Systems of Violence and their Political Economy in Post-Conflict Situations.DOC

Systems of Violence and their Political Economy in Post-Conflict Situations Nazih Richani Associate Professor Director of Latin American Studies Program Political Science Department Kean Univesity nrichani@kean.edu Work in Progress March 2007 Abstract: Conflict and post-conflict studies have paid inadequate attention to the political economy of crime after the termination of civil wars, and the challenges that this poses to reconstruction efforts Save few exceptions, the literature has largely overlooked the rising socio-economic and political costs of organized criminal violence, and its negative effects on creating conditions for sustainable development The main goal of this paper is to fill an important gap in the literature by undertaking a comparative study of El Salvador’s, Guatemala’s, and Lebanon’s post-conflict experiences It will attempt to answer why, in the post-conflict cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, there was an exponential increase in violence, while Lebanon witnessed a decline in crime compared to the level prior to the civil war This research argues that post-conflict criminal violence in Guatemala and El Salvador is attributed to economic policies that weakened the state’s coercive and distributive capacities, which in turn diminished the opportunity costs of crime This condition was further aggravated by contingencies Whereas, Lebanon’s economic policies and contingencies differed sharply from the other two cases under investigation, which may explain its low crime rates This paper also demonstrates that criminal violence constitutes a serious threat as a return to civil war In fact, in El Salvador and Guatemala, the costs of criminal violence have already exceeded those of their respective civil war Finally, this paper adopts a systemic approach to explain the endurance of crime over time with its proper dynamic and political economy In this regard, one noticeable finding is: homicides rates are inversely proportional to the institutionalization of the system of violence For the most part, researchers in post-conflict studies have focused on two important sets of issues One set is primarily concerned with the conditions under which conflict may resume (Collier &Hoeffler, 2002, 2005; Sambinis & Doyle 2000; 2006) The other sets focus is security reform and policing as means to strengthen public security in societies traumatized by civil wars (Call 2000; Call and Stanley, 2001) Notwithstanding the important contributions of the mentioned literature, valuable questions remain unanswered regarding the causes and permanence of high crime in postconflict countries Questions such as: whether crime is causally linked to the economic policies adopted when civil wars terminate, or if crime is the continuation of the civil war by other means High levels of post-conflict violence are undermining economic growth and threatening the consolidation of democratic processes, both of which are core contributors for successful reconstruction and subsequent political stability It also demonstrates that criminal violence poses at least as serious a threat to development as a return to civil war (See table 2) A broader question asks whether the spike in crime is attributed to similar factors that govern crime in societies that did not witness civil wars This paper attempts to answer the first set of questions and provides insights that could help in answering the second This paper undertakes a comparative analysis of criminal violence in three countries that have experienced civil wars: El Salvador, Guatemala, and Lebanon Following the termination of their civil wars, El Salvador and Guatemala have witnessed unprecedented levels of criminal violence, particularly homicides In 2005, El Salvador recorded a homicide rate of 54.7/100.000 and Guatemala 48.5/100.000 (La Prensagrafica, January 15, 2006; Prensa Libre March 3, 2006); however, in Lebanon the recorded rate of post-civil war crime was as low as 2.2/100.000 in 2004, lower than the crime rate prior to its civil war(Lebanon’s National Police, 2005) All three countries witnessed protracted civil wars lasting until the early to mid 1990s El Salvador’s 12-year-long civil war was brought to a peaceful settlement in 1992; by then, 75,000 deaths were attributed to the combat The Guatemalan conflict continued for 36 years and by the time a peace accord was signed in 1996, roughly 200,000 Guatemalans had been killed Lebanon’s 15-year civil war, which finally ended in 1990, was by far the bloodiest of the three; the conflict claimed 120,000 lives in a country whose population at the start of the war was 2.4 million, less than half the population of El Salvador and less than one-quarter the population of Guatemala Why compare El Salvador, Guatemala and Lebanon? In this paper I follow the two main methods of