Developing a dialectical understanding of generalization an unfinalized dialogue between vygotsky and davydov

Chapter Developing a Dialectical Understanding of Generalization: An Unfinalized Dialogue Between Vygotsky and Davydov Manolis Dafermos Introduction The issue of generalization was an object of intensive, ongoing discussions at different stages in the history of philosophy (see, for example, the dispute between Plato and Aristotle on the existence of forms, the debate between realism and nominalism on universals, the long-standing conflict between empiricism and rationalism on the origin of knowledge, and the discussion on analytic/synthetic distinction) The issue of generalization arose in the period of the emancipation of psychology from philosophy in the context of the endeavor to establish psychology as a strict natural science in accordance with the pattern of Newtonian physics Even nowadays, psychology pretends to become a discipline able to find some universal laws of mental life and human behavior Discovering and justifying laws and law-like generalizations stem from the striving to establish psychology as a natural, “nomothetic” discipline Danziger (2009) labeled the search for universals as the “Holy Grail” in psychology Despite the claim to produce generally accepted and universal knowledge, in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, psychology was trapped in a deep crisis Various attempts at conceptualization and explanation of the crisis in psychology emerged (Willy 1897, 1899; Bühler 1927; Lewin 1931; Driesch 1925; Vygotsky 1997a) The crisis and fragmentation of psychology undermined the claim to establish universal generalizations and raised difficult questions: how is the establishment of psychology as a scientific discipline possible? What kind of generalization can be employed for building a psychological theory? The problem of generalization in quantitative research is examined as “a numerical problem, which is to be solved by statistical means” (Flick 2007: 118) M Dafermos (*) Department of Psychology, University of Crete, Rethymnon, Greece e-mail: mdafermo@uoc.gr © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2019 C Højholt, E Schraube (eds.), Subjectivity and Knowledge, Theory and History in the Human and Social Sciences, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-29977-4_4 mdafermo@uoc.gr 61 62 M Dafermos Generalization in psychology is examined mainly in terms of formal logic Operationalism promoted further the technical apparatus of formal logic in relation to measurement in psychology in its quest for universality This type of generalization produced on the basis of statistical means has been criticized for formalism that leads “to an epistemological misunderstanding, as far as the nonreflexive researchers forget that any inference—whether inductive, deductive or abductive—is context and content dependent” (Tateo 2015: 60) In comparison with the dominant nomothetic approach to explaining human behavior, an idiographic approach is formed as a way of understanding unique individuals in particular contexts Nomothetic-idiographic perspectives reflect and elaborate further the ongoing controversy between the general and the particular in the study of mental life and human behavior In contrast to widespread methodological dualism between idiographic and nomothetic approaches, dialectics focuses on the close interconnection between the general and the particular From a dialectical perspective, the knowledge spiral includes the double movement of thinking from the particular to the general and from the general to the particular (Blakeley 1964; Vygotsky 1987) The issue of generalization and the relation between general and particular are complex theoretical and methodological problems connected with the examination of a set of other issues such as inductive and deductive reasoning, the relation between the concrete and the abstract, the analysis–synthesis process, and the interaction between everyday and scientific concepts In contrast to the abstract and formalistic conceptualization of generalization that has become widespread in mainstream positivist-oriented psychology, the adherents of the dialectical tradition in philosophy and psychology advocate that the general is internally bound up with the particular The concept of the concrete universal developed within the dialectical tradition is especially important in order to go beyond the rigid particular/general dichotomy Due to the hostility to dialectics in Anglo-American and continental philosophy of science in the twentieth century (see Popper 1940), dialectical thinking remains “terra incognita” in North Atlantic academia The present work is an attempt to fill the gap in understanding of dialectics by conceptualizing the issue of generalization from a dialectical perspective More concretely, the chapter explores how generalization has been conceptualized in Vygotsky’s work The chapter also discusses the contribution of Vasily Davydov (1930–1998), an eminent psychologist in Vygotsky’s footsteps who investigated theoretical generalization Vygotsky’s and Davydov’s ideas on generalization were formed within the dialectical tradition in the field of psychology Bringing into dialogue Vygotsky’s and Davydov’s dialectical insights can enrich the contemporary discussion on formal and situated generalization mdafermo@uoc.gr Developing a Dialectical Understanding of Generalization: An Unfinalized Dialogue… 63 Exploring Generalization as an Act of Human Consciousness Vygotsky’s project has rightly been characterized as “the first attempt in psychology and education to apply the principles of Marxist dialectics in developing theory of human development and learning” (Stetsenko 2010: 70) Materialist dialectics was employed by Vygotsky as a way to overcome the crisis in psychology that was internally connected with the dominant conceptualization of generalization in the domain of psychology For Vygotsky, the crisis in psychology is related to the tendency of the main trends in the field of psychology toward generalization The representatives of various trends of psychology such as