P1: IML/IKJ P2: IML/UKS 05211555132PRE CY064-Davis QC: IML/UKS July 14, 2002 T1: IML 11:6 This page intentionally left blank ii P1: IML/IKJ P2: IML/UKS 05211555132PRE CY064-Davis QC: IML/UKS July 14, 2002 T1: IML 11:6 Meaning, Expression, and Thought This philosophical treatise on the foundations of semantics is a systematic effort to clarify, deepen, and defend the classical doctrine that words are conventional signs of mental states, principally thoughts and ideas, and that meaning consists in their expression This expression theory of meaning is developed by carrying out the Gricean program, explaining what it is for words to have meaning in terms of speaker meaning, and what it is for a speaker to mean something in terms of intention But Grice’s own formulations are rejected, and alternatives are developed The foundations of the expression theory are explored at length, and the author develops the theory of thought as a fundamental cognitive phenomenon distinct from belief and desire and argues for the thesis that thoughts have parts, identifying ideas or concepts with parts of thoughts This book will appeal to students and professionals interested in the philosophy of language Wayne A Davis is a professor of philosophy at Georgetown University i P1: IML/IKJ P2: IML/UKS 05211555132PRE CY064-Davis QC: IML/UKS July 14, 2002 T1: IML 11:6 ii P1: IML/IKJ P2: IML/UKS 05211555132PRE QC: IML/UKS CY064-Davis T1: IML July 14, 2002 11:6 cambridge studies in philosophy General editor ernest sosa (Brown University) Advisory editors: jonathan dancy (University of Reading) john haldane (University of St Andrews) gilbert harman (Princeton University) frank jackson (Australian National University) william g lycan (University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill) sydney shoemaker (Cornell University) judith j thomson (Massachusetts Institute of Technology) recent titles barry maund Colours michael devitt Coming to Our Senses michael zimmerman The Concept of Moral Obligation michael stocker with elizabeth hegeman Valuing Emotions sydney shoemaker The First-Person Perspective and Other Essays norton nelkin Consciousness and the Origins of Thought mark lance and john o’leary hawthorne The Grammar of Meaning d m armstrong A World of States of Affairs pierre jacob What Minds Can Do andre gallois The World Without the Mind Within fred feldman Utilitarianism, Hedonism, and Desert laurence bonjour In Defense of Pure Reason david lewis Papers in Philosophical Logic wayne davis Implicature david cockburn Other Times david lewis Papers on Metaphysics and Epistemology raymond martin Self-Concern annette barnes Seeing Through Self-Deception michael bratman Faces of Intention amie thomasson Fiction and Metaphysics david lewis Papers on Ethics and Social Philosophy fred dretske Perception, Knowledge and Belief lynne rudder baker Persons and Bodies john greco Putting Skeptics in Their Place derk pereboom Living Without Free Will brian ellis Scientific Essentialism richard foley Intellectual Trust in Oneself and Others alan goldman Practical Rules iii P1: IML/IKJ P2: IML/UKS 05211555132PRE CY064-Davis QC: IML/UKS July 14, 2002 T1: IML 11:6 iv P1: IML/IKJ P2: IML/UKS 05211555132PRE CY064-Davis QC: IML/UKS July 14, 2002 T1: IML 11:6 Meaning, Expression, and Thought WAYNE A DAVIS Georgetown University v Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, São Paulo Cambridge University Press The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge , United Kingdom Published in the United States by Cambridge University Press, New York www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521555135 © Wayne A Davis 2003 This book is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provision of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press First published in print format 2003 ISBN-13 978-0-511-06779-2 eBook (EBL) ISBN-10 0-511-06779-8 eBook (EBL) ISBN-13 978-0-521-55513-5 hardback ISBN-10 0-521-55513-2 hardback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of s for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate P1: IML/IKJ P2: IML/UKS 05211555132PRE CY064-Davis QC: IML/UKS