comparative analysis: the “deep analogy” method as presented by Arend Lijphrat and Arthur Stinchcombe where the researcher chooses a few well matched cases; and the method of disagreement, where extreme cases are presented exhibiting analogous development The latter method is advocated by Adam Przeworski and Henry Teune Each method is supported by John Stuart Mill’s insights on comparative research.1 El Salvador, Guatemala, and Lebanon allow for the application of these two methods El Salvador and Guatemala are good candidates for the “deep analogy” method due to similar historical experiences regarding state formations, level of economic development and the role violence since the 19th century Yet they demonstrate variations in a dependent variable of post-conflict scenarios: crime rates.2 Three independent My choice of the methodology was informed by the work of Fernando Lopez Alves, State Formation in Latin America 1810-1900 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), p.9 Robert Holden, Armies without Nations: Public Violence and State Formation in Central America 18211960 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006) variables are explored in this research: state capacities and opportunity costs of both crime and contingencies Lebanon and Guatemala represent the most different scenarios that allow for the application of the disagreement method El Salvador represents what Fernando LopezAlves called a “nexus case”, falling between the extremes of Lebanon and Guatemala The three countries, however, are classified by UNDP as middle income, and they are ranked respectively according to the human development index: Lebanon 75; El Salvador 104; and Guatemala 120 (Human Development Report 2002) Understanding the dynamics of post-conflict violence and the factors that contribute to it is imperative in creating effective policies to reduce crime and dismantle its tangible and intangible social and economic structures This paper argues that the high indices of crime during post-conflict periods are attributed to the formation of a system of violence, which has its own dynamics and political economy This system is formed when the following three variables intersect: a) Low state capacities, measured in terms of the state’s coercive and distributive functions The coercive capacity is measured against the law enforcement ability of the state The percentage of criminals who remain unpunished is a proxy indicator to measure the efficiency of law enforcement This indicator is complemented with an analysis of the justice system and police/inhabitant ratio The distributive function of the state is measured by the level of the government’s social expenditures, including poverty reduction, education, and health services State capacities in these two areas are fundamental to effective governance Ibid b) Low opportunity costs of crime Alternatives to crime are assessed by evaluating average income obtained from crime versus minimum salary, levels of unemployment, underemployment, and average education levels of the criminal population c) Contingencies Certain contingencies contribute to the formation of a system of violence, such as the repatriation of immigrants and narcotrafficking in El Salvador and Guatemala Alternatively, Lebanon experienced favorable post-civil war conditions that prevented the formation of a system of violence; a sharp decline in its population growth, an influx of investments, and highly skilled migrating labor Hence, when low state capacities and low opportunity costs of crime intersect with contingencies that stress the state, the most likely outcome is a system in which the main interacting units are the specialists of violence (states’ agents, organized crime, political entrepreneurs, and private security) interact, forming a dynamic relationship and a political economy that institutionalizes and perpetuates violence Consequently, this paper defines the system of violence as a pattern of interaction sustained over time (say ten and more years)* and whose constituent units are: states’ agents, organized crime including gangs, political entrepreneurs and private security However, due to the constraints of space, this paper focuses on two actors: state and organized crime and makes reference to private security and political entrepreneurs when deemed necessary This definition is informed by the insights of Robert Jervis, System Effects: Complexity in Political and Social Life (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); and also draws on Nazih Richani, Systems of Violence: The Political Economy of War and Peace in Colombia (Albany: State University of New York, 2002) *The ten years or more figure is not totally arbitrary but is informed by the cases under investigation This paper is divided into five sections The first explores the role of former combatants in the subsequent violence that ensued Each case