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CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY 11 | Monopoly and Antitrust Policy Figure 11.1 Oligopoly versus Competitors in the Marketplace Large corporations, such as the natural gas producer Kinder Morgan, can bring economies of scale to the marketplace Will that benefit consumers? Or is more competition better for consumers? (Credit: modification of work by Derrick Coetzee/Flickr Creative Commons) More than Cooking, Heating, and Cooling If you live in the United States, there is a slightly better than 50–50 chance your home is heated and cooled using natural gas You may even use natural gas for cooking However, those uses are not the primary uses of natural gas in the U.S In 2012, according to the U.S Energy Information Administration, home heating, cooling, and cooking accounted for just 18% of natural gas usage What accounts for the rest? The greatest uses for natural gas are the generation of electric power (39%) and in industry (30%) Together these three uses for natural gas touch many areas of our lives, so why would there be any opposition to a merger of two natural gas firms? After all, a merger could mean increased efficiencies and reduced costs to people like you and me In October 2011, Kinder Morgan and El Paso Corporation, two natural gas firms, announced they were merging The announcement stated the combined firm would link “nearly every major production region with markets,” cut costs by “eliminating duplication in pipelines and other assets,” and that “the savings could be passed on to consumers.” The objection? The $21.1 billion deal would give Kinder Morgan control of more than 80,000 miles of pipeline, making the new firm the third largest energy producer in North America As the third largest energy producer, policymakers and the public wondered whether the cost savings really would be passed on to consumers, or would the merger give Kinder Morgan a strong oligopoly position in the natural gas marketplace? That brings us to the central question this chapter poses: What should the balance be between corporate size and a larger number of competitors in a marketplace? We will also consider what role the government should play in this balancing act Introduction to Monopoly and Antitrust Policy In this chapter, you will learn about: 223 224 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY • Corporate Mergers • Regulating Anticompetitive Behavior • Regulating Natural Monopolies • The Great Deregulation Experiment The previous chapters on the theory of the firm identified three important lessons: First, that competition, by providing consumers with lower prices and a variety of innovative products, is a good thing; second, that large-scale production can dramatically lower average costs; and third, that markets in the real world are rarely perfectly competitive As a consequence, government policymakers must determine how much to intervene to balance the potential benefits of largescale production against the potential loss of competition that can occur when businesses grow in size, especially through mergers For example, in 2006, AT&T and BellSouth, two telecommunications companies, wished to merge into a single firm In the year before the merger, AT&T was the 121st largest company in the country when ranked by sales, with $44 billion in revenues and 190,000 employees BellSouth was the 314th largest company in the country, with $21 billion in revenues and 63,000 employees The two companies argued that the merger would benefit consumers, who would be able to purchase better telecommunications services at a cheaper price because the newly created firm would be able to produce more efficiently by taking advantage of economies of scale and eliminating duplicate investments However, a number of activist groups like the Consumer Federation of America and Public Knowledge expressed fears that the merger would reduce competition and lead to higher prices for consumers for decades to come In December 2006, the federal government allowed the merger to proceed By 2009, the new post-merger AT&T was the eighth largest company by revenues in the United States, and by that measure the largest telecommunications company in the world Economists have spent – and will still spend – years trying to determine whether the merger of AT&T and BellSouth, as well as other smaller mergers of telecommunications companies at about this same time, helped consumers, hurt them, or did not make much difference This chapter discusses public policy issues about competition How can economists and governments determine when mergers of large companies like AT&T and BellSouth should be allowed and when they should be blocked? The government also plays a role in policing anticompetitive behavior other than mergers, like prohibiting certain kinds of contracts that might restrict competition In the case of natural monopoly, however, trying to preserve competition probably will not work very well, and so government will often resort to regulation of price and/or quantity of output In recent decades, there has been a global trend toward less government intervention in the price and output decisions of businesses 11.1 | Corporate Mergers By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Explain antitrust law and its significance • Calculate concentration ratios • Calculate the Herfindahl-Herschman Index (HHI) • Evaluate methods of antitrust regulation A corporate merger occurs when two formerly separate firms combine to become a single firm When one firm purchases another, it is called an acquisition An acquisition may not look just like a merger, since the newly purchased firm may continue to be operated under its former company name Mergers can also be lateral, where two firms of similar sizes combine to become one However, both mergers and acquisitions lead to two formerly separate firms being under common ownership, and so they are commonly grouped together Regulations for Approving Mergers Since a merger combines two firms into one, it can reduce the extent of competition between firms Therefore, when two U.S firms announce a merger or acquisition where at least one of the firms is above a minimum size of sales (a threshold that moves up gradually over time, and was at $70.9 million in 2013), or certain other conditions are met, they are required under law to notify the U.S Federal Trade Commission (FTC) The left-hand panel of Figure 11.2 (a) shows the number of mergers submitted for review to the FTC each year from 1999 to 2012 Mergers were very high in the late 1990s, diminished in the early 2000s, and then rebounded somewhat in a cyclical fashion The right-hand panel of Figure 11.2 (b) shows the distribution of those mergers submitted for review in 2012 as measured by the size of the transaction It is important to remember that this total leaves out many small mergers under $50 million, which only need to be reported in certain limited circumstances About a quarter of all reported merger and acquisition transactions in 2012 exceeded $500 million, while about 11 percent exceeded $1 billion This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY Figure 11.2 Number and Size of Mergers (a) The number of mergers in 1999 and 2000 were relatively high compared to the annual numbers seen from 2001–2012 While 2001 and 2007 saw a high number of mergers, these were still only about half the number of mergers in 1999 and 2000 (b) In 2012, the greatest number of mergers submitted for review was for transactions between $100 and $150 million The laws that give government the power to block certain mergers, and even in some cases to break up large firms into smaller ones, are called antitrust laws Before a large merger happens, the antitrust regulators at the FTC and the U.S Department of Justice can allow the merger, prohibit it, or allow it if certain conditions are met One common condition is that the merger will be allowed if the firm agrees to sell off certain parts For example, in 2006, Johnson & Johnson bought the Pfizer’s “consumer health” division, which included well-known brands like Listerine mouthwash and Sudafed cold medicine As a condition of allowing the merger, Johnson & Johnson was required to sell off six brands to other firms, including Zantac® heartburn relief medication, Cortizone anti-itch cream, and Balmex diaper rash medication, to preserve a greater degree of competition in these markets The U.S government approves most proposed mergers In a market-oriented economy, firms have the freedom to make their own choices Private firms generally have the freedom to: • expand or reduce production • set the price they choose • open new factories or sales facilities or close them • hire workers or to lay them off • start selling new products or stop selling existing ones If the owners want to acquire a firm or be acquired, or to merge with another firm, this decision is just one of many that firms are free to make In these conditions, the managers of private firms will sometimes make mistakes They may close down a factory which, it later turns out, would have been profitable They may start selling a product that ends up losing money A merger between two companies can sometimes lead to a clash of corporate personalities that makes both firms worse off But the fundamental belief behind a market-oriented economy is that firms, not governments, are in the best position to know if their actions will lead to attracting more customers or producing more efficiently Indeed, government regulators agree that most mergers are beneficial to consumers As the Federal Trade Commission has noted on its website (as of November, 2013): “Most mergers actually benefit competition and consumers by allowing firms to operate more efficiently.” At the same time, the FTC recognizes, “Some [mergers] are likely to lessen competition That, in turn, can lead to higher prices, reduced availability of goods or services, lower quality of products, and less innovation Indeed, some