CHƯƠNG 5 KẾT LUẬN
5.3. Hướng phát triển đề tài
Dữ liệu thu thập về sở hữu nhà đầu tư tổ chức nước ngồi cịn hạn chế. Trong tương lai, các ài nghiên cứu có khoảng thời gian dài hơn sẽ có kết quả khách quan hơn trong việc tìm hiểu mối quan hệ giữa sở hữu tổ chức nước ngồi và hiệu quả hoạt động cơng ty. Đồng thời các nghiên cứu khác trong tương lai có thể tìm hiểu thêm các yếu tố như hình thức sở hữu khác của các công ty niêm yết bao gồm sở hữu nhà nước, sở hữu tổ chức trong nước.., đặc trưng ngành và mở rộng xem xét các cơng ty thuộc sở hữu gia đình hay khơng thuộc sở hữu gia đình hay hoạt động có liên quan đến ngân hàng hay không liên quan ngân hàng để xét rõ mối quan hệ giữa cơ cấu tổ chức và hiệu quả hoạt động trên thị trường.
TÀI LIỆU THAM KHẢO Danh mục tài liệu bằng tiếng Việt
1. Nguyễn Thị Minh Huệ và Đặng Tùng Lâm, 2017. Tác động của cấu trúc sở hữu
đến hiệu quả hoạt động của các cơng ty niêm yết trên sàn chứng khốn Việt Nam.
Tạp chí khoa học Đại học quốc gia Hà Nội, kinh tế và kinh doanh, tập 31, số 1 (2017) 23-33.
2. Trần Ngọc Thơ và các đồng nghiệp, 2012. Giáo trình tài chính doanh nghiệp.
Đại học Kinh tế Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh.
3. Võ Xuân Vinh, 2013. Sở hữu nước ngoài, hiệu quả hoạt động, và giá trị doanh nghiệp – nghiên cứu các công ty trên thị trường chứng khoán Việt Nam. Đại học
Kinh tế Thành phố Hồ Chí Minh.
Danh mục tài liệu tiếng Anh
1. Arellano, M., Bond, S., 1991. Some tests of specification for panel data: monte
Carlo evidence and an application to employment equations. Rev. Econ. Stud. 58,
277–297.
2. Arellano, M., Bover, O., 1995. Another look at the instrumental variables estimation of error components models. J. Econom. 68, 29–51.
3. Babu, M.S., Prabheesh, K.P., 2008. Causal relationships between foreign institutional investments and stock returns in India. Int. J. Trade Glob. Mark. 1 (3),
259–265.
4. Baek, J.S., Kang, J.K., Park, K.S., 2004. Corporate governance and firm value:
evidence from the korean financial crisis. J. Financial Econ. 71, 265–313.
5. Bai, C., Liu, Q., Lu, J., Song, F.M., Zhang, J., 2004. Corporate governance and market valuation in China. J. Comp. Econ. 32, 599–616.
6. Barney, J.B., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. J.
Manage. 17 (1), 99–120.
7. Becker, B.J., Irani, A., 2010. Do corporate governance attributes affect adverse
selection costs? Rev. Quant. finance accounting 10 (3), 281–296.
9. Berle, A., Means, G., 1932. The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
Harcourt, Brace and World Publication, New York.
10. Bertrand, M., Mehta, P., Mullainathan, S., 2002. Ferreting out tunnelling: an application to Indian business groups. Q. J. Econ. 117, 121–148.
11. Bhattacharya, P., Graham, M., 2009. On institutional ownership and firm performance: a disaggregated view. J. Multinational Financial Manage. 19 (5),
370–394.
12. Blundell, R.W., Bond, S.R., 1998. Initial conditions and moment restrictions in
dynamic panel data models. J. Econom. 87, 115–143.
13. Botosan, C., 1997. Disclosure level and the cost of equity capital. Accounting
Rev. 80, 21–53.
14. Branas, P., Bucheli, M., García, T., 2011. Dynamic Panel Data: A Useful Technique in Experiments, Retrieved
fromhttps://ideas. repec. org/p/gra/wpaper/10-22. html.
15. Chaganti, R., Damanpour, F., 1991. Institutional ownership, capital structure and firm performance. Strategic Manage. J. 12, 479–491.
16. Chakrabarti, R., 2002. FII flows to India: nature and causes. Money Finance 2 (7), 61–81.
profitability in Korea. Corporate Gov. Int. Rev. 15 (2), 239–250.
18. Cho, M.H., 1998. Ownership structure, investment, and the corporate value: an
Empirical analysis. J. Financial Econ. 47 (1), 103–121.
