0521772273 cambridge university press realism and appearances an essay in ontology may 2000

This page intentionally left blank R EA L I S M AND AP P EARANCES An essay in ontology This book addresses one of the fundamental topics in philosophy: the relation between appearance and reality John W Yolton draws on a rich combination of historical and contemporary material, ranging from the early modern period to present-day debates, to examine this central philosophical preoccupation, which he presents in terms of distinctions between phenomena and causes, causes and meaning, and persons and man He explores in detail how Locke, Berkeley and Hume talk of appearances and their relation to reality, and offers illuminating connections and comparisons with the work of contemporary philosophers such as Paul Churchland and John McDowell He concludes by offering his own proposal for a “realism of appearance,” which incorporates elements of both Humean and Kantian thinking His important study will be of interest to a wide range of readers in the history of philosophy, the history of ideas, and contemporary philosophy of mind, epistemology and metaphysics    is Professor Emeritus at the Department of Philosophy, Rutgers University He is the author of many publications on John Locke and on the history of philosophy more generally, most recently Perception and Reality: A History from Descartes to Kant (Cornell University Press, ) REALISM AND APPEARANCES An essay in ontology JOHN W YO LTON Professor Emeritus, Rutgers University           The Pitt Building, Trumpington Street, Cambridge, United Kingdom    The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK 40 West 20th Street, New York, NY 10011-4211, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia Ruiz de Alarcón 13, 28014 Madrid, Spain Dock House, The Waterfront, Cape Town 8001, South Africa http://www.cambridge.org © John W Yolton 2004 First published in printed format 2000 ISBN 0-511-03449-0 eBook (Adobe Reader) ISBN 0-521-77227-3 hardback ISBN 0-521-77660-0 paperback For Jean We shall have hereafter to enquire into the nature of appearance, but for the present we may keep a fast hold on this, the appearances exist This is absolutely certain, and to deny it is nonsense And what exists must belong to reality F H Bradley, Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay, pp – ’Tis certain, that almost all mankind, and even philosophers themselves, for the greatest part of their lives, take their perceptions to be their only objects, and suppose, that the very being, which is intimately present to the mind, is the real Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p  body or material existence Conclusion: The realism of appearances  and perceivers “Any impingements across such an outer boundary could only be causal, and not rational” (p ) McDowell’s way of expressing the point made by the writers discussed in chapter , and the suggestion by Descartes – that there is a noncausal, meaning relation between the world and perceivers – is to say that “in experience the world exerts a rational influence on our thinking” (ibid., cf p ).13 His rational relations play, I think, the role of those noncausal, semantic relations I have argued for He asserts emphatically that “We need to bring responsiveneness to meaning back into the operations of our natural sentient capacities as such, even while we insist that responsiveness to meaning cannot be captured in naturalistic terms, so long as ‘naturalistic’ is glossed in terms of the realm of law” (p ).14 McDowell contrasts the realm of law (nature) with the realm of reason (meaning, justification), but he urges us to redefine “nature” in such a way that it comes within the realm of reason and conceptualization He seems to want a naturalism “that makes room for meaning” (p ), although he admits that naturalizing meaning might not really provide a proper naturalism We see the same struggle in McDowell as is found in Kant: to find a way to naturalize our cognitive processes, to make some of them the result of an independent reality, an empirical not a transcendental reality The trick, at least for McDowell, is how to maintain that conceptualization