy from a central to a socialist-oriented market economy Figure C2a: SOE Privatization and Divestment Process (Simplified) In 1986, the Vietnamese government launched an economic reform program, namely Doi Moi or renovation, which helped to transfer the economy from a central planned to a market system Vietnam has witnessed many noticeable alternations, 218 especially the elevated and stable growth rates In order to pave the way for greater accomplishments, the ambitious target of privatizing most SOEs by 2010 was set with the pilot scheme introduced in 1992 based on Prime Minister's Decision 202CT on Privatization Programs At first, the pilot program was carried out cautiously, with only five state-owned enterprises being privatized during 1992–1996 (Truong et al., 2004) After that, a new stage of equitization was introduced with the inauguration of the Decree 28-CP in May 1996, transforming small-to-medium-sized and non-strategic SOEs into joint-stock corporations Therefore, ministries, people’s committees, and state companies need to choose firms for privatization However, only 25 firms were equitized from 1996 to 1998, presenting a sluggish process (Truong et al 2004) A legal framework has recently been introduced to manage the equitization process properly In particular, in 2017, Document No 991/2017/TTg-MDN was issued by the Prime Minister to approve a list of state-owned enterprises undergoing yearly privatization during the period of 2017–2020 In particular, in 2018 alone, in the whole country, 64 state-owned enterprises were projected to be privatized to foster nationwide economic growth, but in reality, the proportion is only 17%, equivalent to 12 companies, and the others are transferred to following years Furthermore, on November 16, 2017, the government issued Degree No 126/2017/N-CP to transfer state-owned enterprises and one-member limited companies with 100% stateownership to listed firms on the stock market as a legal framework to strengthen the privatization process in Vietnam in the new era Additionally, the Degree 71/2017/N-CP was introduced to instruct corporate governance applied in public companies to pave the way for enterprises listed on the Vietnam stock market According to a report by the World Bank (2013), the privatization of SOEs has generally been slower than expected Furthermore, only small and medium-sized 219 state-owned enterprises have been prioritized for equitization, with a small proportion of privatized assets in the hands of non-state shareholders (World Bank 2014) Figure C2b Number of equitized SOEs Source: World Bank (2013) However, the speed of privatization has been accelerated with the opening of the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange in 2000 and the Hanoi Stock Exchange in 2005, on which approximately 3,400 firms, mostly small and medium-sized, have been equitized since 2000 Many large and strategic SOEs were scheduled to be equitized in 2007, with sluggishness due to governmental gradualism and the anxiety of oversupply in the stock market (Quach, 2016) In terms of stock market listing, the number of state-owned equitized enterprises that are currently listed on the stock market is limited (Figure C2c) According to the Ministry of Finance, only 231 enterprises were registered as public companies with the State Securities Commission as of September 12, 2018, including 152 enterprises that had listed and registered transactions, 56 enterprises that had not listed/registered transactions, and 23 businesses that had canceled public company 220 registration As a result, the rate of listing registration / transaction registration of state-owned enterprises after equitization is low—only 152/747 enterprises, accounting for 20.3 percent of all enterprises Overall, the vast majority of equitized SOEs are still unlisted Figure C2c Listing Status of Equitized SOEs on the Stock Exchange SOE until March 2018 The stock market serves the demands of funding firm investment, enhancing corporate governance and performance In line with development, the expansion of firms in size and complexity leads to separation in ownership and control, resulting in disagreements within companies, which can be triggered by information asymmetry between parties and conflicts of interest This phenomenon will incur agency costs that weaken corporate efficiency, as per academic literature illustrated as an agency problem The agency problem draws special attention from domestic and international authors nearly two decades after the first stock exchange was introduced in Vietnam in 2000 Stock exchanges in emerging markets like Vietnam play a crucial role as 221 financing alternatives due to asymmetric information and limited collateral that companies find challenging to access through bank loans and bonds Moreover, with the government’s privatization process, state-owned enterprises have undergone an equitization process to get listed on the stock market with the objective of improving their efficiency All together, these issues inspire the author's study on agency problems and firm performance in Vietnam However, most studies concentrate on trend and qualitative research and make recommendations to government agencies, policymakers, and management boards In addition, previous studies mention agency cost and firm performance separately, as well as research on determinants of management behavior or determinants of agency cost, such as capital structure and management ownership Furthermore, most researchers approve the availability of agency cost in listed firms in Vietnam, but few studies can quantify the agency cost to figure out its impact on the firm's performance For example, in Than et al.'s (2014) studies, they use only one measure of agency cost ratio and the OLS method to measure agency cost and point out the relationship between agency cost and ownership structure to mitigate agency cost in listed firms Furthermore, recent studies focus on analyzing the privatization process in Vietnam but fail to link the equitization process with firm performance in the agency perspective Moreover, few studies in Vietnam have studied the rapport between agency cost and firm performance with the participation of state ownership in listed firms, so as to compare the impact of agency cost on two groups of corporations (the stateowned and non-state-owned ones) to analyze how agency cost affects firm performance differently in these corporations Little research considers agency cost in combination with the privatization process to examine the inter-relationship between them but only analyzes them separately In addition, other determinants of firm performance have been investigated, such as capital structure, working capital, ownership structure, etc., but the impact of agency costs on firm performance is still not fully exploited Therefore, this issue should be given further and thorough 222 consideration in the future This is why, in order to gain an understanding of this issue in a typically transitional economy like Vietnam, extensive research into agency costs influencing firm performance and the relationship between state ownership and firm performance during the privatization process is required In the new era, equitization in Vietnam is carried out in order to improve the efficiency of state-owned companies while also creating a transparent business environment for all sectors The equitization program of Vietnam has achieved certain accomplishments; however, it is evaluated as being moderate Furthermore, after more than 30 years of Doi Moi, state shareholding remains prevalent in the economy (World Bank, 2011, 2014) However, Vietnam’s economy, similarly to other South-East Asian countries, mainly consists of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), with about 98% of SMEs, and the other 2% consisting of SOEs and foreign companies (Le, 2018) Generally, SOEs still hold a dominant position in the economy while the private sector shows an emerging role of providing up to 40% of GDP, 30% of the national budget, and employing about 85% of the total labor force available (Le, 2018) The current situation places the government in the predicament of recognizing the emerging role of the private sector while also retaining SOEs in vital industries to allot scarce resources Thus, the above matters encourage new research on the relationship between agency cost and firm performance with state involvement in listed firms by sorting data into two groups of companies to offer insight to policymakers to decide which sector is more effective in the economy Moreover, the state's ownership of corporations has two sides of effect, including positive and negative ones For that reason, what proportion of state-ownership can significantly improve the firm's performance should be figured out in order that the government can adjust its percentage of power in SOEs for optimal firm performance So far, there have not been many studies on that issue to suggest some solutions for the government as well as policymakers to improve Vietnam’s equitization process ... managers are eager for a salary, allowance, and bonus In addition, the second reason is information asymmetry between managers and owners of a company’s assets and performance, since professional... studies, the authors have done research on the agency costs of corporations separately but have not made a comparison in one study For instance, Afzalur (2018) evaluates the impact of compensation-based... understandable that in addition to the operating cost, there is also a particular cost named the agency cost to maintain the relationship between the principal and the agent This cost originates