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0521826810 cambridge university press principles and methods of law and economics enhancing normative analysis oct 2005

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  • Cover

  • Half-title

  • Title

  • Copyright

  • Dedication

  • Contents

  • Preface

  • Introduction: Innovation in Legal Thinking

    • A. Proposals, Consequences, and Ideals

    • B. Toward Scientific Analysis of Law

    • C. Bibliographical Note

  • Part 1: Principles

    • 1. From Formal Logic to Normative Reasoning

      • A. Formal Deontic Logic

      • B. Formal Logic’s Failure in Normative Reasoning

      • C. The Informal Normative Syllogism

        • Proposals, Consequences, and Ideals in Normative Reasoning

      • D. Concluding Exercises

      • E. Bibliographical Note

    • 2. Social Welfare versus Moral Philosophy

      • A. Ideals behind Law and Economics: Welfarism and Pragmatism

      • B. Juxtaposition with Other External Derivations of Ideals

        • i. Deriving Ideals from Existing Rules (Including Formalism)

        • ii. Rawls’ Contractarianism

        • iii. The Potential Equivalence of Derived Ideals and Preferences

      • C. Distinguishing Features of Economic Analysis

        • i. Avoidance of Moral Relativity

        • ii. Preference for Applications over Refinement of Principles

        • iii. Ubiquitous Importance of Incentives

        • iv. Treatment of Preferences as Objective

        • v. Lack Bias for Rule Proliferation

        • vi. Orientation Toward the Future

      • D. Concluding Exercises

      • E. Bibliographical Note

    • 3. From Political Philosophy to Game Theory

      • A. Political Theory

        • i. Inefficiencies of Majority Rule

        • ii. Legal Process: Explaining the Administrative State

        • iii. Civic Republicanism

        • iv. Perfectionism

      • B. Voting System Design

        • An example of the Borda count: Suppose the electorate consists of

      • C. Game Theory

        • i. Cooperation Games: Prisoner’s Dilemma

        • ii. Coordination Games: Driving Side

        • iii. Game Theory in Legal Scholarship

      • D. Social Norms

      • E. Bounded Rationality

      • F. Concluding Exercises

      • G. Bibliographical Note

    • 4. The Importance of Distribution of Wealth

      • A. Redistribute

      • B. Do Not Redistribute!

      • C. Delegating Redistribution to Tax Policy

      • D. Concluding Exercises

      • E. Bibliographical Note

    • 5. Coase and Law’s Irrelevance

      • A. Coasean Irrelevance

      • B. Normative Use

        • i. Revealing Imperfections

        • ii. An Example

      • C. Transaction Costs: The Usual Suspect

        • i. Vantage Point Makes Transaction Costs

        • ii. Innovations Transform Transaction Costs

        • iii. Litigation Costs: Transaction Cost or Not?

        • iv. Example: Increasing Social Gain from Private Litigation

        • v. Normative Implications for Litigation of the Analysis of Transaction Costs

      • D. Concluding Exercises

      • E. Bibliographical Note

    • 6. More Failures of Coasean Irrelevance

      • A. Negotiation Holdouts

      • B. Systematic Errors

      • C. Risk Aversion

        • i. Imposing a Transaction Cost

        • ii. Substantive Solutions of Risk Aversion

      • D. Distribution

      • E. Concluding Exercises

      • F. Bibliographical Note

  • Part 2: Methods

    • 7. Mathematical Modeling

      • A. Symbols, Functions, and Idioms

      • B. Simplification and the Model as a Premise

      • C. Modelling Applications

        • i. Modeling Negligence Law: Optimization

        • ii. Modeling the End of Affirmative Action: Differential Equations

      • D. Concluding Exercises

      • E. Bibliographical Note

    • 8. Confronting Uncertainty: Basic Probability Theory

      • A. Describing Randomness: Probability and Expectation

      • B. Mathematical Models of Expectation

      • C. Uncertain Uncertainty: Conditional Probability

      • D. Concluding Exercises

      • E. Bibliographical Notes

    • 9. Advanced Probability: Distributions as the Shape of Randomness

      • A. The Shape of Randomness: Distribution Functions

        • i. Visual Comparison of Discrete and Continuous Distributions

        • ii. CDF and PDF: Features and Relations

        • iii. Truncated and Censored Distributions

      • B. The Normal Distribution

      • C. Concluding Exercise: Imperfect Enforcement

      • D. Bibliographical Note

    • 10. How to Price Uncertainty: Finance

      • A. Valuation in Perfect Markets

        • i. Known Rates: Discounting

        • ii. Risky Assets

      • B. Normative Implications of the CAPM

        • i. Financial Information

        • ii. Forecasts

      • C. Financial Market Microstructure: The Game-Theoretical Foundation of the CAPM