is present in the very impressions that owe in some way their existence if not their function to the empirical world For Kant, the empirical world is the product of the combination of the activity of the understanding (spontaneity) and the receptivity of the senses Kant boot-straps sensibility with the affection relation, an action from a nonempirical world This is just the move that McDowell wants to avoid Whether the nonempirical world in Kant’s account is in fact another world, or whether it is just the world in which we live but prior to our being aware of objects, is a question of some debate McDowell recognizes that if he is to avoid an idealism where the 13 14 McDowell characterizes Donald Davidson, against whom he writes, as saying “a causal, not rational, linkage between thinking and independent reality will do” (p ) Although McDowell mentions “perceptual experience” in several places (pp xxiii, , , ), he does not pretend to offer a theory of perception He employs locutions such as being “open to the way things manifestly are” (p xx); “What perceptually appears to a subject that things are thus and so” (p xviii); “In experience one takes in, for instance sees, that things are thus and so” (p ; cf p ); in veridical experience “that things are thus and so are aspects of the layout of the world: it is how things are” (p ) None of these phrases is accompanied with an account of how things come to appear thus and so To fill in the details of the perceptual process is not part of McDowell’s program Nor is there any mention of the role of neurophysiology in our perceptual experience  Realism and appearances spontaneity of the understanding is the only determining factor in the formation and discovery of objects, he must find in receptivity some contribution other than what the understanding brings to experience, some “constraints” upon our conceptualization But he insists that there is no reality “located outside the boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere” (p ) If the contributions of sensibility are already conceptualized, does that not threaten to dilute any contribution from the senses? He wants to have only the empirical world while having independence too He puts the crucial question to himself: “But how can the empirical world be genuinely independent of us, if we are partly responsible for its fundamental structure?” (p ) Concepts are at work in all levels of experience, but they function at the level of sense experience, in spite of our being “acted on by independent reality” (p ) McDowell is very close to Kant when he uses Kant’s phrase, “outer experience,” and claims that an independent reality makes impressions on us, impressions which have conceptual content.15 Kant employs the notion of affection, McDowell speaks of “constraints.” The nature of the source of affection and the constraint remains for both authors somewhat obscure Neither wants us to think of the “ordinary empirical world” as if it is “constituted by appearances of a reality beyond” our experience (p ) A realism of appearances may not require that appearances are of another world, a distinction between appearances and that which appears Perhaps a phenomenalism might succeed in finding features in experience that are not under our control Kant can be read this way: outer representations exhibit an order and sequence that we cannot control Berkeley’s realism, I have argued, recognizes that there is a uniformity and lawfulness of observable and predictable phenomena For Berkeley, there seems to be no reality behind or beyond the reality of perceived objects For a realism of appearances combined with some notion of a reality as more than the appearances, the problem is how to talk about or refer to those other aspects of reality, the real causes and powers (Hume), the source of affection (Kant) When our language for talking about the world is restricted to experiential words, to words, phrases and concepts that describe features of an observable world, references to nonexperiential components (causes, forces, powers) are faced with indirectness and vagueness We may simply have to accept the fact that there are aspects of a philosopher’s