19. Chung, K.H., Pruitt, S.W., 1994. A simple approximation of Tobin’s Q.
Financial Manage. 23, 70–74.
20. Cincera, M., 2003. Financing constraints, fixed capital and R&D investment decisions of Belgian firms. In: Butzen, P., Fuss, C. (Eds.), Firms’ Investment and Finance Decisions: Theory and Empirical Methodology. Edward Elgar,
Cheltenham UK, pp. 129–147.
21. Claessens, S., Djankov, S., 1999. Ownership concentration and corporate performance in the Czech Republic. J. Comp. Econ. 27 (3), 498–513.
23. Cornett, M.M., Markus, A.J., Saunders, A., Tehranian, H. (2005). Earnings management, corporate governance and true financial performance, online at
http://papers.ssrn.com.
24. Cuervo-Cazurra, A., Dau, L., 2009. Structural reform and firm profitability in
developing countries. Acad. Manage. J. 52 (6), 1348–1368.
25. Dahlquist, M., Robertsson, G., 2001. Direct foreign ownership, institutional investors and firm characteristics. J. Financial Econ. 59, 413–440.
26. Demsetz, H., 1983. The structure of ownership and the theory of the firm. J. Law Econ. 26, 375–390.
27. Demsetz, H., Lehn, K., 1985. The structure of corporate ownership: causes and
consequences. J. Political Econ. 93, 1155–1177.
performance. J. Corporate Finance 7, 209–233.
29. Dharwadkar, R., George, G., Brandes, P., 2000. Privatization in emerging economies: an agency theory perspective. Acad. Manage. Rev. 25 (2), 650–669.
30. Douma, S., George, R., Kabir, R., 2006. Foreign and domestic ownership, business groups, and firm performance: evidence from a large emerging market.
Strategic Manage. J. 27, 637–657.
31. Duggal, R., Millar, J.A., 1999. Institutional ownership and firm performance: the case of bidder return. J. Corporate Finance 5, 103–117.
32. Eisenhardt, K.M., 1989. Agency theory: an assessment and review. Acad.
Manage. Rev. 14, 57–74.
33. Fama, E.F., Jensen, M.C., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. J. Law Econ. 26, 301–325.
34. Ferreira, M.A., Massimo, M., Matos, P., 2010. Dividend Clienteles Around the
World: Evidence from Institutional Holdings. Marshall School of Business
Working Paper No FBE 2010 35–09.
35. Ganguli, S.K., Agrawal, S., 2009. Ownership structure and firm performance: an empirical study on listed mid-cap indian companies. Icfai J. Appl. Finance 15
(2), 37–52.
36. Hansen, L.P., 1982. Large sample properties of generalized method of moments
estimators. Econometrica 50 (4), 1029–1054.
37. Hausman, J.A., 1978. Specification tests in econometrics. Econometrica 46 (6), 1251–1271.
incentives on firm performance. Financial Manage. 20 (winter), 101–112.
39. Hillman, A.J., Dalziel, T., 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Acad. Manage. Rev. 28,
383–396
40. Hoskisson, R.E., Eden, L., Lau, C.M., Wright, M., 2000. Strategy in emerging economies. Acad. Manage. J. 43, 249–267.
41. Jensen, M.C., Meckling, W.H., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior:
agency costs and ownership structure. J. Financial Econ. 3, 305–360.
42. Johnson, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2000. Tunneling. Am. Econ. Rev. Pap. Proc. 90, 22–27.
43. Kaplan, S.N., Zingales, L., 1997. Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful measures of financing constraints? Q. J. Econ. 112 (1), 169–216.
44. Karpoff, M. Jonathan, Malatesta, P.H., Walking, R.A., 1996. Corporate governance and shareholder initiatives: empirical evidence. J. Financial Econ. 42
(3), 365–395.
45. Khanna, T., Rivkin, J.W., 2001. Estimating the performance effects of business
groups in emerging markets. Strategic Manage. J. 22, 45–74.
46. Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 1999. Emerging Market Business Groups, Foreign Investors and Corporate Governance. NBER Working Paper No. W6955.
47. Khanna, T., Palepu, K., 2000a. Business groups, foreign intermediaries, and corporate governance. In: Morck, R.K. (Ed.), Concentrated Corporate Ownership.
University of Chicago Press., pp. 265–292.
markets? An analysis of diversified Indian business groups. J. Finance 55, 867–
891.
49. Lins, K.V., 2003. Equity ownership and firm value in emerging markets. J. Financial Quant. Anal. 38, 159–184.
50. Loderer, C., Martin, K., 1997. Executive stock ownership and performance. J.
Financial Econ. 45, 223–255.