Gestalt, psychoanalysis, and reflexology go beyond their boundaries and transfer their concepts to adjacent fields Particular concepts, ideas, or discoveries from the particular fields and subdisciplines of psychology tend to become universal postulates for the explanation of the totality of psychological phenomena Vygotsky focused his attention on the tendency for the extrapolation of particular ideas beyond the proper boundaries into the broader realm of knowledge This tendency demonstrates the real need to develop a kind of generalization in the domain of psychology and the failure of the current approaches to offer a solution to this problem Vygotsky found a link between the tendency toward unification and generalization in a discipline Moreover, the failure to solve the problem of unification and generalization is examined by Vygotsky as an objective and necessary illusion, instead of attributing it to the personal mistake of the scientists involved The failure to solve the problem of unification and generalization through the extrapolation of concepts and ideas beyond their boundaries is similar to the transcendental illusions of pure Reason that were analyzed by Kant Transcendental illusions inevitably emerge when Reason attempts to apply concepts beyond all possible experience Vygotsky discussed critically Neokantian conceptualization of psychology He agreed with Binswanger’s idea that general science is “a theory of ultimate foundation, of the general principles and problems of a given area of knowledge” (Vygotsky 1997a: 247) from special disciplines (sub-disciplines) However, he challenged Binswanger’s examination of general science as a part of the logic that studies various logical forms in different disciplines More generally, Vygotsky called into question Kantian and Neokantian “critique of psychology” and any kind of a priori formalistic construction of a system of concepts of scientific knowledge: “We proceed by induction-we generalize enormous groups of facts, compare them, analyze and create new abstractions” (Vygotsky 1997a: 252) However, for Vygotsky, scientific research is not reduced to a simple observation and description of empirical data Scientific knowledge goes beyond the boundaries of sensuous experience Scientific work “isolates, analyzes, separates, abstracts a single feature” (Vygotsky 1997a: 274) In the first stages of their development, concrete disciplines move from the sensuous concrete to the abstract by using methods such as the analysis of phenomena into their elements and inductive generalization The absolutization of the movement from the sensuous concrete to the abstract leads to the “cult of empiricism” in mdafermo@uoc.gr 64 M Dafermos mainstream North American psychology (Toulmin and Leary 1985) The attempt to avoid philosophical theory and the concomitant faith in empirical data and the “facts” themselves is one of the expressions of the “cult of empiricism.” As part of the movement of thinking from the sensuous concrete to the abstract in the domain of psychology a set of quantitative procedures and technical tools has been employed as a means to establish universality of psychological knowledge Vygotsky found not only the Kantian a priori construction of a system of scientific concepts problematic but also the empiricist account of science as a linear accumulation of pure empirical facts Vygotsky accepted Goethe’s idea that every fact becomes fact within a particular theory: “Everything described as a fact is already a theory” (Vygotsky 1997a: 249) The strict opposition between the description of facts and the articulation of theoretical concepts reproduces a dualism in the process of knowledge construction More generally, Vygotsky challenged the reproduction of an unbridgeable gap between concepts and objects as well as the separation of the conceptual system of psychology from its historical development as a discipline Moreover, in contrast to the examination of methodology as a homogeneous corpus of technical instruments, Vygotsky stated that there is not a general methodology of psychology, but a struggle between “deeply hostile, mutually exclusive, methodological principles” (Vygotsky 1997a: 261) For Vygotsky, a general theory or a general methodology cannot be established through an eclectic combination of elements from different theories and methodologies Challenging eclecticism, Vygotsky proposed the development of “the dialectic of psychology – this is what we may now call the general psychology” (Vygotsky 1997a: 256) The need for the re-foundation of psychology as a discipline stems first and foremost from the societal practice Bridging the gap between theory and societal practice is one of the most important challenges from the perspective of dialectics “The dialectic unity of methodology and practice” (Vygotsky 1997a: 310) was presented by Vygotsky as a way to develop a new conceptualization of generalization Developing a monistic, dialectic system of psychological concepts on the basis of new societal and professional practice was crucial for Vygotsky It was argued that a system of concepts of psychology should be built, as Marx established the system of concepts of political economy “Psychology is in need of its own Das Kapital” (Vygotsky 1997a: 330) But for building the system of concepts of psychology, it is necessary to find its “cell,” its starting point In contrast to analysis into elements, Vygotsky proposed promoting an analysis into units that reveals the smallest part of a complex whole with all its essential properties The unit of analysis serves as a starting point for the theoretical reconstruction of a complex whole as a developing process Vygotsky’s idea on “cell” and “units of analysis” constitutes an important contribution to the understanding of generalization in the domain of psychology The “cell” and “units of analysis” fit the investigation of self-organizing, changing, developing systems, rather than mechanical systems Vygotsky employed these concepts in order to develop a dialectical, holistic, historical approach to consciousness (Dafermos 2018) In his manuscript “The historical sense of psychological