system, especially the ontology, 15 There is a similarity here with Descartes’s ideas which as modes of mind strictly lack content, the content being added by objects: objects particularize the ideas Conclusion: The realism of appearances  that cannot be encompassed within the epistemology advanced by, or even the conditions for intelligibility accepted by, its author Many will find such a suggestion quite unsatisfactory, but the alternative may be equally unacceptable: to translate what seems to be references to nonempirical claims into experiential terms Some of our most honored philosophers may believe more than they can say Bibliography Ackerman, Diane Natural History of the Senses New York: Random House,  Arnauld, Antoine Des vrayes et des fausses idées, contre ce qu’enseigne l’auteur de la Recherche de la verité Cologne: N Schouten,  On True and False Ideas Trans with an introductory essay by Stephen Gaukroger Manchester: Manchester University Press,  Berkeley, George Works Ed A A Luce and T E Jessop  vols London: Nelson, – Bracken, Harry M Berkeley London: Macmillan,  Bradley, F H Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay London: G Allen & Unwin,  Broadie, Alexander Notion and Object: Aspects of Late Medieval Epistemology Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Chalmers, David J The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory Oxford: Oxford University Press,  Churchland, Paul M The Engine of Reason, the Seat of the Soul: A Philosophical Journey into the Brain Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,  Collier, Arthur Clavis Universalis, or A New Inquiry after Truth; Being a Demonstration of the Non-Existence or Impossibility of an External World London: R Gosling,  Coulter, Jeff “Neural Cartesianism Comments on the Epistemology of the Cognitive Sciences,” in The Future of the Cognitive Revolution, ed Johnson and Erneling, pp – Crane, Tim (ed.) 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Minds, Ideas and Objects: Essays on the Theory of Representation in Modern Philosophy North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy, vol  Atascadero, Calif.: Ridgeview,  Deely, John New Beginnings: Early Modern Philosophy and Postmodern Thought Toronto: University of Toronto Press,  Descartes, René Oeuvres de Descartes Ed Ch Adam and P Tannery  vols Paris: L Cerf, – The Philosophical Writings of Descartes Trans J Cottingham, R Stoothoff and D Murdoch  vols Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, – Treatise of Man French text with translation and commentary by Thomas Steele Hall Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,   Bibliography  Oeuvres philosophiques Ed F Alquié  vols Paris: Garnier Frères, – Flage, Daniel E Berkeley’s Doctrine of Notions: A Reconstruction Based on His Theory of Meaning London: Croom Helm,  “Relative Ideas and Notions,” in Minds, Ideas and Objects, ed Cummins and Zöller, pp – Foster, John and Howard Robinson (eds.) Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Garrett, Don Cognition and Commitment in Hume’s Philosophy New York: Oxford University Press,  Gillet, Grant Representation, Meaning and Thought Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Gram, Moltke S The Transcendental Turn: The Foundation of Kant’s Idealism Gainesville: University of Florida Press,  Grove, Henry An Essay Towards a Demonstration of the Soul’s Immateriality London: Printed for J Clark,  Hardin, Clyde Color for Philosophers: Unweaving the Rainbow Expanded edn Indianapolis: Hackett,  Hume, David Essays Moral, Political and Literary Ed Eugene Miller Rev edn Indianapolis: Liberty Fund,  Hume’s Philosophical Works Ed T H Green and T H Grose  vols London, – Enquiries concerning Human Understanding and concerning the Principles of Morals Ed L A Selby-Bigge rd edn., revised by P H Nidditch Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Most of my references are to the Enquiry concerning Human Understanding; I cite this in the text by the word Enquiry A Treatise of Human Nature Ed L A Selby-Bigge nd edn., revised by P H Nidditch Oxford: Clarendon Press,  This edition contains An Abstract of a Book Lately Published ., pp – Jackson, Frank “Mental