International Water Scarcity and Variability The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous support to this book provided by the Stephen Bechtel Fund International Water Scarcity and Variability Managing Resource Use across Political Boundaries Shlomi Dinar and Ariel Dinar UN IV E R S ITY O F C A L IFO R N IA P R E S S University of California Press, one of the most distinguished university presses in the United States, enriches lives around the world by advancing scholarship in the humanities, social sciences, and natural sciences Its activities are supported by the UC Press Foundation and by philanthropic contributions from individuals and institutions For more information, visit www.ucpress.edu University of California Press Oakland, California © 2017 by The Regents of the University of California Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Dinar, Shlomi, 1975- author | Dinar, Ariel, 1947- author Title: International water scarcity and variability : managing resource use across political boundaries / Shlomi Dinar and Ariel Dinar Description: Oakland, California : University of California Press, [2017] | Includes bibliographical references and index Identifiers: LCCN 2016023974 (print) | LCCN 2016025167 (ebook) | ISBN 9780520283077 (cloth : alk paper) | ISBN 9780520292789 (pbk : alk paper) | ISBN 9780520958906 (e-edition) Subjects: LCSH: Water-supply—International cooperation | Water security—Social aspects Classification: LCC HD1691 D5625 2017 (print) | LCC HD1691 (ebook) | DDC 333.91—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016023974 Manufactured in the United States of America 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 10 To our families CONTENTS List of Illustrations Acknowledgments Introduction: The Debate on Climate Change and Water Security Theory of Scarcity-Variability, Conflict, and Cooperation Emergence of Cooperation under Scarcity and Variability Institutions and the Stability of Cooperative Arrangements under Scarcity and Variability Incentives to Cooperate: Political and Economic Instruments Evidence: How Basin Riparian Countries Cope with Water Scarcity and Variability Conclusion and Policy Implications Notes References Index ILLUSTRATIONS F I G U RE S 2.1: A stylized scarcity and variability–cooperation continuum 3.1: Renewable available water resources per capita per year in Angola and Austria, 1955–2100 6.1: The Jordan River Basin 6.2: Total Jordan inflow to Lake Kineret, 1970–2005 6.3: The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basin 6.4: Water flow at Hardinge Bridge and Farakka during the lean period 6.5: The Syr Darya Basin and the Aral Sea 6.6: Measured water flow at Toktogul, 1910–2011 6.7: The Tagus River Basin 6.8: Flow in Tajos at Cedillo 6.9: The Rio Grande and Rio Conchos system 6.10: The Colorado Basin 6.11: Extractions from the Rio Grande by the United States and Mexico, 1958– 2000 6.12: Annual flow volume of the Colorado River at Lee’s Ferry, 1894–2004 TAB LE S 3.1: Distribution of the river geographies in the dataset (treaty and non-treaty rivers) 3.2: Distribution of the treaties per river in the dataset 3.3: Distribution of water treaty signing years, 1850–2002 3.4: Distribution of treaties with number of issues over time 3.5: Distribution of treaty issues over time 3.6: Principal component variables 3.7: Descriptive statistics of variables included in the regression analyses 3.8: Results of the cooperation estimates applied to the full dataset 3.9: Results of the cooperation estimates applied to the only-treaty dataset 3.10: Results of the cooperation estimates applied to only water allocation issue treaties 3.11: Water supply variability impact on treaty likelihood and cooperation 3.12: Likelihood of treaty formation 3.13: Cooperation estimates applied to the full dataset 3.14: Marginal values of main variables calculated at the sample mean 4.1: Definition and description of allocation mechanisms found in treaties A4.1: Individual and linked games in the case of the Mekong River Basin A4.2: Results of selected institutional arrangements included in treaties A4.3: Selected results of the role of institutions in mitigation impact of water variability on treaty performance 5.1: Stipulations summary per basin 6.1: The 1996 Ganges treaty at Farakka 6.2: The Albufeira allocation regime 6.3: Comparison of the water scarcity issues and the arrangements introduced in the five case-study basins M APS 3.1: Distribution of bilateral basins ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book is based to a large extent on our work and consultation with colleagues in the past decade and a half, and on discussions we had during seminars and conferences with scholars working in the field of international water Although there are numerous people