crisis,” Vygotsky supposed that “the mechanism of reaction” (Vygotsky 1997a: 320) is the “cell” of psychology as a science In the subsequent stages of his creative development, mdafermo@uoc.gr Developing a Dialectical Understanding of Generalization: An Unfinalized Dialogue… 65 Vygotsky proposed other definitions of the “unit of analysis” (or “cell”) (Vygotsky 1987: 46), “instrumental act” (Vygotsky 1997b), “meaning” (Vygotsky 1987: 244), “perezhivanie”1 (Vygotsky 1994) It seems that Vygotsky was not satisfied by his own proposals of the “cell’” and “units of analysis” (Veresov 1999; Dafermos 2014) The issue of theoretical generalization was posed by Vygotsky, but it remained unsolved Generalization was examined by Vygotsky in the context of his investigation of concept formation by using the method of double stimulation2 from a developmental perspective Vygotsky distinguished different types of generalization in the process of concept development During the syncretic stage, children collect objects together in accordance with their subjective impressions, without understanding the objective relations between the objects themselves Complexive thinking was examined by Vygotsky as a crucial stage of concept development Children become able to define both subjective and objective connections that actually exist among the objects that are involved in a practical operation “The complexcollection is a generalization based on their co-participation in a single practical operation, a generalization of things based on their functional collaboration” (Vygotsky 1987: 139) Conceptual thinking is based on the ability to generalize on the basis of essential relations between objects It consists of the development of an ability to reveal the complex hierarchical relations between things, the relations between the general and the particular: “the process of concept formation came to be understood as a complex process involving the movement of thinking through the pyramid of concepts, a process involving constant movement from the general to the particular and from the particular to the general” (Vygotsky 1987: 162) For Vygotsky, concept development is connected with the formation of the child’s ability to generalize The development of generalization is internally connected with the transition from the sensuous concrete to abstract thinking in the process of resolving concrete problems The main limitation of Vygotsky’s investigation of concept formation on the basis of the method of double stimulation was connected with his focus on artificial concepts and the lack of attention on the word meaning From the investigation of artificial concepts on the basis of the method of double stimulation, Vygotsky moved toward an inquiry into real-life concepts Vygotsky investigated the interconnection between everyday and scientific concepts on the basis of a critical reflection of Piaget’s theory of cognitive development The Russian word “perezhivanie” refers to living through experience and working through it The concept of perezhivanie was used by Vygotsky as a part of the system of concepts of cultural-historical theory This concept expresses the dialectical, dynamic relation between personality, and the social environment which is part and parcel of personality development (Dafermos 2018) “In an emotional experience [perezhivanie] we are always dealing with an indivisible unity of personal characteristics and situational characteristics, which are represented in the emotional experience [perezhivanie]” (Vygotsky 1994: 342) L. Sakharov and L. Vygotsky developed the method of double stimulation for the study of the development of higher functions with the help of two types of stimuli: simple stimuli that cause a direct response and auxiliary means that help the subject to organize his behavior (Vygotsky 1987; Zavershneva and Van der Veer 2018) mdafermo@uoc.gr 66 M Dafermos Everyday concepts are acquired by children in their everyday life, while scientific concepts are formed in the context of the systematic school instruction Everyday concepts develop from “bottom to top,” from everyday experience to generalizations, while scientific concepts from “top to bottom,” from verbal explanations to children’s everyday experience “Concepts are distributed between poles ranging from an immediate, sensual, graphic grasping of the object to the ultimate generalization (i.e., the most abstract concept)” (Vygotsky 1987: 226) Concept development was examined by Vygotsky as a transition from a concrete, immediate sensory grasp of an object to the abstract thinking based on maximally generalized conceptualization Braun (1991) notes that Vygotsky associated the concrete thought with factually based mental complexes and the abstract thought with the articulation of logical concepts The identification of the concrete with sensuous perception and the abstract with a maximally generalized conceptualization in Vygotsky’s writings demonstrates that despite Vygotsky’s attempt to develop a dialectical account of human development, he could not avoid the influence of the Lockean empiricist tradition on his research on concept development At the last stage of the elaboration of his book Thinking and Speech Vygotsky took an important step toward overcoming the intellectualistic understanding of concept formation For Vygotsky, thinking as a higher mental function reflects reality “in a generalized way” (Vygotsky 1997a: 48–49) For Vygotsky, every word contains a kind of generalization The generalized function of a word is connected with its meaning “From a psychological perspective, word meaning is first and foremost a generalization” (Vygotsky 1997a: 47) Meaning was examined by Vygotsky as a unit of analysis of consciousness The elaboration of the concept of unit of analysis can be examined as an attempt to go beyond empirical, inductive generalization and develop a theoretical generalization Empirical generalization is a kind of inference based on identifying external similarities between different properties or parts of an object For example, a phenotypical, formal analysis of the external characteristics of the whale leads to the conclusion