0521895073 cambridge university press personality identity and character explorations in moral psychology jun 2009

This page intentionally left blank Personality, Identity, and Character Moral notions are foundational questions that have commanded deep reflection since antiquity, reflection that psychological science cannot evade, because the moral formation of children is a central concern of parents, schools, and communities charged with educating the next generation In this respect there are few domains of study more crucial than moral psychology, and few topics of greater importance than the development of moral self-identity, of moral character, and of the moral personality Heretofore, the fragmented research on moral personality has been mostly a study of cognition without desires, rationality without brains, agents without contexts, selves without culture, traits without persons, persons without attachments, dispositions without development This edited volume features the expertise of preeminent scholars in moral personality, self, and identity, such as moral philosophers, personality theorists, developmental psychologists, moral personality researchers, social psychologists, and neuroscientists It brings together cutting-edge work in moral psychology that illustrates an impressive diversity of theoretical perspectives and methodologies, and simultaneously points the way toward promising integrative possibilities Darcia Narvaez is an Associate Professor in Psychology, specializing in moral development and character education, at the University of Notre Dame and directs the university’s Collaborative for Ethical Education She is coeditor of The Handbook on Moral and Character Education (with Larry Nucci), Moral Development in the Professions: Psychology and Applied Ethics (with James Rest), and coauthor or coeditor of the award-winning books Postconventional Moral Thinking: A NeoKohlbergian Approach (with James Rest, Muriel Bebeau, and Stephen Thoma) and Moral Development, Self, and Identity (with Daniel Lapsley) Narvaez was the leader of the design team for the Minnesota Community Voices and Character Education Project She currently serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Educational Psychology and the Journal of Moral Education Daniel K Lapsley is the ACE Collegiate Professor of Psychology and Chair of the Department of Psychology at the University of Notre Dame He is the author or editor of seven books, including Moral Psychology, and of numerous articles and chapters on various topics in child and adolescent development – ­particularly in the areas of social cognition, personality development, moral psychology, and moral education He is coeditor of the award-winning book Moral Development, Self, and Identity (with Darcia Narvaez) He currently serves on the editorial boards of the Journal of Educational Psychology and the Journal of Early Adolescence For our parents, M axine, Richard, C orrin e, Thomas Personality, Identity, and Character Explorations in Moral Psychology Edited by Darcia Narvaez University of Notre Dame Daniel K Lapsley University of Notre Dame CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521895071 © Cambridge University Press 2009 This publication is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press First published in print format 2009 ISBN-13 978-0-511-59542-4 eBook (EBL) ISBN-13 978-0-521-89507-1 Hardback ISBN-13 978-0-521-71927-8 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate Information regarding prices, travel timetables, and other factual information given in this work are correct at the time of first printing, but Cambridge University Press does not guarantee the accuracy of such information thereafter C onte nts Contributors page vii Introduction 1 The Moral Personality 11 Dan P McAdams The Moral Functioning of the Person as a Whole: On Moral Psychology and Personality Science 30 Daniel Cervone and Ritu Tripathi Moral Science? Still Metaphysical After All These Years 52 Owen Flanagan Cultural Pluralism and Moral Identity 79 David B Wong Neuroscience and Morality: Moral Judgments, Sentiments, and Values 106 Jorge Moll, Ricardo de Oliveira-Souza, and Roland Zahn Triune Ethics Theory and Moral Personality 136 Darcia Narvaez Early Foundations: Conscience and the Development of Moral Character 159 Ross A Thompson The Development of the Moral Personality 185 Daniel K Lapsley and Patrick L Hill v vi Contents Urban Neighborhoods as Contexts for Moral Identity Development 214 Daniel Hart and M Kyle Matsuba 10 Moral Personality Exemplified 232 Lawrence J Walker and Jeremy A Frimer 11 Greatest of the Virtues? Gratitude and the Grateful Personality 256 Robert A Emmons 12 The Elusive Altruist: The Psychological Study of the Altruistic Personality 271 Gustavo Carlo, Lisa M PytlikZillig, Scott C Roesch, and Richard A Dienstbier 13 Growing Toward Care: A Narrative Approach to Prosocial Moral Identity and Generativity of Personality in Emerging Adulthood 295 Michael W Pratt, Mary Louise Arnold, and Heather Lawford 