July 14, 2002 T1: IML 11:6 Dedicated to David K Lewis, model philosopher, with deep gratitude vii P1: IML/IKJ P2: IML/UKS 05211555132PRE CY064-Davis QC: IML/UKS July 14, 2002 T1: IML 11:6 viii P1: FCH 0521555132REF CY064-Davis July 14, 2002 6:42 Smith, D V et al (1952) The English Language Arts New York: Appleton-CenturyCrofts Prepared by the Commission on the English Curriculum of the National Council of Teachers of English Smith, D W (1981) Indexical sense and reference Synthese, 49, 101–28 Smith, D W (1982) Husserl on demonstrative reference and perception In Husserl, Intentionality, and Cognitive 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see also convention Aristotle, 1–3, 16, 193, 304, 452, 448n, 461n, 499, 563 Armstrong, D M., 66, 179 Arnauld, A., 2, 164, 226, 405, 482, 486, 555n asserting, 31 associated refutation, 262–263 association, 304, 311–312, 461–480 associative networks, 470–473 conditioning, 468–469 connectionist models, 477–480 versus constituency, 473–476 definition, 462–465 explanatory power, 466–469 laws, 304, 465–466 predictive power, 470 propositional networks, 474–476 prototype structures, 515–516 associationism, 3, 311, 461–462, 470, 547 atomic ideas, 411, 413–416, 429–430, 450, 508, 518 audience, 67 Augustine, 2, 23n Austin, J L., 167, 556n Avramides, A., 568–569, 579, 588n Bach, K., 205, 250 Barwise, J., 563–566 belief, 98–99 actual versus potential, 324, 328–329 connectionist models, 479–480 content, 540–542, 542–547 general constituency thesis, 399–403 objects of (propositions), 331 occurrent versus dispositional, 321–326 Stich’s sentential analysis, 338–339, 539–540 versus thought, 6, 27, 296–312, 326–327 unconscious, 325–326 ways of believing, 352, 546 belief-desire-action rule, 304–305 Bennett, J., 74–75, 83, 178, 186, 572 Berkeley, G., 484n, 488n, 568, 569 Blackburn, S., 178, 231, 284, 570–571, 579–580, 603, 604 Block, N., 183 Bloomfield, L., 275, 582n Brentano, F., 116, 407 Burge, T., 113–114, 361, 407, 487n Carruthers, P., 191 Cartwright’s problem, 556 causal theory of reference, 117 645 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 7:35 Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet, 175, 556n Chomsky, N., 84, 166, 210, 226, 233, 239, 240, 260, 261, 329, 389, 547, 580, 582 Church, A., 358 Churchland, P M., 5, 376, 542 Clark, A., 390 Clark, H H., 245 Clark and Marshall situation, 53, 66 classical theory, 414, 419, 516–517; see also ideas, conceptualist theory; ideas, definability; universals, conceptualist theory classification, 191, 409, 433, 505 codes, 21, 32, 92, 192, 363–364 cogitative speaker meaning, see speaker meaning, cogitative cognitive speaker meaning, see speaker meaning, cognitive commitment, 75–79 communication, 85–99 versus attempting to communicate, 86, 89, 95–96 as common interest sustaining linguistic conventions, 198, 220 definitions, 90, 94 as effective expression, 94 expression-communication equivalence, 201–202 Gricean analysis, 86–87 objects of, 94, 97–98 overtness of, 90 versus recognition of intention, 95–96 versus speaker meaning, 67, 85–86 successful, 95–96 to versus with, 88–92, 93–96 transmission model, 96–99 understanding condition, 87–88, 198 complex ideas, 411, 413–416, 430, 450, 508, 518 compositionality, 140–141, 229–264, 333, 357 definition, 387–388 as evidence for constituency thesis, 387–388, 397–399 exceptions to, 231, 565–566 objections to, 247–257 referential versus semantic, 147 versus sentential primacy thesis, 181, 183 computational content theories, 542–547; see also language of thought hypothesis computational process theories, 308, 547–550; see also language of thought hypothesis concept, see ideas concept acquisition, 435 by abstraction (observation), 448, 455–460 by abstractive thought, 449 by communication, 448 versus concept creation, 449–450 versus concept learning, 451–454, 529–531 versus conception acquisition, 453–454 by constructive thought, 448–449 empiricist theory, 435, 451–452 versus word meaning learning, 454 concept creation, 449–450 concept learning, 451–454, 529–531 concept mastery, 444–445 concept possession, 428–446, 505 definition, 428–430 inferentialist