that it is a fish A theoretical generalization is an act of thinking that reflects the internal relations of an object as a whole, its dynamics of development Based on a theoretical generalization, comparative and evolutionary biology offers evidence that the whale is a marine mammal Vygotsky’s understanding of the word as a kind of generalization was formed under the influence of his reading of Lenin’s Philosophical Notebook Lenin articulated the idea that “every word already universalizes” (Zavershneva and Van der Veer 2018: 136) According to Vygotsky, Lenin examined the rational core of idealism which connected the freedom that every concept offers “In the simplest generalization, in the most elementary general idea, there is a certain bit of fantasy = freedom In the concept, there is freedom” (Zavershneva and Van der Veer 2018: 134) This bit of fantasy offers the freedom from the thing The danger of idealism consists in turning concepts into isolated, separated beings The dialectical understanding of generalization reflects the twofold movement of thinking “toward the real thing and away from it” (Zavershneva and Van der Veer 2018: 134) mdafermo@uoc.gr Developing a Dialectical Understanding of Generalization: An Unfinalized Dialogue… 67 Generalization as a product of this twofold movement of thinking develops in the process of social communication, rather than an individual mind Vygotsky established an internal connection between generalization as function of thinking and communication: “generalization becomes possible only with the development of social interaction” (Vygotsky 1997a: 48) Vygotsky’s idea of the unity between thinking and communication is linked with his project on the investigation of consciousness The interconnection between thinking and communication is reflected in the etymology of the word “consciousness” that originates from the Latin ‘conscius’ (con- ‘together’ + scientia- ‘to know’) The very term “consciousness” refers to the process of sharing knowledge jointly knowing: Etymologically, of course, the term ‘consciousness’ is a knowledge word This is evidenced by the Latin form, -sci-, in the middle of the word But what are we to make of the prefix con- that precedes it? Look at the usage in Roman Law, and the answer will be easy enough Two or more agents who act jointly—having formed a common intention, framed a shared plan, and concerted their actions – are as a result conscientes They act as they knowing one another’s plans: they are jointly knowing (Toulmin 1982: 64) Due to his early death, Vygotsky’s project on the investigation of consciousness remained unfinalized However, several of Vygotsky’s ideas, developed in the last phase of his life, still retain their importance for the examination of the issue of generalization It is worth noting that for Vygotsky, thinking and generalization as its essential function is a social process, rather than an individual or purely cognitive process From a cultural-historical perspective, thinking can be examined as a sign-mediating joint action From this perspective, generalization is a reflective, sense making, intersubjective act of human consciousness, rather than a purely cognitive process based on formalist procedures In separation from a sense-making process of human consciousness in a concrete sociohistorical and scientific context, any kind of generalization can lose its meaning Based on an analysis of Vygotsky’s “Psychology of Art,” Valsiner (2015) argues that Vygotsky developed an affective generalization in the form of feelings More concretely, Vygotsky employed the concept of short circuit (korotkoe zamykanie) that emerges as a result of the clash and destruction of tension between opposite emotions In other words, generalization as a form of dialectical synthesis can be achieved not only on a cognitive level but also in the form of feelings and, more generally, as an act of human consciousness A Search for Theoretical Generalization The issue of generalization arose in the context of discussions on activity theory and its relation to Vygotsky’s cultural-historical theory One of the most important contributions to the investigation of the issue of generalization was associated with the eminent adherent of activity theory, Vasily Davydov He was involved in a debate about the possibilities of the creation of a system of psychological concepts on the basis of the concept of activity mdafermo@uoc.gr 68 M Dafermos Calling into question Vygotskian conceptualization of generalization, Davydov developed his own understanding of generalization under the influence of discussions on dialectics of Marx’s “Das Kapital” in the 1950s to early 1960s in the USSR. A rich and multifaceted tradition of the study of the concepts and laws of dialectics was formed in that context (Ilyenkov 1960; Vaziulin 1985, 2002; Dafermos 2003; Levant and Oittinen 2014) On the basis of a reflection on Hegel’s Logic and Marx’s “Das Kapital,” Ilyenkov (2009) offered a critique of Locke’s empiricist tradition in philosophy and concrete disciplines and their understanding of the universal in terms of sameness, a common characteristic of a group of phenomena In the empiricist tradition, universal is examined as a property abstracted, isolated from the concrete phenomena In contrast to the concept of abstract universal, Ilyenkov proposed the concept of the concrete universal as the substance, or the genetic root of a concrete whole For Ilyenkov, Marx’s concept of value in Das Kapital serves as a form of a concrete universal (Ilyenkov 1960) Challenging the examination of generalization from the perspective of formal logic, Davydov proposed that dialectical logic can offer a new understanding of theoretical generalization Under the influence of Ilyenkov’s account of dialectical logic, Davydov advocated that the method of the ascent from the abstract to the concrete can be employed for the construction of a system of psychological concepts For Davydov, the concept of activity serves as a concrete universal, the “germ cell” for building a monistic psychological theory Davydov proposed the elaboration of the concept of theoretical generalization