14 Moral Identity, Integrity, and Personal Responsibility 316 Barry R Schlenker, Marisa L Miller, and Ryan M Johnson 15 The Dynamic Moral Self: A Social Psychological Perspective 341 Bent Monin and Alexander H Jordan 16 The Double-Edged Sword of a Moral State of Mind 355 Linda J Skitka and G Scott Morgan 17 Moral Identity in Business Situations: A Social-Cognitive Framework for Understanding Moral Functioning 375 Karl Aquino and Dan Freeman 18 The Moral Functioning of Mature Adults and the Possibility of Fair Moral Reasoning 396 Augusto Blasi 19 Moral Personality: Themes, Questions, Futures 441 Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K Lapsley Author Index 449 Subject Index 451 C ontribu tor s karl aquino University of British Columbia jeremy a frimer University of British Columbia mary louise arnold Ontario Institute for Studies in   Education daniel hart Rutgers University augusto blasi University of Massachusetts, Boston gustavo carlo University of Nebraska–Lincoln daniel cervone University of Illinois at Chicago ricardo de oliveira-souza LABS-D’Or Hospital Network and  Gaffree e Guinle University Hospital, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil richard a dienstbier University of Nebraska–Lincoln robert a emmons University of California, Davis owen flanagan Duke University dan freeman University of Delaware patrick l hill University of Notre Dame ryan m johnson University of Florida alexander h jordan Stanford University daniel k lapsley University of Notre Dame heather lawford Concordia University m kyle matsuba University of Missouri–   St Louis dan p mcadams Northwestern University marisa l miller U.S Army Research Institute,   Fort Benning, Georgia v ii v iii jorge moll LABS-D’Or Hospital Network,   Rio de Janeiro, Brazil bent monin Stanford University g scott morgan University of Illinois at Chicago darcia narvaez University of Notre Dame michael w pratt Wilfrid Laurier University lisa m pytlikzillig University of Nebraska–Lincoln scott c roesch University of Nebraska–Lincoln Contributors barry r schlenker University of Florida linda j skitka University of Illinois at Chicago ross a thompson University of California, Davis ritu tripathi University of Illinois at Chicago lawrence j walker University of British Columbia david b wong Duke University roland zahn The University of Manchester 442 Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K Lapsley appreciation of perspectives, an awareness of behavioral norms, a sense of obligation, duty, and conscience that imbue the personality with its moral qualities Much of this was missed, or dismissed, when developmental ­science was preoccupied with reasoning and dilemma solving But developmental research across a wide front of topics illustrates just how richly moral is the fabric of early childhood The third theme is that the study of moral personality development requires a more expansive view of the moral domain For example, the vast literatures on temperament, attachment, the development of self-regulation and of event representations – to name four examples – are now revealing how these acquisitions have implications for moral and prosocial functioning Research on trait dispositions have charted long-term relationships with numerous outcome variables, but often those that reflect adaptation in the breech – with conduct problems or psychopathology, or with broad indices of adaptation, are only rarely linked with distinctly prosocial outcomes The fourth theme is that context and culture matter in any account of moral personality The display of dispositional tendencies is moderated by environmental contexts, from childrearing practices to neighborhood effects to work setting demands The dispositional view of traits as if-then contingencies is a useful heuristic for conceptualizing the dynamic transaction between personal and contextual variables, and calls as much attention to the structure of settings and situations for influencing moral behavior as to the structure of personality What’s more, the present volume highlights broader cultural factors, too, as crucial for understanding moral personalities Moralities are part of cultures, and cultures provide different narrative options for making sense of our moral vision, and for framing our moral conversations Questions Of course, a volume that is intended to serve as a seedbed of ideas for an emergent, interdisciplinary field of study cannot wrap things up too neatly Progressive research programs anticipate novel facts, and generate new hypotheses and questions And certainly the present volume raises ­questions One question concerns just what neuroscience and evolutionary perspectives will tell us about moral personality Neuroscience and evolutionary psychology are themselves “young and provisional” sciences, and much of the extant research has focused on localizing brain regions during moral decision-making tasks using exotic moral dilemmas The chapters by Moll and his colleagues, and by Narvaez, point us in promising directions insofar as