WORLD AND INDIVIDUAL that because the visible matter which is gross is itself the earth and has hardness for its character therefore it must have been matter derived from the basic element of e-arth (it!HI) which is the element of hardness, then, the visible matter has in it the characters of moisture and heat too, which should, according to the Abhidharmika, properly belong to the basic elements of water and fire.4 But here the Abhidharmika would say that these four basic elements are not apart from one :mother; in the derived eanh there is not only the basic element of earth but there are also the basic elements of water, fire and wind Similarly in each of the other derived forms of physical elements also all the four basic elements are found Only in earth, the earthy element is more and therefore it is called earth The same is the case with the other elements too But how can he maintain this? If, e.g., in fire all the four basic elements are present, then all of them should be of the nature of heat For, there is nothing in fire that is not hot But if the other three elementS are there in fire and yet are not hot, they are not called fire But if they are not there, then you should admit that these elements give up their self nature, and the entire thing is called fire (I 94C) Suppose the Abhidharmika would say that these three are there as such, but they are too subtle to be perceived (�ttc�1iJ1:n) Then they are as good as not being there (J{lj��1!\U\), for we have no ground to speak of them as being there.6 It is only if anything is obtained in its gross state then we can reason back to their subtle state (even when unperceived) But if the thing is not perceived in the gross state, there is no way of knowing that it is there in the subtle state (��llIQ)l'��) (I94c-I9Sa) The notion that there are in reality subtle, independent elements called earth etc., which are ultimate and substantial while all gross things are sunya, relative and non-substantial is only an imagination that does 213 NAGARJUNA'S PHILOSOPHY not hold All things, physical or mental: gross or subtle are· alike lunya Non-ultimacy of atomic' elements: But is it necessary that everything should exist by only depending on the cooperation of causal factors? How about the atomic elements? They �re most subtle and are therefore indivisible Being indivisible they cannot be said to be the results of the combination of causal factors Of the gross things it can be said that they are produced and destroyed; but how can the atoms which are indivisible be produced and destroyed?' Here the Sastra replies that there is not anything absolutely fixed as the "subtlest"; the name has been simply imposed on certain things Gross and subtle are relative denominations It is only depending on the gross that there is the subtle Moreover, the things that one takes to be subtle would admit of even further analysis into still subtler dements (in the light of which the former would be gross).7 The subtl�t, the atomic element, is a purely conceptual limit which is significant not in itself, but only in relation to the gross Further, if the subtle elements are physical, then they are not indivisi ble (atonuc), and if they are indivisible they would lack the character of being physical as they would not have the spatial divisions.8 Again, the subtle physical elements must have in them as much share of color as of taste, smell and touch If they have these, then they are not indivisi ble, but if they not have these, then they lack these- qualities The divisible is not eternal and the eternal (indivisible) is not physical The Sastra observes, in truth as the SutTa says, "Whether gross or subtle, internal or external, rupa is found on examination to be devoid of per manence and self-being."9 Some may say that they not admit of the subtle eternal entities called atOms; they just take the visible form as rupa which is there de finitely and undeniably How can this be analysed and demonstrated as lunyaPO The Sastra says: , Now, even if you not accept atoms (as subtle, eternal entities), still, the visible '"pa that is born out of the togetherness of the four basic elements is alsQ a derived name For example, when the wind blows the 214 WORLD AND INDIVIDUAL water.all over the four sides, there arises the ball of foam (which is not anything substantial) This is the case even with the riipa that is born of the four basic elements.ll (292a) If the four basic elements are scattered apart (Mit) there is nothing like the physical object of sight For, in the, case of the exclusion of all elements, smell etc., there is no separate physical, entity as such.1\! When by means of understanding one analyses everything into its component elements, then, one finds that riipa (�) the physical entity is unobtainable as anything substantial If riipa were a substantial self existent entity (1l;ff) then even apart from all these dements there should be a separate entity called riipa, but (actually) there is no such separate entity Therefore the Sutra says, "Whatever riipa is there, all that arises from the cooperation C?f the four basic elements." & it arises from the cooperation of several causal factors, it is all a derived name Being a derived name, it can be analysed and scattered (and known to be composite and therefore Jimya, non-5ubstantial).18 (292a) Further, it may be recalled that the fact that there are names for things should not be taken as the ground for their substantiality While Signifi cant names suggest the possibility of the objects which they stand for they not necessarily mean that they are substantial; to suppose that they so is to fall into the error of etemalism The mental elements: Experience and the object of experience: Further, objects of experience have no being isolated or disconnected from the experiencing of them; these are inseparable correlatives An exclusive emphasis on either of them would be only a falsification Take, for example, the hardness of earth Hardness is there only as (an object of experience) perceived by the sense of touch (:litm:litla) (and interpreted by the sense of monas) If it is not an object of the experience of touch, then there is no (possibility) of (knowing a thing as) hardness at all (17U) 2IS that there is such NAGARJUNA'S PHIl OSOPHY Suppose it is said that whether the hardness or not, earth is always hard sense of touch experiences the Now, either one has already experienced hardness personally (fH'C m�) or one has heard of it from another (fi�fI!!.lI8) and has thus come to know that there is such a thing called hardness Ifhardness is not at all an object of experience in any way then (there is no knowing of any thing like hardness and) it is (as good as) non-existent (I7Ia) There is no knowing that the earth is hard even when not experi enced Cognition and objects of cognition are correlative; one cannot be found without the other The element of cognition for example comes into being only depending on its object; when the object be comes extinct, even the element of cognition ceases to be When the object is denied even its idea stands denied; the one is not found without the other All the, four kinds of mental elements arise and function only depending on their respective objects There is no absoluteness about them They are comparable to fire in respect to their functions: Fire, for example, receives its name in accordanc