He criticized the dominance of a narrow empiricism in school education and educational psychology In accordance with the dominant, empiricist type of conceptualization, generalization is a process of finding some similar (or common) qualities, stable characteristics in a class of objects Generalization is based on the transition from the empirical description to making comparison between the qualities of an object (or a class of objects) Moreover, by using the operation of abstracting, some common elements or qualities are defined Following the nominalist tradition, empirical generalization deals with observable, individual objects, their comparison, and the process of abstracting of their common properties on the basis of formal logic According to Davydov (1990, 1996), the dominant understanding of generalization in psychology and didactics originates from formal logic The formation of concepts takes place through finding similarities and differences in observable, individual objects In other words, empirical generalization is internally linked with the movement of thinking from the concrete sensory to the abstract The general is defined in formal logic as something important and essential that emerges as a result of the isolation from the non-essential, the particular General and particular, essential and non-essential are presented as mutually exclusive concepts In other words, the dialectical, historical relationship between the general and the particular is lost The lack of a dialectical understanding of the relation between the general and the particular is reflected in the realism vs nominalism debate The representatives of nominalism argue that the properties and relations of objects are particular, not universal Denying the existence of universals, nominalist tradition mdafermo@uoc.gr Developing a Dialectical Understanding of Generalization: An Unfinalized Dialogue… 69 leads to the reproduction of dualism between general/universal concepts and particular facts Particular facts are examined as singular and divorced from any general concepts, while general, universal concepts are presented as formal and abstract Davydov demonstrated the limitations of formal logical understanding of generalization For Davydov, formal logic and mathematical logic cannot serve as a main criterion of truth, because they are “isolated from the concrete elaboration of empirical material” (Davydov 1988: 174) It was argued that the truly concrete universal is distinct from both the formal general and sensible concrete Davydov argued that Vygotsky did not offer a well-defined criterion for the distinction between spontaneous (everyday) and scientific concepts: “the determining difference between everyday concepts and scientific ones was found, not in their objective content, but in the method and ways of mastery (‘personal experience … the process of instruction’)” (Davydov 1990: 88) For Davydov, the criteria between spontaneous (everyday) and scientific concepts lie in the distinction between empirical and theoretical types of knowledge Spontaneous (everyday) concepts are based on observation and categorization of the external properties of a concrete object, while scientific concepts represent its essential, internal relations Theoretical generalization of the internal relation of an object was examined by Davydov as a result of a deduction, a movement of thinking from the general to the particular, from the internal to the external It was argued that the educational process should be oriented on the formation of contentful generalizations that reproduce the concrete universal properties of things This kind of contentful, theoretical generalization develops from the basis of special activities replicating the concrete object as a whole, rather than as a sum of elements (Davydov 1988) Theoretical thinking was considered by Davydov as a purposeful activity oriented to the reflection of essential relationships and transforming the material reality The deep knowledge of the internal societal contradictions offers the opportunity to promote transformative action Davydov’s conceptualization of theoretical generalization has been criticized from various perspectives (Engeström 2015; Koshmanova 2007; Nissen 2012; Hedegaard and Chaiklin 2005) For Koshmanova (2007: 84), Davydov’s conceptualization of theoretical generalization “might lead to the formation of formalistic knowledge.” Similarly, Nissen (2012) notes that Davydov’s “theoretical concepts” are not dialectically connected with empirical concepts, and they shape scholastic knowledge Engeström (2015) argues that Davydov’s argumentation tends to reproduce a dichotomic way of thinking From my perspective, because of his strong criticism of empiricism, Davydov was led straight to the other extremity, the absolutization of theoretical thinking and the devaluation of empirical thinking First, it is significant to note that sensuous experience is not identical with empiricism Second, the understanding of the relation between theoretical and empirical thinking in Davydov’s theory of generalization is found problematic: “Empirical thinking and theoretical thinking are presented as mutually exclusive alternatives Their mutual dependency and mutual penetration are temporarily set aside” (Engeström 2015: 196) The exclusive emphasis on theoretical generalization is a problematic approach because it does not consider the complexity of the educational process mdafermo@uoc.gr 70 M Dafermos There is a certain danger of transforming deductive teaching into students’ memorization of concepts, which might lead to the formation of formalistic knowledge This approach works only for intellectually homogeneous groups of students who have a positive motivation to learn and are ready to grasp complex theoretical knowledge My experience has shown that students who not have a great interest in learning a subject are not able to study theoretical concepts (Koshmanova 2007: 84–85) Koshmanova (2007) argues that theoretical generalization should be combined with inductive generalization However, the following questions can be raised: How is it possible to combine empirical and