mergers create a concentrated market, while others enable a single firm to raise prices.” The challenge for the antitrust regulators at the FTC and the U.S Department of Justice is to figure out when a merger may hinder competition This decision involves both numerical tools and some judgments that are difficult to quantify The following Clear it Up helps explain how antitrust laws came about 225 226 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY What is U.S antitrust law? In the closing decades of the 1800s, many industries in the U.S economy were dominated by a single firm that had most of the sales for the entire country Supporters of these large firms argued that they could take advantage of economies of scale and careful planning to provide consumers with products at low prices However, critics pointed out that when competition was reduced, these firms were free to charge more and make permanently higher profits, and that without the goading of competition, it was not clear that they were as efficient or innovative as they could be In many cases, these large firms were organized in the legal form of a “trust,” in which a group of formerly independent firms were consolidated together by mergers and purchases, and a group of “trustees” then ran the companies as if they were a single firm Thus, when the U.S government passed the Sherman Antitrust Act in 1890 to limit the power of these trusts, it was called an antitrust law In an early demonstration of the law’s power, the U.S Supreme Court in 1911 upheld the government’s right to break up Standard Oil, which had controlled about 90% of the country’s oil refining, into 34 independent firms, including Exxon, Mobil, Amoco, and Chevron In 1914, the Clayton Antitrust Act outlawed mergers and acquisitions (where the outcome would be to “substantially lessen competition” in an industry), price discrimination (where different customers are charged different prices for the same product), and tied sales (where purchase of one product commits the buyer to purchase some other product) Also in 1914, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was created to define more specifically what competition was unfair In 1950, the Celler-Kefauver Act extended the Clayton Act by restricting vertical and conglomerate mergers In the twenty-first century, the FTC and the U.S Department of Justice continue to enforce antitrust laws The Four-Firm Concentration Ratio Regulators have struggled for decades to measure the degree of monopoly power in an industry An early tool was the concentration ratio, which measures what share of the total sales in the industry are accounted for by the largest firms, typically the top four to eight firms For an explanation of how high market concentrations can create inefficiencies in an economy, refer to Monopoly Say that the market for replacing broken automobile windshields in a certain city has 18 firms with the market shares shown in Table 11.1, where the market share is each firm’s proportion of total sales in that market The four-firm concentration ratio is calculated by adding the market shares of the four largest firms: in this case, 16 + 10 + + = 40 This concentration ratio would not be considered especially high, because the largest four firms have less than half the market If the market shares in the market for replacing automobile windshields are: Smooth as Glass Repair Company 16% of the market The Auto Glass Doctor Company 10% of the market Your Car Shield Company 8% of the market Seven firms that each have 6% of the market 42% of the market, combined Eight firms that each have 3% of the market 24% of the market, combined Then the four-firm concentration ratio is 16 + 10 + + = 40 Table 11.1 Calculating Concentration Ratios from Market Shares The concentration ratio approach can help to clarify some of the fuzziness over deciding when a merger might affect competition For instance, if two of the smallest firms in the hypothetical market for repairing automobile windshields merged, the four-firm concentration ratio would not change—which implies that there is not much worry that the degree of competition in the market has notably diminished However, if the top two firms merged, then the four-firm concentration ratio would become 46 (that is, 26 + + + 6) While this concentration ratio is modestly higher, the four-firm concentration ratio would still be less than half, so such a proposed merger might barely raise an eyebrow among antitrust regulators This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY Visit this website (http://openstaxcollege.org/l/Google_FTC) to read an article about Google’s run-in with the FTC The Herfindahl-Hirshman Index A four-firm concentration ratio is a simple tool, which may reveal only part of the story For example, consider two industries that both have a four-firm concentration ratio of 80 However, in one industry five firms each control 20% of the market, while in the other industry, the top firm holds 77% of the market and all the other firms have 1% each Although the four-firm concentration ratios are identical, it would be reasonable to worry more about the extent of competition in the second case—where the largest firm is nearly a monopoly—than in the first Another approach to measuring industry concentration that can distinguish between these two cases is called the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) The HHI, as it is often called, is calculated by summing the squares of the market share of each firm in the industry, as the following Work it Out shows Calculating HHI Step Calculate the HHI for a monopoly with a market share of 100% Because there is only one firm, it has 100% market share The HHI is 1002 = 10,000 Step For an extremely competitive industry, with dozens or hundreds of extremely small competitors, the value of the HHI might drop as low as 100 or even less Calculate the HHI for an industry with 100 firms that each have 1% of the market In this case, the HHI is 100(12) = 100 Step Calculate the HHI for the industry shown in Table 11.1 In this case, the HHI is 162 + 102 + 82 + 7(62) + 8(32) = 744 Step Note that the HHI gives greater weight to large firms Step Consider the example given earlier, comparing one industry where five firms each have 20% of the market with an industry where one firm has 77% and the other 23 firms have 1% each The two industries have the same four-firm concentration ratio of 80 But the HHI for the first industry is 5(202) = 2,000, while the HHI for the second industry is much higher at 772 + 23(12) = 5,952 Step Note that the near-monopolist in the second industry drives up the HHI measure of industrial concentration Step Review Table 11.2 which gives some examples of the four-firm concentration ratio and the HHI in various U.S industries in 2009 (You can find market share data from multiple industry sources Data in the table are from: Verizon (for wireless), The Wall Street Journal (for automobiles), IDC Worldwide (for computers) and the U.S Bureau of Transportation Statistics (for airlines).) U.S Industry Wireless Four-Firm Ratio 91 Table 11.2 Examples of Concentration Ratios and HHIs in the U.S Economy, 2009 HHI 2,311 227 228 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY U.S Industry Four-Firm Ratio HHI Largest five: Verizon, AT&T, Sprint Nextel, T-Mobile, MetroPCS Automobiles 63 1,121 74 1,737 44 536 Largest five: GM, Toyota, Ford, Honda, Chrysler Computers Largest five: HP, Dell, Acer, Apple, Toshiba Airlines Largest five: Southwest, American, Delta, United, U.S Airways Table 11.2 Examples of Concentration Ratios and HHIs in the U.S Economy, 2009 In the 1980s, the FTC followed these guidelines: If a merger would result in an HHI of less than 1,000, the FTC would probably approve it If a merger would result in an HHI of more than 1,800, the FTC would probably challenge it If a merger would result in an HHI between 1,000 and 1,800, then the FTC would scrutinize the plan and make a case-bycase decision However, in the last several decades, the antitrust enforcement authorities have moved away from relying as heavily on measures of concentration ratios and HHIs to determine whether a merger will be allowed, and instead carried out more case-by-case analysis on the extent of competition in different industries New Directions for Antitrust Both the four-firm concentration ratio and the Herfindahl-Hirschman index share some weaknesses First, they begin from the assumption that the “market” under discussion is well-defined, and the only question is measuring how sales are divided in that market Second, they are based on an implicit assumption that competitive conditions across industries are similar enough that a broad measure of concentration in the market is enough to make a decision about the effects of a merger These assumptions, however, are not always correct In response to these two problems, the antitrust regulators have been changing their approach in the last decade or two Defining a market is often controversial For example, Microsoft in the early 2000s had a dominant share of the software for computer operating systems However, in the total market for all computer software and services, including everything from games to scientific programs, the Microsoft share was only about 16% in 2000 A narrowly defined market will tend to make concentration appear higher, while a broadly defined market will tend to make it appear smaller There are two especially important shifts affecting how markets are defined in recent decades: one centers on technology and the other centers on globalization In addition, these two shifts are interconnected With the vast improvement in communications technologies, including the development of the Internet, a consumer can order books or pet supplies from all over the country or the world As a result, the degree of competition many local retail businesses face has increased The same effect may operate even more strongly in markets for business supplies, where so-called “business-to-business” websites can allow buyers and suppliers from anywhere in the world to find each other Globalization has changed the boundaries of markets As recently as the 1970s, it was common for measurements of concentration ratios and HHIs to stop at national borders Now, many industries find that their competition comes from the global market A few decades ago, three companies, General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler, dominated the U.S auto market By 2007, however, these three firms were making less than half of U.S auto sales, and facing competition from well-known car manufacturers such as Toyota, Honda, Nissan, Volkswagen, Mitsubishi, and Mazda When HHIs are calculated with a global perspective, concentration in most major industries—including cars—is lower than in a purely domestic context Because attempting to define a particular market can be difficult and controversial, the Federal Trade Commission has begun to look less at market share and more at the data on actual competition between businesses For example, in February 2007, Whole Foods Market and Wild Oats Market announced that they wished to merge These were the two largest companies in the market that the government defined as “premium natural and organic supermarket chains.” However, one could also argue that they were two relatively small companies in the broader market for all stores that sell groceries or specialty food products Rather than relying on a market definition, the government antitrust regulators looked at detailed evidence on profits and prices for specific stores in different cities, both before and after other competitive stores entered or exited Based on that evidence, the Federal Trade Commission decided to block the merger After two years of legal battles, the merger was eventually allowed in 2009 under the conditions that Whole Foods sell off the Wild Oats brand name and a number of This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY individual stores, to preserve competition in certain local markets For more on the difficulties of defining markets, refer to Monopoly This new approach to antitrust regulation involves detailed analysis of specific markets and companies, instead of defining a market and counting up total sales A common starting point is for antitrust regulators to use statistical tools and real-world evidence to estimate the demand curves and supply curves faced by the firms that are proposing the merger A second step is to specify how competition occurs in this specific industry Some possibilities include competing to cut prices, to raise output, to build a brand name through advertising, and to build a reputation for good service or high quality With these pieces of the puzzle in place, it is then possible to build a statistical model that estimates the likely outcome for consumers if the two firms are allowed to merge Of course, these models require some degree of subjective judgment, and so they can become the subject of legal disputes between the antitrust authorities and the companies that wish to merge 11.2 | Regulating Anticompetitive Behavior By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Analyze restrictive practices • Explain tying sales, bundling, and predatory pricing • Evaluate a real-world situation of possible anticompetitive and restrictive practices The U.S antitrust laws reach beyond blocking mergers that would reduce competition to include a wide array of anticompetitive practices For example, it is illegal for competitors to form a cartel to collude to make pricing and output decisions, as if they were a monopoly firm The Federal Trade Commission and the U.S Department of Justice prohibit firms from agreeing to fix prices or output, rigging bids, or sharing or dividing markets by allocating customers, suppliers, territories, or lines of commerce In the late 1990s, for example, the antitrust regulators prosecuted an international cartel of vitamin manufacturers, including the Swiss firm Hoffman-La Roche, the German firm BASF, and the French firm Rhone-Poulenc These firms reached agreements on how much to produce, how much to charge, and which firm would sell to which customers The high-priced vitamins were then bought by firms like General Mills, Kellogg, Purina-Mills, and Proctor and Gamble, which pushed up the prices more Hoffman-La Roche pleaded guilty in May 1999 and agreed both to pay a fine of $500 million and to have at least one top executive serve four months of jail time Under U.S antitrust laws, monopoly itself is not illegal If a firm has a monopoly because of a newly patented invention, for example, the law explicitly allows a firm to earn higher-than-normal profits for a time as a reward for innovation If a firm achieves a large share of the market by producing a better product at a lower price, such behavior is not prohibited by antitrust law Restrictive Practices Antitrust law includes rules against restrictive practices—practices that not involve outright agreements to raise price or to reduce the quantity produced, but that might have the effect of reducing competition Antitrust cases involving restrictive practices are often controversial, because they delve into specific contracts or agreements between firms that are allowed in some cases but not in others For example, if a product manufacturer is selling to a group of dealers who then sell to the general public it is illegal for the manufacturer to demand a minimum resale price maintenance agreement, which would require the dealers to sell for at least a certain minimum price A minimum price contract is illegal because it would restrict competition among dealers However, the manufacturer is legally allowed to “suggest” minimum prices and to stop selling to dealers who regularly undercut the suggested price If you think this rule sounds like a fairly subtle distinction, you are right An exclusive dealing agreement between a manufacturer and a dealer can be legal or illegal It is legal if the purpose of the contract is to encourage competition between dealers For example, it is legal for the Ford Motor Company to sell its cars to only Ford dealers, for General Motors to sell to only GM dealers, and so on However, exclusive deals may also limit competition If one large retailer obtained the exclusive rights to be the sole distributor of televisions, computers, and audio equipment made by a number of companies, then this exclusive contract would have an anticompetitive effect on other retailers Tying sales happen when a customer is required to buy one product only if the customer also buys a second product Tying sales are controversial because they force consumers to purchase a product that they may not actually want or need Further, the additional, required products are not necessarily advantageous to the customer Suppose that to purchase a popular DVD, the store required that you also purchase a portable TV of a certain model These products are only loosely related, thus there is no reason to make the purchase of one contingent on the other Even if a customer was interested in a portable TV, the tying to a particular model prevents the customer from having the option of selecting one from the numerous types available in the market A related, but not identical, concept is called bundling, where two or more products are sold as one Bundling typically offers an advantage for the consumer by allowing them to acquire multiple products or services for a better price For example, several cable companies allow customers to buy products like cable, internet, and a phone line 229 230 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY through a special price available through bundling Customers are also welcome to purchase these products separately, but the price of bundling is usually more appealing In some cases, tying sales and bundling can be viewed as anticompetitive However, in other cases they may be legal and even common It is common for people to purchase season tickets to a sports team or a set of concerts so that they can be guaranteed tickets to the few contests or shows that are most popular and likely to sell out Computer software manufacturers may often bundle together a number of different programs, even when the buyer wants only a few of the programs Think about the software that is included in a new computer purchase, for example Recall from the chapter on Monopoly that predatory pricing occurs when the existing firm (or firms) reacts to a new firm by dropping prices very low, until the new firm is driven out of the market, at which point the existing firm raises prices again This pattern of pricing is aimed at deterring the entry of new firms into the market But in practice, it can be hard to figure out when pricing should be considered predatory Say that American Airlines is flying between two cities, and a new airline starts flying between the same two cities, at a lower price If American Airlines cuts its price to match the new entrant, is this predatory pricing? Or is it just market competition at work? A commonly proposed rule is that if a firm is selling for less than its average variable cost—that is, at a price where it should be shutting down—then there is evidence for predatory pricing But calculating in the real world what costs are variable and what costs are fixed is often not obvious, either The Microsoft antitrust case embodies many of these gray areas in restrictive practices, as the next Clear it Up shows Did Microsoft® engage in anticompetitive and restrictive practices? The most famous restrictive practices case of recent years was a series of lawsuits by the U.S government against Microsoft—lawsuits that were encouraged by some of Microsoft’s competitors All sides admitted that Microsoft’s Windows program had a near-monopoly position in the market for the software used in general computer operating systems All sides agreed that the software had many satisfied customers All sides agreed that the capabilities of computer software that was