Causation.” Mind , no  (), – Johnson, David Martel and Christina E Erneling (eds.) The Future of the Cognitive Revolution New York: Oxford University Press,  Kant, Immanuel Critique of Pure Reason Trans N K Smith London: Macmillan,  Lloyd, A C “The Self in Berkeley’s Philosophy,” in Essays on Berkeley: A Tercentennial Celebration, ed Foster and Robinson Locke, John Mr Locke’s Reply to The Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Worchester’s Answer to his Second Letter () In Works (), vol , pp – Drafts for the Essay concerning Human Understanding, and Other Philosophical Writings Ed Peter H Nidditch and G A J Rogers Vol  Oxford: Clarendon Press,  An Essay concerning Human Understanding Ed Peter H Nidditch Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Some Thoughts concerning Education Ed John W and Jean S Yolton Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Lowe, E J Locke on Human Understanding London: Routledge,  “Experience and its Objects,” in The Contents of Experience, ed Tim Crane, pp –  Bibliography “Perception: A Causal Representative Theory,” in New Representationalisms, ed Edmond Wright, pp – Subjects of Experience Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  McDowell, John Mind and World Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,  Malebranche, Nicolas Oeuvres complètes Direction: André Robinet  vols Paris: J Vrin, – Mayne, Charles An Essay concerning Rational Notions London: W Innys,  Mayne, Zachary Two Dissertations concerning Sense and the Imagination; with an Essay on Consciousness London: J Tonson,  Oakes, Robert “Representational Sensing: What’s the Problem,” in New Representationalisms, ed Edmond Wright, pp – Pasnau, Robert Theories of Cognition in the Later Middle Ages Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  Priestley, Joseph Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit; To Which Is Added, The History of the Philosophical Doctrine concerning the Origin of the Soul, and the Nature of Matter  vols London: J Johnson,  Robinson, Howard “Physicalism, Externalism and Perceptual Representation,” in New Representationalisms, ed Edmond Wright, pp – Sassen, Brigitte “Critical Idealism in the Eyes of Kant’s Contemporaries,” Journal of the History of Philosophy (), Savellos, Elias E and ĩnit D Yalỗin (eds.) Supervenience: New Essays Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  Siewert, Charles P The Significance of Consciousness Princeton: Princeton University Press,  Strawson, Galen The Secret Connexion: Causation, Realism and David Hume Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Sutton, John Philosophy and Memory Traces: Descartes to Connectionism Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  Tomida, Yasuhiko Idea and Thing: The Deep Structure of Locke’s Theory of Knowledge Dordrecht: Kluwer,  Reprinted from Analecta Husserliana,  (), – Winkler, Kenneth P “The New Hume.” The Philosophical Review, , no  (October ), – Berkeley: An Interpretation Oxford: Clarendon Press,  Wright, Edmond (ed.) New Representationalisms: Essays in the Philosophy of Perception Avebury Series in Philosophy Aldershot: Avebury,  Wright, John P The Sceptical Realism of David Hume Manchester: Manchester University Press,  Yolton, John W Locke and the Compass of Human Understanding Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,  Locke and French Materialism Oxford: Clarendon Press,  A Locke Dictionary Oxford: Blackwell,  Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Oxford: Blackwell,  Bibliography  Thinking Matter: Materialism in Eighteenth-Century Britain Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press; Oxford: Blackwell,  “Schoolmen, Logic and Philosophy,” in The History of the University of Oxford, vol , ed L S Sutherland and L G Mitchell (Oxford: Clarendon Press, ), ch , pp – Perception and Reality: A History from Descartes to Kant Ithaca: Cornell University Press,  Index Ackerman, Diane,  action, , , –, , , , , , , ,  and behavior,  and body motion,  human, , ,  of the mind,  moral, , , , ,  of moving limbs,  and persons,  Adam, ,  anatomy, n,  Aristotelian system,  Aristotelian logic,  Aristotelian notion of form,  Armstrong, David,  