NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY and independent of the skandhas there is the individual as a substantial entity, the SQstra would reply that it would amount to tending towards etemalism, an extreme against which the Buddha exhorted so much His disciples to guard themselves Further, even granting that the indi vidual entity is there apart from the five skandhas, how is that entity to be known? It is not there among the objects ofthe six kinds of sensation Again, these objects are seen to be impermanent, subject to birth and death and not self-possessed; but the individual as an entity is supposed to be a permanent self-being, not subject to birth and death Certainly no entity of that kind could be found among the objects of the differ ent kinds of sensation If there were any such entity, then there should have been an altogether separate sense, a seventh vijfiiina, to cognize it.17 But there is no such thing The soul-theory of the non-Buddhists: The non-Buddhists urge that the soul which is one's own self cannot be denied without stultifying one sel£ The self should be recognized as the subject, they argue Every one has a soul of his own; and the soul of each is a separate, self-identical entity; it is pennanent; it is the knower, the doer of deeds and the ex periencer of results They place their view on the following grounds (A) The soul as the self of everybody is the o.bject of the notion of "I"; it is the basis of distinction between oneself and another If within one's body there is not one's own soul, then it should have to be ad mitted that the sense of'II" arises even without any object And if even in reference to one's own person the sense of "I" is (devoid of object and hence) false, then why should it not arise in reference to another? (B) If within the body, there is no soul (as the subject) then, as sensa tions arise and perish every moment, what other principle is there to distinguish and synthesise them? Without such a principle how can there be any definite knowledge that this is blue and this is red? (C) Further, if within the body there is no soul, at the end of the present span of life, who follows the deeds and receives their results, good or bad? Who experiences pleasure and pain? And who realizes freedom?18 On these grounds, these people hold that soul should be defmitely recognized as a real, substantial entity ZI8 WORLD AND INDIVIDUAL A Soul and the Sense of uI" (I) Is soul as the basis of the distinction of" self" and"other"? As regards the sense of "self" and the sense of "other," the Sastra draws attention to their correlativity as references and observes that there is no rigidness even in regard to their spheres of reference No rigid line could be drawn be tween "self" and "other." What is referred to as "s elf " at one time or in a certain context may be the "other" (or n ot s elf) at another time or in another context so th at this question as to why tht" se nse of "I" should not arise in reference to another person could be met with a counter ques tio n: If in reference only to another person one holds the sense of "I" (lr�ft!1�1:at��), - Then, why does this sense not arise in the case of one's own perso n? (148b) Further, this question is based on a supposition of an absolute dis tinction between self an d other, which again presupposes an absolute entity called soul (lr1f"�RJ1f1l£�) as the' object of the reference of "self" conceived as inde pend en t of and separate from the "other." But it is this very existence of the soul (ijiI/I) as a separate entity that is in question; when this is itself not settled, how could the further point of the absolute distinctness of "self" and "other" be based on it? This is like the question bein g asked about the n at ure of the hare's hom and the reply be ing given that it resembles the horn of the horse (148b) Further, the objec ti on, why the sense of "I" is not born for one in reference to another, is relevant to th e position of the soul-theorist and not of the Madhyamika Because, the soul -theori st holds that the soul is all-pervasive and so, there should arise for one the sense of "I" even in reference to another The Siistra obse rve s that actually there are per sons who give rise to the sense of "self" even in refe re nce to "other" persons as well as in reference to what is usually considered as no t-self 219 NAGARJUNA'S PIDLOSOPHY The contemplatives of the non-Buddhist schools, for example, during the course of their contemplation on the all-pervasiveness of e lements give rise to the notion "I am the earth, earth is mysel£" Again, in a state of confusion (�fjJ) one might hold the sense of "I" even in reference to other persons 111 So it cannot be argued that because there are the nottons of "self" and "other," therefore there should be the soul as a real, substantial, s;>ccific entity (II) Is soul the object oj the notion of (fI"? The objector contends that even granting that there is no soul, the sense of "I" is surely there If there were no soul, this sense should have to be devoid of a defimte object That cannot be.20 The Sastra observes that the s,nse of "I" is certainly not devoid of object The usual object of the sense of "I" is the body-mind complex, the stream of the five skahdhas Owing to per version there arises in one the different kinds of the false sense of self in reference to it It is this co mplex of the five skandhas that i s the object of the sense of "I" and "mine." It is not anything substantial as it is a com posite entity; everything in it is causally born, subj ect to arising and perishing and hence devoid of self-hood Out of ignorance one imagines it as a substantial entity and clings to it as "I" and "mine." That the sense of self usually arises only in reference to a speQfic set of five skandhas is a matter of deep- rooted habit (fl); out of habit one conceives a par ticular complex of five skandhas as one's sel£21 Without this fIXedness the world of convention would be a mass of