they alert the field to how deeply integrative are our cognitive Moral Personality 443 and emotional moral response systems, and how varied moral responses are linked to evolved structures of the brain A second question concerns how to think about the defining attributes of moral identity Is moral identity a matter of the self-importance of moral commitments? Does it mean that morality is central, essential, and important to self-understanding? Or does it mean that such notions are chronically accessible? A related question concerns the role of self-consistency as a motivational force for moral action Some theorists in the present volume endorse such a view, but others wonder if self-consistency is empirically credible or is strictly necessary Several authors point out the shifting nature of moral identities in their studies Others postulate multiple identities that vary by context This raises several questions How inclusive is the notion of moral identity? Do only some people have moral identities, based on the centrality of moral concerns to the self? Exemplar research supports such a view when it finds differences in moral concerns between exemplars and controls But the research on adult moral functioning in social psychology experiments is shaking up the standard account of moral identity Although the standard account is deontological, the adult studies suggest that individuals are situational utilitarians, modifying their behavior according to a balance sheet or according to what is morally mandated by their convictions in the moment These findings raise many questions: How stable is a moral identity? Does it shift, as some find, based on priming or other conditions? How many identities does a person have? Or, does moral identity involve a broader swath of what a good life entails, incorporating notions of purity or ingroup security? Does everyone have a moral identity, or only one that varies based on context or “ideo-affective posture” (Tomkins, 1965)? Related to the question of defining features is the question of whether moral identity invariably cashes out in ways that “pay off ” – that is, are adaptive, salutary, morally praiseworthy, and the like Most researchers agree that a committed moral identity provides one a schematic way of appraising the interpersonal landscape Yet we have seen evidence in this volume that morally committed ways of viewing the world can harden into ideology, be a double-edged sword, or be trumped by situational variables That the work of moral identity interacts with situational variables is not itself a theoretical embarrassment of any kind Indeed, it is expected, given the orienting frameworks noted earlier Yet it does invite reflection as to when one should be credited with having a moral identity, in what areas of one’s life, and under what conditions A further question concerns whether it makes sense to study particular virtues in isolation Kohlberg’s research team focused on justice as a kind of 444 Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K Lapsley master virtue, so there is certainly precedent for investigating how particular dispositions – gratitude, say, or altruism – play out in the moral life of persons How particular virtues cohere within the structure of personality as a dimension of individual differences is an interesting empirical question, one that points up the fact that there could be many kinds and varieties of moral personality; that there are many virtues around which to organize dispositional tendencies; and that how these develop, cohere, and relate to the world suggests productive lines of research How much consciousness is required of a moral personality? Does moral identity entail an approach to the moral life that is reflective, effortful, and deliberative – as something consuming attentional resources? Or is there automaticity to the work of moral identity? Is it intuitive or prereflective in any way? The traditional view of moral identity, following foundational sources in ethical theory (e.g., Harry Frankfurt and Charles Taylor), hold out for reflectiveness as the defining hallmark of the mature moral person Others are not so sure if this is strictly required Perspectives guided by findings in the cognitive and social-cognitive literatures are open to dual ­processing models that allow for the possibility of intuitive, heuristic, automatic­ behavior, as well as the more deliberative kind But the question of how much and what kind of cognitive resources are required for moral self-identity, character, and personality is one that is not going away any time soon Perhaps the most fundamental question begged by the entire volume, and one that will take some time to answer, is whether it is even sensible to talk about moral personality, or moral traits, or moral character, or moral self-identity What does “moral” add to our understanding of ­psychological processes? Of decision making? Of personality structure? What does moral character add to our understanding of character? Are there traits, and then