theories, 441–442 information semantics, 436–438, 455 knowledge theory, 439–441 memory theory, 438–439 nominalist theories, 432–433 recognition theories, 433–436 theorems, 430–431 concept understanding, 442–446, 505 versus word understanding, 587 conception, see thought; ideas conceptions, 35, 128, 416, 500–518 activation, 506 cognitive versus cogitative, 500 versus concepts (ideas), 35, 128, 416, 431, 443, 453, 503–509, 515 definition, 501–503 grasping (understanding) concepts, 505 individuation, 507 inferential system structure, 506–507 versus meanings, 511–513 motivational role, 504 mutability, 508 noncompositionality, 511–513, 516 nonuniqueness, 503 prototype structure, 506, 513–517 versus reference determiners, 511 semantic properties, 503–504 Condillac, E B de, 509, 520n connectionism, 390–393 connotation, 4; see also situation semantics constituency thesis, 368–406 compositionality, 387–388, 397–399 connectionist thesis, 390–393 co-occurrence relations, 382–383, 395–396 correlation thesis, 380–389 feature thesis, 379–380, 394–397 general constituency thesis, 399–403 genus thesis, 380 introspective integration, 381–382 mereological versus logical containment, 404–406 phrase-structure syntax, 388–389 productivity, 384–386, 389 646 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 referential and representational dependencies, 386–387 similarity relations, 382, 396 subpropositional constituents, 393–399 systematic relations, 383–384, 396–397 systematicity, 384–386, 400–401, 430 content, referential versus nonreferential sense, 422, 423; see also ideas, content; thoughts, content conventions, 192, 195, 204–228; see also implicature, conventional; word meaning, conventional versus accidental correlations, 194, 209, 241 versus agreements, 204–5 arbitrariness of, 212–215, 222 association in, 209 communication, 220 correct usage, 219–225, 284 definition, 206 enculturation in, 210 habit in, 209–210 nonspecific, 244–247 normative force of, 211, 222, 224 precedent in, 208 rationality of, 208–209 regularity requirement, 216–219 rules, 205, 216, 223 self-perpetuation requirement, 207–212 social pressure in, 211 social utility requirement, 207, 218 versus stipulations, 283 of truthfulness, 288–292 variation by community, 266 conveying, 56 correct usage, 219–225; see also conventions Cowie, A P., 252 creativity, 389 Creoles, 283; see also languages Crimmins, M., 402–404, 423n, 410n, 446, 565 Cruse, D A., 252 customs individual, 286–287 social, see conventions Daniels and Bright, 138, 208 Davidson, D., 159, 338, 348, 563 declarative thoughts, see propositions; thoughts, propositional versus nonpropositional deep structure, 139, 236, 239, 335, 580; see also surface structure definite descriptions, 26, 103–104 referential versus attributive interpretation, 103–104, 244 definition, 12–16, 99, 600–602 7:35 definitional circularity objection, 588–594 Dennett, D C., 385, 520n de re versus de dicto attitudes, 10; see also opaque-transparent distinction Descartes, R., 2, 407, 452, 482–483, 485, 489 Devitt, M., 14, 523, 580 dialects, 134–137; see also languages disquotation principle, 340–341 distraction, 304, 306, 308 Dretske, F., 436 Dummett, M., 178–179, 181, 567 eliminative materialism, ellipsis, 21, 32, 81 empiricism, 435; see also concept acquisition, empiricist theory Esperanto, 269–270, 284 Evans, G., 175, 429, 430n, 436, 441 Evans, J., 441–442, 444 evidential expression, 43 and indication, 53 evidential meaning, 19–20 conventional versus natural, 22–23 and indication, 20, 45 expression, 43–44; See also evidential expression; speaker expression; word expression expression-communication equivalence, 201–202, 238 expression-indication equivalence, 202–203, 238 expression structures, 234 expression theory of meaning, 1–4, 553–555, 591 expressions, 22, 160–161 extensional contexts, 116; see also intensional contexts; intentionality extensions, 345, 352, 422–425, 426, 526–527 Fasold, R., 220 fiction, 26–27, 79–80, 82–83, 190 Field, H., 572–573, 589 figurative use, 21, 26, 32–33, 79–80, 190, 290 first law of occurrence, 326–330, 430–431, 532 Fodor, J A., 149, 230, 252, 311, 324, 377, 433n, 428, 515 argument for innate ideas, 452–454 argument from systematicity, 384–386, 401 information semantics, 436–438, 455 language of thought hypothesis, 401–402, 524n, 527, 528–535 lexical primitiveness thesis, 415–416, 508 Forbes, G., 349–351, 566–567 forgetfulness, 304, 306, 308 formalist theory of mind, 548–550 647 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 7:35 Frege, G., 4, 175–176, 314–317, 486, 520 definition of thought, 343n on ideas, 568–569 on indirect discourse, 563–567 Frege’s problem, 170, 351–352 Geach, P T., 429n, 434, 436, 457 generality constraint, 430n; see also constituency thesis, systematicity generative structure, 333 Gilbert, M., 214 Graham, G., 468 grammaticality restriction, 256–260; see also word meaning Green, O H., 60 Grice, H P., 7–8, 22, 159 analysis of cogitative speaker meaning, 81–82 analysis of cognitive speaker meaning, 63–75 analysis of communication, 86–88 analysis of word meaning, 166–170, 174–175, 177 implicature theory, 241–244 program, 7–8, 83 on subsentential word meaning, 185 Hamlyn, D W., 432 Hampshire, S., 60 Harman, G., 88, 521 Harnish, R., 205 Harrison, G., 49 Hawthorne, J (O’Leary), 224, 325 Heath, P L., 556n, 582n hidden language theories, 533–535; see also language of thought hypothesis higher-order intentions, 71–75, 228 Hobbes, T., 2, 22–23, 165, 193, 203, 555n, 562, 563 Holdcroft, D., 73 Horwich, P., 100, 146, 165, 173, 484n, 557n Hugly and Sayword, 179–180 Hume, D., 206, 213, 488n, 569 Hungerland and Vick, 68 Husserl, E., 69, 407, 484n, 487n idea structures, 234 ideas (concepts), 35, 127, 317; see also thoughts abstractness, 492, 494 activation, 463 association, 461–480; see also association atomic (simple) versus complex, 411, 413–416, 429–430, 450, 508, 518 Cartesian definition, 378, 417, 419, 482–488 causal role, 504–505; see also thought, causal role conceiving concepts, 416–419 conceiving of objects, 417 concept acquisition, 447–460; see also concept acquisition concept possession, 402, 428–446; see also concept possession versus conceptions, 35, 128, 416, 431, 443, 453, 500–518 conceptualist theory, 419, 484 content, 419–422, 525–526, 535–542, 542–547, 560–561 versus contents, 487–488 definability, 414–416, 516–517 definition, 407–413 expressing, 34–37, 58 extension, 422–425, 526–527, 606 identity conditions, 574–578 ideo-reflexive reference, 37, 141–151; see also ideo-reflexive reference versus images, 35, 128, 488–499, 567–571 immutability, 508 individuation, 422, 426, 308–309, 488 innate, 376, 451–452, 455 versus meanings, 128–129, 132, 454, 555–557, 560–561 object, 419–422 occurrence, 318, 416–419, 462–463, 450–451, 575–576, 584 Ockham-Reid definition, 417 Perry’s definition, 402–404, 410 phrase structure, 388–389, 506 privacy, 571–572 propositional versus subpropositional, 393–399, 416 referential properties, 9, 141, 422–425, 526–527, 606–607 representational properties, 419–422, 526–527 semantic properties, 494, 503–504 singular versus general, 409 types versus tokens, 410, 418, 492 uniqueness, 410, 492–493, 501–502 versus universals, 419 versus words, 410, 582–584 ideational semantics, 606–607 ideational theories of meaning, 4, 6, 553–555 definitional circularity objection, 588–594 Fregean theories, 555 identity objection, 574–578 incompleteness objections, 599–607 metalinguistic circularity objection, 594–598 648 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 naming objection, 562–567 non-entity objection, 555–561 privacy objection, 571–574 reflection-or-ignorance objection, 580–586 regress objection, 586–588 sensationist objection, 567–571 synonymy objection, 572–574 identification, 409, 433 identity conditions, 574–578 identity objection, 574–578 ideo-reflexive reference, 36–37, 141–151, 307, 345–351, 409–410, 585–586, 594–597 Davidson’s theory, 348 Forbes’s theory, 349–351 Frege’s theory, 563–567 oratio recta versus oratio obliqua form, 27, 147–149, 151, 297–298, 337, 410 idiolects, 9, 286–288; see also languages idioms, 229, 233, 252; see also word meaning illocutionary acts, 75, 77, 167 images, 35, 128, 488–499 imagining, 494 implication (speaker), 24–25, 29–30 implicature, 241–244, 245 conversational versus conventional, 242, 243 sentence versus speaker, 242 impure use, 358–359 incompleteness objections, 599–607 indexical expressions, 38, 81, 110, 113, 142, 190, 326, 340, 355, 523 indexical thoughts, 97, 523 indication, 44–46, 69 expression-indication equivalence, 202–203 individuation, 422, 507, 574–578; see also conceptions, individuation; ideas, individuation; thoughts, individuation inference, 311, 506–507, 547–550 inferential semantics, 183, 441–442 inferentialism, 183, 441–442, 547–550 information semantics, 436–438, 455 informing, 67, 92–93 innateness, 284, 529–531 insincerity, 46, 73, 75 intensional contexts, 116, 171, 173, 351 intensions, 345, 353 intention, 50 to communicate, 86, 90 higher-order, 71–75, 228 primary, 51 recognition of, 70–71, 95–96 role in expression, 47–54 self-referential, 88 7:35 to produce belief, 64–70, 87 to provide indications, 47–49, 68–70 intentionality (Brentano’s sense), 116–118; see also intensional contexts essential indefiniteness, 116–117 failures of existential instantiation, 116, 421 failures of substitutivity of identity, 116, 420 intentional contexts, 116, 352 intentional objects, 319, 425, 482–488, 489 of meanings, 560–561 versus relationality, 116, 117, 420–421, 422–425 interjections, 40, 42, 127, 134 interpretation, see understanding; use-interpretation equivalences irony, 21, 26, 32, 82 James, W., 461n, 466 Kant, I., 405–406 Katz, J J., 197, 230, 252, 254, 256, 261, 406n, 407, 415, 581 Kittay, E., 254 Kretzmann, N., 562 Kripke, S., 101, 113, 224 Kripke’s puzzle, 113, 341–342 problem of normativity, 224 Wittgensteinian critique, 569–570 Lahav, R., 251 Lance, M., 28, 224 Landau, S I., 190, 194, 219–220, 221, 258 language, 125 origins of, 589–590 language of thought hypothesis, 6, 401–402, 519–550 alphabet of human thought, 519, 537 computational content theories, 542–547 computational process theories, 308, 547–550 hidden language theories, 533–535 innateness, 529–531 language thought in, 520 mental language theories, 524–533 as model of mental representation, 519 natural language theories, 521–524 neural code, 520 uninterpreted language theories, 535–542 languages, 9, 92, 125 artificial, 9, 131, 267–268, 282–286 boundaries, 276–280 change in, 136 convention-dependent, 131, 267–271 creativity, 389 Creoles, 283 649 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 7:35 languages (cont.) dead, 131, 267–268, 280–282 definition, 130, 271, 283–284, 288 dialects, 134–137, 154, 157–158, 220–221, 277–279 duality of patterning, 285 established, 131, 265 idiolects, 9, 286–288 innate, 284, 529–531 vesus language, 125 linguistic lineages, 272–276 linguistic relativity, 132, 265–267 living, 9, 265–292 models of, 126–129, 136–137 mutual intelligibility, 278 natural, 131, 282–286 object language versus metalanguage, 132, 266 pidgin, 283 productivity, 230–231, 255, 285, 384–386, 389 rules of, 137–141, 229, 234 sign languages, 270, 284, 285 truthfulness convention requirement, 288 unit of difference, 277–278 use of, 152–158, 271 variation in, 134–137, 157–158 written versus spoken, 138–139, 269, 275–276, 285 latitudinarianism, 108–109, 120; see also opaque-transparent distinction Laurence, S., 165, 210, 525 laws of occurrence first law, 326–330, 430–431, 532 second law, 307, 430, 505 third law, 450–451 Lehrer, A., 258 Leibniz, G., 404, 451, 482, 519–520, 537 Leibniz’s law, 574–575 Lewis, D., 125, 126, 153n, 606n on conventions, 206, 208, 218, 225–228 on conventions of truthfulness, 288–292 equilibrium condition, 225–226 mutual knowledge requirement, 226–228 lexical primitiveness thesis, 415–416, 508 lexicography, 194, 208, 219, 220 linguistic intuition, 200 linguistic lineages, 272–276; see also languages linguistic relativity, 132, 265–267; see also languages Linsky, L., 574 Loar, B., 239–241, 244, 440, 482, 537n Locke, J., 3, 7, 16, 193, 203, 451, 448n, 484, 555n, 563, 568, 571 Lycan, W., 524n, 526 Lyons, J., 187, 226, 595 Malcolm, N., 327 Maloney, J., 524 Margolis, E., 523 materialism, 5, 11, 602–606 Mates objection, 356–367, 575 Church’s reply, 358 impure use, 358–359 inexact synonyms, 359–367 Sellars’s reply, 359 Soames’s reply, 364–365 standard reply, 358 McDowell, J., 50 McGinn, C., 303 meaning, senses and kinds of, 19–25, 29, 41, 42, 292; see also evidential meaning; speaker meaning; word meaning meanings as idea contents, 560–561 versus ideas, 6, 128–129, 132, 454, 555–557 versus images, 567–571 as intentional objects, 560–561 as properties, 6, 557–558, 561–562 referential versus nonreferential sense, 558–560 Meinong, A., 485 mental language theories, 524–533; see also language of thought hypothesis metalinguistic circularity objection, 594–598 metaphor, see figurative use Mill, J., 413, 488n, 563 Mill, J S., 4, 562–563 Millikan, R., 98–99 modes of expression, 126, 129–130 modes of presentation, 352, 486 mutual intelligibility, 278 mutual knowledge, 88–89, 226–228 naming objection, 562–567 natural language theories, 521–524; see also language of thought hypothesis natural languages, 131, 282–286 Neale, S., 50 neo-Gricean analysis, see word meaning non-entity objection, 555–561 nonideational meaning, 40–42, 134 normativity, 224 noun compounds, 245 object nominals, 101, 149, 299, 318 occurrence, 56, 297, 312–313, 318 and expression, 56 laws of, 307–308, 370–371, 430–431, 450–451, 532 occurrent belief, 27, 321–326 650 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 occurrent thought, 312–313; see also thought Ockham, W., 2, 193, 417, 527, 563, 588n O’Leary-Hawthorn, J., 224, 325 opaque-transparent distinction, 10, 90, 104–116, 150, 319, 325, 329, 420, 422, 541–542 default interpretation, 115–116 Kripke’s puzzle, 113 latitudinarianism, 108–109, 120 transparent-to-opaque reduction formula, 108 oratio recta versus oratio obliqua, 27, 147–149, 151, 297–298, 337, 410 Peacocke, C., 78–79, 314, 373, 374, 378, 433n, 441, 445, 487, 590–592 pejorative terms, 40 Perry, J., 109, 402–403, 410n, 563–566 phrase structure, 332, 388–389, 506 physicalism, 5, 11, 602–606 pidgin languages, 283; see also languages Pitcher, G., 580 Place, U T., 603 Platts, M., 592 possible world semantics, 126, 351–353 practices individual, 286–287 social, see conventions pretense, 55, 565 Price, H H., 55, 418–419, 429n, 433n, 436, 438–439 priming, 464, 471, 472 privacy objection, 571–574 problem of error, 511 problem of ignorance, 511 productivity, 230–231, 255, 285, 384–386, 389 pronouns, see indexical expressions propositional attitudes, 295–296, 298, 331, 531–532; see also belief; thought propositions, 331, 342–345; see also thoughts and mental representations, 531–533 connectionist models, 476–479 definition, 343 expressing, 59 identity criterion, 354 negative existence criterion, 353 paradoxical, 343 the proposition that p, 345–367, 585–586; see also ideo-reflexive reference propositional networks, 474–476 prototype structure, 506, 513–517 punctuation marks, 42 Putnam, H., 100 brain in vat case, 117 hypothetical cat case, 197, 415, 507 Mates objection, 356n, 358 7:35 quantifying in, 118–121 variable convention, 120 Quine, W V O., 4, 107, 354n, 573, 574 reasoning 311, 547–550 Recanati, F., 73, 249–250 recognition, 70, 88, 94–96, 409, 438, 505 reference, see speaker reference; word reference referential theories of meaning, 4, 606–607 reflection-or-ignorance objection, 580–586 regress objection, 586–588 regularities, 216–219; see also convention Reid, T., 417, 448n, 483, 486–487, 555n, 594n relational objects, 320, 425 representation, 419–420, 526–527 relational versus intentional sense, 423–425 representations, 332, 408, 419–422, 510–511, 531–535 Richard, M., 108 rigid designators, 144 Ruhl, C., 251 rules, 205, 216, 223; see also conventions construction, 140–141, 234 for ideo-reflexive reference, 141–151 of language, 137–141 lexical, 234 rules-and-representations approach, 547–550 of warranted inference, 547 word formation, 258 Russell, B., 4, 170, 176–177, 205 Russell’s problem, 170, 351–352 Ryle, G., 302, 372, 375–376, 418–419, 498, 556n, 571, 579 Salmon, N., 362–363 saying, 31, 65, 92–93, 169 Schiffer, S., 15, 25, 67, 71, 83, 216, 327, 487n, 520n, 566, 574n, 585–586, 601 analysis of cogitative speaker meaning, 80–81 nominalist theory of concept possession, 433 Searle, John, 54, 75, 77, 82 second law of occurrence, 307, 430, 505 selection restrictions, 256, 