51. Lowenstein, L., 1991. Why managers should (and should not) have respect for
their shareholders. J. Corporation 17, 1–27.
52. Lynall, M.D., Golden, B.R., Hillman, A.J., 2003. Board composition from adolescence to maturity: a multitheoreticview. Acad. Manage. Rev. 28, 416–431.
53. McConaughy, D., Walker, M., Henderson, G., Mishra, C., 1998. Founding family controlled firms: efficiency and value. Rev. Financial Econ. 7 (1), 1–19.
54. McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. J. Financial Econ. 27, 595–612.
55. Mileva, E., 2007. Using Arellano -Bond Dynamic Panel GMM Estimators in Stata. Economics Department Fordham University.
56. Mishra, C.S., Randoy, T., Jenssen, J.I., 2001. The effect of founding family influence on firm value and corporate governance. J. Int. Financial Manage.
Accounting 12 (3), 235–259.
57. Mitton, T., 2002. A cross-firm analysis of the impact of corporate governance on the East Asian financial crisis. J. Financial Econ. 64 (2), 215–241.
58. Morck, R., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1988. Management ownership and market
59. Mukherjee, P., Bose, S., Coondoo, D., 2002. Foreign institutional investment in
the indian equity market: an analysis of daily flows during january 1999-may 2002. Money Finance 2 (9–10), 21–47.
60. Mukhopadhyay, J và Chakraborty, I Foreign institutional investment, business
groups and firm performance: Evidence from India.Research in International
Business and Finace (39) (2017) 454-465.
61. North, D.C., 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, New York.
62. Oliver, C., 1997. Sustainable competitive advantage: combining institutional and resource-based views. Strategic Manage. J. 18, 697–713.
63. Orr, R.J., Scott, W.R., 2008. Institutional exceptions on global projects: a process model. J. Int. Bus. Stud. 39, 562–588.
64. Sarkar, J., Sarkar, S., 2000. Large shareholder activism in corporate governance in developing countries: evidence from India. Int. Rev. Finance 1 (3),
161–194.
65. Schmalensee, R., 1985. Do markets differ much? Am. Econ. Rev. 75 (3), 341– 351.
66. Seifert, B., Gonenc, H., Wright, J., 2005. The international evidence on performance and equity ownership by insiders, blockholders, and institutions. J.
Multinational Financial Manage. 15, 171–191.
67. Shleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. J.
Political Econ. 94, 461–488.
52 (2), 737–783.
69. Skousen, J., Simmons, J., McDonald, L.M., Ziemkiewicz, P., 2002. Acid–base
accounting to predict post-mining drainage quality on surface mines. J. Environ.
Qual. 31 (6), 2034–2044.
70. Staiger, D., Stock, J.H., 1997. Instrumental variables regression with weakinstruments. Econometrica 65 (3), 557–586.
71. Stock, J.H., Yogo, M., 2005. Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression. In: Andrews, D.W.K., Stock, J.H. (Eds.), Identification and Inference
for Econometric Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp. 80–108
72. Van Witteloostuijn, A., Boone, C., 2006. A resource-based theory of market structure and organizational form. Acad. Manage. Rev. 31 (2), 409–426.
73. Wintoki, M.B., James, S., Linck, J.S., Netter, J.M., 2012. Endogeneity and the
dynamics of internal corporate governance. J. Financial Econ. 105 (3), 581–606.
74. Mukhopadhyay, J và Chakraborty, I Foreign institutional investment, business
groups and firm performance: Evidence from India.Research in International
Business and Finace (39) (2017) 454-465.
