246 Louis XVI the original memorandum Facing unfavorable conditions in Korea, Japan made considerable concessions in this agreement, which had two secret provisions First, the two countries agreed to send additional troops to Korea in the event of major disturbances Second, they might station the same number of troops in Korea until the emergence of a trained Korean force When Yamagata offered Lobanov the draft of the agreement he was unaware that a few days earlier the Russians had signed with China’s Li-Lobanov Agreement The Russians had invited to the czar’s coronation ceremony the Chinese statesman Li Hongzhang, who was bribed to sign the Li-Lobanov Agreement The core of the agreement, whose content was revealed only in 1922, was mutual aid in the event of Japanese aggression One clause in the agreement was implemented at once—Li’s consent to grant Russia the concession to build a significant shortcut for the Trans-Siberian Railway across Manchuria, which led immediately to a substantial increase in Russian involvement in the region Because of the changing circumstances, the YamagataLobanov Agreement was replaced two years later by the Nishi-Rosen Agreement The new accord specified that both sides would refrain from political intervention in Korea and would seek each other’s approval in providing military or financial advisors as requested by the Korean government Russia also explicitly acknowledged Japan’s special position in Korea, allowing it free commercial and industrial activity in the area in return for implicit Japanese acknowledgment of Russian influence in Manchuria These two Russo-Japanese agreements did not prevent the struggle between the two nations over Korea Japan increasingly regarded Russian involvement in Korea as a threat to its vital interests, especially as Russian involvement in neighboring Manchuria intensified and the Trans-Siberian Railway project was about to be completed After 1901 Japan insisted on the formula of Manchuria-Korea exchange, namely that Manchuria would go to Russia and Korea to Japan Failing to persuade Russia to relinquish Korea, Japan began to attack Russian bases in Korea and Manchuria on February 8, 1904, opening a 19-month campaign that would become known as the Russo-Japanese War Further reading: Asakawa, Kin’ichi The Russo-Japanese War, Its Causes and Issues Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin, 1904; Duus, Peter The Abacus and the Sword Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995; Kowner, Rotem Historical Dictionary of the Russo-Japanese War Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 2005; Lensen, George Alexander Bal- ance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea and Manchuria, 1884–99 Tallahassee, FL: The Diplomatic Press, 1982; Malozemoff, Andrew Russian Far Eastern Policy, 1881–1904, With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1958; Nish, Ian The Origins of the Russo-Japanese War New York: Longman, 1985 Rotem Kowner Louis XVI (1754–1793) French monarch Born in August 1754, the ill-fated Louis XVI became king of France in 1774, on the death of his father, Louis XV In 1770 he had married Marie Antoinette of Austria, the daughter of Francis I and Maria Theresa It was a dynastic marriage, intended to cement the alliance of France and Austria-Hungary, the heart of the Holy Roman Empire The alliance, known as the diplomatic revolution of 1756, had completely altered the balance of power in Europe, by allying Bourbon France with the Habsburgs of Austria-Hungary, who had been at odds for centuries The alliance had been one of the major causes of the Seven Years’ War of 1756–63 When Louis XVI ascended the throne, France was enjoying one of its rare periods of peace in the 18th century The time was ripe for a serious reconstruction of the economy The extreme expenses incurred by the wars of Louis XIV and Louis XV weighed heavily on the depleted treasury, and there was the threat of bankruptcy However, events would prove that Louis XVI, unlike Louis XIV, lacked the determination or ruthlessness to carry out the reforms needed to rescue his kingdom Although given a choice of some of the most astute ministers to ever serve the French monarchy, Louis XVI simply lacked the will to support them against the entrenched opposition that contested their attempts at renewal for France Louis’s first financial adviser, Anne-Robert-Jacques Turgot, had already had substantial experience at the provincial level in France as an economist Turgot’s attempts at reforms almost immediately made enemies among the entrenched interests of France, including the nobility and the bourgeoisie of the provinces In 1776 Turgot went ahead with six edicts to radically modernize both France’s economy and society But he seemed unable to gauge the impact of what he did and brought about negative unintended results Finally, he made the mistake of refusing favors for those in