another class of things called moral traits? When is a personality a moral personality? If it is said that one has a moral identity when moral notions are central to one’s self-definition, is it clear just what the notion of ­centrality points to? Our hunch is that even deeply motivated moral action – or pervasively moral ways of being-in-the-world – is driven by clusters of dispositional tendencies that could just as well drive other ways of ­being-in-the world Questions of this sort will require robust collaboration with philosophers of moral psychology Futures We close by considering some possible future lines of research for the field of moral personality The juxtaposition of different research paradigms Moral Personality 45 often shakes out in many new research ideas It is not always possible to see the future clearly, and it would be presumptuous to articulate a research agenda that is too detailed and too prescriptive In our view, what is needed is theoretical and methodological pluralism Still, the present volume­ suggests some fruitful new lines of research One suggestion is to attend to initial life conditions, developmental constraints, and opportunities as these are experienced in sensitive ­periods A moral identity presumably has work to in the way the personality is organized and functions It is assumed to influence the negotiation and ­construction of experiences across the life course Attachment and its ­neurobiological imprints appear to influence moral personality in terms of fostering agreeableness and conscience Other elements of the environment of evolutionary adaptedness may also be relevant to cultivating moral ­personality At the very least, there appear to be sensitive periods in development (e.g., first year of life for emotion regulation and motivation; first five years for social functioning; early adolescence for social functioning; late adolescence for executive functions) Conscience development is related to responsive parenting in the early years whereas community service during adolescence fosters moral identity and civic engagement in adolescence Mapping the sensitive periods for different elements of the moral personality, and how these are influenced by contextual factors, may help guide family, school-based, and community interventions Erikson’s lifespan theory of development proved useful in framing research on the role of moral identity and the life tasks of generativity in middle adulthood Indeed, Pratt and his colleagues make the interesting point that perhaps generativity itself is a nascent developmental variable that has manifestations in earlier periods of the lifespan, and otherwise resonates throughout the lifespan much the way self-identity issues We might push this idea further and ask: What then about other psychosocial tasks, such as trust, autonomy, and initiative? How are these tasks experienced across the lifespan, and how does their articulation influence one’s moral orientation? For example, built from caregiver responsiveness, trust appears to have a strong influence on early conscience development, supporting compliance with adult directives and prosocial behavior in childhood How does this extend across the lifespan? Similar research questions attend other psychosocial tasks There is one Eriksonian viewpoint that has never been tested This concerns his claim that each successful resolution of developmental challenges in the psychosocial stage sequence entails the cultivation of a characteristic virtue One does not have to buy the whole Eriksonian meta-theory in order to wonder if there is structure and sequence to the acquisition 446 Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K Lapsley of virtues; or if, and how, such developmentally crucial virtues can be assessed Wedding positive psychology’s emphasis on strengths and virtues (Peterson & Seligman, 2003) with a developmental perspective generally seems highly promising In recent writings, William Damon (2008) has written on “youth ­purpose” as an organizing construct in the study of positive youth development Youth purpose is understood as a stable and generalized intention to accomplish something that is meaningful to the self, and that leads to productive engagement with some aspect of the world beyond the self The search for self-meaning that is also self-transcendent is a strongly ethical enterprise that goes to the heart of what it means to live well the life that is good for one to live Indeed, for Aristotle, the highest of human purposes involves eudaimonia, where flourishing has a pronounced ethical dimension How does purpose organize self-identity and the moral dimensions of personality? This invites broader investigations about how moral personality maps into the emerging field of positive youth development, positive psychology, and the nature of well-being in adulthood Personality research, and moral personality research more so, has hardly begun to examine the effects of mediated technology on personality development Youth are spending an increasing