under investigation is discussed in a separate section (sections 2-4) The final section includes a comparative analysis and preliminary conclusions Post-conflict Violence and Former Combatants The key question addressed in this section is whether criminal violence in El Salvador and Guatemala can be attributed to disgruntled former combatants being recycled into the crime market, and whether the low crime rates in post-conflict can be credited to a successful process of demobilization El Salvador was more successful compared to Lebanon in demobilizing its combatants; however, the crime rate in El Salvador increased, while in Lebanon it decreased This confirms that post-conflict criminal violence corresponds to distinct causes and dynamics that cannot be attributed to former combatants (See following sections) In Guatemala, crime is a more complex phenomenon because it is related to the combination of former (either purged or demobilized) and active members of the state security, together with youth gangs Postconflict violence in Guatemala is characterized by former and current elements of the military protection-racket state In El Salvador, the average age of the criminal population ranges between 15 and 21 years, indicating that they were born between the years of 1977 and 1983, and were not combatants during the civil war (Cruz, 1998) Former members of the insurgency were integrated into a newly formed police force In 1994 and 1996, the number of In El Salvador 20,000 soldiers were demobilized and 10, 490 combatants from the FMLN (7,500 of those chose to engage in agriculture, 1600 chose to start a small business And 699 chose to continue their education See Centro de Estudios Internacionales, Hablan los Desmobilizados de Guerra: Nicaragua, El Salvador and Mozambique (Managua: CEI,1995), p76 homicides spiked, largely attributed to reprisals related to the conflict; however, the violence between 1997 and 2005 was subject to different causalities and dynamics About two third of Lebanon’s 30,000 demobilized fighters were incorporated into the armed forces; the remainder (circa 10,000) joined private security companies, emigrated, or returned to their professions.6 This partial demobilization was not coupled with the removal of light weapons nor was it complete Hezbollah, a military structure with several thousand fighters, deployed along the border with Israel, retained its weapons Nevertheless, the homicide rate in Lebanon (2.2/100,000) is amongst the lowest in the world (Lebanese Police) Former military and ex-Civil Defense Patrullas De Autodefensas Civil (known by the acronym PACs) have become among the main perpetrators of criminal violence in Guatemala during the post-conflict period A number of former generals removed after the failed coup d’etat of 1993 constituted the nucleus of a criminal organization known as GS.7 This group was primarily involved in narcotrafficking and at least five retired military officers were allegedly involved in this group, two of whom played leading roles.8 In fact, in November 2005, the Minister of Defense, General Carlos Aldana Villanueva, and the chief of the antinarcotics division of the police were removed from office because of blatant links between the military and criminal elements, including the construction of a landing strip in an army base financed by organized crime (Prensa Libre, November 21, 2005) A number of combatants were not full timers or if they were, they did for a limited time which allowed to keep their jobs or practice their professions See Elizabeth Picard, Prospects For Lebanon: The Demobilization of the Lebanese Militias (London: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1999), p.29 David Keen, Demobilising Guatemala Working Paper no 37 (London: London School of Economics, 2003), p.16 It is reported that the retired generals Lius Francisco Menaldo and Manuel Callejas are two key figures accused of narcotraffking see Prensa Libre, November 22, 2005 Ibid The insurgent army in Guatemala did not exceed more than 1,500 combatants when the peace agreement was signed Hence, their reintegration into civilian life was relatively seamless, however, the real problem stemmed from an inflated security apparatus that was largely geared toward containing the insurgency For example, the PAC, which was formed between 1978 and 1982 and banned after the accords, had about 900,000 rural men between the ages of fifteen and sixty years (representing nearly 80% of the male rural indigenous population)(Bruneau, 2004:21) When it was dissolved in 1995, about 375,000 were still in the patrols These patrols did not receive any salaries but acquired significant power in their villages, in turn allowing them to improve their social status and material conditions Some of these ex-patrol members may have also been involved in criminal activity (Interviews, Guatemala City, 2005) Demobilization in Guatemala led