confusion But this fixed ness in reference should not lead one to think that the object of this re ference is a real , substantial entity Again, it may be added, not all self reference need be one of clinging : there is the non-clinging sense of "I" as well as the clinging sense of "I." Actually the clinging to the complex of the five skandhas as "I" and "mine" is pu rely a ca�e of ignorance and perversion There is in truth no absoluteness about the sphere of self reference; one should not seek for an absolute rule in this regard Fur ther, if the sense of "I" were something absolute and stable, and if it were to refer invariably to a particular substantial entity, then every one should forever be committed to a divided life, which even the soul theorists would not admit 220 WORLD AND INDIVIDUAL (III) Has soul any dtjinite nature? Moreover, of this soul that these people imagine as the defmite object of the notion of "I," truly, no de finite nature can be found It cannot be held that the soul is absolutely permanent or that it is absolutely impermanent, that it is completely self-possessed or utterly devoid of self-possession, that it is something material or immaterial, etc A definite substantial entity must have its own definite nature ; a thing devoid of nature is (as good as) non-existent If the soul is devoid of all nature, it is as good as non-existent.u (I49a) The soul, for instance, cannot be held to be eternal ; ifit were eternal it should be devoid of death and rebirth ; a person should not then be conceived as possible of being killed An eternal and all-pervasive entity such as soul should not be conceived again as transmigrating, for it should for ever be existent everywhere So how can there happen birth , or death to it? Does not death mean leaving this sphere, and birth, emerging in another? Again, such an eternal soul should be devoid of the experience of pleasure and pain If the soul became sad with the approach of pain and glad with the approach of pleasure, then it should not be beyond change and hence not eternal The soul that and all-pervasive should be like iikiisa which the is eternal rains cannot wet and the sun cannot dry ; it should then be devoid of the distinctions of this world and the other world ; it should not be that it dies here and emerges there Again if the soql were eternal, then the sense of "I" should also be for ever there, and there should then be no way of becoming free from it Again, if there were an eternal soul, as these people conceive, then there should be no question of forgetting anything Only because there is no such eternal soul, and because vijiiiina, the principle of intel lectioll, is "not a permanent entity, therefore there is the forgetting of things So it cannot be held that there is any such real, substantial, per manent ('oW) entity called soul such eternal But can the soul It cannot also be that the person is as (jII ) be evanescent ( � * ) , or even a s impermanent skandhas? To imagine that the self is evanescent is as the ever perishing 221 NAGARjUNA'S PHILOSOPHY to deny causal continuity, which is again to deny the possibility of sin and merit This is to fall into the wrong notion of negativism Then there would be none that would reach the next span of life and receive ' the results of deeds done in the previous span If the self as well as the body became wholly extinct, then , to realize Nirvaz:1a, there would be no need to cultivate the way and terminate the forces that bind one to e rro r and suffering S o it cannot be that the person is ev anescent 'Again, is the soul (jfrlfr) completely self-possessed ( 13 tE) and complete ly sel f-willed ( !3 f'F) ? In this case every one should get whatever one wishes even without any effort Actually this does not happen In fact, one does not get what one wishes and one gets what one does not wish Again, if everyone were completely self-possessed, one should not commit sin and fall into evil or inferior states of life No,.one deli ghts in pain If the self were comp letely self-possessed who would be in this state where, in spite of one's desire for pleasure, what one gets is still mo re pain? Further, people are often forced to good deeds only because they fear sin Now, if the person (A) were completely self willed where is the question of his fearing sin and being forced to culti vate merit?24.· That the soul is devoid of complete freedom means that it is devoid of the nature of soul But is the person completely devoid of self-will? If the person were completely devoid of self-will (�f'F�), Then, when the sinner is asked by Yamaraja (Im.x) (the kin g of ho w could he reply, "I have done it myself (:.IHJt !3 f'F) "? Therefore it should be that the person is not completely devoid of self will (?F� !3 it) (I49b) death) as to who made him commit the sin, Some imagine that the soul' (jfrlfr) is something of a determinate shape and size, that it is something formed (physical) , and that it has a definite location (spatial) Thus so me say the soul is in the heart and is as small as the mustard seed (jI:+) ; it is pure and is called the pure p hysical body (f-$f5,llt ) Some others say that the soul is like a corn of maize Some say that it is like a bean Some say it is h alf an inch in measure and so me say, one inch in measure They say that in receiving the body it is the fo remost to reach it Some say that the size of the soul varies with the 222 ... Again, it may be added, not all self reference need be one of clinging : there is the non-clinging sense of "I" as well as the clinging sense of "I." Actually the clinging to the complex of the. ..WORLD AND INDIVIDUAL A Soul and the Sense of uI" (I) Is soul as the basis of the distinction of" self" and"other"? As regards the sense of "self" and the sense of "other," the Sastra draws... is h alf an inch in measure and so me say, one inch in measure They say that in receiving the body it is the fo remost to reach it Some say that the size of the soul varies with the 222