      • D. Normative Application of Microstructure: Insider Trading

      • E. Concluding Exercises

      • F. Bibliographical Note

    • 11. Finance and Probability: Options and Derivatives

      • A. Option Pricing

      • B. Normative Implications of Option Pricing

        • i. Recipients of Fiduciary Obligation

        • ii. Automated Reorganizations via Options

        • iii. The Options Understanding of the New Value Exception

      • C. Concluding Exercises

      • D. Bibliographical Note

    • 12. Using Spreadsheets

      • A. The Basics

        • i. Obtaining Built-in Help about Functions

        • ii. Using the Function Wizard

        • iii. Categories of Built-in Functions

        • iv. Relative and Absolute References in Copying

      • B. Graphics

        • i. Chart Types

        • ii. Completing the Chart Wizard

        • iii. Manipulating Charts

      • C. Solving Equations

        • i. The Solver

        • ii. Goal Seek

      • D. Macros and User-Defined Functions

        • i. Recording a Macro

        • ii. Editing a Macro

        • iii. Assigning a Macro to a Graphic

        • iv. Entering a Function

      • E. Downloading and Combining Data

        • i. Data Files Separating Columns with Commas or Tabs

        • ii. Specifying the Type of Data

        • iii. Fixed-Width Data

        • iv. Combining Data

      • F. Concluding Exercises

      • G. Bibliographical Note

    • 13. Statistics

      • A. The Use of Statistics in Legal Thinking

      • B. Fundamentals: Descriptive Statistics and Distributions

      • C. Empirical Research

        • i. Basics: Comparing Data That Take Values and Data That Fall into Categories

        • ii. Determining Influences: Multiple Outcomes

        • iii. Determining Influences: Yes/No Outcomes

        • iv. Observations That Are Filtered by a Threshold

      • D. Concluding Exercises

      • E. Bibliographical Note

    • 14. Conclusion: Importing Methodological Innovations

      • A. Cellular Automata

      • B. Fractals

      • C. Evolutionary Theory

      • D. To End

      • E. Bibliographical Note

        • of Complex Dynamical Systems (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1986);

        • for the Classroom: Part One – Introduction to Fractals and Chaos (New

        • Foundations and Applications (New York: John Wiley and

        • Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press

  • Appendix A: Meinhard v. Salmon 249 N.Y. 458 (1928)

  • Appendix B: Glossary

  • Appendix C: Mathematica Notebooks

    • A. Differential Equations in Law: The Effect of Terminating Affirmative Action

      • i. Determine the Participation in the Workforce

      • ii. Add the Initial Condition

      • iii. Manipulate the Exponent to See It Disappear

      • iv. The Long-Run Participation

      • v. The Composition of the Candidates

      • vi. Graphics

    • B. Derivation of the Normal Distribution

      • i. Derive the Normal Distribution as Gauss Did

      • ii. The Standard Normal Distribution

      • iii. Restating with Standard Deviation

      • iv. Restating with Average Deviation

      • v. The Triangular Distribution

    • C. Application of Triangular Distribution: The Uncertain Apprehension of Speed Limit Violations