amount of time interacting through technological (e.g., text messaging) and virtual means (e.g., Second Life), and not necessarily to their intellectual benefit (Bauerlein, 2008) How these experiences, and the lack of the face-to-face experiences they replace, influence identity? We know that young people take up different identities online and in electronic role games Are there measurable effects of these activities on moral identity? Augusto Blasi’s chapter advocates an expansion of the parameters for research into moral functioning to include the public sphere, more specifically, the challenges adults face in the workplace He reflects on the ­narrowness of everyday adult moral functioning, which is typically focused on family and private issues, and less thoughtful about broader social issues He urges researchers to broaden their views of moral functioning to emphasize the self ’s coordination of multiple elements critical for citizenship and adult responsibilities Adults need skills of reflection; intuition will not (and he has much to say against the “intuitions as normal” perspective; also see Narvaez, 2009) Examining the landscape of adult functioning and how to foster it is an area ripe for study Allied with Blasi’s suggestion to examine mature moral functioning is a plea to expand the study of moral personality beyond moral exemplars Moral Personality 447 in highly restricted domains of social life (e.g., volunteer behavior) What about “moral collapse”? What about moral functioning in the breech? Or research on the structure and malleability of vices? Moreover, it may be useful to study the elements of moral personality in such domains as moral sensitivity, focus, and action skills Although Casebeer (2005) and Churchland (1998) have argued that moral personality understood in terms of virtue ethics is the most ­neurobiologically plausible moral theory, none of our authors directly incorporated virtue theory into their work Virtues are cultivated by particular life experiences What are they? How people transform themselves into virtuous agents? How ordinary people become morally focused, if not moral exemplars? Elsewhere, Bill Puka (2006 Symposium talk) suggested that the acquisition of virtues is a practical affair – they are “experiments in truth,” that can be scientifically studied, and for whose impediments interventions can be designed Progress on social phenomena will also require theoretical innovation in understanding the brain’s distinctly biological form of functioning, which is anchored by emotions, needs, drives, and the instinct for survival As of yet, the basic neural principles governing the relation of these basic functions to planning, judgment, and moral decision making are barely understood Moll et al and Narvaez make suggestions for how to bridge the gaps between general biological aspects of human functioning and moral ­functioning More recent research on the epigenome (environmental effects on gene expression) indicates that the environment plays a leading role in determining how genes function in physiology and personality For example, during gestation the fetus interprets “environmental information to predict aspects of its future environment and thus resets its developmental trajectories to optimise its future performance … in adult life” (Gluckman & Hanson, 2004, p 23) No doubt there are social and morally relevant impacts to be examined Last but perhaps most important, the question of assessment, particularly developmental assessment, will play a crucial role in developing a field of moral personality We generally lack well-attested assessments of many core constructs in the field One reason that Kohlberg’s stage theory was so productive and so influential was because highly regarded assessments of moral reasoning were available to generate research Nothing like that exists with respect to moral personality constructs, and nothing can stop the momentum of research more surely than the absence of adequate ­measurement strategies 448 Darcia Narvaez and Daniel K Lapsley References Bauerlein, M (2008) The dumbest generation: How the digital age stupefies young Americans and jeopardizes our future New York: Tarcher/Penguin Blasi, A (this volume) Moral reasoning and the moral functioning of mature adults In D Narvaez & D. K Lapsley (Eds.) Personality, identity, and character explorations in moral psychology (pp 396–440) New York: Cambridge University Press Casebeer (2005) Natural ethical facts Cambridge, MA: MIT Press Churchland, P (1998) Toward a cognitive neurobiology of the emotions Topoi, 17, 83–96 Damon, W (2008) The path to purpose: Helping our children find the calling in life New York: The Free Press Gluckman, P. D., & Hanson, M A (2004) Living with the past: Evolution, development, and patterns of disease Science, 305, 1733–1736 McAdams, D (this volume) The moral personality In D Narvaez & D. K Lapsley (Eds.) Personality, identity, and character explorations in moral psychology (pp 11–29) New York: Cambridge University Press Moll, J., de