Arnauld, Antoine, xii, xiii, , , n, , ,  atheism,  awareness, , , , , , ,  of abilities,  of actions,  cause of,  conscious, , ,  contents of, ,  of perceptions,  perceptual, , , , ,  phenomena of,  of objects, n, , ,  of the relation of ideas,  sensory,  Behan, David, n, n, n belief, , , , , , , , , ,  Berkeley, George, xii, xiii, n, , , , , , , , , , ,  on existence in the mind, ,  ideas as objects in, n,  his realism, ,  role of notions in his philosophy, – Bible,  biology, ,  Blakselee, Sandra, n Bonnet, Charles,  Boyle, Robert,  Bracken, Harry M.,  Bradley, F H., ,  brain, , , , , , , , , , , ,  epistemic pathways in, ,  and mind, ,  motion in, , , , , n motion as signs, ,  and neural events, xiii and neural networks, ,  physical and mental states of, , ,  properties of, ,  thought as a property of,  brain states, , , n, , , ,  Broadie, Alexander, n causality agent, ,  of events,  free, , ,  natural,  universal,  causation, , , , , , , , ,  of action,  agent, xii mental, ,  of perception,  physical, ,  of sense experience,  of sensory ideas,  causes chain of, ,  real,  universal and necessary,  Chalmers, David J., , n, – Churchland, Paul, , , , –, –, n, n, ,    Index Clarke, Samuel, n cohesion, , , n Collier, Arthur, n consciousness, , n, , , , n, , , , , , , , ,  corpuscles, , , , n, ,  corpuscular hypothesis, ,  corpuscular power,  corpuscular structure, , , , , , n, , ,  corpuscular theory, , n corpuscularianism,  Coulter, Jeff, n Crane, Tim, n Cudworth, Ralph, , , n Culverwel, Nathanael,  Cummins, Philip D., n experience, xiii, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  cognitive,  conscious, , , , , ,  and observation, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  outer,  perceptual, , , n phenomenal, ,  sense, , ,  visual, ,  explanation, ,  causal, ,  of cognition,  of consciousness,  physiological,  Davidson, Donald, n Deely, John, n, , n, , , – deists,  Descartes, René, xi, xii, xiii, , , , , n, , , , n and objective reality, , , , , , , , , ,  sign-relation between brain and mind, , , ,  Diderot, Denis, xii, , ,  dualism, , , , ,  of properties, ,  fate,  Favrholdt, David, xiii Feder, Johann,  Fields, Howard, n Flage, Daniel F., – Foster, John, n freedom, ,  elasticity, ,  “the epistemic shift,” ,  Erneling, Christina E., n “esse est percipi,” , , n,  essences nominal, ,  real, , ,  ethics, ,  events brain, , , , , , , , , , , ,  causal chains of,  cognitive, xiii, , ,  empirical series of,  internal,  mental, , , , ,  natural, ,  neural, xiii, , , , , , ,  physical, xiii, , , , , , , , , , ,  psychological, ,  sensible,  successions of,  Garrett, Don, n Gaukroger, Stephen, n Gillet, Grant, , n, n, – Glanvill, Joseph, ,  God, xi, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  the cause of all action,  Gram, Moltke S., n gravity, ,  Green, T H., n, n Grosse, T H., n, n Grove, Henry, , ,  Hardin, Clyde, , , –, , ,  Herbert, Edward, Baron Herbert of Cherbury,  Hobbes, Thomas, , , ,  Holbach, Paul-Henri Dietrich, xii,  Homer,  Hume, David, xii, xiii, , n, , , n, , ,  his account of perceptual awareness, – the being of objects in the mind, ,  the ordinary view of our knowledge of the external world, , ,  perceptions as objects, ,  on the person or self, n Index his references to springs and principles and powers, –, ,  idealism, ,  subjective, xiii transcendental, xiii ideas, xii, , , , , , , ,  acquisition of, ,  as appearances, xiii Berkeley's special sense of,  causation of,  idealistic implications of,  as the immediate objects of perceptions,  as modes of mind,  as modes of substances,  as objects,  of objects,  relation of,  sensory, ,  as signs, , ,  theory of, ,  as things, ,  true and false,  veil of, xi identity,  image, , , ,  imagination, , , , ,  impressions, , , , , , , , , , , , ,  internal,  original,  sense, , ,  simple,  information, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  intentions, , , ,  interaction causal,  significatory, , ,  Jackson, Frank, , , –, ,  Jessop, T E., n John of St Thomas, Saint, see Poinsot Johnson, David Martel, n Johnson, Samuel, n Kant, Immanuel, xii, xiii, , , , , ,  his concepts of person and action, , , , , –, –,  the relation of affection, xii, n, ,  