theoretical thinking, empirical and theoretical generalization? Usually, the very idea of the combination between empirical and theoretical thinking stems from their examination as isolated processes The strong opposition between empirical and theoretical thinking as well as the gap between particular and general seems to be questionable More specifically, it can be argued that there are two different approaches to the relation between empirical and theoretical thinking within the dialectical tradition The representatives of the first approach focus almost exclusively on the development of theoretical thinking (Davydov 1996) The representatives of the second approach propose to go beyond the absolute distinction between theoretical and empirical thinking and concepts (Nissen 2012) From the perspective of the second approach, the general is internally bound up with the particular In the same direction, it can be argued that empirical and theoretical thinking internally connects moments of the knowledge spiral (Vaziulin 1985) Moreover, the question of the relation between the general and particular, between empirical and theoretical thinking, is not merely cognitive or epistemological but also social and practical In particular, it is important to address some fundamental questions: What is the purpose of the combination of empirical and theoretical thinking? What type of problems can we attempt to solve by using empirical and theoretical generalization and in which context? Promoting a Dialogue on Dialectical Understanding of Generalization From the previous analysis, we see that both Lev Vygotsky and Vasily Davydov attempted to overcome the crisis of traditional psychology based on formal generalizations and develop a dialectical account of human development in its complexity They were inspired by dialectics as a way of thinking and attempted to build a monistic theory in the domain of psychology Developing a monistic account of human development was a way to go beyond Cartesian dualism that still dominates psychology Moreover, in the quest for a “dialectical synthesis,” both Vygotsky and Davydov posed the problem of the concrete universal in the field of psychology, but they resolved it in different ways There are essential differences between Vygotsky and Davydov in understanding of the relation between empirical and theoretical generalization as well as the interaction between everyday and scientific concepts mdafermo@uoc.gr Developing a Dialectical Understanding of Generalization: An Unfinalized Dialogue… 71 They were involved in the search for the theoretical generalization that can become the fundament of the construction of a new psychological theory Both Vygotsky and Davydov articulated this crucial question, but they attempted to solve it in different ways In contrast to the dominant tendency in psychology for a reductionist analysis into elements, Vygotsky proposed “units of analysis.” He was looking for a way of investigating the complex configuration of human subjectivity For Davydov, the concept of activity can serve as the “germ cell” for the building of a system of psychological concepts Vygotsky’s search for “units of analysis” and Davydov’s emphasis on theoretical generalization can be examined as different ways of formulating the problem of concrete universal in the field of psychology Inspired by Davydov’s concept of generalization, Tolman argue that “…the crisis in general psychology is such that it can only be resolved by resorting to an alternate form of generalization that leads to concrete theoretical knowledge rather than abstract generalities” (Tolman 1989: 207) This type of universality that became the dominant way of thinking in psychology was labeled by Hegel as “abstract”: The activity of the understanding consists generally in the bestowing of the form of universality on its content; and the universal posited by the understanding is, of course, an abstract one, which is held onto in firm opposition to the particular (Hegel 1991: 126) Hegel’s conceptualization of generalization is based on the distinction between Understanding (Verstand) and Reason (Vernunft) Understanding applies a set of concepts and procedures to empirical data in order to produce generalized knowledge Understanding as a way of thinking moves away from sensuous perception to the abstract through an analysis based on the separation of various aspects of its object The concepts formed through Understanding are static, inert and unchanging For Hegel, Understanding is not able to go beyond abstract generalization of phenomena based on the separation of the universal from the particular Understanding cannot grasp and conceptually reflect the internal relations of a concrete object, its movement and change (Vaziulin 1985; Pavlidis 2010) At the level of Understanding, the general and the particular are considered as isolated and alienated each from other (the general as negation of the particular and the particular as a negation of the general) Offering an abstract, formal generalization, Understanding as a way of thinking is unable to grasp the complex configuration between various sides and determinations of an object It is important to clarify that according to Hegel, a reflection on universals is crucial for philosophical thinking: “Philosophy is in the region of thought, and has therefore to deal with universals” (Hegel 1892: 24) However, developing a strong criticism of abstract generalization, Hegel proposed the concept of the concrete universal as “a unity of distinct determinations” (Hegel 1991: 71) The concrete universal can be considered as a totality of the essential relations between particularities (Baumann 2011) Ilyenkov (1960) argued that the concrete universal is the “cell” of all particular phenomena From this perspective, the concrete universal incorporates into itself the richness of particularities, but it is not reduced to them or to their sum mdafermo@uoc.gr 72 M Dafermos We ought to take into account a contradiction in Hegel’s understanding of the concrete universal In contrast to dogmatism of the metaphysics of Understanding that “consists in its adherence to one-sided