Oliveira-Souza, R., & Zahn, R (this volume) Neuroscience and morality: Moral judgments, sentiments and values In D Narvaez & D. K Lapsley (Eds.) Personality, identity, and character explorations in moral psychology (pp 106–135) New York: Cambridge University Press Narvaez, D (this volume) Triune ethics theory and moral personality In D Narvaez & D Lapsley (Eds.), Personality, identity, and character explorations in moral psychology (pp 136–158) New York: Cambridge University Press   (2009) The fatal attraction of truthiness and the importance of mature moral functioning Manuscript under review Peterson, C., & Seligman, M (2004) Character strengths and virtues: A handbook and classification New York: American Psychological Association and Oxford University Press Tomkins, S (1965) Affect and the psychology of knowledge In S. S Tomkins & C. E Izard (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and personality (pp. 72–97) New York: Springer Au thor Inde x Adler, M., 317 Alger, H., 68 Allport, G., 11–12 Anscombe, E., 56–57 Aristotle, 52, 58, 446 Bandura, A., 35, 149 Bartlett, M., 261 Batson, C D., 277 Blasi, A., 31, 39–45, 197, 202, 319, 375, 376, 380, 446 Block, J., 191 Bloom, P., 414 Blum, L., 59 Boyd, R., 83 Camus, A., 96 Carlo, G., 319 Casebeer, W., 447 Chomsky, N., 407 Churchland, P., 447 Cialdini, R., 278 Cicero, 257 Colby, A., 21, 298, 319 Confucius, 59 Cosmides, L., 419 Cotterill, R., 147 Damon, W., 21, 298, 319, 446 Darwin, C., 145, 399 DeSteno, D., 261 de Waal, F., 259, 401, 402, 411 Dewey, J., 56 Doris, J., 55 Eisenberg, N., 194, 198 Erikson, E., 18–19, 214, 295, 297, 298, 312–313, 445 Foucault, M., 87 Freud, S., 400 Fry, D., 141 Gazzaniga, M., 402 Gigerenzer, G., 405–406, 409, 419 Greene, J., 115 Haidt, J., 14, 409–419 Hardy, S., 319 Harman, G., 55 Hart, D., 298–299, 319 Hartshorne, H., 34 Hauser, M., 403, 407–409 Heine, S., 41 Jefferson, T., 396 Kant, I., 59, 257, 328 Kagan, J., 168 Killen, M., 170 Kochanska, G., 174–176, 199–200 Koenigs, M., 116 Kohlberg, L., 34, 161, 185, 232, 281, 299, 308, 420, 431 449 450 Author Index Konner, M., 146 Kuhl, J., 44–45 Kymlicka, W., 89 Lakoff, G., 23, 357 Lapsley, D., 18, 201, 203, 346, 356, 377, 378, 391 Lewin, K., 188 Locke, J., 71, 73, 74 Loevinger, J., 15 Luther, M., 319 MacIntyre, A., 20 MacLean, P., 136, 145, 146 Mahmood, S., 87 May, M., 34 McAdams, D., 146, 148, 194, 198, 206, 216, 237, 238, 241, 242, 246, 247, 296, 299, 313 McCullough, M., 262, 264 Mencius, 59 Mill, J S., 59 Miller, J., 41 Mischel, W., 34 Moll, J., 403 Mozi, 59 Murdoch, I., 57, 59 Narvaez, D., 18, 201, 203, 346, 356, 377, 378, 391, 414, 416, 417 Nicholas, C., 86 Nietzsche, F., 400 Nisan, M., 348 Nucci, L., 34 Panksepp, J., 136–137 Piaget, J., 161, 162, 418, 420 Pizarro, D., 414 Puka, B., 447 Rawls, J., 99 Rest, J., 30, 379, 431 Richerson, P., 83 Saltzstein, H., 414 Sandel, M., 99 Schore, A., 137, 144, 145 Seneca, 257 Simmel, G Singer, P., 402 Skitka, L., 31 Sperber, D., 86 Stich, S., 55 Taylor, C., 99 Tomasello, M., 173 Tompkins, S., 141 Tooby, J., 419 Tsang, J., 261–262 Walker, L., 15, 21, 146, 198, 215, 281, 299, 343, 356 Warneken, F., 173 Watkins, P C., 262, 264 Weil, S., 59, 144 Whitehead, A N., 57 Wittgenstein, L., 90 Wong, D., 59 Worthman, C., 92 Sub je ct Inde x Abortion, 356, 362, 364, 371 Adaptation, 11, 13, 120, 123, 145 Adolescents, 146, 151, 191, 193, 195, 198, 214, 217–220, 220–228 Adults, 424–436 Agency, 430, 434 Moral, 404, 423 Rational moral, 185 Agreeableness, 15, 16, 18, 23–24, 25, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 198, 264, 265, 282, 283, 285 Altruism, 173, 257, 262, 271–289 Evolutionary basis, 275–277 Antisocial behavior, 331, 335 Aretaic judgments, 185 Attachment, 118, 119–122 Extended attachment, 121, 145 Relation to moral exemplarity, 244, 249 Security, 238 Authenticity, 327 Authority independence, 359, 360, 366–370 Autobiographical reasoning, 20 Bag of virtues, 232 Benevolence, 328, 330 Biology, see Neurobiology Brain, 106–127 Cortical, 119 Limbic system, 115–116 Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), 123, 148 Prefrontal cortex (PFC) and related structures, 114–115, 116, 117–118, 120–121, 125, 147, 148, 276 Central executive, 114 R-complex (extrapyramidal action nervous system), 143 Buddhism, 102 Camden Sports Teaching Adolescents Responsibility and Resiliency (STARR), 227–228 Capital punishment, 361, 364 Categorical imperative, 328 Character, see Personality, Dispositional traits Character strength, 327 Characteristic adaptations, see Personality, Characteristic adaptations Charitable behavior, 389 Cheating, 316, 389 Child labor, 359 Child saturation, 222, 224, 225 Childhood distress, 144 Childrearing, 140, 145–146, 152 Circumcision, female, 359 Cognitive science, 399–419 Communitarianism, 80 Community service, 228 see also Volunteering Compassion, see Empathy Conflict management, 363–366 Confucianism, 94, 102 45 452 Subject Index Conscience, 174–178, 288–289 Conscientiousness, 15, 199–200 Contingencies of Self-Worth scale, 346 Cosmopolitanism, 88–89, 95 Culture, 13, 79, 85–99, 121, 124, 125, 