and representations, , ,  knowledge, xii, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,   of bodies,  of causes,  demonstrative,  experiential,  of external objects, xi, , , , ,  of the external world, , , , , , ,  limited to experience, ,  Locke's definition of,  moral,  of truths,  of powers,  of real essence, n representative theory of,  of self,  sources of, – Kripke, Saul,  La Mettrie, Julien Offray de,  language, , , , , , , , , , , , , –, , , , ,  first beginners of,  of ideas, , , ,  learning of, , ,  of mind, ,  ontological, xii,  ordinary, ,  phenomenal, ,  psychological,  of reality,  Laslett, Peter, n laws, , ,  civil and religious,  natural,  of nature,  physical,  of physics,  psychophysical,  Leibniz, G W., ,  Levine, Joseph, n Lewis, C I., n liberty, , ,  Lloyd, A C.,  Locke, John, xi, xii, xiii, , , , , , , –, –, n, , , ,  his account of the person, – on actions, , n ideas and words as signs in, – ideas as objects, –, ,  on the nature of the objects we perceive, – necessary connections in nature, – on notions, –,  on real essence, , n  Index Locke, John (cont.) his suggestion about thinking matter, –, , ,  logic, ,  Lowe, E J., , , –, n, , , –, , n Luce, A A., n McDowell, John, , , n, – Malebranche, Nicolas, xii, , , , n, n, ,  materialism, , n, , , , , ,  French, xii Hobbes's,  reductive, xiii matter, , , , , , , , n, n, ,  active, xi, ,  concept of, ,  corpuscular, xi, , , , ,  as force and power, xi, , , , n idea of,  immaterialized,  organized, , , ,  structure and parts of,  thinking, xi, xii, , , , ,  Mayne, Charles, n Mayne, Zachary, n Maynwaring, Everard, n memory, , , ,  mental action, ,  mental contents, , , , , , , ,  mental processes,  mental states, n, , , , , , , , , ,  causal properties of,  metaphysics, , , , , , ,  Miller, Eugene, n Millikan, Ruth Garrett, n mind, xi, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  appearances in, ,  concept of,  its essence unknown,  philosophy of, xii Mitchell, L G., n morality, , , ,  and responsibility,  traditional, xi Nagel, Thomas, , , , n, n necessary connection, , , , , n, ,  nerves, , , , , , , ,  and brain, , ,  neural pathways, , ,  neural processes, ,  neural analogs, , , ,  neural networks, , , , , ,  neurophysiology, , , , , , , , n of the person,  neuroscience, , , , , , , , ,  Newton, Isaac, , n Nidditch, P H., n Noah,  “no cognition at a distance,” xi,  Norris, John,  notions, , , , see also Locke acquisition of,  Berkeley's use of, – Oakes, Robert, n objects, , ,  appearances of, , ,  appearing to the senses, ,  of awareness, n changeable,  of cognition, n conjunctions of,  empirical, ,  of experience, ,  external, xi, , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  Hume's discussion of, –, , n, ,  immediate,  independent,  internal,  as known, xii,  material, , , ,  of the mind, ,  in the mind, , , , , , ,  natural, ,  nonphysical,  ordinary, , , , , ,  outward, ,  perceived,  of perception,  as perceptions, ,  physical, xii, , , , , , , , , , , , , , n, , , , ,  private, n psychological,  sensible, , , ,  spatial,  Index succession of, , ,  tangible, ,  their role in perception,  of thought, , ,  unknown,  visible,  in the world,  occasionalism, xi, ,  Ockham, William,  Odense University (Denmark), xiii Parfit, Derek,  particles, , , , ,  Pasnau, Robert, , n, n, n, , , , ,  Peirce, C S., n,  perception, , , , , , , , , , ,  causal theory of, , , ,  conscious, , ,  representative theory of, , , , , n,  theory of, xi, , , , n perceptions, , , , , , , , , ,  groups of,  Hume's discussion of, – internal,  as objects, , , , , ,  person, , , , , , , –, , , , , , , ,  as actor,  as agent of actions, , ,  and man, ,  personal identity, , ,  phenomena, , , , , ,  cognitive,  conscious, , , , ,  experienced,  of human action,  mental, , , ,  of nature,  neural, ,  visible,  phenomenalism,  phenomenology, xiii, , , ,  physical influence theory of, xi physiology, , , , ,  Poinsot, John (John of St Thomas), n, ,  powers, , , , , , , , , , n, , , ,  of bodies, ,  causal, ,  common,   concept of,  hidden, , ,  mental, ,  of the mind,  natural, , , , , ,  objective,  of objects, , , ,  and real causes,  of the understanding,  unknown,  