thought determinations in their isolation” (Hegel 1991: 70), Hegel advocated dialectical Reason (Vernunft) that reflects a concrete universal as a totality of multiple determinations From this perspective, the universal is contained within its particular manifestations At the same time, subsuming the particular under the universal, Hegel treats an object in general (its logic in general), rather than the peculiar logic of a peculiar object as Marx proposed Instead, Marx proposed that the main task consists “in grasping the specific logic of the specific subject” (Marx 1975: 91) Inspired largely by Hegel, Marx developed a further dialectical method for the theoretical reconstruction of the capitalist mode of production as a living, organic, developing whole through the creation of a system of interrelated categories As I have already mentioned, Vygotsky’s and Davydov’s views on generalization were developed in the context of an extensive discussion on dialectical methodology in Marx’s “Das Kapital” in the USSR From a dialectical perspective, the concept of concrete universal is crucial for the investigation of complex organic systems that could not be sufficiently explained by employing reductionist, atomistic models based on abstract and formal generalizations Vygotsky developed the concept of “units of analysis” as a part of his project of the investigation of consciousness Davydov developed the concept of theoretical generalization in the context of his attempt to establish an interdisciplinary activity theory Despite the essential differences in the subject matter and the research focus between Vygotsky and Davydov, both thinkers shared some important common orientations Both Vygotsky and Davydov attempted to investigate human subjectivity as a complex phenomenon that it is impossible to grasp by employing abstract and formal generalizations of empiricist psychology Both of them were against the “cult of empiricism” in psychology Vygotsky was aware of the limitations of narrow empiricism, but for him inductive generalization cannot be expelled from psychology For Vygotsky (1987), inductive generalization is employed inevitably in the concrete stages of cognitive development (e.g., thinking in complexes) Vygotsky (1987) focused on the double movement of thinking from the general to the particular and from the particular to the general in the process of concept formation Davydov (1988) emphasized exclusively on the movement of thinking from the general to the particular in the practice of teaching However, the dialectics of the knowledge process can be lost as a result of the underestimation of the opposite side, the movement of thinking from the particular to the general In this regard, it is worth mentioning Oscar Wilde statement that “It is only shallow people who not judge by appearances.” Although I am firmly convinced that Davydov was very far from being a shallow person, I think that the depreciation of the movement of thinking from the appearance to the essence3 is a weak point in his There is a fundamental difference between essentialism and the dialectical conceptualization of the relation between essence and phenomena Essentialism is a metaphysical conceptualization of generalization based on the examination of specific properties of an object as stable, universal, and mdafermo@uoc.gr Developing a Dialectical Understanding of Generalization: An Unfinalized Dialogue… 73 theory of generalization The movement of thinking from the appearance to the essence as well as from the particular to the general is dialectically connected with the movement from the essence to the appearance and from the general to the particular The indifference to particularities and the lack of understanding of the dialectical interconnection between the particular and the general leads inevitably to the transformation of theoretical generalization into a new abstract, formal universal For Davydov, the learning activity of children can be built only on the basis of theoretical generalization Hence, a question may arise: Is it fruitful to reduce the learning process to the replacement of everyday concepts by the scientific concepts based on theoretical generalization? From my perspective, ignoring subjectivity and the active agency of participants of the learning process, the idea of the replacement of everyday concepts with the scientific concepts is linear and one-dimensional It is more constructive to examine the learning process in terms of a dialectical transformation of both everyday and scientific concepts rather than as the replacement of the former by the latter It is important to take into account that the question of the interaction between everyday concepts and scientific concepts is not a purely cognitive or epistemological question but also a practical issue Both Vygotsky and Davydov advocated that teaching/learning can promote children’s mental development Vygotsky’s concept of Zone of Proximal Development was an attempt to respond to the question of what kind of teaching/learning can promote development Davydov’s theory of developmental education marks a slightly different route to solve the same crucial problem Theoretical and practical questions raised by Vygotsky and Davydov remain reasonably discussable Hedegaard and Chaiklin (2005) argue that Vygotsky’s investigation of everyday and scientific concepts is insufficient, because “it does not have an analysis of the relation of knowledge to children’s societal lives, and his analysis of the relation between forms of practice and forms of knowledge was not sufficiently explicit” (Hedegaard and Chaiklin 2005: 34) From a radical-local point of view, Hedegaard and Chaiklin expand dialogue on the relation between everyday and scientific concepts by proposing its examination in the context of the living conditions of children and the real problems that they face in their everyday life In fact, in order to overcome the cognitivist framework of the examination of the relation between everyday and scientific concepts, it is important to focus on participation in society’s existing and potential economic, political, and cultural practices not