148, 442 As conversation, 96–101 Hybridity, 95 Morality as cultural invention, 82–85 Organizational, 390 Resistance, 87–88 Thick concept, 86–87 Thin concept, 86 Cultural norms, see Norms Cultural transmission, 98 Daoism, 94, 102 Deliberation, see Moral reasoning Development of conscience, 199–200 of obligation, 169–171 of understanding intention, 169–171 social cognitive, 200–205 Disgust, 123, 384 Disposition, 60–64, 192–197, 198–200 Grateful, 263 Prosocial, 285, 287 Traits, see Personality, Dispositional traits Diversity, 79–104 Dogmatism, 323 Duty, 81 Early childhood, 137, 142, 145–146, 148, 160–179, 442, 445 Ego resiliency, 191–192 Elian Gonzalez case, 368–369 Emotions, 136–137, 163–164 Moral emotions, 216–217 Empathy, 172, 260, 278–279 Environment of evolutionary adaptedness, 12, 138–140, 145, 152 Epigenetics, 296, 312, 447 Ethic, 94, 100 Engagement, 138, 139, 142, 145–146, 149 Imagination, 138, 139, 142, 146–149 Security, 137, 139, 142, 143–145, 149, 150 Ethical brain, 403 Ethology, 400–405 Eudaimonia, 52–53 Evil, 144 Evolution, 14, 82–83, 136–137, 274–277, 400–405 Executive function Exemplar, moral, 202, 215, 232–253, 271, 280, 298–299, 319, 326, 329, 341, 343–344, 356, 447 Brave, 236 Caring, 236 Folk conceptions, 235 Expertise, moral, 203, 204 Faith, 328 Fight-or-flight response, 143 Also see Stress hormones Free will, Free won’t, 147 Gay marriage, 356, 371 Generativity, 17, 295–313, 445 Generosity, 258 Genes, 13, 137 Genetic similarity hypothesis, 275 Gratitude, 256–269 Gratitude Questionnaire, 264 Gratitude, Resentment, and Appreciation Test, 264 Gratitude Toward God scale, 264 Guilt, 172, 260 Honor, 327 Hormones, see Neurobiology Identity, 18–19, 42–45, 296 Development, 298 Material, 383 Moral, 186, 205–207, 214–228, 274, 279–282, 298–313, 317, 319, 320, 323, 329, 345, 356, 375–391, 443, 445 Business, 389–390 Internalization, 345, 378, 388 Moderation, 388 Subject Index Narrative, 19–23, 295, 301 Personal fable, 20 Practical identity, 85 Salience, 387 Self-importance, see Moral self, importance Self-perception, 390 Sources, 215–218 Symbolization, 346, 378, 388 Ideology Ethical, 316–337 Expedient, 316–337 Principled ethical, 316–321, 322–337 Imitation, 161, 162 Impartiality, 401–402 Individualism, 80–81 Information processing, 195, 205, 377–379, 384 Ingroup, 137–138, 139, 142, 143 Institutions, 220 Integrity, 197, 317–318, 320–322, 376 Integrity Scale, 322 Intention, 169–171 Intolerance, 360–363 Intuition, see Moral intuition Judgment-action gap, 233 Knowledge accessibility, see Schema, Accessibility Liberalism, 99–100 Life review narrative, 238, 239 Limbic resonance, 145 Loyola Generativity Scale (LGS), 296, 302, 309 Machiavellianism, 329, 331 Mature moral functioning, see Personality, Moral, Maturity Memory, 203–204 Metaphysics, see Narrative, Metaphysic thesis Moral action, see Moral components Moral affect, 171–172 Also see Empathy, Shame, Guilt Moral ambivalence, 80–82, 150 45 Moral balance model, 348–349 Moral barometer, 260 Moral centrality, 342, 345 Moral chronicity, see Schema, Moral Chronicity Moral cognition, 137, 250, 251 Cortico-limbic integration model, 115 Moral condemnation, 330 Moral commitment, 320 Moral compensation, 341, 348 Moral components Action, 250–251 Opportunities, 216–218 Judgment, see Moral reasoning Motivation, 118–119, 260, 261, 262, 298, 310, 341 Sensitivity, 21, 112, 143, 144, 162, 164, 246, 277 Moral conviction, 357, 358–363 Integrated theory of moral conviction (ITMC), 358–360 Moral courage, 304, 305–306, 310 Moral credentials, 341, 348–350 Moral desert, 54, 66, 69–71 Moral desire, 376 Moral dialect, 99 Moral dilemma, 115 Moral disengagement, 331, 334, 380, 381, 388 Moral diversity, 363 Moral dumbfounding, 412–413, 414 Moral education, 152 Moral exemplar, see Exemplar, moral Moral faculty, 407 Moral heuristics, 405–407, 419, 425 Moral ideal, 344 Moral identity, see Identity, Moral Moral internalization, 199 Moral integrity, 313 Moral intuition, 397, 407, 408, 409–419, 425 Moral judgment, see Moral reasoning Moral luck, 71–72 Moral mandate, 358, 365, 370–371 Moral motivation, see Moral components Moral necessity, 401 Moral norms, 83 454 Subject Index Moral personality, see Personality, Moral Moral point of view, 185 Moral principles, 332 Moral prototype, see Prototype theory Moral reasoning, 250, 299, 308, 379, 411–436 Conventional, 162 Postconventional, 15, 431 Preconventional, 162 Moral reflection, 398, 411–436 Moral relativism, 80 Moral resentment, 341–348, 350 Moral responsibility, 398, 423, 433 Moral schema, see Schema, moral Moral self, 172–174, 298, 310, 341, 441–442 Moral self-importance, 345–346, 347, 375, 377, 378, 387, 443 Moral self-regard, 347, 348, 351 Moral self-schema, 377 Self model of moral functioning, 375 Moral sense, 145 Emerging, 168, 169 Moral sensitivity, see Moral Components Moral sentiments, 67, 106–127 Moral steadfastness, 311 Moral values, 89, 97, 123, 124–126 Motivated cognition, 137 Mutually responsive orientation, 199 Narcissism, 327, 335 Narrative, 65–76 Accomplishment and desert, 69–72, 73 Contamination, 