compatible with Windows—both software produced by Microsoft and that produced by other companies—had expanded dramatically in the 1990s Having a monopoly or a near-monopoly is not necessarily illegal in and of itself, but in cases where one company controls a great deal of the market, antitrust regulators look at any allegations of restrictive practices with special care The antitrust regulators argued that Microsoft had gone beyond profiting from its software innovations and its dominant position in the software market for operating systems, and had tried to use its market power in operating systems software to take over other parts of the software industry For example, the government argued that Microsoft had engaged in an anticompetitive form of exclusive dealing by threatening computer makers that, if they did not leave another firm’s software off their machines (specifically, Netscape’s Internet browser), then Microsoft would not sell them its operating system software Microsoft was accused by the government antitrust regulators of tying together its Windows operating system software, where it had a monopoly, with its Internet Explorer browser software, where it did not have a monopoly, and thus using this bundling as an anticompetitive tool Microsoft was also accused of a form of predatory pricing; namely, giving away certain additional software products for free as part of Windows, as a way of driving out the competition from other makers of software In April 2000, a federal court held that Microsoft’s behavior had crossed the line into unfair competition, and recommended that the company be broken into two competing firms However, that penalty was overturned on appeal, and in November 2002 Microsoft reached a settlement with the government that it would end its restrictive practices The concept of restrictive practices is continually evolving, as firms seek new ways to earn profits and government regulators define what is permissible and what is not A situation where the law is evolving and changing is always somewhat troublesome, since laws are most useful and fair when firms know what they are in advance In addition, since the law is open to interpretation, competitors who are losing out in the market can accuse successful firms of anticompetitive restrictive practices, and try to win through government regulation what they have failed to accomplish in the market Officials at the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice are, of course, aware of these issues, but there is no easy way to resolve them This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY 11.3 | Regulating Natural Monopolies By the end of this section, you will be able to: • Evaluate the appropriate competition policy for a natural monopoly • Interpret a graph of regulatory choices • Contrast cost-plus and price cap regulation Most true monopolies today in the U.S are regulated, natural monopolies A natural monopoly poses a difficult challenge for competition policy, because the structure of costs and demand seems to make competition unlikely or costly A natural monopoly arises when average costs are declining over the range of production that satisfies market demand This typically happens when fixed costs are large relative to variable costs As a result, one firm is able to supply the total quantity demanded in the market at lower cost than two or more firms—so splitting up the natural monopoly would raise the average cost of production and force customers to pay more Public utilities, the companies that have traditionally provided water and electrical service across much of the United States, are leading examples of natural monopoly It would make little sense to argue that a local water company should be broken up into several competing companies, each with its own separate set of pipes and water supplies Installing four or five identical sets of pipes under a city, one for each water company, so that each household could choose its own water provider, would be terribly costly The same argument applies to the idea of having many competing companies for delivering electricity to homes, each with its own set of wires Before the advent of wireless phones, the argument also applied to the idea of many different phone companies, each with its own set of phone wires running through the neighborhood The Choices in Regulating a Natural Monopoly So what then is the appropriate competition policy for a natural monopoly? Figure 11.3 illustrates the case of natural monopoly, with a market demand curve that cuts through the downward-sloping portion of the average cost curve Points A, B, C, and F illustrate four of the main choices for regulation Table 11.3 outlines the regulatory choices for dealing with a natural monopoly Figure 11.3 Regulatory Choices in Dealing with Natural Monopoly A natural monopoly will maximize profits by producing at the quantity where marginal revenue (MR) equals marginal costs (MC) and by then looking to the market demand curve to see what price to charge for this quantity This monopoly will produce at point A, with a quantity of and a price of 9.3 If antitrust regulators split this company exactly in half, then each half would produce at point B, with average costs of 9.75 and output of The regulators might require the firm to produce where marginal cost crosses the market demand curve at point C However, if the firm is required to produce at a quantity of and sell at a price of 3.5, the firm will suffer from losses The most likely choice is point F, where the firm is required to produce a quantity of and charge a price of 6.5 Quantity Price 14.7 Total Revenue* 14.7 Marginal Revenue - Total Cost 11.0 Marginal Cost - Average Cost 11.00 Table 11.3 Regulatory Choices in Dealing with Natural Monopoly (*Total Revenue is given by multiplying price and quantity However, some of the price values in this table have been rounded for ease of presentation.) 231 232 CHAPTER 11 | MONOPOLY AND ANTITRUST POLICY Total Revenue* Marginal Revenue Total Cost Marginal Cost Average Cost Quantity Price 12.4 24.7 10.0 19.5 8.5 9.75 10.6 31.7 7.0 25.5 6.0 8.50 9.3 37.2 5.5 31.0 5.5 7.75 8.0 40.0 2.8 35.0 4.0 7.00 6.5 39.0 –1.0 39.0 4.0 6.50 5.0 35.0 –4.0 42.0 3.0 6.00 3.5 28.0 –7.0 45.5 3.5 5.70 2.0 18.0 –10.0 49.5 4.0 5.5 Table 11.3 Regulatory Choices in Dealing with Natural Monopoly (*Total Revenue is given by multiplying price and quantity However, some of the price values in this table have been rounded for ease of presentation.) The first possibility is to leave the natural monopoly alone In this case, the monopoly will follow its normal approach to maximizing profits It determines the quantity where MR = MC, which happens at point P at a quantity of The firm then looks to point A on the demand curve to find that it can charge a price of 9.3 for that profit-maximizing quantity Since the price is above the average cost curve, the natural monopoly would earn economic profits A second outcome arises if antitrust authorities decide to divide the company, so that the new firms can compete As a simple example, imagine that the company is cut in half Thus, instead of one large firm producing a quantity of 4, two halfsize firms each produce a quantity of Because of the declining average cost curve (AC), the average cost of production for each of the half-size companies each producing 2, as shown at point B, would be 9.75, while the average cost of production for a larger firm producing would only be 7.75 Thus, the economy would become less productively efficient, since the good is being produced at a higher average cost In a situation with a downward-sloping average cost curve, two smaller firms will always have higher average costs of production than one larger firm for any quantity of total output In addition, the antitrust authorities must worry that splitting the natural monopoly into pieces may be only the start of their problems If one of the two firms grows larger than the other, it will have lower average costs and may be able to drive its competitor out of the market Alternatively, two firms in a market may discover subtle ways of coordinating their behavior and keeping prices high Either way, the result will not be the greater competition that was desired A third alternative is that regulators may decide to set prices and quantities produced for this industry The regulators will try to choose a point along the market demand curve that benefits both consumers and the broader social interest Point C illustrates one tempting choice: the regulator requires that the firm produce the quantity of output where marginal cost crosses the demand curve at an output of 8, and charge the price of 3.5, which is equal to marginal cost at that point This rule is appealing because it requires price to be set equal to marginal cost, which is what would occur in a perfectly competitive market, and it would assure consumers a higher quantity and lower price than at the monopoly choice A In fact, efficient allocation of resources would occur at point C, since the value to the consumers of the last unit bought and sold in this market is equal to the marginal cost of producing it Attempting to bring about point C through force of regulation, however, runs into a severe difficulty At point C, with an output of 8, a price of 3.5 is below the average cost of production, which is 5.7, and so if the firm charges a price of 3.5, it will be suffering losses Unless the regulators or the government offer the firm an ongoing public subsidy (and there are numerous political problems with that option), the firm will lose money and go out of business Perhaps the most plausible option for the regulator is point F; that is, to set the price where AC crosses the demand curve at an output of and a price of 6.5 This plan makes some sense at an intuitive level: let the natural monopoly charge enough to cover its average costs and earn a normal rate of profit, so that it can continue operating, but prevent the firm from raising prices and earning abnormally high monopoly profits, as it would at the monopoly choice A Of course, determining this level of output and price with the political pressures, time constraints, and limited information of the real world is much harder than identifying the point on a graph For more on the problems that can arise from a centrally determined price, see the discussion of price floors and price ceilings in Demand and Supply Cost-Plus versus Price Cap Regulation Indeed, regulators of public utilities for many decades followed the general approach of attempting to choose a point like F in Figure 11.3 They calculated the average cost of production for the water or electricity companies, added in an amount This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 APPENDIX C | PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE Chapter 18 All other things being equal, voter turnout should increase as the cost of casting an informed vote decreases The cost in time of voting, transportation costs to and from the polling place, and any additional time and effort spent becoming informed about the candidates The costs of organization and the small benefit to the individual Domestic cotton producers would lobby heavily to protect themselves from the competition, whereas the consumers have little incentive to organize True This is exactly what occurs in a voting cycle That is, the majority can prefer policy A to policy B, policy B to policy C, but also prefer policy C to policy A Then, the majority will never reach a conclusive outcome The problem is an example of a voting cycle The group will vote for mountain biking over canoeing by 2–1 It will vote for canoeing over the beach by 2–1 If mountain biking is preferred to canoeing and canoeing is preferred to the beach, it might seem that it must be true that mountain biking is the favorite But in a vote of the beach versus mountain biking, the beach wins by a 2–1 vote When a voting cycle occurs, choosing a single favorite that is always preferred by a majority becomes impossible The four Coca-Cola candidates compete with each other for Coca-Cola voters, whereas everyone who prefers Pepsi had only one candidate to vote for Thus the will of the majority is not satisfied Chapter 19 False Anything that leads to different levels of productivity between two economies can be a source of comparative advantage For example, the education of workers, the knowledge base of engineers and scientists in a country, the part of a split-up value chain where they have their specialized learning, economies of scale, and other factors can all determine comparative advantage Brazil has the absolute advantage in producing beef and the United States has the absolute advantage in autos The opportunity cost of producing one pound of beef is 1/10 of an auto; in the United States it is 3/4 of an auto In answering questions like these, it is often helpful to begin by organizing the information in a table, such as in the following table Notice that, in this case, the productivity of the countries is expressed in terms of how many workers it takes to produce a unit of a product Country One Sweater One Bottle of wine France worker worker Tunisia workers workers In this example, France has an absolute advantage in the production of both sweaters and wine You can tell because it takes France less labor to produce a unit of the good (a) In Germany, it takes fewer workers to make either a television or a video camera Germany has an absolute advantage in the production of both goods (b) Producing an additional television in Germany requires three workers Shifting those three German workers will reduce video camera production by 3/4 of a camera Producing an additional television set in Poland requires six workers, and shifting those workers from the other good reduces output of video cameras by 6/12 of a camera, or 1/2 Thus, the opportunity cost of producing televisions is lower in Poland, so Poland has the comparative advantage in the production of televisions Note: Do not let the fractions like 3/4 of a camera or 1/2 of a video camera bother you If either country was to expand television production by a significant amount—that is, lots more than one unit—then we will be talking about whole cameras and not fractional ones You can also spot this conclusion by noticing that Poland’s absolute disadvantage is relatively lower in televisions, because Poland needs twice as many workers to produce a television but three times as many to produce a video camera, so the product with the relatively lower absolute disadvantage is Poland’s comparative advantage (c) Producing a video camera in Germany requires four workers, and shifting those four workers away from television production has an opportunity cost of 4/3 television sets Producing a video camera in Poland requires 12 workers, and shifting those 12 workers away from television production has an opportunity cost of two television sets Thus, the opportunity cost of producing video cameras is lower in Germany, and video cameras will be Germany’s comparative advantage (d) In this example, absolute advantage differs from comparative advantage Germany has the absolute advantage in the production of both goods, but Poland has a comparative advantage in the production of televisions (e) Germany should specialize, at least to some extent, in the production of video cameras, export video cameras, and import televisions Conversely, Poland should specialize, at least to some extent, in the production of televisions, export televisions, and import video cameras There are a number of possible advantages of intra-industry trade Both nations can take advantage of extreme specialization and learning in certain kinds of cars with certain traits, like gas-efficient cars, luxury cars, sport-utility vehicles, higher- and lowerquality cars, and so on Moreover, nations can take advantage of economies of scale, so that large companies will compete against each other across international borders, providing the benefits of competition and variety to customers This same argument applies 475 476 APPENDIX C | PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE to trade between U.S states, where people often buy products made by people of other states, even though a similar product is made within the boundaries of their own state All states—and all countries—can benefit from this kind of competition and trade (a) Start by plotting the points on a sketch diagram and then drawing a line through them The following figure illustrates the average costs of production of semiconductors The curve illustrates economies of scale by showing that as the scale increases—that is, as production at this particular factory goes up—the average cost of production declines The economies of scale exist up to an output of 40,000 semiconductors; at higher outputs, the average cost of production does not seem to decline any further (b) At any quantity demanded above 40,000, this economy can take full advantage of economies of scale; that is, it can produce at the lowest cost per unit Indeed, if the quantity demanded was quite high, like 500,000, then there could be a number of different factories all taking full advantage of economies of scale and competing with each other If the quantity demanded falls below 40,000, then the economy by itself, without foreign trade, cannot take full advantage of economies of scale (c) The simplest answer to this question is that the small country could have a large enough factory to take full advantage of economies of scale, but then export most of the output For semiconductors, countries like Taiwan and Korea have recently fit this description Moreover, this country could also import semiconductors from other countries which also have large factories, thus getting the benefits of competition and variety A slightly more complex answer is that the country can get these benefits of economies of scale without producing semiconductors, but simply by buying semiconductors made at low cost around the world An economy, especially a smaller country, may well end up specializing and producing a few items on a large scale, but then trading those items for other items produced on a large scale, and thus gaining the benefits of economies of scale by trade, as well as by direct production A nation might restrict trade on imported products to protect an industry that is important for national security For example, nation X and nation Y may be geopolitical rivals, each with ambitions of increased political and economic strength Even if nation Y has comparative advantage in the production of missile defense systems, it is unlikely that nation Y would seek to export those goods to nation X It is also the case that, for some nations, the production of a particular good is a key component of national identity In Japan, the production of rice is culturally very important It may be difficult for Japan to import rice from a nation like Vietnam, even if Vietnam has a comparative advantage in rice production Chapter 20 This is the opposite case of the Work It Out feature A reduced tariff is like a decrease in the cost of production, which is shown by a downward (or rightward) shift in the supply curve A subsidy is like a reduction in cost This shifts the supply curve down (or to the right), driving the price of sugar down If the subsidy is large enough, the price of sugar can fall below the cost of production faced by foreign producers, which means they will lose money on any sugar they produce and sell Trade barriers raise the price of goods in protected industries If those products are inputs in other industries, it raises their production costs and then prices, so sales fall in those other industries Lower sales lead to lower employment Additionally, if the protected industries are consumer goods, their customers pay higher prices, which reduce demand for other consumer products and thus employment in those industries Trade based on comparative advantage raises the average wage rate economy-wide, though it can reduce the incomes of import-substituting industries By moving away from a country’s comparative advantage, trade barriers the opposite: they give workers in protected industries an advantage, while reducing the average wage economy-wide By raising incomes, trade tends to raise working conditions also, even though those conditions may not (yet) be equivalent to those in high-income countries This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 APPENDIX C | PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE They typically pay more than the next-best alternative If a Nike firm did not pay workers at least as much as they would earn, for example, in a subsistence rural lifestyle, they many never come to work for Nike Since trade barriers raise prices, real incomes fall The average worker would also earn less Workers working in other sectors and the protected sector see a decrease in their real wage If imports can be sold at extremely low prices, domestic firms would have to match those prices to be competitive By definition, matching prices would imply selling under cost and, therefore, losing money Firms cannot sustain losses forever When they leave the industry, importers can “take over,” raising prices to monopoly levels to cover their short-term losses and earn longterm profits 10 Because low-income countries need to provide necessities—food, clothing, and shelter—to their people In other words, they consider environmental quality a luxury 11 Low-income countries can compete for jobs by reducing their environmental standards to attract business to their countries This could lead to a competitive reduction in regulations, which would lead to greater environmental damage While pollution management is a cost for businesses, it is tiny relative to other costs, like labor and adequate infrastructure It is also costly for firms to locate far away from their customers, which many low-income countries are 12 The decision should not be arbitrary or unnecessarily discriminatory It should treat foreign companies the same way as domestic companies It should be based on science 13 Restricting imports today does not solve the problem If anything, it makes it worse since it implies using up domestic sources of the products faster than if they are imported Also, the national security argument can be used to support protection of nearly any product, not just things critical to our national security 14 The effect of increasing standards may increase costs to the small exporting country The supply curve of toys will shift to the left Exports will decrease and toy prices will rise Tariffs also raise prices So the effect on the price of toys is the same A tariff is a “second best” policy and also affects other sectors However, a common standard across countries is a “first best” policy that attacks the problem at its root 15 A free trade association offers free trade between its members, but each country can determine its own trade policy outside the association A common market requires a common external trade policy in addition to free trade within the group An economic union is a common market with coordinated fiscal and monetary policy 16 International agreements can serve as a political counterweight to domestic special interests, thereby preventing stronger protectionist measures 17 Reductions in tariffs, quotas, and other trade barriers, improved transportation, and communication media have made people more aware of what is available in the rest of the world 18 Competition from firms with better or cheaper products can reduce a business’s profits, and may drive it out of business Workers would similarly lose income or even their jobs 19 Consumers get better or less expensive products Businesses with the better or cheaper products increase their profits Employees of those businesses earn more income On balance, the gains outweigh the losses to a nation 477 478 APPENDIX C | PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 APPENDIX C | PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE REFERENCES Welcome to Economics! 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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/19/business/labor-panel-finds-illegal-punishments-at-walmart.html?_r=1& This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 APPENDIX C | PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE Kolesnikova, Natalia A., and Yang Liu Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis: The Regional Economist “Gender Wage Gap May Be Much Smaller Than Most Think.” Last modified October 2011.http://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/ articles/?id=2160 Podmolik, Mary Ellen “HUD Finds Housing Discrimination ‘Hidden’ But Prevalent.” Chicago Tribune: Business, June 12, 2013 http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-06-12/business/ct-biz-0612-housing-discrimination-20130612_1_renterstesters-chicago-area Spreen, Thomas Luke United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics “Recent College Graduates in the U.S Labor Force: Data from the Current Population Survey.” Monthly Labor Review (February, 2013) http://www.bls.gov/opub/ mlr/2013/02/art1full.pdf U.S Bureau of Labor Statistics: BLS Reports “Women in the Labor Force: A Databook (Report 1040).” Last modified February 2013 http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2012.pdf U.S Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, “Walmart to Pay More than $11.7 Million to Settle EEOC Sex Discrimination Suit.” Last modified March 1, 2010 http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/3-1-10.cfm United States Department of Labor: Bureau of Labor Statistics “News Release: Usual Weekly Earnings of Wage and Salary Workers (Third Quarter 2013).” November 1, 2013 http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/wkyeng.pdf Weinberger, Catherine J., and Lois Joy “The Relative Earnings of Black College Graduates, 1980–2001.” In Race and Economic Opportunity in the 21st Century, edited by Marlene Kim New York: Routledge, 2007 http://www.econ.ucsb.edu/~weinberg/ grads.pdf Clune, Michael S “The Fiscal Impacts of Immigrants: A California Case Study.” In The Immigration Debate: Studies on the Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, edited by James P Smith and Barry Edmonston Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1998, 120–182 http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=5985&page=120 Smith, James P “Immigration Reform.” Rand Corporation: Rand Review http://www.rand.org/pubs/periodicals/rand-review/ issues/2012/fall/leadership/immigration-reform.html U.S Department of Homeland Security: Office of Immigration Statistics “2011 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics.” September 2012 http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2011/ois_yb_2011.pdf Information, Risk, and Insurance Consumer Reports “Consumer Reports.org.” http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/index.htm Federal Trade Commission “About the Federal Trade Commission.” Last modified October 17, 2013 http://www.ftc.gov/ftc/ about.shtm Kahneman, Daniel, and Amos Tversky “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk.” Econometrica 47, no (1979): 263-291 http://www.princeton.edu/~kahneman/docs/Publications/prospect_theory.pdf Rasmussen Reports, LLC “Rasmussen Reports.” http://www.rasmussenreports.com/ Central Intelligence Agency “The World Factbook.” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/ National Association of Insurance Commissioners “National Association of Insurance Commissioners & The Center for Insurance Policy and Research.” http://www.naic.org/ OECD “The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).” http://www.oecd.org/about/ Thaler, Richard H., and Sendhil Mullainathan “The Concise Encyclopedia of Economics: Behavioral Economics.” Library of Economics and Liberty http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BehavioralEconomics.html The Henry J Kaiser Family Foundation “Health Reform: Summary of the Affordable care Act.” Last modified April 25, 2013 http://kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/summary-of-new-health-reform-law/ Financial Markets National Venture Capital Association “Recent Stats & Studies.” http://www.nvca.org/ index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=344&Itemid=103Update Former, Jamie D “Should Your Small Business Go Public? Consider the Benefits and Risks of Becoming a Publicly Traded Company.” U.S Small Business Administration: Community Blog (blog) Publication date March 23, 2010 http://www.sba.gov/community/blogs/community-blogs/business-law-advisor/should-your-small-business-go-publicconsider-0 Howley, Kathleen M Bloomberg “Home Value Highest Since ’07 as U.S Houses Make Cash.” Last modified March 26, 2013 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-03-26/home-value-highest-since-07-as-u-s-houses-make-cash-mortgages.html Rooney, Ben “Trading Program Sparked May ‘Flash Crash’.” CNN Money Last modified October 1, 2010 http://money.cnn.com/2010/10/01/markets/SEC_CFTC_flash_crash/index.htm Investment Company Institute “2013 Investment Company Fact Book, Chapter 6: Characteristics of Mutual Fund Owners.” http://icifactbook.org/fb_ch6.html 483 484 APPENDIX C | PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE U.S Department of Commerce: United States Census Bureau “Income: Table H-13 Educational Attainment of Householder—Households with Householder 25 Years Old and Over by Median and Mean Income.” http://www.census.gov/ hhes/www/income/data/historical/household/ Public Economy Olson, Mancur The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1965) Downs, Anthony An Economic Theory of Democracy New York: Harper, 1957 Skinner, B.F Walden Two Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1948 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) “Defending the Freedom to Vote.” https://www.aclu.org/defending-freedom-vote The New York Times “The 2012 Money Race: Compare the Candidates.” http://elections.nytimes.com/2012/campaign-finance The Washington Post “Exit Polls 2012: Where Americans Stood this Election.” Last modified November 7, 2012 http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/special/politics/2012-exit-polls/national-breakdown/ Cornell University Law School: Legal Information Institute “Citizens United v Federal Election Committee (No 08-205).” Last modified January 21, 2010 http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/08-205.ZS.html U.S Department of Commerce: United States Census Bureau “Voting and Registration: Historical Time Series Tables; Table A-9: Reported Voting Rates in Presidential Election Years, by Selected Characteristics: November 1964 to 2012.” http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/index.html Roper Center Public Opinion Archives “A Brief History of Public Opinion on the Government’s Role in Providing Health Care.” Last modified September 23, 2013 U.S Department of Commerce: United States Census Bureau “Voting and Registration: Historical Time Series Tables; Table A-10: Reported Registration Rates in Presidential Election Years, by Selected Characteristics: November 1968 to 2012.” http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/index.html Nixon, Ron “American Candy Makers Pinched by Inflated Sugar Prices Look Abroad.” The New York Times Last modified October 30, 2013 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/31/us/american-candy-makers-pinched-by-inflated-sugar-prices-lookabroad.html?_r=0 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, and Sean Lowry “U.S Tire Tariffs: Saving Few Jobs at High Cost (Policy Brief 12-9).” Peterson Institute for International Economics Last modified April 2012 International Trade Krugman, Paul R Pop Internationalism The MIT Press, Cambridge 1996 Krugman, Paul R “What Do Undergrads Need to Know about Trade?” American Economic Review 83, no 1993 23-26 Ricardo, David On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation London: John Murray, 1817 Ricardo, David “On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.” Library of Economics and Liberty http://www.econlib.org/library/Ricardo/ricP.html Bernstein, William J A Splendid Exchange: How Trade Shaped the World Atlantic Monthly Press New York 2008 Vernengo, Matias “What Do Undergraduates Really Need to Know About Trade and Finance?” in Political Economy and Contemporary Capitalism: Radical Perspectives on Economic Theory and Policy, ed Ron Baiman, Heather Boushey, and Dawn Saunders M E Sharpe Inc, 2000 Armonk 177-183 World Trade Organization “The Doha Round.” Accessed October 2013 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/dda_e.htm The World Bank “Data: World Development Indicators.” Accessed October 2013 http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/worlddevelopment-indicators Globalization and Protectionism Bureau of Labor Statistics “Industries at a Glance.” Accessed December 31, 2013 http://www.bls.gov/iag/ Oxfam International Accessed January 6, 2014 http://www.oxfam.org/ Bureau of Labor Statistics “Data Retrieval: Employment, Hours, and Earnings (CES).” Last modified February 1, 2013 http://www.bls.gov/webapps/legacy/cesbtab1.htm Kristof, Nicholas “Let Them Sweat.” The New York Times, June 25, 2002 http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/25/opinion/letthem-sweat.html Kohut, Andrew, Richard Wike, and Juliana Horowitz “The Pew Global Attitudes Project.” Pew Research Center Last modified October 4, 2007 http://www.pewglobal.org/files/pdf/258.pdf United States Department of Commerce “About the Department of Commerce.” Accessed January 6, 2014 http://www.commerce.gov/about-department-commerce This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 APPENDIX C | PRESENT DISCOUNTED VALUE United States International Trade Commission “About the USITC.” Accessed January 6, 2014 http://www.usitc.gov/ press_room/about_usitc.htm E Helpman, and O Itskhoki, “Labour Market Rigidities, Trade and Unemployment,” The Review of Economic Studies, 77 (2010): 1100-1137 M.J Melitz, and D Trefler “Gains from Trade when Firms Matter.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives, 26.2 (2012): 91-118 Rauch, J “Was Mancur Olson Wrong?” The American, February 15, 2013 http://www.american.com/archive/2013/february/wasmancur-olson-wrong Office of the United States Trade Representative “U.S Trade Representative Froman Announces FY 2014 WTO Tariff-Rate Quota Allocations for Raw Cane Sugar, Refined and Specialty Sugar and Sugar-Containing Products.”Accessed January 6, 2014 http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2013/september/WTO-trq-for-sugar The World Bank “Merchandise trade (% of GDP).” Accessed January 4, 2014 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ TG.VAL.TOTL.GD.ZS 485 486 INDEX INDEX Symbols 401(k), 137 A AARP, 367 absolute advantage, 378, 392 Accounting profit, 147 accounting profit, 160, 211 acquisition, 224, 236 actual rate of return, 344, 358 Adam Smith, 13, 37, 214 additional external cost, 255 additional external costs, 244 Adverse selection, 332 adverse selection, 336 Affirmative action, 315 affirmative action, 319 Affordable Care Act (ACA), 323, 334, 367 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 314 Agriculture and Food Research Initiative (AFRI), 271 Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), 286 Alfred Marshall, 67 Allocative efficiency, 35, 199 allocative efficiency, 40, 181, 201, 256 American Federation of State, 309 Anthony Downs, 364 Anti-dumping laws, 409 anti-dumping laws, 417 Antitrust Division of the Justice Department, 214 antitrust laws, 225, 236 asymmetric information, 324, 336 average cost curve, 231 average profit, 152, 160 Average total cost, 150 average total cost, 160 Average variable cost, 150 average variable cost, 160 B backward-bending supply curve for labor, 132, 140 bar graph, 431 Barriers to entry, 188 barriers to entry, 201 behavioral economics, 138, 140 behavioral economists, 326 biodiversity, 253, 255 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 365 bond, 341, 358 bond yield, 346, 358 bondholder, 342, 358 bonds, 346, 451 budget constraint, 28, 40, 121, 126, 136, 441 budget constraint line, 121, 140, 283 budget line, 440 bundling, 229, 236 C capital gain, 342, 358 cartel, 214, 219 Celler-Kefauver Act, 226 certificate of deposit (CD), 345, 358 ceteris paribus, 49, 59, 69, 78 checking account, 345, 358 circular flow diagram, 17, 23 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 313 Civil Rights Act of 1991, 314 Clayton Antitrust Act, 226 Clean Air Act, 246, 249, 250 Clean Water Act, 246 coinsurance, 331, 336 collateral, 329, 336 collective bargaining, 305, 319 collusion, 214, 219 command economy, 18, 23 command-and-control regulation, 246, 255 common market, 417 common markets, 413 common resources, 273 comparative advantage, 14, 36, 40, 378, 406 competition, 265 competitive market, 314 complements, 51, 69 Compound interest, 355 compound interest, 358 concentration ratio, 226, 236 constant cost industry, 180 constant returns to scale, 156, 160 Constant unitary elasticity, 103 constant unitary elasticity, 114 consumer equilibrium, 125, 140 consumer surplus, 65, 69, 402 consumption, 120 consumption budget constraint, 34 consumption choice budget constraint, 131 copayment, 331, 336 copyright, 190, 201 This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 core competency, 14 corporate bond, 341, 358 corporate governance, 343, 358 corporation, 342, 358 cosigner, 328, 336 cost, 34 cost-plus regulation, 233, 236 County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME), 309 coupon rate, 346, 358 cross-price elasticity of demand, 111, 114 CTC, 287 D David Ricardo, 378 deadweight loss, 66, 69 debit card, 345, 358 decreasing cost industry, 181 deductible, 336 deductibles, 331 demand, 44, 69, 266 demand and supply diagram, 65 demand and supply models, 88 demand curve, 44, 49, 69, 101, 102, 207, 210, 400 demand curves, 229 demand schedule, 44, 69 Democracy, 369 Deposit insurance, 330 deregulation, 190, 201, 233 differentiated product, 219 differentiated products, 207, 212 diminishing marginal returns, 149 diminishing marginal utility, 121, 140, 440 Discrimination, 311 discrimination, 319 diseconomies of scale, 156, 160 disruptive market change, 416, 417 diversification, 350, 358 dividend, 342, 358 division of labor, 13, 23, 388 Dodd-Frank Act, 235 Dow Jones Index, 348 dumping, 390, 417 Dumping, 409 duopoly, 215, 219 E earned income tax credit (EITC), 287, 299 economic efficiency, 38 Economic profit, 147 economic profit, 160 economic surplus, 66, 69 economic union, 417 INDEX economic unions, 413 Economics, 12 economics, 23 economies of scale, 14, 23, 389 Economies of scale, 154, 189 ecotourism, 250 effective income tax, 296, 299 efficiency, 65 elastic demand, 98, 114 elastic supply, 98, 114 Elasticity, 98 elasticity, 114 elasticity of savings, 112, 114 entry, 179, 183 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), 315 Equal Pay Act of 1963, 314 equilibrium, 48, 65, 69, 77, 211, 325, 399 equilibrium price, 48, 69, 326 equilibrium quantity, 48, 61, 69 equity, 350, 358 estate tax, 297, 299 European Union, 413 European Union (EU), 64 excess demand, 48, 69 excess supply, 48, 69 exclusive dealing, 229, 236 exit, 179, 183 expected rate of return, 344, 358 Explicit costs, 147 explicit costs, 160 export, 386 Exports, 21 exports, 23 external costs, 244 externality, 243, 255 F face value, 346, 358 factors of production, 53, 69 Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 346 Federal Trade Commission, 214 Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 328 fee-for-service, 331, 336 financial capital, 83 financial capital market, 328 financial capital markets, 324 Financial capital markets, 340 financial intermediary, 344, 358 firm, 35, 55, 146, 160, 211, 217, 264, 307, 341, 370 firms, 206 Fiscal policy, 16 fiscal policy, 23 fixed cost, 160 Fixed costs, 148 fossil fuels, 253 four-firm concentration ratio, 236 Francine Blau, 311 free rider, 272, 275 free trade, 409 free trade agreement, 417 free trade agreements, 413 function, 423 fungible, 138, 140 G gain from trade, 381, 392 game theory, 214, 219 Gary Becker, 314 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 412, 417 George Psacharopoulos, 267 globalization, 20, 23, 228, 295, 378, 406 good, 46 goods and services market, 17, 23 Great Depression, 378 Great Recession, 288 gross domestic product (GDP), 21, 23, 254 growth rate, 426 H Health Care for America Now (HCAN), 367 health maintenance organization (HMO), 331, 336 Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), 227, 236 high yield, 346 high yield bonds, 358 High-income countries, 401 high-income countries, 410 I immigrants, 316 imperfect information, 324, 336 imperfectly competitive, 206, 219 Implicit costs, 147 implicit costs, 160 import quotas, 398, 417 Imports, 21 imports, 23, 386 Income, 280, 296 income, 299 income effect, 127, 140, 442 income elasticity of demand, 111 income inequality, 299 increasing cost industry, 181 index fund, 350, 358 indifference curve, 439 Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs), 137 inelastic demand, 98, 114 inelastic supply, 98, 114 inequality, 280 infant industry argument, 408 inferior good, 51, 69, 111, 127 Infinite elasticity, 102 infinite elasticity, 114 initial public offering (IPO), 342, 358 inputs, 53, 69 Insurance, 329 insurance, 336 intellectual property, 190, 201, 275 Intellectual property, 268 interest rate, 84, 92, 451 international externalities, 253, 255 international trade, 390, 416 International Trade Commission (ITC), 371 intertemporal budget constraint, 134, 135 intertemporal choices, 39 intertemporal decision making, 85 intra-industry trade, 388, 392 invisible hand, 39, 40 J Joan Robinson, 371 John Maynard Keynes, 16 junk bonds, 346, 358 K key input, 106 kinked demand curve, 217, 219 L labor, 148 labor market, 17, 23, 78, 328 labor markets, 290 labor union, 305, 319 labor-leisure budget constraint, 130, 283 labor-leisure diagram, 445 Laurence Kahn, 311 law of demand, 44, 69, 84 law of diminishing marginal utility, 31, 40 law of diminishing returns, 34, 40 law of supply, 46, 69 legal monopoly, 188, 201 leviathan effect, 157 line graphs, 427 liquidity, 344, 358 487 488 INDEX living wage, 81 lobbyists, 366 logrolling, 369, 373 long-run average cost (LRAC) curve, 155, 160 long-run equilibrium, 180, 183 Lorenz curve, 291, 299 loss aversion, 138 low-income countries, 401, 410 M Macroeconomics, 15 macroeconomics, 23 marginal analysis, 31, 40 marginal benefits, 251 Marginal cost, 150 marginal cost, 160, 171, 195, 232 marginal cost curve, 251 marginal cost curves, 246 Marginal profit, 197 marginal profit, 201 marginal rate of substitution, 440 marginal revenue, 169, 183, 195 marginal utility, 121, 140, 439 Marginal utility per dollar, 123 marginal utility per dollar, 140 market, 19, 23, 228, 332 market economy, 19, 23, 35, 265 market failure, 245, 255 market price, 207 market share, 226, 236 market structure, 166, 183 marketable permit program, 248, 255 maturity date, 346, 358 maximizing utility, 124 median, 427 median voter theory, 369, 373 Medicaid, 282, 289, 299 Medicare, 367 merger, 224, 236 Michael S Clune, 316 Microeconomics, 15 microeconomics, 23 Midpoint Formula, 100 Midpoint Method, 99, 101 minimum resale price maintenance agreement, 229, 236 minimum wage, 81, 92, 407 model, 17, 23 Mollie Orshansky, 280 Monetary policy, 16 monetary policy, 23 money-back guarantee, 327, 336 monopolistic competition, 206, 219 monopoly, 188, 201, 230 monopoly firm, 307 Moody’s, 347 Moral hazard, 331 moral hazard, 336 municipal bond, 341 municipal bonds, 358 mutual funds, 350, 358 N National Academy of Engineers, 271 National Academy of Scientists, 271 National Association of Insurance Commissioners, 333 National Education Association, 309 National Institutes of Health, 271 national interest argument, 412, 417 National Labor-Management Relations Act, 310 National Venture Capital Association, 341 natural monopoly, 188, 201, 213, 231 near-poor, 286, 299 negative externalities, 366 negative externality, 243, 255 negative slope, 424 nonexcludable, 271, 275 nonrivalrous, 271, 275 Nontariff barriers, 398 nontariff barriers, 417 normal good, 51, 69 normal goods, 111, 127 normative statement, 40 normative statements, 37 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), 405, 413 O occupational license, 336 Occupational licenses, 328 oligopoly, 206, 219 Oligopoly, 213 opportunity cost, 29, 40, 378, 386, 405 opportunity set, 28, 40, 443 Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 216 output, 215 Oxfam International, 401 P partnership, 342, 358 patent, 190, 201, 268 This content is available for free at http://cnx.org/content/col11627/1.8 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), 323, 334 Pension insurance, 330 perfect competition, 166, 183 perfect elasticity, 102, 114 perfect inelasticity, 103, 114 perfectly competitive firm, 166, 167, 180, 192 perfectly elastic, 207 Pew Research Center for People and the Press, 59 physical capital, 148 pie chart, 430 pie graph, 430 pollution charge, 246, 255 pork-barrel spending, 368, 373 positive externalities, 265, 275 positive externality, 243, 255 positive slope, 424 positive statement, 40 positive statements, 37 poverty, 280, 299 poverty line, 280, 299 poverty rate, 280, 299 poverty trap, 283, 299 predatory pricing, 191, 201, 230 premium, 336 premiums, 329 present discounted value (PDV), 451 present value, 346, 359 price, 30, 44, 49, 69, 217 price cap regulation, 233, 236 price ceiling, 62, 66, 69 price control, 66, 69 Price controls, 62 price controls, 89, 368 Price elasticity, 98 price elasticity, 114 price elasticity of demand, 98, 114 price elasticity of supply, 98, 114 price floor, 62, 67, 69 price taker, 166, 183 price takers, 206 prisoner’s dilemma, 214, 219 private benefits, 265, 275 private company, 342, 359 private enterprise, 19, 23, 160 Private enterprise, 146 private insurance, 330 Private markets, 243 private rates of return, 266, 275 producer surplus, 66, 69, 402 product differentiation, 207 production, 146, 160 production possibilities frontier (PPF), 32, 40 production possibility frontier (PPF), 253, 379 INDEX production technologies, 153, 160 Productive efficiency, 35, 181 productive efficiency, 40, 211, 256 productivity, 384 profit, 167 profit margin, 152 profit-maximizing, 208 profits, 215 progressive tax system, 296, 299 property rights, 249, 255 protectionism, 398, 402, 417 Protectionism, 405 public company, 343, 359 public good, 271, 275 Public policy, 296 Q quantity demanded, 44, 69 Quantity demanded, 213 quantity supplied, 46, 69 quintile, 299 quintiles, 290 quotas, 369 R race to the bottom, 410, 417 rational ignorance, 364, 373 Redistribution, 296 redistribution, 299 regulatory capture, 234, 236, 366 restrictive practices, 229, 236 Retirement insurance, 330 revenue, 147, 160 Risk, 344 risk, 359 risk group, 331, 336 S safety net, 286, 299 salary, 76 Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 234 savings account, 345, 359 Scarcity, 12 scarcity, 23, 38 service, 46 service contract, 327, 336 Service Employees International Union, 309 shareholders, 342, 359 shares, 342, 359 Sherman Antitrust Act, 226 shift in demand, 52, 70 shift in supply, 53, 70 short-run average cost (SRAC) curve, 160 short-run average cost (SRAC) curves, 155 shortage, 48, 70 shutdown point, 183 Simple interest, 354 simple interest, 359 slope, 33, 424 social benefits, 265, 275 social costs, 243, 255 social rate of return, 267, 275 social surplus, 66, 70 sole proprietorship, 342, 359 Special interest groups, 366 special interest groups, 373 Special Supplemental Food Program for Women, Infants and Children (WIC), 289 specialization, 14, 23, 381 spillover, 255 spillovers, 243 splitting up the value chain, 388, 392 Standard & Poor’s 500 index, 348 Stock, 342 stock, 353, 359 stocks, 451 straight-line demand curve, 101 subsidies, 401 substitute, 51, 70 substitution effect, 127, 140, 442 sunk costs, 32, 40, 151 Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP), 288, 299 supply, 46, 70 supply curve, 46, 49, 70, 400 supply curves, 229 supply schedule, 46, 70 surplus, 48, 70 T Taft-Hartley Act, 308 tariff, 366 Tariffs, 390 tariffs, 392, 398 tax incidence, 108, 114 technology, 265 Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 286 theory, 17, 23 thick market, 326 thin market, 326 time series, 430 total cost, 160 total costs, 148, 167 Total revenue, 167 total revenue, 195 total surplus, 66, 70 total utility, 121, 140 trade secrets, 190, 201 trademark, 190, 201 tradeoffs, 38 traditional economy, 18, 23 Treasury bond, 341, 359 Tying sales, 229 tying sales, 236 Tyler Cowen, 274 U U.S Census Bureau, 51 U.S Department of the Treasury, 341 underground economies, 20 underground economy, 23 Unemployment insurance, 330 Unitary elasticities, 98 unitary elasticity, 114 United Mineworkers union, 308 usury laws, 88, 92 utility, 31, 40, 121, 439 utility maximizing, 326 utility-maximizing, 364 utility-maximizing choice, 126 V value chain, 388, 392 variable, 423 variable cost, 160 Variable costs, 148 Venture capital, 341 venture capital, 359 voting cycle, 370, 373 W wage, 76 wage elasticity of labor supply, 111, 114 Walter McMahon, 267 warranty, 327, 336 wealth, 296, 299 Workman’s compensation insurance, 330 World Trade Organization (WTO), 390, 399, 409, 412, 417 Z Zero elasticity, 103 zero inelasticity, 114 489 ... Transportation (22 8) (1) (22 4) Power (464) (36) ( 122 ) - - Change 20 07 20 12 (508) (3 42) 121 (378) (730) Table 12. 1 U.S Carbon Dioxide (CO2) Emissions from Fossil Fuels Consumed 20 07 20 12, Million Metric... numbers seen from 20 01 20 12 While 20 01 and 20 07 saw a high number of mergers, these were still only about half the number of mergers in 1999 and 20 00 (b) In 20 12, the greatest number of mergers submitted... Bureau of Transportation Statistics (for airlines).) U.S Industry Wireless Four-Firm Ratio 91 Table 11 .2 Examples of Concentration Ratios and HHIs in the U.S Economy, 20 09 HHI 2, 311 22 7 22 8 CHAPTER