to links between the military and criminal elements, whereas in El Salvador the successful demobilization of civil war combatants produced a different outcome in terms of criminal violence; alternatively, the partial success of demobilization in Lebanon did not impact crime rates What explains the differences between the outcomes of demobilization in these three countries? In the following sections, I argue that the answer lies in the dynamic interplay of the three variables: the post-conflict states’ capacities, low opportunity costs of crime, and specific contingencies The Paradox of El Salvador Between 2000 and 2004, El Salvador witnessed 10,000 homicides, making it one of the most violent places in the world In the 12 years that followed the 1992 peace accord, an estimated 49,317 individuals were killed, which is equivalent to 2/3 of the 75,000 deaths recorded during its civil war (UNDP, El Salvador, 2005) The main contributors to violence in El Salvador are gangs and narcotraffickers The first part of this section examines the genesis of the gang problem in El Salvador, which in 2004 was responsible for the 60% of the country’s homicides (Ribando, 2005) Gangs Following the peace accord, El Salvador’s economy was transformed into a service economy and largely dependent on the remittances of Salvadorans in the Diaspora In 2004, the remittances reached 16.2% of the GDP.9 Between 1979 and 1991, thousands of Salvadorians left their country, heading mainly to the U.S These numbers convey the scope of the exodus: in 1980, only 94,000 Salvadoran-born people resided in the U.S., by 1984 this number quadrupled to 400,000, and by 2000 the number was 1.2 million or 40% of the population of El Salvador in 1980 (Hayden, 2004: 202) The immigrants were unskilled, mostly peasants, with low levels of education and speaking little, if any, English Naturally, they were at a great disadvantage in the U.S labor market This disadvantage, coupled with the U.S economy’s limited capacity to absorb such a large pool of unskilled labor, particularly for those settling in Los Angeles, led to high levels of unemployment among the Salvadoran immigrants, making them a fertile recruitment pool for the inner city crime economy (Hayden, 2004) In the 1980s hundreds of these immigrants were drawn into the then flourishing gangs such as the 18th street gang ( Hayden 2004; Davis, 1992) http://www.bcr.gob.sv/publicaciones/main_comunicado12005.html The 18th street gang offered protection in tough neighborhoods to some Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants who shared similar backgrounds in terms of class, language and professional skills The new Salvadoran immigrants started calling themselves “la Mara Loca” (the “crazy group”) Mexican immigrants established the 18th street gang in the 1940s and continue to constitute its core Initially, the relationship between the La Mara Loca and the 18th street was good, but the introduction of drug economy stirred their ethnic differences leading to gang warfare in competition for a larger share of the drug market The ramifications of this warfare and the respective narratives that each gang constructed about its identity came to form an integral part of today’s gang violence and dynamics in El Salvador and Guatemala alongside the U.S, Honduras, and Mexico In this process of identity building, la Mara Loca started calling itself Mara Salvatruchas Stoners: Salvatruchas in recognition of their country origins and Stoners since rock music was their favorite beat Later they dropped the Stoners from their name and retained Mara Salvatrucha or MS (Hayden 2004:204) The MS expanded its membership to where the Salvadoran youth lived in Los Angeles, and later on to San Francisco, New York, Long Island, Reno, and Texas, and in most recent times Washington, DC, and Virginia The FBI estimates that the MS has about 10, 000 members in the U.S and is active in smuggling immigrants along the Mexico-U.S border.10 Since the mid 1990s, the MS and the 18 Street gangs have exacerbated the crises of governance in El Salvador and Guatemala, contributing to the formation of the systems of violence in their respective countries 10 Se http://www.pbs.org/newshour/extra/features/july-dec05/gangs_10-05.htmle 10 Guatemala El Salvador Lebanon Social 6.2 (%)of GDP 4.3(%)of 6.2(%)of Spending GDP GDP Public 2.3(1990) 3.6(1990) Na(1990) Health 2.3(2000-2) 3.6 (2000-2) 3.5*(2000-2) Public 1.4 (1990) 1.9(1990) 2.7**(2000Education (2000-2) na 2.9(2000-2) 2) Fertilty 6.2(1970-5) 6.1(1970-5) 4.8(1970-5) Rates 4.2 (2000-5) 2.9(2000-5) 2.3(2000-5) Population 43.6(2003) 34.7(2003) 29.5 (2003) under age 15 Source: (Booth et al 2006); Human Development Report 2002 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002) *Source on the public health and education spending is Human Development Report 2005 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005) **Ibid A final