261 self-perpetuation, 207–212; see also conventions self-referential intentions, 88 Sellars, W., 359, 495n, 588n semantic acts, semantic theorems, 353–355; see also Mates objection semantic universality assumption, 252 651 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 7:35 semantics, 1, 20, 386–387, 606; see also ideational semantics; inferential semantics; information semantics; possible world semantics; situation semantics sensationism, 488, 495 sensationist objection, 567–571 sentential analogy, 332–334, 369, 521 sentential primacy thesis, 9, 174–189, 238; see also word meaning sign languages, 270, 284, 285 signaling, 68 Simpson, J., 154 simulation, 54–56 covert versus overt, 55–56 semi-covert, 71 situation semantics, 351–353 situational extension, 352, 426 Smart, J J C., 603 Smith, E E., 516–517 Smolensky, P., 390 Soames, S., 364–365 social utility, 207; see also conventions speaker expression, 30, 43, 58–62 as action, 39 versus conveying, 56 direct versus indirect, 29, 32–34, 102, 197, 244, 245 effective, 94 and indication, 44 insincere, 46 and intention, 47–53; see also intention versus meaning or implying, 30 and occurrence, 56–57 of propositions, 59 and public observability, 46 versus reference, 101–104 versus simulation, 55–56 verbal, 102, 152 speaker implication, 24–25, 29–30 speaker meaning, 8, 19–21 versus action, 39 without attempting to communicate, 74–75 without audience, 67–69 cogitative, 9, 25–29, 31–35, 36, 38, 79–84, 190, 244 cognitive, 9, 25–29, 63–75, 244 versus commitment, 75–79 conventional, 21; see also conventions definitions, 30, 38 established, 265 inclusive versus exclusive, 29, 32, 81, 102 Gricean analysis, 63–75 without mutual knowledge, 228 naive analysis, 21, 592–593 nonideational, 40–42, 134 versus reference, 101–104 versus simulation, 55 as species of intention, 39 versus truth conditions, 77–79 versus word meaning, 21, 355, 592–593 speaker reference, 100–121 as action, 39 ambiguities, 103–106 causal theory, 117 versus classification, 191 definition, 103 versus expression, 37, 101–104 as opaque and intentional, 104, 118, 151 versus speaker meaning, 101–103 speech act theory, 7–8 Sperber and Wilson, 290 Stampe, D., 71–74 Sterelny, K., 385, 454, 495n, 580, 601n, 606n Stich, S., 338–339, 535–542 Stillings and colleagues (Cognitive Science: An Introduction), 114–115, 427, 474, 605 stipulations, 283; see also word meaning Strawson, P., 71 subpropositional constituents, 393–399 surface structure, 139, 236, 335, 580; see also deep structure synonymy, 126, 133, 196–198, 334–335, 346, 529 degree of, 366 exact versus near, 360–362, 366–367 ideational identity criterion, 575 Mates objection, 356–367; see also Mates objection propositional identity criterion, 354 Quinean objections, 572–574 substitutivity principle, 356, 358 synonymy objection, 572–574 systematicity, 384–385; see also constituency thesis; thoughts systematization, 11 Tarski, J., 344 Tarskian theory, 344, 607 telling, 67, 92–93 that-clauses, 148–149 third law of occurrence, 450–451 thought (thinking) act-object ambiguity, 296, 426 association, 304; see also association versus belief, 6, 27, 296–312, 326–327 causal role, 304–310, 504 versus computation, 547–550 content, 425–427, 487, 525, 586 definition, 313 development, 530–531, 589–590 disquotation principle, 340–341 forgetfulness, 304, 306, 308 652 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 as intrinsic property, 301 versus imagining, 494 versus inference, 547–550 versus inner speech, 333, 495–499, 528–529 in a language, 498–499, 521 without language, 496, 589–590 language independence, 335–337 language of thought hypothesis, 519–550; see also language of thought hypothesis of objects, 317–321, 413, 417, 429, 481 objects, intentional, 319, 425, 482–488 objects, relational, 320, 425 occurrence laws, 307, 326–330, 370–371, 430–431 versus occurrent belief, 321–326 out loud, 302 privacy, 301–302, 571–572 as propositional attitude, 6, 296, 298, 330 qualitative character, 303, 411–412 quantitative features, 303–304 rationality, 306–307, 311, 312, 547–548 second-order, 321 versus sentential attitude, 298, 337–342 temporal features, 303–304, 