Nguồn dữ liệu:
Nguồn dữ liệu được thu thập từ các website tài chính, chi tiết như sau: www.cafef.vn
www.cophieu68.com www.vietstock.vn
PHỤ LỤC Bảng 4.1. Thống kê mô tả
TOBINQ ROA FII SIZE AGE LEV OWNC CASHF CAPEX
Mean 1.080219 5.857787 12.1174 13.49101 26.39579 0.522457 15.21703 0.096708 0.012373 Median 0.956055 4.730795 5.37 13.47298 24 0.545576 6.1 0.082274 0.004073 Maximum 22.72462 41.02475 83.88 19.01097 71 1.900619 97.11 1.35687 0.657316 Minimum 0.185568 -65.7038 0 9.21104 1 0.005593 0 -0.9462 -5.38344 Std. Dev. 0.798565 7.308196 14.69004 1.389064 13.82065 0.230044 18.73245 0.109471 0.1776 Skewness 16.42879 -0.6745 1.455882 0.327284 0.504588 0.080482 1.372302 2.144541 -19.0102 Kurtosis 395.5152 15.04581 4.481068 3.811044 2.485494 3.559174 4.049885 35.979 567.3995 Jarque-Bera 9832492 9311.141 676.3336 68.84111 81.31986 21.45785 547.2501 70093.41 20279518 Probability 0 0 0 0 0 0.000022 0 0 0 Sum 1643.013 8909.694 18430.56 20519.83 40148 794.6571 23145.1 147.093 18.81899 Sum Sq. Dev. 969.3131 81182.79 328011.8 2932.836 290335.7 80.43893 533375.2 18.21544 47.94336 Observations 1521 1521 1521 1521 1521 1521 1521 1521 1521 Bảng 4.2. Ma trận tương quan CAPEX 0.0950 0.1723 0.0800 0.0739 -0.0080 0.0023 -0.0215 0.0726 1.0000 CASHF 0.4532 0.4802 0.0355 0.2760 -0.0160 -0.2966 -0.1045 1.0000 OWNC -0.0397 -0.0573 0.0294 0.1000 -0.1751 0.0260 1.0000 LEV -0.1214 -0.3576 -0.1706 0.0795 0.1534 1.0000 AGE -0.0242 0.0043 -0.0724 -0.0072 1.0000 SIZE 0.4469 0.3613 0.2101 1.0000 FII 0.1018 0.1872 1.0000 ROA 0.3294 1.0000 TOBINQ 1.0000 TOBINQ ROA FII SIZE AGE LEV OWNC CASHF CAPEX (obs=1,521)
. correlate TOBINQ ROA FII SIZE AGE LEV OWNC CASHF CAPEX . gen FIIG= FII*GROUP
Bảng 4.3. Kiểm định đa cộng tuyến
Bảng 4.4. Kết quả hồi quy theo phương pháp 2SLS
Hồi quy 2SLS khơng có biến giả
Mơ hình 1: Biến phụ thuộc Tobin Q
Mean VIF 1.13 CAPEX 1.01 0.985599 AGE 1.06 0.942451 OWNC 1.06 0.939425 FII 1.10 0.905963 SIZE 1.21 0.825251 LEV 1.21 0.824988 CASHF 1.26 0.795527 Variable VIF 1/VIF . vif _cons -1.807889 .1725212 -10.48 0.000 -2.146295 -1.469483 CAPEX .1941554 .0957831 2.03 0.043 .0062737 .3820371 CASHF 2.423034 .172964 14.01 0.000 2.083759 2.762308 OWNC -.0017715 .0009302 -1.90 0.057 -.0035961 .000053 LEV -.1648499 .0808251 -2.04 0.042 -.3233909 -.0063088 AGE -.0009071 .0012587 -0.72 0.471 -.0033761 .0015619 SIZE .2065348 .0133834 15.43 0.000 .1802829 .2327868 FII .0001686 .0012078 0.14 0.889 -.0022006 .0025378 TOBINQ Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval] Total 969.313067 1,520 .637705965 Root MSE = .65842 Adj R-squared = 0.3202 Residual 655.911457 1,513 .433517156 R-squared = 0.3233 Model 313.40161 7 44.7716586 Prob > F = 0.0000 F(7, 1513) = 103.28 Source SS df MS Number of obs = 1,521 . reg TOBINQ FII SIZE AGE LEV OWNC CASHF CAPEX
r(199);
command et is unrecognized . et sto A
Instruments: SIZE AGE LEV OWNC CASHF CAPEX DIV RM
Instrumented: FII
rho .44990266 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .59444192 sigma_u .53758722 _cons -1.747741 .3583665 -4.88 0.000 -2.450126 -1.045356 CAPEX .0248034 .1477813 0.17 0.867 -.2648426 .3144494 CASHF .733412 .2308519 3.18 0.001 .2809506 1.185873 OWNC -.0018096 .0014053 -1.29 0.198 -.0045638 .0009447 LEV -.0384607 .1911909 -0.20 0.841 -.413188 .3362665 AGE .0003939 .0033503 0.12 0.906 -.0061726 .0069604 SIZE .1584688 .0478745 3.31 0.001 .0646365 .2523011 FII .0541415 .024058 2.25 0.024 .0069887 .1012944 TOBINQ Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Wald chi2(7) = 239.42 overall = 0.0614 max = 9 between = 0.0637 avg = 9.0 within = 0.0817 min = 9 R-sq: Obs per group:
Group variable: M Number of groups = 169 G2SLS random-effects IV regression Number of obs = 1,521
Mơ hình 2: Biến phụ thuộc ROA
Hồi quy 2SLS có biến giả FIIG và GROUPD
Mơ hình 3: Biến phụ thuộc Tobin Q
Instruments: SIZE AGE LEV OWNC CASHF CAPEX DIV RM
Instrumented: FII
rho .64236533 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e 5.4886015 sigma_u 7.3558513 _cons -21.35344 3.352639 -6.37 0.000 -27.92449 -14.78239 CAPEX 2.126956 1.323933 1.61 0.108 -.4679041 4.721817 CASHF 10.71934 2.172782 4.93 0.000 6.460761 14.97791 OWNC -.0085498 .0129788 -0.66 0.510 -.0339879 .0168882 LEV -1.429197 1.604197 -0.89 0.373 -4.573365 1.71497 AGE .0011948 .0384369 0.03 0.975 -.07414 .0765297 SIZE 1.339199 .4147569 3.23 0.001 .5262908 2.152108 FII .7366568 .2188317 3.37 0.001 .3077545 1.165559 ROA Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Wald chi2(7) = 376.72 overall = 0.0885 max = 9 between = 0.0573 avg = 9.0 within = 0.2361 min = 9 R-sq: Obs per group:
Group variable: M Number of groups = 169 G2SLS random-effects IV regression Number of obs = 1,521
Instruments: SIZE AGE LEV OWNC CASHF CAPEX GROUP FIIG DIV RM
Instrumented: FII
rho .28487003 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e .5997606 sigma_u .37853743 _cons -1.731038 .356663 -4.85 0.000 -2.430084 -1.031991 FIIG -.0488436 .0249648 -1.96 0.050 -.0977736 .0000864 GROUP .5186145 .2936545 1.77 0.077 -.0569377 1.094167 CAPEX -.0217732 .1745675 -0.12 0.901 -.3639193 .3203729 CASHF 1.440801 .3045255 4.73 0.000 .8439422 2.03766 OWNC -.0026465 .001566 -1.69 0.091 -.0057158 .0004229 LEV .190274 .2767456 0.69 0.492 -.3521374 .7326854 AGE .000777 .0030074 0.26 0.796 -.0051174 .0066714 SIZE .1307014 .0590205 2.21 0.027 .0150233 .2463794 FII .0686601 .0324839 2.11 0.035 .0049927 .1323274 TOBINQ Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Wald chi2(9) = 216.51 overall = 0.0563 max = 9 between = 0.0663 avg = 9.0 within = 0.0555 min = 9 R-sq: Obs per group:
Group variable: M Number of groups = 169 G2SLS random-effects IV regression Number of obs = 1,521
Mơ hình 4: Biến phụ thuộc ROA
Các kiểm định thống kê
Kiểm định mơ hình 1: Biến phụ thuộc Tobin Q
Kiểm định Cragg-Donal F
Instruments: SIZE AGE LEV OWNC CASHF CAPEX GROUP FIIG DIV RM
Instrumented: FII
rho .66973017 (fraction of variance due to u_i)
sigma_e 5.5426928 sigma_u 7.8928943 _cons -23.06319 3.085981 -7.47 0.000 -29.1116 -17.01478 FIIG -.2931797 .1629666 -1.80 0.072 -.6125883 .026229 GROUP 2.455584 1.853031 1.33 0.185 -1.176291 6.087459 CAPEX 2.007028 1.395238 1.44 0.150 -.7275872 4.741644 CASHF 11.81436 2.135956 5.53 0.000 7.627968 16.00076 OWNC -.0106157 .0134244 -0.79 0.429 -.036927 .0156957 LEV -.7793633 1.740375 -0.45 0.654 -4.190435 2.631708 AGE -.0073062 .0405078 -0.18 0.857 -.0867001 .0720876 SIZE 1.407914 .4106007 3.43 0.001 .6031509 2.212676 FII .7993894 .2586332 3.09 0.002 .2924776 1.306301 ROA Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval] corr(u_i, X) = 0 (assumed) Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 Wald chi2(9) = 386.96 overall = 0.0804 max = 9 between = 0.0512 avg = 9.0 within = 0.2166 min = 9 R-sq: Obs per group:
Group variable: M Number of groups = 169 G2SLS random-effects IV regression Number of obs = 1,521
Source: Stock-Yogo (2005). Reproduced by permission.
25% maximal IV size 7.25 20% maximal IV size 8.75 15% maximal IV size 11.59 10% maximal IV size 19.93 Stock-Yogo weak ID test critical values for K1=1 and L1=2: