A critical discourse analysis of “finest hour” speech of sir winston churchill = phân tích diễn ngôn phê phán bài phát biểu finest hour của sir winston churchill

VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI UNIVERSITY OF LANGUAGES & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FACULTY OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES NGUYỄN THỊ PHƯƠNG MAI A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF “FINEST HOUR” SPEECH BY SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL (Phân tích diễn ngơn phê phán phát biểu “Finest hour” Sir Winston Churchill) M.A THESIS PROGRAMME I Field : English Linguistics Code : 8220201.01 Hanoi - 2019 VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI UNIVERSITY OF LANGUAGES & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FACULTY OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES NGUYỄN THỊ PHƯƠNG MAI A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF “FINEST HOUR” SPEECH BY SIR WINSTON CHURCHILL (Phân tích diễn ngơn phê phán phát biểu “Finest hour” Sir Winston Churchill) M.A THESIS PROGRAMME I ` Field : English Linguistics Code : 8220201.01 Supervisor : Prof.Dr Nguyễn Hòa Hanoi - 2019 DECLARATION I hereby certify that I am the sole author of this thesis and that no part of this thesis has been published or submitted for publication I certify that, to the best of my knowledge, my thesis does not infringe upon anyone’s copyright nor violate any proprietary rights and that any ideas, techniques, quotations, or any other material from the work of other people included in my thesis, published or otherwise, are fully acknowledged in accordance with the standard referencing practices I declare that this is a true copy of my dissertations, including any final revisions, as approved by my thesis committee and the Post Graduate Studies office and that this thesis has not been submitted for a higher degree to any other University or Institution Hanoi, 2019 Nguyễn Thị Phương Mai i ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My achievement in completing this thesis would not have been possible without the people who were involved in this study To the following people who donated their time and energy to this study, I am grateful and thankful: First, I would like to offer my greatest appreciation to my supervisor, Professor Nguyễn Hòa His expertise and knowledge have guided me during the study He offered me his support which has been especially helpful to my academic work I also would like to thank my classmates for their advice and assistance in keeping my progress on schedule My great thankfulness is also given to the teachers of Post Graduate Faculty Studies for their ideas to my paper and many thanks to my family and all my friends who have encouraged and helped me during the time of analyzing data, information for the study ii ABSTRACT Politicians and orators employ words as weapons in order to exert ideological control and make an audience believe something in an ostensive way In this regard, this study attempted to discover the connection between language, power embraced in “Finest hour” speech by Sir Winston Churchill on June 18th, 1940, a crucial period for the outcome of the Second World War Based on a brief overview of critical discourse analysis provided by Norman Fairclough, the study followed a framework with three stages: Description, Interpretation, and Explanation It focused on the analysis of language features, the relationship between situational and intertextual context, and the discourse process and social process The results obtained support the idea that Churchill's skillful use of language is closely connected with his overall political goals of instilling courage, inspiring confidence and spark the national pride in his fellow countrymen in such difficult times for Britain as those of war against powerful Nazi Germany, and the fascism in general Keywords: Critical discourse analysis, political discourse, speech, ideology, language iii ABBREVIATIONS CDA: MR: Critical Discourse Analysis Member’s Resources iv TABLE OF CONTENT Declaration Error! Bookmark not defined Acknowledgments ii Abstract iii Abbreviations iv CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 1.1 Rationale 1.2 Scope of the study 1.3 Aims of the study 1.4 Significance of the study 1.5 Research methodology 1.5.1 Analytical framework 1.5.2 Data collection and analysis 1.6 Structure of the thesis CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW & THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 2.1 Discourse analysis 2.2 Critical discourse analysis 2.3 The virtue and limitations of CDA 2.4 Some main concepts of CDA 2.4.1 Ideology 2.4.2 Power 10 2.4.3 Language and ideology 11 2.5 Main approaches to CDA 12 2.5.1 Wodak’s discourse-historical Approach 12 2.5.2 Van Dijk’s socio-cognitive Approach 13 2.5.3 Norman Fairclough’s dialectical - relational approach 14 v 2.6 Review of previous studies 16 CHAPTER METHODOLOGY 19 3.1 Data 19 3.2 Context of the speech 20 3.3 Analytical framework 21 CHAPTER FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 26 4.1 Description 26 4.1.1 Vocabulary 26 4.1.2 Grammar 32 4.1.3 Connective values 38 4.1.4 Large-scale structure (macro-structure) 41 4.2 Interpretation 47 4.2.1 Situational context 47 4.2.2 Intertextual context and presupposition 49 4.2.3 Speech acts 51 4.3 Explanation 52 CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 55 5.1 Recap 55 5.2 Conclusion 57 5.3 Limitations of the study 58 5.4 Suggestions for further study 58 REFERENCES .59 APPENDIX……………………………………………………………………………………i vi CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION This chapter presents the rationale of the study, research objectives, research questions, research scope, research significance and research methodology which includes the analytical framework and the data collected 1.1 Rationale Since the prehistoric era of human beings, the need for communication early arose and the system of communication before anything else is language There are numerous theories about the origin of language: the divine source, the natural sound source, the social interaction source, the physical adaption source, the tool-making source, the genetic source Yet, the primary purpose of language still the same: communication As human beings continuously evolve, they utilize language in an intentional and more sophisticated way Language not only simply holds its initial function communication but also is meant to represent ideologies and practice power As Fairclough (2001) stated, "exercise of power is increasingly achieved through ideology, particularly through the working of language" Concerning this issue, critical discourse analysis has emerged as a major multidisciplinary approach to "show how discourse is shaped by relations of power and ideologies, and the constructive effects discourse has upon social identities, social relations and the system of knowledge and belief" (Fairclough, 1992b) Since CDA's important interest is "the way social and political domination are produced in text and talk", numerous speeches or rhetorical talks of professional politicians have been analyzed CDA is asserted to be an effective tool to discover the power and ideology hidden in political discourse Winston Churchill is one of the most influential Prime Ministers in Britain's history Besides the skillful military tactics and effective leadership which led Britain to the victory in the Second World War, Churchill is also well-known for his professional language competence He was the only prime minister awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature in 1953 "for his mastery of historical and biographical description as well as for brilliant oratory in defending exalted human values" Every speech he made is a masterpiece in rhetoric "Finest hour" is a speech delivered by Churchill on June 18, 1940, during one of the lowest and most uncertain moments of the Second World War The speech was made, first to the Parliament and then over the radio to the nation, become one of the most celebrated one of the war and his career Due to the huge linguistic, social and historical impact it brings forth, many writings discussing this speech However, as far as I am concerned, there has not any scientific writing concerning investigating the speech from CDA perspective, which urges the author to conduct this researched entitled: A critical discourse analysis of “Finest hour” speech by Sir Winston Churchill 1.2 Scope of the study The analysis of the "Finest hour" speech of Winston Churchill is restricted to the transcript of the speech and the social context when the speech was presented Thus, paralinguistics (intonation, speed, loudness, etc) and extra linguistics (facial expressions, eye contact, gestures, etc), despite their significant roles in delivering the speaker's message, are not taken into consideration Moreover, within the scope of an MA thesis, not all of the linguistic features are investigated In other words, only salient aspects of the speech are examined Finally, the thesis will be conducted for the academic purpose only and has no relation to any party’s support The researcher's political view is also ignored in this study 1.3 Objectives of the study By analyzing Churchill’s speech in the light of CDA, the study aims to discover the ideological traits in Churchill’s speech from linguistics features, uncover the way he encouraged people and persuaded them to believe in his ideas and solutions, how his language in the speech impacted listeners in the United Kingdom, which led to stronger British’ resolve and willingness to fight To reach these aims above, two research questions are answered: - What are Churchill's ideologies constructed in the speech? - How are they manifested linguistically? language” (John & Peccei, 2004) In terms of this aspect, some previous studies on rhetorical use of Churchill have been made clear Thus, along with other researches, my study has made a contribution to a more comprehensive analysis of Churchill’s linguistic skill and made an addition in an investigation of his ideologies unpacked through purposeful language use 5.3 Limitations of the study There are several limitations to this study First, the nature of qualitative research limits a great level of generalizability Besides, there have been critiques of CDA which suggest that its methods of inquiry remain largely exploratory and compared with quantitative methods they lack “genuine analytical procedures” (Flick, 2009) It is true that CDA methods are still evolving; however, this should not prevent the research with CDA methods The ongoing application of CDA is crucial to the refinement of such analytical procedures In this sense, this current research can help develop CDA and contribute to its methodological development as well 5.4 Suggestions for further study It is hoped that this critical analysis will, in its own modest way, contribute to the field of CDA and stimulate further research in political issues, especially wartime ones, to investigate the power and ideology of the author To avoid and overcome the above-mentioned limitation, researchers should divide their research questions into smaller ones, and focus on each aspect of the text instead of covering all of it Transitivity and thematization, in connection with non-verbal cues such as voice tone and facial expressions, are some aspects that later researchers may have concerns Another suggestion is that the researchers can analyze the speech in lights of its connection with the speech series that Churchill has made before and after the event mentioned in this study Comparison and contrast of these speeches potentially reveal interesting things about strategies used, and ideology and power implied in each speech, which unpacks the fluctuation or consistency of the speaker’s ideology and the social influence can be considered for analysis to explain these change 58 REFERENCES English Brown, G., & Yule, G (1983) Discourse Analysis Cambridge University Press Cook, G (1994) Discourse and Literature: The Interplay of Form and Mind Oxford Univesity Press, Oxford Drake, H T (2005) A Critique of Critical Discourse Analysis The University of Reading Hongkong Dunmire, P.L (2005) Preempting the future: Rhetoric and ideology of the future in Political Discourse Discourse & Society, 16(4), 481-513 Fairclough, N (1989) Language and Power London: Longman Fairclough, N (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis New York: Longman Fairclough, N (1995) Critical Discourse Analysis and The Marketization of Public Discourse : The Universities In Critical Discourse Analysis: the Critical Study of Language London: Longman Fairclough, N., & Wodak, R (1997) Critical discourse analysis London: Sage Fairclough, N (2001) Language and Power (2nd ed.) London: Routledge Fairclough, N (2002) Discourse and Text In M Toolan (Ed.), Critical Discourse Analysis: Critical Concepts in Linguistics New York: Routledge 10 Fairclough, N (2003) Analyzing Discourse: Textual Analysis for Social Research London, New York: Routledge 11 Fernandez, E C (2013) Words as weapons for mass persuasion: dysphemism in Churchill's wartime speeches Text & Talk An Interdisciplinary Journal of Language, Discourse & Communication Studies 33(3) 12 Ferrari, F (2007) Metaphor at work in the analysis of political discourse: Investigating a ‘preventive war’ persuasion strategy Discourse & Society, 18(5), 603-625 12 Foucault, M., & Gordon, C (1980) Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings, 1972-1977 New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf 13 Fowler, R (1991b) Language in the news: Discourse and ideology in the press London: Routledge 59 14 Ellison, E (2013) Critical discourse analysis of Barack Obama (War on Terror) (Master Dissertation) Retrieved from https://www.academia.edu/4838009 14 Gilbers, G N., & Mukay, M (1984) Opening pandora’s box: A sociological analysis of scientists’ discourse Cambridege: Cambridge University Press 15 I., & Fairclough, N (2012) Political Discourse Analysis: A method for Advanced Students London: Routledge 16 I., & Fairclough, N (2012) Analysis and evaluation of argumentation in CDA: deliberation and the dialectic of enlighment Argumentation et analyse du Discours 9(2), 1-27 17 Halliday, M.A.K (1994) Introduction to Functional Grammar London: Edward Arnold 18 Haque, M S (2008) Critical Discourse Analysis East West University Journal, Vol.2 19 Heather, N (2000) Religious Language and Critical Discourse Analysis: Ideology and Identity in Christian Discourse Today Oxford: Peter Lang 20 Kintsch, W., & van Dijk, T A (1978) Toward a model of text comprehension and production Psychological Review, 85(5), 363-394 21 Krzyzanowski, M (2005) “European identity wanted”: On discursive and communicative dimensions of the European Convention In R Wodak, & P Chilton (Eds.), A new agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis: Theory, methodology and interdisciplinarity (pp 137-163) Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins 22 Maguire, L (2014) “We shall fight”: A rhetorical analysis of Churchill’s famous speech Rhetoric and Public Affairs 17(2), 255-286 23 Schiffrin, D (1994) Approaches to Discourse Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd 24 Schegloff, E A (1997) Whose text? Whose context? Discourse and Society 8(2), 165-87 25 Sinclair, J & Coulthard, R (1975) Toward an Analysis of Discourse Oxford: Oxford University Press 60 26 Van Dijk, T (1993) Priciples of Critical Discourse Analysis SAGE journal 4(2) 27 Van Dijk, T (1996) Discourse, Power and Access, in C.R Caldas-Coulthard, and M Coulthard, (eds.) Texts and Practices: Readings in Critical Discourse Analysis, London: Routledge 28 Van Dijk, T A (2001) Critical Discourse Analysis In D Tannen, D Schiffrin, & H Hamilton (Eds.), The Hand Book of Discourse Analysis (pp 352-371) Oxford:s Blackwell 29 Wetherell, M (2001) Debates in discourse research In M Wetherell, S Taylor and S.J Yates (Eds) Discourse theory and practice: A reader London: Sage Publications 30 Widdowson, H G (1998) The theory and Practice of Critical Discourse Analysis Applied Linguistic 31 Wodal, R., & Chilton, P (Eds) (2005) New Agenda in Critical Discourse Analysis Amsterdam: John Benjamins 32 Wodak, Ruth (2006) The discourse-historical approach In Ruth Wodak & Micheal Myer (Eds.) Method of critical discourse analysis London: Sage 33 Wooffitt, R (2005) Conservation analysis and discourse analysis: A comparative and critical introduction London: Sage 34 Zhou, L (2008) Critical discourse analysis of Churchill “speech on Hilter’s invasion of the U.S.S.R” Journal of Jiangxi Institute of Education Vol.1 Vietnamese Nguyễn Hòa (2006) Phân tích diễn ngơn phê phán: Lý luận phương pháp Hanoi: VNU Press Nguyễn Văn Độ (2017), Language and Culture, Hanoi: Education Publishing House 61 APPENDIX I spoke the other day of the colossal military disaster which occurred when the French High Command failed to withdraw the northern Armies from Belgium at the moment when they knew that the French front was decisively broken at Sedan and sthrew out of action for the critical period the whole of the British Expeditionary Force Our Army and 120,000 French troops were indeed rescued by the British Navy from Dunkirk but only with the loss of their cannon, vehicles and modern equipment This loss inevitably took some weeks to repair, and in the first two of those weeks the battle in France has been lost When we consider the heroic resistance made by the French Army against heavy odds in this battle, the enormous 10 losses inflicted upon the enemy and the evident exhaustion of the enemy, it may 11 well be the thought that these 25 divisions of the best-trained and best-equipped 12 troops might have turned the scale However, General Weygand had to fight 13 without them Only three British divisions or their equivalent were able to stand in 14 the line with their French comrades They have suffered severely, but they have 15 fought well We sent every man we could to France as fast as we could re-equip and 16 transport their formations 17 I am not reciting these facts for the purpose of recrimination That I judge to be 18 utterly futile and even harmful We cannot afford it I recite them in order to explain 19 why it was we did not have, as we could have had, between twelve and fourteen 20 British divisions fighting in the line in this great battle instead of only three Now I 21 put all this aside I put it on the shelf, from which the historians, when they have 22 time, will select their documents to tell their stories We have to think of the future 23 and not of the past This also applies in a small way to our own affairs at home 24 There are many who would hold an inquest in the House of Commons on the 25 conduct of the Governments-and of Parliaments, for they are in it, too-during the 26 years which led up to this catastrophe They seek to indict those who were 27 responsible for the guidance of our affairs This also would be a foolish and 28 pernicious process There are too many in it Let each man search his conscience i 29 and search his speeches I frequently search mine 30 Of this I am quite sure, that if we open a quarrel between the past and the present, 31 we shall find that we have lost the future Therefore, I cannot accept the drawing of 32 any distinctions between Members of the present Government It was formed at a 33 moment of crisis in order to unite all the Parties and all sections of opinion It has 34 received the almost unanimous support of both Houses of Parliament Its Members 35 are going to stand together, and, subject to the authority of the House of Commons, 36 we are going to govern the country and fight the war It is absolutely necessary at a 37 time like this that every Minister who tries each day to his duty shall be 38 respected; and their subordinates must know that their chiefs are not threatened 39 men, men who are here today and gone tomorrow, but that their directions must be 40 punctually and faithfully obeyed Without this concentrated power we cannot face 41 what lies before us I should not think it would be very advantageous for the House 42 to prolong this Debate this afternoon under conditions of public stress Many facts 43 are not clear that will be clear in a short time We are to have a secret Session on 44 Thursday, and I should think that would be a better opportunity for the many 45 earnest expressions of opinion which Members will desire to make and for the 46 House to discuss vital matters without having everything read the next morning by 47 our dangerous foes 48 The disastrous military events which have happened during the past fortnight have 49 not come to me with any sense of surprise Indeed, I indicated a fortnight ago as 50 clearly as I could to the House that the worst possibilities were open; and I made it 51 perfectly clear then that whatever happened in France would make no difference to 52 the resolve of Britain and the British Empire to fight on, ‘if necessary for years, if 53 necessary alone.” During the last few days we have successfully brought off the 54 great majority of the troops we had on the line of communication in France; and 55 seven-eighths of the troops we have sent to France since the beginning of the war- 56 that is to say, about 350,000 out of 400,000 men-are safely back in this country 57 Others are still fighting with the French, and fighting with considerable success in ii 58 their local encounters against the enemy We have also brought back a great mass of 59 stores, rifles and munitions of all kinds which had been accumulated in France 60 during the last nine months 61 We have, therefore, in this Island today a very large and powerful military force 62 This force comprises all our best-trained and our finest troops, including scores of 63 thousands of those who have already measured their quality against the Germans 64 and found themselves at no disadvantage We have under arms at the present time in 65 this Island over a million and a quarter men Behind these we have the Local 66 Defence Volunteers, numbering half a million, only a portion of whom, however, 67 are yet armed with rifles or other firearms We have incorporated into our Defence 68 Forces every man for whom we have a weapon We expect very large additions to 69 our weapons in the near future, and in preparation for this we intend forthwith to 70 call up, drill and train further large numbers Those who are not called up, or else 71 are employed during the vast business of munitions production in all its branches- 72 and their ramifications are innumerable-will serve their country best by remaining at 73 their ordinary work until they receive their summons We have also over here 74 Dominions armies The Canadians had actually landed in France, but have now 75 been safely withdrawn, much disappointed, but in perfect order, with all their 76 artillery and equipment And these very high-class forces from the Dominions will 77 now take part in the defence of the Mother Country 78 Lest the account which I have given of these large forces should raise the question: 79 Why did they not take part in the great battle in France? I must make it clear that, 80 apart from the divisions training and organizing at home, only 12 divisions were 81 equipped to fight upon a scale which justified their being sent abroad And this was 82 fully up to the number which the French had been led to expect would be available 83 in France at the ninth month of the war The rest of our forces at home have a 84 fighting value for home defence which will, of course, steadily increase every week 85 that passes Thus, the invasion of Great Britain would at this time require the 86 transportation across the sea of hostile armies on a very large scale, and after they iii 87 had been so transported they would have to be continually maintained with all the 88 masses of munitions and supplies which are required for continuous battle-as 89 continuous battle it will surely be 90 Here is where we come to the Navy-and after all, we have a Navy Some people 91 seem to forget that we have a Navy We must remind them For the last thirty years 92 I have been concerned in discussions about the possibilities of oversea invasion, and 93 I took the responsibility on behalf of the Admiralty, at the beginning of the last war, 94 of allowing all regular troops to be sent out of the country That was a very serious 95 step to take, because our Territorials had only just been called up and were quite 96 untrained Therefore, this Island was for several months particularly denuded of 97 fighting troops The Admiralty had confidence at that time in their ability to prevent 98 a mass invasion even though at that time the Germans had a magnificent battle fleet 99 in the proportion of 10 to 16, even though they were capable of fighting a general 100 engagement every day and any day, whereas now they have only a couple of heavy 101 ships worth speaking of-the Scharnhorst and the Gneisenau We are also told that 102 the Italian Navy is to come out and gain sea superiority in these waters If they 103 seriously intend it, I shall only say that we shall be delighted to offer Signor 104 Mussolini a free and safeguarded passage through the Strait of Gibraltar in order 105 that he may play the part to which he aspires There is a general curiosity in the 106 British Fleet to find out whether the Italians are up to the level they were at in the 107 last war or whether they have fallen off at all 108 Therefore, it seems to me that as far as sea-borne invasion on a great scale is 109 concerned, we are far more capable of meeting it today than we were at many 110 periods in the last war and during the early months of this war, before our other 111 troops were trained, and while the B.E.F had proceeded abroad Now, the Navy 112 have never pretended to be able to prevent raids by bodies of 5,000 or 10,000 men 113 flung suddenly across and thrown ashore at several points on the coast some dark 114 night or foggy morning The efficacy of sea power, especially under modern 115 conditions, depends upon the invading force being of large size; It has to be of large iv 116 size, in view of our military strength, to be of any use If it is of large size, then the 117 Navy have something they can find and meet and, as it were, bite on Now, we must 118 remember that even five divisions, however lightly equipped, would require 200 to 119 250 ships, and with modern air reconnaissance and photography it would not be 120 easy to collect such an armada, marshal it, and conduct it across the sea without any 121 powerful naval forces to escort it; and there would be very great possibilities, to put 122 it mildly, that this armada would be intercepted long before it reached the coast, and 123 all the men drowned in the sea or, at the worst blown to pieces with their equipment 124 while they were trying to land We also have a great system of minefields, recently 125 strongly reinforced, through which we alone know the channels If the enemy tries 126 to sweep passages through these minefields, it will be the task of the Navy to 127 destroy the mine-sweepers and any other forces employed to protect them There 128 should be no difficulty in this, owing to our great superiority at sea 129 Those are the regular, well-tested, well-proved arguments on which we have relied 130 during many years in peace and war But the question is whether there are any new 131 methods by which those solid assurances can be circumvented Odd as it may seem, 132 some attention has been given to this by the Admiralty, whose prime duty and 133 responsibility is to destroy any large sea-borne expedition before it reaches, or at the 134 moment when it reaches, these shores It would not be a good thing for me to go 135 into details of this It might suggest ideas to other people which they have not 136 thought of, and they would not be likely to give us any of their ideas in exchange 137 All I will say is that untiring vigilance and mind-searching must be devoted to the 138 subject, because the enemy is crafty and cunning and full of novel treacheries and 139 stratagems The House may be assured that the utmost ingenuity is being displayed 140 and imagination is being evoked from large numbers of competent officers, well- 141 trained in tactics and thoroughly up to date, to measure and counterwork novel 142 possibilities Untiring vigilance and untiring searching of the mind is being, and 143 must be, devoted to the subject, because, remember, the enemy is crafty and there is 144 no dirty trick he will not v 145 Some people will ask why, then, was it that the British Navy was not able to prevent 146 the movement of a large army from Germany into Norway across the Skagerrak? 147 But the conditions in the Channel and in the North Sea are in no way like those 148 which prevail in the Skagerrak In the Skagerrak, because of the distance, we could 149 give no air support to our surface ships, and consequently, lying as we did close to 150 the enemy’s main air power, we were compelled to use only our submarines We 151 could not enforce the decisive blockade or interruption which is possible from 152 surface vessels Our submarines took a heavy toll but could not, by themselves, 153 prevent the invasion of Norway In the Channel and in the North Sea, on the other 154 hand, our superior naval surface forces, aided by our submarines, will operate with 155 close and effective air assistance 156 This brings me, naturally, to the great question of invasion from the air, and of the 157 impending struggle between the British and German Air Forces It seems quite clear 158 that no invasion on a scale beyond the capacity of our land forces to crush speedily 159 is likely to take place from the air until our Air Force has been definitely 160 overpowered In the meantime, there may be raids by parachute troops and 161 attempted descents of airborne soldiers We should be able to give those gentry a 162 warm reception both in the air and on the ground, if they reach it in any condition to 163 continue the dispute But the great question is: Can we break Hitler’s air weapon? 164 Now, of course, it is a very great pity that we have not got an Air Force at least 165 equal to that of the most powerful enemy within striking distance of these shores 166 But we have a very powerful Air Force which has proved itself far superior in 167 quality, both in men and in many types of machine, to what we have met so far in 168 the numerous and fierce air battles which have been fought with the Germans In 169 France, where we were at a considerable disadvantage and lost many machines on 170 the ground when they were standing round the aerodromes, we were accustomed to 171 inflict in the air losses of as much as two and two-and-a-half to one In the fighting 172 over Dunkirk, which was a sort of no-man’s-land, we undoubtedly beat the German 173 Air Force, and gained the mastery of the local air, inflicting here a loss of three or 174 four to one day after day Anyone who looks at the photographs which were vi 175 published a week or so ago of the re-embarkation, showing the masses of troops 176 assembled on the beach and forming an ideal target for hours at a time, must realize 177 that this re-embarkation would not have been possible unless the enemy had 178 resigned all hope of recovering air superiority at that time and at that place 179 In the defence of this Island the advantages to the defenders will be much greater 180 than they were in the fighting around Dunkirk We hope to improve on the rate of 181 three or four to one which was realized at Dunkirk; and in addition all our injured 182 machines and their crews which get down safely-and, surprisingly, a very great 183 many injured machines and men get down safely in modern air fighting-all of 184 these will fall, in an attack upon these Islands, on friendly soil and live to fight 185 another day; whereas all the injured enemy machines and their complements will be 186 total losses as far as the war is concerned 187 During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to the 188 French Army, both by fighters and bombers; but in spite of every kind of pressure 189 we never would allow the entire metropolitan fighter strength of the Air Force to be 190 consumed This decision was painful, but it was also right, because the fortunes of 191 the battle in France could not have been decisively affected even if we had thrown 192 in our entire fighter force That battle was lost by the unfortunate strategical 193 opening, by the extraordinary and unforseen power of the armored columns, and by 194 the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers Our fighter Air Force 195 might easily have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and then 196 we should have found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight But as it 197 is, I am happy to inform the House that our fighter strength is stronger at the present 198 time relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever 199 been; and consequently we believe ourselves possessed of the capacity to continue 200 the war in the air under better conditions than we have ever experienced before I 201 look forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter pilots-these splendid men, 202 this brilliant youth-who will have the glory of saving their native land, their island 203 home, and all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks vii 204 There remains, of course, the danger of bombing attacks, which will certainly be 205 made very soon upon us by the bomber forces of the enemy It is true that the 206 German bomber force is superior in numbers to ours; but we have a very large 207 bomber force also, which we shall use to strike at military targets in Germany 208 without intermission I not at all underrate the severity of the ordeal which lies 209 before us; but I believe our countrymen will show themselves capable of standing 210 up to it, like the brave men of Barcelona, and will be able to stand up to it, and carry 211 on in spite of it, at least as well as any other people in the world Much will depend 212 upon this; every man and every woman will have the chance to show the finest 213 qualities of their race, and render the highest service to their cause For all of us, at 214 this time, whatever our sphere, our station, our occupation or our duties, it will be a 215 help to remember the famous lines: He nothing common did or mean, Upon that 216 memorable scene 217 I have thought it right upon this occasion to give the House and the country some 218 indication of the solid, practical grounds upon which we base our inflexible resolve 219 to continue the war There are a good many people who say, “Never mind Win or 220 lose, sink or swim, better die than submit to tyranny-and such a tyranny.” And I 221 not dissociate myself from them But I can assure them that our professional 222 advisers of the three Services unitedly advise that we should carry on the war, and 223 that there are good and reasonable hopes of final victory We have fully informed 224 and consulted all the self-governing Dominions, these great communities far 225 beyond the oceans who have been built up on our laws and on our civilization, and 226 who are absolutely free to choose their course, but are absolutely devoted to the 227 ancient Motherland, and who feel themselves inspired by the same emotions which 228 lead me to stake our all upon duty and honour We have fully consulted them, and I 229 have received from their Prime Ministers, Mr Mackenzie King of Canada, Mr 230 Menzies of Australia, Mr Fraser of New Zealand, and General Smuts of South 231 Africa-that wonderful man, with his immense profound mind, and his eye watching 232 from a distance the whole panorama of European affairs-I have received from all 233 these eminent men, who all have Governments behind them elected on wide viii 234 franchises, who are all there because they represent the will of their people, 235 messages couched in the most moving terms in which they endorse our decision to 236 fight on, and declare themselves ready to share our fortunes and to persevere to the 237 end That is what we are going to 238 We may now ask ourselves: In what way has our position worsened since the 239 beginning of the war? It has worsened by the fact that the Germans have conquered a 240 large part of the coast line of Western Europe, and many small countries have been 241 overrun by them This aggravates the possibilities of air attack and adds to our naval 242 preoccupations It in no way diminishes, but on the contrary definitely increases, the 243 power of our long-distance blockade Similarly, the entrance of Italy into the war 244 increases the power of our long-distance blockade We have stopped the worst leak 245 by that We not know whether military resistance will come to an end in France or 246 not, but should it so, then of course the Germans will be able to concentrate their 247 forces, both military and industrial, upon us But for the reasons I have given to the 248 House these will not be found so easy to apply If invasion has become more 249 imminent, as no doubt it has, we, being relieved from the task of maintaining a large 250 army in France, have far larger and more efficient forces to meet it 251 If Hitler can bring under his despotic control the industries of the countries he 252 has conquered, this will add greatly to his already vast armament output On the 253 other hand, this will not happen immediately, and we are now assured of 254 immense, continuous and increasing support in supplies and munitions of all 255 kinds from the United States; and especially of aeroplanes and pilots from the 256 Dominions and across the oceans coming from regions which are beyond the 257 reach of enemy bombers 258 I not see how any of these factors can operate to our detriment on balance before 259 the winter comes; and the winter will impose a strain upon the Nazi regime, with 260 almost all Europe writhing and starving under its cruel heel, which, for all their 261 ruthlessness, will run them very hard We must not forget that from the moment 262 when we declared war on the 3rd September it was always possible for Germany to ix 263 turn all her Air Force upon this country, together with any other devices of invasion 264 she might conceive, and that France could have done little or nothing to prevent her 265 doing so We have, therefore, lived under this danger, in principle and in a slightly 266 modified form, during all these months In the meanwhile, however, we have 267 enormously improved our methods of defence, and we have learned what we had no 268 right to assume at the beginning, namely, that the individual aircraft and the individual 269 British pilot have a sure and definite superiority Therefore, in casting up this dread 270 balance sheet and contemplating our dangers with a disillusioned eye, I see great 271 reason for intense vigilance and exertion, but none whatever for panic or despair 272 During the first four years of the last war the Allies experienced nothing but disaster 273 and disappointment That was our constant fear: one blow after another, terrible 274 losses, frightful dangers Everything miscarried And yet at the end of those four 275 years the morale of the Allies was higher than that of the Germans, who had moved 276 from one aggressive triumph to another, and who stood everywhere triumphant 277 invaders of the lands into which they had broken During that war we repeatedly 278 asked ourselves the question: How are we going to win? and no one was able ever 279 to answer it with much precision, until at the end, quite suddenly, quite 280 unexpectedly, our terrible foe collapsed before us, and we were so glutted with 281 victory that in our folly we threw it away 282 We not yet know what will happen in France or whether the French resistance 283 will be prolonged, both in France and in the French Empire overseas The French 284 Government will be throwing away great opportunities and casting adrift their 285 future if they not continue the war in accordance with their Treaty obligations, 286 from which we have not felt able to release them The House will have read the 287 historic declaration in which, at the desire of many Frenchmen-and of our own 288 hearts-we have proclaimed our willingness at the darkest hour in French history to 289 conclude a union of common citizenship in this struggle However matters may go 290 in France or with the French Government, or other French Governments, we in this 291 Island and in the British Empire will never lose our sense of comradeship with the x 292 French people If we are now called upon to endure what they have been suffering, 293 we shall emulate their courage, and if final victory rewards our toils they shall share 294 the gains, aye, and freedom shall be restored to all We abate nothing of our just 295 demands; not one jot or tittle we recede Czechs, Poles, Norwegians, Dutch, 296 Belgians have joined their causes to our own All these shall be restored 297 What General Weygand called the Battle of France is over I expect that the Battle 298 of Britain is about to begin Upon this battle depends the survival of Christian 299 civilization Upon it depends our own British life, and the long continuity of our 300 institutions and our Empire The whole fury and might of the enemy must very soon 301 be turned on us Hitler knows that he will have to break us in this Island or lose the 302 war If we can stand up to him, all Europe may be free and the life of the world may 303 move forward into broad, sunlit uplands But if we fail, then the whole world, 304 including the United States, including all that we have known and cared for, will 305 sink into the abyss of a new Dark Age made more sinister, and perhaps more 306 protracted, by the lights of perverted science Let us therefore brace ourselves to our 307 duties, and so bear ourselves that, if the British Empire and its Commonwealth last 308 for a thousand years, men will still say, “This was their finest hour” xi ...VIETNAM NATIONAL UNIVERSITY, HANOI UNIVERSITY OF LANGUAGES & INTERNATIONAL STUDIES FACULTY OF POST GRADUATE STUDIES NGUYỄN THỊ PHƯƠNG MAI A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS OF FINEST HOUR SPEECH BY SIR. .. author to conduct this researched entitled: A critical discourse analysis of Finest hour speech by Sir Winston Churchill 1.2 Scope of the study The analysis of the "Finest hour" speech of Winston. .. CDA: the discourse- historical approach of Wodak and the social-cultural approach of Fairclough and the idiosyncratic approach of Van Dijk Applying discourse- historical approach, scholars have