dependent on the concrete context From a dialectical perspective, essence is examined as a system of contradictory, dynamic, historical relations of a concrete, developing object, rather than an abstract, formal set of deconceptualized attributes Moving from a purely descriptive, empirical study of phenomena to investigate their internal essence was a crucial issue for Vygotsky “In theory, the internal essence of things and the external form of their manifestation not coincide “If the form of manifestation and the essence of things coincided directly, then all science would be superfluous”” (Vygotsky 1998: 188–189) mdafermo@uoc.gr 74 M Dafermos Advancing Dialogue on Generalization and Its Relation to Changing Societal Practice Addressing the issue of the contribution of different forms of practice (in home, school, community, work, etc.) to concept formation, the theory of situated learning promises a broader perspective for research of generalization The community of practice framework has been proposed by the adherents of situated learning as a way to go beyond the abstract and decontextualized models of generating by focusing on the subjective and intersubjective dimensions of human life (Rogoff and Lave 1984; Henning 2004) Situated learning became one the most important ways to fill a real gap in understanding the relation between everyday and scientific concepts and offer a contextual, relational, and intersubjective understanding of learning The question arises whether the knowledge that has been acquired in everyday situations in particular contexts and domains can be generalized It is important also to clarify what kind of generalization it is and how it is associated with other forms of generalization The issue of the relation between formal and situated generalization provokes tension and controversy Nemirovsky argues that “adherents of the situated cognition perspective are at ease with the pervasive evidence that local circumstances, ongoing goals, and tools at hand, shape human thinking and action, while, on the other hand, generalizing and abstraction appear difficult to account for” (Nemirovsky 2002: 234) Calling into question formal generalization, the situated cognition perspective brings to light the complexity of cognition and learning in particular domains and contexts Clancey argues that “the theory of situated learning claims that every idea and human action is a generalization, adapted to the ongoing environment” (1995: 49) The particularistic emphasis implicit in the theory of situated learning is an understandable reaction against universalism of cognitivism (Bredo 1997) The focus on situated cognition has been developed—to a significant extent— under the influence of the postmodern criticism of the modern pursuit of universality that “leads to the repression of particularity” (Susen 2015: 46) Particularism as a way of thinking is close to the postmodern glorification of difference and diversity However, the postmodern celebration of particularity and differences risks asserting them as a new “universal” (or an “new absolute”) It is easy to jump from one extreme to another and difficult to grasp the dialectical interconnection between the general and the particular The reduction of the general to the particular is no less one-dimensional than the Hegelian approach to subsume the particular under the universal More generally, I argue that universalism and particularism mutually reinforce each other, and they can be examined as two sides of the same coin From my perspective, the creative potential of the concrete, situated ways of knowing can be tapped only in its dialectical interconnection with the general forms of cognition in terms of a dialectical synthesis The dialectical way of thinking offers the opportunity to go beyond the tension between empirical and abstract generalization and highlight the spiral-like mdafermo@uoc.gr Developing a Dialectical Understanding of Generalization: An Unfinalized Dialogue… 75 development of knowledge that includes both the movements of thinking from the concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete (Vaziulin 1985) By employing this dialectical, double movement of thinking (the movements of thinking from the sensuous concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete), the subjects become aware of the complexity of the real world and are actively involved in societal practice From a dialectical perspective, generalization emerges as a creative, reflective act (see Tateo 2013) with a complex configuration Revealing the shortcomings of abstract, formal generalization that remains dominant in positivist-oriented psychology, both Vygotsky and Davydov proposed to develop a dialectical approach to generalization The disagreements between them on the ways of the development of a dialectical approach to generalization demonstrate the complexity of this issue and the real need to examine it concretely and historically The relation between the general and the particular is not static, but it changes dynamically in the process of the historical development of society and science The dialectical way of thinking brings to light the historicity of the concepts “general” and “particular” and the transformations of their interrelations (included their meanings) in the social history and the history of science Moreover, the dialectical way of thinking offers the opportunity to address the issue of generalization not only on the domain of actually existing societal forms, but also anticipate potential future societal development The understanding of the dynamic, historical relation between the general and the particular as well as the spiral-like development of knowledge as a contradictory unity of both movements of thinking from the sensuous concrete to the abstract and from the abstract to the concrete are essential in order to develop a dialectical grasp of the relationship between theory and societal 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Promoting a? ?Dialogue on? ?Dialectical Understanding of? ?Generalization From the previous analysis, we see that both Lev Vygotsky and Vasily Davydov attempted