22 Arab-Israeli War (1973) Organization (PLO) as the sole representative of the Palestinian people It also set the stage for a cycle of violence between Palestinian and Israeli forces that continued into the 21st century Further reading: Dayan, Moshe Story of My Life New York: Morrow, 1976; Ennis, James J., Jr Assault on the Liberty: The True Story of the Israeli Attack on an American Intelligence Ship New York: Random House, 1980; Herzog, Chaim The Arab-Israeli Wars: War and Peace in the Middle East New York: Vintage, 1984; Laqueur, Walter The Road to War: The Origins and Aftermath of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1967– 68 London: Penguin Books, 1969; Neff, Donald Warriors for Jerusalem: The Six Days that Changed the Middle East New York: Linden Press/Simon and Schuster, 1984 Janice J Terry Arab-Israeli War (1973) The 1973 Arab-Israeli War (October 6–26), known as the Yom Kippur War in Israel and the Ramadan War among Arabs, was the fourth major military conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbors During the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, Israel occupied Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian-Palestinian territories; despite international efforts by U.S secretary of state William Rogers and UN special envoy Gunnar Jarring, no peace agreement was reached, and Israel continued to occupy the territories taken in 1967 Although in March 1972 Syrian president Hafez al-Assad publicly expressed his readiness to accept UN Resolution 242 recognizing Israel with the return of all of the Syrian Golan Heights, Israeli policy remained unchanged Syria and Egypt, with the support of Saudi Arabia, therefore decided to initiate a limited war in order to break the political stalemate The Egyptian president, Anwar el-Sadat, was also anxious to relieve domestic discontent and to force the Soviet Union to supply Egypt with more advanced weaponry It appears that Sadat and al-Assad began the secret planning of a joint strategy in 1971 and by the end of the year had reached an agreement on a broad strategy of action In August 1973 the Egyptian chief of staff, Lieutenant General Saad el-Shazly, and his Syrian counterpart, Yusuf Shakkur, formally agreed on two possible dates for the war: September 7–11 or October 5–10 Less than a week later Egypt and Syria agreed on October At the time, in spite of Arab military preparations, Israeli military intelligence did not believe that war was imminent The possibility of Israel’s being taken by surprise was not seriously considered, nor was the thought accepted as valid that Arabs might launch a limited war to force serious political negotiations The Egyptian and Syrian attack on October was therefore an unpleasant and shocking surprise for Israel Hostilities began when the Syrians attacked the Golan Heights and the Egyptian army surprised Israel by crossing the Suez Canal on a pontoon bridge and by breaching the supposedly impregnable Israeli Bar Lev Defense Line in Sinai Syrian armored and infantry divisions stormed the Golan plateau but were stopped several miles from the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias and the River Jordan On October the Israeli defense minister, Moshe Dayan, ordered the deployment of Israeli nuclear weapons, fearing that the “third temple” (the state of Israel) might be in danger His fears proved premature; the Israeli army regained the initiative, and General Ariel Sharon launched a counteroffensive and established a bridgehead on the east bank of the Suez Canal, only 60 miles from Cairo A cease-fire was agreed upon on October 24 The situation was similar in the north, where Syrian advances on the Golan were reversed, and the outskirts of Damascus came into range of Israeli artillery Three major factors enabled the Israeli forces to reverse their initial losses First, once the superior Israeli military forces had been fully mobilized they retook initiatives on both fronts Second, a crucial role was played by an enormous airlift of U.S military supplies The airlift, larger than the Berlin airlift, provided Israel with some 24,000 tons of arms, ammunition, tanks, missiles, and howitzers A third and crucial factor was the differing political and strategic goals of Sadat and al-Assad Sadat had started a limited war to shatter the status quo and pressure the United States to mediate the dispute in order to regain the Sinai Peninsula Assad wanted to retake the entire Golan and put pressure on Israel to give up the occupied Palestinian territories After two days of successful advances, the Egyptian forces were ordered to adopt a defensive stance by Sadat, but, in reaction to Syrian setbacks in the north and the U.S airlift, Egyptian forces reinitiated the attack against Israel on October 14 However, they failed to regain the initiative The Soviet Union was reluctant to become further involved, and U.S secretary of state Henry Kissin ger’s skillful diplomacy resulted in a political gain for