observation is in order Although Lebanon managed to prevent a system of violence in its post-conflict period, it remains to be seen whether violent entrepreneurs would exploit the security vacuum left by the Syria’s forces withdrawal in the early 2005 Particularly, Lebanon’s economy has become stagnant and poverty levels are on the rise Governance and Crime From the six indicators of governance (voices and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption) three are relevant to this paper (Kaufmann & Mastruzzi, 2004; see appendix) These are government effectiveness, regulatory quality and the rule of law The irony is that in the case where the government applied regulatory policies that are not marketfriendly in the areas of trade, banking, price control as Kaufmann and Mastruzzi defined this index, the less crime we have as Lebanon’s case demonstrated, and conversely the lesser regulatory quality as in El Salvador, the more incidence of crime Plausibly, this is because the lesser regulation in times of transition affected the governments’ capacities to deliver public goods, including security In other words, it affected what Kaufmann and Mastruzzi articulated as the “inputs required for governments to produce good policies and deliver public goods” effectively and consequently the rule of law 46 The rule of law index devised by Kaufmann and Mastruzzi as the figure below demonstrates three different tendencies; one is the declining rule of law in Lebanon which I did not find any evidence to support such a claim This can be attributed to the methodology and the sources used by the two authors, whereas, Guatemala is trailing behind El Salvador which this paper concurs, particularly the down turn trend in Guatemala 47 Conclusion This paper argues that the increase in criminal violence is attributed to the formation and subsequent consolidation of a system of violence, which was a result of the interplay between three variables: weak states’ capacities, low opportunity costs of crime and the contingencies of forceful repatriation, and narcotrafficking These three variables were present in El Salvador and Guatemala, and were absent in Lebanon, possibly explaining why Lebanon’s conditions did not allow for the formation of a system of violence One of the main factors that can explain why Lebanon’s system of violence was never formed was that the post-conflict reconstruction followed a Keynesian model, which expanded the role of the state in the economy, which was coupled with an 48 enhancement of its coercive apparatus The policies were implemented at a time when Lebanon did not have to grapple with the decomposition of its rural economy Whereas, El Salvador and Guatemala followed a different path by applying neo-liberal economic reforms; leading to a lessening of the state’s economic, social and coercive roles, and exacerbating the crises of their respective rural economies Before jumping into conclusions and establishing linear causality between the decomposition of the rural economy and the rise of crime it is important to note some nuances Since Guatemala was more dependent on its rural economy, one may expect that its crises would have severe social consequences compared to El Salvador and Lebanon, particularly when these crises interacted with narcotrafficking and the “imports” of gang members But why that was not case? The answer lies in the degree of institutionalization and stability of Guatemala’s system of violence, manifested in the interdependent relationship between organized crime and the state, and the hegemonic control exercised by large narcotrafficking organizations, which unwittingly contributed to lower homicide rates than El Salvador In the latter, the state security apparatus is less penetrated by organized crime and thus far no large criminal organization exercises hegemony over the crime market, as is the case in Guatemala Consequently, El Salvador’s crime market is disputed by various contending forces and this could in part explain the difference between the homicides rates in the two Then, one could plausibly argue that the higher the institutionalization of the system the lesser homicides are expected This finding is worth further exploring in other contexts 49 This paper could not validate two key findings of Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998) One, higher income inequality increases the incidence of crime In this study Guatemala has the highest income distribution gap but not the highest incidence of homicides, but rather El Salvador has higher incidence of crime, followed by Guatemala and Lebanon is a distant third The crime incidence depends on drug activity Again, more narcotrafficking activity occurs in Guatemala, but it does not have the highest incidence of crime El Salvador has less narcotrafficking and more crime followed by Guatemala and then Lebanon In Lebanon, narcotrafficking activity