371, 497 trains of thought, 310–311, 371 unconscious, 325–326 voluntary control, 308–310 thought-action rule, 305–307 thoughts, see also ideas as abstract objects, 314–315, 344, 374 cognitive parts, 411–412; see also ideas connectionist models, 476–479 content, 336, 412, 425–427, 525, 526, 535–542, 542–547, 603 as events, 6, 315 versus expressions (symbols), 525–533, 542–547 individuation, 309–309, 422, 426, 542–547 as introspectible, 99, 525, 581–582 language of thought hypothesis, 519–550; see also language of thought hypothesis as neurophysiological, 602–606 parts, 368–406; see also constituency thesis phrase structure, 332, 388–389, 506 propositional (declarative) versus nonpropositional, 34, 298–299, 331–332, 343–343 referential properties, 426, 533, 536, 546, 603–604 representational properties, 526–527, 603 as representations, 332, 526–527, 531–535 semantic properties, 412, 494, 526, 529, 535–542 versus sentences, 331–342, 522–524 7:35 as structured, 6, 332–333, 335, 344, 412, 519, 535–542, 542–547 subpropositional constituents, 393–399 syntactic properties, 412, 535–542, 542–547 Tarskian theory, 344, 607 temporal features, 371 the thought that p, 345–348; see also ideo-reflexive reference types versus tokens, 313–317, 344, 374–375, 531–533 as undefined, 599–602 as universals, 315–317, 344 Tienson, J., 393 tokens, 313–317, 344, 374–375, 410, 418, 492, 531–533 transmission model, 96–99; see also communication transparent interpretations, see opaque-transparent distinction transparent-to-opaque reduction formula, 108 truth conditions, 77–79, 606–607; see also ideational semantics; possible world semantics; situation semantics truthfulness convention, 288 types, 313–317, 344, 374–375, 410, 418, 492, 531–533 understanding (word), 8, 71, 87, 198–201, 255, 256, 287 versus concept understanding, 587 as condition of communication, 87, 94 linguistic intuition, 200 sentences, 584–585 theories, 95, 201 uninterpreted language theories, 535–542; see also language of thought hypothesis universals, 315–317 conceptualist theory, 419, 484 use-interpretation equivalences, 198–201, 238, 287 use theories, 9, 167, 191 Van Gelder, T., 390 Vendler, Z., 509–510 verificationism, 342, 582, 592–594 Vlach, F., 51 Wallace, J., 176 Weiskrantz, L., 496 Wettstein, H K., 51, 510–511 Whorf, B., 336 Wierzbicka, A., 62 Wittgenstein, L., 4, 54, 167, 175, 495n, 569–570 653 P1: FHB 0521555132IND-Davis 0521555132 July 14, 2002 7:35 Woodfield, A., 191, 501n, 502n word expression, 6, 43 definition, 131 versus naming and reference, 141–142, 346, 562–567 word formation rules, 258 word meaning, 6, 8, 19–20, 162–203 Alston’s analysis, 171–173, 177–178 analyticity, 196–198, 405 anomalous, 260–264 applied, 81, 158–161, 252 associational analyses, 164–166 autonomy of, 192 basic, 189–198 bestowal of, 292 compositionality, see compositionality conventional, 21–22, 192, 195; see also conventions definition, 132, 143, 148, 237, 272, 287–288, 556 explanation problem, 195 Fregean theories, 555–557 grammaticality restriction, 256–260 Gricean analysis, 166–170, 174–175, 177 versus idea content, 586–588, 588–594, 604 ideational theories, 553–555; see also ideational theories idiolectic, 286–288 idioms, 229, 233, 252 versus implicature conventions, 244 linguistic intuition, 200 neo-Gricean analysis, 189–191, 209, 212, 218, 223, 229 versus nonspecific conventions, 244–247 potential meaning analysis, 231–233 productivity problem, 230–231 recursive neo-Gricean analysis, 233–241, 257, 259, 264, 267, 270 relativity to languages, 9, 264–267 selection restrictions, 256, 261 semantic universality assumption, 252 sentential primacy thesis, 9, 174–189, 238 stipulative, 283 subsentential, 9, 174–189 token meaning, 160–161 translational theories, 586 truth conditional analysis, 170–174 use theories, 167–170 written versus spoken, 193 word reference, 9, 100, 141, 151–152 definition, 152 determinants, 511 referential semantics, 606–607 as transparent and relational, 118, 151 versus word meaning, 15, 170–171, 351–352 words, 163–164 world-sets, 126, 353; see also possible world semantics Yagisawa, T., 583–584, 588n Ziff, P, 34, 154, 166, 231, 278 654