238, 247 Free agency, 72–73 Generative, 297 Identity, 19, see also Identity Life, 12, 19, 147–148, 299, 309–310 Master narratives, 54, 67–76 Metaphysic thesis, 54, 65 Redemption, 21, 238, 247–248, 249 Self, 238 National Educational Longitudinal Study (NELS:88), 224 National Household Educational Survey of 1999 (NHES-99), 223 National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (ADD Health), 220 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), 219 Naturalism, 79, 82 Negative state relief model, 278 Neurobiology, 399–405 Hypothalamic pituitary adrenal axis, 275 Mirror neurons, 276 Hormones Neuropeptides (e.g., Oxytocin), 119–120, 122, 140, 275 Stress, 138 Neuroethics, 403 Neuroscience, see Brain Nichomachean Ethics (see also Aristotle), 52 Norms, 383, also see Moral nomis Nurturant caregiver morality, 23 Obligation, 169–171 Ontology, 53 Openness to experience, 15 Optimism, 242–243 Outgroups, 386 Parent-child relationships, 174–176 Parental practices, 176–177 Socialization, 175, 176 Personal fable, 20 Personality, 11–13, 32–34 Aristotelian, 187 Characteristic adaptations, 12, 16–18, 24, 237 Consistency, 34, 36–37 Dispositional traits (also see Disposition, Trait), 12–16, 23, 141, 237 Dominance, 237 Five-factor theory (also see Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, Openness to experience), 13–16, 32–33, 188, 189–191, 193, 282, 321, 329 Galilean, 188–189, 190–191 Knowledge-and-Appraisal Personality Architecture (KAPA), 35–39 Life narratives, 24–25, 237, 240–245, 246, also see Narratives Subject Index Mentor, influence of, 249 Moral, 13–25, 141, 215, 232–253, 342–345 Maturity, 151, 396–436 Typology, 237 New Big-Five (McAdams), 12, 441 Nurturance, 237 Personal Strivings, 237, 239 Social cognitive theory, 37–45, 186, 188, 201–207, 375–390 Structure, 32 Trauma, 243 Two disciplines, 187–189 Types, 191, 206, 219–220 Personality-Systems Interaction Theory (PSI), 44 Positive youth development, 446 Postconventional thinking, see Moral reasoning Poverty, 218–228 Preschoolers, 160–163, 169–171, 172–173, 174–177 Primatology, 400–405 Prosocial behavior, 198–199, 260, 262, 267–268, 272–274, 300, 309 Prototype theory, 90–91 Moral, 343, 344–345, 346, 347, 378 Psychological realism, 57 Public sphere, 426–428, 431–433 Purpose, 446 Rationalism, 420 Reasoning, 147, also see Moral reasoning Autobiographical, 20 Reciprocal altruism hypothesis, 275 Reciprocity, 259–260, 263 Redemption narrative, see Narrative, Redemption Religiosity, 328 Extrinsic, 328 Intrinsic, 328 Role models, 384–385 Schema Accessibility, 201, 377 Moral, 316–317, 356 45 Automaticity, 398 Chronicity, 18, 201, 203, 346, 356, 377, 378, 391 Self Moral, see Moral self Self-concept Moral, 344, 347 Working self concept, 379, 385 Self-consistency, 40–42, 376, 381, 443 Self-criticism, 41 Self-evaluation, 216 Self-identity, 42, 186 Self-regulation, 193, 317, 333, 336, 342, 379, 385 Self-schemas, 35, 377 Self-system, 319, 332 Self-worth, 267 Shame, 171, 172, 260 Situation, power of, 141, 149, 150, 382 Person-situation debate, 189 Social capital, 221 Social cognitive, see Personality, Social cognitive theory Social cooperation, 83–85 Social desirability, 330 Social information processing, 384 Social intuitionism, 202, 409–411 Social referencing, 164–165 Spirituality, 328 Spontaneous trait inferences, 203 Standards, 165–169 Stoics, 60 Stress Hormones, see Neurobiology Poverty, 218–220 Strict-father morality, 23 Subjective well-being, 265–267 Suicide Physician-assisted, 356, 359, 367 Temperament, 13, 193–196, 200, 216, 219–220, 276 Elaboration of, 194 Ten Commandments, 387–388 Theory of mind (ToM), 164 Thoughts and Feelings Questionnaire, 284 456 Subject Index Trait, 187, 189, 198–200, also see Disposition Dysregulation, 195 Triangle model of responsibility, 333 Tribalism, 143 Trolley problem, 111, 113, 116, 117, 408 Triune Ethics Theory (TET), see Ethic, Engagement/Imagination/ Security Values, 11, 18, 23, 24, 30, 39, 44, 106, 107, 137, 143, 145, 146, 160, 161, 163, 174, 175, 176, 199, 217, 220, 224, 225, 280, 345, 350, 363, 427, 429 Value conflict, 80, 81, 100–103 Varieties of Moral Personality, 55–57 Virtue, 57–65, 257, 268, 320–321, 382 Volition, see Willpower Volunteering, 223, 225, 282–287, 329 Ultimatum game, 117 Universal moral grammar, 407–409 Universalism, 81 Utilitarianism, 117 War, 427 Willpower, 197, 376 Workplace, 425–426, 427–430 Youth Involvement Inventory (YII), 303 ... of a Moral State of Mind 355 Linda J Skitka and G Scott Morgan 17 Moral Identity in Business Situations: A Social-Cognitive Framework for Understanding Moral Functioning 375 Karl Aquino and Dan... orrin e, Thomas Personality, Identity, and Character Explorations in Moral Psychology Edited by Darcia Narvaez University of Notre Dame Daniel K Lapsley University of Notre Dame CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY. .. the moral domain in mind Or, those who study the dispositional aspects of moral functioning – under the headings, say, of moral self -identity, character, or personality – propose powerful and interesting