is insignificant compared to the other cases, although in the 1980s Lebanon witnessed an expansion in its opium and hashish production, but these were reduced by the eradication campaigns enforced by the Syrian forces in the Biqa’ valley where the production was concentrated Hashish is still produced for local market consumption but in limited amount, and its distribution networks did not develop into a full scale narcotrafficking organization This paper validates Fajnzylber, Lederman and Loayza (1998) finding that the coercive component per se did not have a significant impact on the incidence of homicides in El Salvador in comparison with Guatemala This latter with smaller police ratio recorded less homicides, keeping in mind that the police force is El Salvador is less corrupt than Guatemala.37 Henceforth, the degree of institutionalization of a system of violence must be considered as an intervening variable that is worth considering when explaining these differences I suspect that with further research a threshold can be established to indicate the different levels of institutionalization of a system of violence In light if this research a plausible spectrum is suggested to range between the rates of 37 This observation is based on my interviews with government officials and experts in Guatemala and El Salvador all of which agree with such view 50 40/100.000 and 50/100.000 homicides This range may indicate that a system is in operation The range also demonstrates the stability and institutionalization process of the system The higher rate, say 50/100.000 and above are indicators of less institutional stability produced by the correlation of forces between state’s agents and organized crime including gangs and the intra rivalry among criminal groups But what about if the homicides rates are at 10/100.000, 20/100.000 or 30/100.000 can we detect a violent system at these levels? Initially a measure of arbitrariness may be tolerated in order to allow more research to establish an inception benchmark of the system, say at 10/100.000, which in turn could also help in furnishing appropriate polices to avert the consolidation of the system Given that states’ coercive capacity has no apparent bearing on crime reduction in El Salvador and Guatemala where the distributive were also curtailed and considering that Lebanon’s enhanced its coercive alongside increasing its public spending, then it is plausible to infer that this latter may have more weight in crime reduction than coercion Lebanon’s case lends support to the notion that the state’s coercion is more effective when the opportunity costs are raised by the social policies of the state, particularly those that affect employment and underemployment This finding is consistent with the recommendations of “policies of social inclusion” advanced by Collier and Hoeffler (2002) which they thought are suitable to avoid the recurrence of civil wars These same policies may also help in preventing the emergence of systems of criminal violence, or the continuation of civil wars by criminal means Finally, a question is in order: Did the experiences of civil wars and their aftermath have any bearing on the homicide rates in Guatemala and El Salvador? 51 This paper’s findings suggest that crime depends on the socio-economic policies that states apply in the post conflict period, which could weaken their capacities to contend with contingencies and lower the opportunity costs of crime And if these same economic policies were to be applied by states with similar capacities to El Salvador and Guatemala and have to contend with unfavorable contingencies the most likely outcome is a system of violence Case in point is Honduras which has sustained rates of homicides as high as those of El Salvador over the last decade Bibliography Ardon, Roberto (2005) President of the Chamber of Commercial, Agricultural, Industrial and Financial institutions, Interview with author Guatemala City, May Arlachi, P (1988) The Mafia Business Oxford: Oxford University Press Becker, Gary S (1968) “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach.” Journal of Political Economy 76: 169-217 Berry, B (1973) The Human Consequences of Urbanization New York: Free press Bergali R and Summer, C (eds.) 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Villanueva, and the chief of the antinarcotics division of the police were removed from office because of blatant links between the military and criminal elements, including the construction of a landing... consolidation of the system of violence could generate authoritarian civilian strands under the pretext of fighting crime and maintaining order and security Finally, this system of violence has... the production and distribution of crack They also maintained their communication with gang leaders in Los Angeles and elsewhere in the U.S Beginning in 2005, the Department of Homeland Security