vulgar idea of, ,  pre-established harmony, xi, , , ,  presence cognitive, ,  epistemic, xii Hume's notion of,  of objects,  spatial,  to or with the mind, xi, xii, , , , , , , , , , ,  to perceivers,  to the senses,  to the understanding,  Priestley, Joseph, , , ,  probability, , , ,  of causes,  properties, , , , ,  of bodies, ,  of the brain, , ,  causal, ,  external,  of God,  mental, ,  of the mind, , , ,  of objects, , , ,  phenomenal,  physical,  of substance, ,  of things, , ,  psychological states,  psychology cognitive, xii,  vocabulary of,  qualia, , , , , n, , ,  epiphenomenal, n perceived,  sense, , , , , , ,  qualities, , , , , , ,  coexisting, xii, , , , , , ,  groups of, ,  of matter, n of objects, , , , , , , n,   qualities (cont.) observed,  perceived, , ,  phenomenal, ,  physical,  primary, , , , , , n, , ,  secondary, , , , , , , ,  sense, ,  sensible, n, , , , , , n,  realism, xii, , , ,  of appearances, xii, , , – direct, , , , , ,  empirical, xii epistemic, xii indirect, , n,  of objects,  skeptical,  of substance, n transcendental, xii reflection, , , ,  Reid, Thomas, xi relation, , ,  of affection, xii, –, , ,  between appearance and reality,  between brain and mind, ,  between consciousness and the brain,  between ideas and impressions,  between ideas and objects, xi between mentality and physicality, xii between notions and ideas,  between perceivers and the world, , , ,  between physical events and perceptual appearances,  between reality and appearance,  between motives and actions,  causal, xi, , , , , , , , , , , , ,  of coexistence,  cognitive,  epistemic, xi,  of ideas, ,  of identity,  mind–body,  mind–brain,  of necessary connection,  representative, ,  semantic, , , , ,  sign, , , , ,  of things,  representationalism,  representations, , , , , , ,  and realism, xii Index Robinson, Howard, , –, , n Russell, Bertrand, n Sassen, Brigitte,  Savellos, Elias S., n scholastic theories,  scholastic writers,  scholastics, , ,  sign theory,  Schøsler, Jørn, xiii science, , , , , , , , , ,  demonstrative,  experiential,  of man, ,  of nature,  physical, , , ,  Searle, John,  secret springs and principles, , –, , ,  Selby-Bigge, L A., n self, , , , , , , , ,  semiotics, n,  sensations, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,  sense organs, ,  sensible things, , , , ,  Sergeant, John,  signs, , , n, ,  concept of, ,  doctrine of, , , , , , ,  formal,  ideas as, ,  Locke's account of, – meaningful,  natural, n theory of, n,  words as, , , ,  skepticism, , , , , , , , , n,  skeptics,  Smith, N K., n soul, , , , , , n, ,  and body,  immateriality of, xi seat of,  space, , , , , ,  idea of,  species, , , , , ,  intelligible, ,  sensible,  Spinoza, Baruch, , , , , n,  spirits, , , , , , , ,  animal, , , n, ,  immaterial, ,  Index Strawson, Galen, n substance, , , , , , , , , –, , , , , , ,  extended,  immaterial, xi, , , , , , ,  insensible,  material, , , , , ,  psychological, ,  spiritual, ,  supervenience, , , – Sutherland, L S., n Sutton, John, n, n, n Thomas Aquinas, Saint, , ,  Thomistic system,  Toland, John,  Tomida, Yasuhiko, –,  truth, , , ,  Uexküll, Jacob von, n Valberg, J J., n Wilkins, John,  Winkler, Kenneth P., , , n, –  world, ,  empirical,  of experience,  external, , , , , , , , , , ,  of external objects,  Hume's, ,  intellectual, , ,  internal, ,  the known, ,  material, , , ,  moral,  natural, , , ,  of nature,  observable,  observed,  phenomenal,  physical, , , , , , , , , , ,  sensible,  Wright, Edmund, n, n Wright, John P.,  Yalỗin, ĩmit D., n Zửller, Gỹnter, n ... of distinctions between phenomena and causes, causes and meaning, and persons and man He explores in detail how Locke, Berkeley and Hume talk of appearances and their relation to reality, and offers... in cognitive psychology and philosophy of mind can illuminate the theories and doctrines of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers A good, detailed and accurate knowledge and understanding... important issue in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writings, the relation between physical processes in the environment and the brain and processes of thinking, perceiving, seeing, etc In particular,