    • D. A Comparison of Insider Trading Regimes

      • i. Foundation

      • ii. Problem

      • iii. Solution: Statement

      • iv. Solution: Proof

      • v. Illustration of Price Path

  • Index

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P1: JZP 0521826810agg.xml CB861/Georgakapoulos 521 82681 This page intentionally left blank June 7, 2005 15:54 P1: JZP 0521826810agg.xml CB861/Georgakapoulos 521 82681 June 7, 2005 PRINCIPLES AND METHODS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS This is an introductory book that targets the reader who aspires to apply economic analysis but seeks a technical introduction to its mathematical techniques or a structured elaboration of its philosophical principles It juxtaposes economic analysis with moral philosophy, political theory, egalitarianism, and other methodological principles It then presents the details of methods, such as model building, derivatives, differential equations, statistical tests, and the use of computer programs Nicholas Georgakopoulos is Professor of Law at Indiana University School of Law He received his master’s degree and doctorate from Harvard Law School, where he specialized in finance and the regulation of financial markets His publications are cited prominently, including citations by the U.S Supreme Court and the Securities Exchange Commission i 15:54 P1: JZP 0521826810agg.xml CB861/Georgakapoulos 521 82681 ii June 7, 2005 15:54 P1: JZP 0521826810agg.xml CB861/Georgakapoulos 521 82681 June 7, 2005 Principles and Methods of Law and Economics Basic Tools for Normative Reasoning Nicholas L Georgakopoulos Indiana University iii 15:54 CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 8RU, UK Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521826815 © Nicholas L Georgakopoulos 2005 This publication is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press First published in print format 2005 eBook (EBL) ISBN-13 978-0-511-34449-7 ISBN-10 0-511-34449-X eBook (EBL) ISBN-13 ISBN-10 hardback 978-0-521-82681-5 hardback 0-521-82681-0 ISBN-13 ISBN-10 paperback 978-0-521-53411-6 paperback 0-521-53411-9 Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of urls for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate P1: JZP 0521826810agg.xml CB861/Georgakapoulos 521 82681 In memory of my mother May justice and welfare end random violence v June 7, 2005 15:54 P1: JZP 0521826810agg.xml CB861/Georgakapoulos 521 82681 vi June 7, 2005 15:54 P1: JZP 0521826810agg.xml CB861/Georgakapoulos 521 82681 June 7, 2005 Contents Preface xiii Introduction: Innovation in Legal Thinking A Proposals, Consequences, and Ideals r B Toward Scientific Analysis of Law r C Bibliographical Note r Part 1: Principles From Formal Logic to Normative Reasoning 11 A Formal Deontic Logic r 12 B Formal Logic’s Failure in Normative Reasoning r 13 C The Informal Normative Syllogism r 15 Proposals, Consequences, and Ideals in Normative Reasoning r 16 D Concluding Exercises r 17 E Bibliographical Note r 19 Social Welfare versus Moral Philosophy 20 A Ideals behind Law and Economics: Welfarism and Pragmatism r 23 B Juxtaposition with Other External Derivations of Ideals r 25 i Deriving Ideals from Existing Rules (Including Formalism) r 25 ii Rawls’ Contractarianism r 26 iii The Potential Equivalence of Derived Ideals and Preferences r 27 C Distinguishing Features of Economic Analysis r 29 i Avoidance of Moral Relativity r 30 vii 15:54 P1: JZP 0521826810agg.xml CB861/Georgakapoulos viii 521 82681 June 7, 2005 Contents ii Preference for Applications over Refinement of Principles r 30 iii Ubiquitous Importance of Incentives r 30 iv Treatment of Preferences as Objective r 31 v Lack Bias for Rule Proliferation r 34 vi Orientation Toward the Future r 34 D Concluding Exercises r 35 E Bibliographical Note r 36 From Political Philosophy to Game Theory 37 A Political Theory r 38 i Inefficiencies of Majority Rule r 39 ii Legal Process: Explaining the Administrative State r 40 iii Civic Republicanism r 42 iv Perfectionism r 43 B Voting System Design r 44 C Game Theory r 50 i Cooperation Games: Prisoner’s Dilemma r 51 ii Coordination Games: Driving Side r 54 iii Game Theory in Legal Scholarship r 55 D Social Norms r 57 E Bounded Rationality r 59 F Concluding Exercises r 66 G Bibliographical Note r 70 The Importance of Distribution of Wealth 72 A Redistribute! r 75 B Do Not Redistribute! r 79 C Delegating Redistribution to Tax Policy r 84 D Concluding Exercises r 89 E Bibliographical Note r 94 Coase and Law’s Irrelevance 95 A Coasean Irrelevance r 96 B Normative Use r 98 i Revealing Imperfections r 98 ii An Example r 99 C Transaction Costs: The Usual Suspect r 99 i Vantage Point Makes Transaction Costs r 103 ii Innovations Transform Transaction Costs r 104 iii Litigation Costs: Transaction Cost or Not? r 105 iv Example: Increasing Social Gain from Private Litigation r 105 15:54 ... schools, the law and economics seminar of Harvard Law School, the finance seminar of Harvard Business School, the faculty seminar of the University of Connecticut School of Law, the law and economics. .. exploring law and economics is the change in the mode of reasoning Law and economics has a normative focus that leads to a change in the level of certainty and the burden of proof of the argumentation... The value of economic analysis of law is that it produces normative conclusions of vastly greater certainty than other methods The methodological rigor of law and economics produces normative

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