to thank, we would like to acknowledge the following individuals who helped us galvanize the ideas that culminated in this book: Scott Barrett, Thomas Bernauer, Brian Blankespoor, Itay Fischhendler, Mark Giordano, David Katz, Marc Kilgour, Daene McKinney, Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, Pradeep Kurukulasuriya, Lucia De Stefano, Erika Weinthal, Aaron Wolf, and Neda Zawahri International River Basins: The Importance of Institutional Capacity.” Water Resources Update 125: 31–40 Wolf, Aaron, Shira Yoffe, and Mark Giordano 2003 “International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk.” Water Policy 5(1): 29–60 World Bank 2004 Water Energy Nexus in Central Asia: Improving Regional Cooperation in the Syr Darya Basin Europe and Central Asia Region Washington, DC: World Bank ——— 2009 Boundaries of the World Map Design Unit Worldfolio 2014 “On the Grid: [Interview with] HE Usmonali Uzmonzoda, Ministry of Energy and Water Resources of the Republic of Tajikistan.” www.theworldfolio.com/interviews/usmonaliuzmonzoda-ministry-of-energy-and-water-resources-of-the-republic-of-tajikistan/3327/ Yoffe, S., B Ward, and A Wolf 2000 “The Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database Project: Tools and Data for Evaluating International Water Conflict.” www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/ Yoffe, Shira, Aaron Wolf, and Mark Giordano 2003 “Conflict and Cooperation over International Freshwater Resources: Indicators of Basins at Risk.” Journal of the American Water Resources Association 39(5): 1109–1126 Young, Oran R 1975 “The Analysis of Bargaining: Problems and Prospects.” In Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation, edited by O R Young, 391–408 Urbana: University of Illinois Press ——— 1982 “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes.” International Organization 36: 277–297 ——— 1989 International Cooperation: Building Regimes for Natural Resources and the Environment Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press ——— 1994 International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press Zartman, William, and Jeffrey Rubin (eds.) 2000 “Symmetry and Asymmetry in Negotiation.” In Power and Negotiation, edited by William Zartman and Jeffrey Rubin Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press Zawahri, Neda A 2006 “Stabilizing Iraq’s Water Supply: What the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers Can Learn from the Indus.” Third World Quarterly, 27(6): 1041–1058 ——— 2009 “Third Party Mediation of International River Disputes: Lessons from the Indus River.” International Negotiation 14(2): 281–310 Zawahri, N., A Dinar, and G Nigatu 2014 “Governing International Freshwater Resources: An Analysis of Treaty Design.” International Environmental Agreements, August doi:10.1007/s10784– 014–9259–0 Zawahri, N., and S Mitchell 2011 “Fragmented Governance of International Rivers: Negotiating Bilateral vs Multilateral Treaties.” International Studies Quarterly 55(3): 835–858 Zeitoun, Mark, and Jeoroen Warner 2006 “Hydro-hegemony: A Framework for Analysis of Transboundary Water Conflicts.” Water Policy 8(5): 435–460 Zonn, Igor 1999 “The Impact of Political Ideology on Creeping Environmental Changes in the Aral Sea Basin.” In Creeping Environmental Problems and Sustainable Development in the Aral Sea Basin, edited by Michael Glantz, 157–160 Cambridge: Cambridge University Press INDEX Abbink, Klaus, 34–35 Ackerman, John, 27, 33, 38, 76 adaptability mechanisms, 92, 97–98, 101, 103, 174 Akaev, Askar, 133 Alam, Undfala, 24 Albufeira Convention (AC), 157–58, 159fig Allan, John Anthony, 21 allocation mechanisms, 5, 8, 84–87, 88t, 100, 102, 107t; fixed vs flexible, 3–4, 84–85, 86–87, 150– 51, 173; policy recommendations, 173 See also water allocations Amu Darya, 117–19 Angola, future water scarcity in, 46, 47fig Annan, Kofi, 17, 169 Ansink, E., 34 appreciable harm principle, 114 Aral Sea Basin, 152map; background and current hydro-politics, 117–19, 132–35; incentivizing future cooperation, 135–36; potential for future tensions, 7, 139, 142; stipulations summary, 140– 41t See also Syr Darya River Armenia: the Kura-Araks Basin, 137–38, 140–41t Arora, V., 52 Asian Development Bank, 134 Assad, Bashar al-, 126, 185n21 Ath-Thawrah Dam, 113 Austria, future water scarcity in, 46, 47fig Azerbaijan: the Kura-Araks Basin, 137–38, 140–41t Bakker, M., 101 Bangladesh–India agreements and negotiations, 101, 148–51, 166–67t Ban Ki Moon, 17, 169 Barbieri, K., 39 Barnaby, Wendy, 1, 170 Barrett, S., 84, 121 barter agreements, in the Aral Sea Basin, 118–19, 132–33, 135–36, 152–55 basin maps, 48, 49map basin-wide treaties, 91–92, 106, 108, 175 See also specific basins Beard, R M., 34 benefit sharing, 92, 93, 95–97, 103, 131, 174 Bennett, L., 117 Bernauer, T., 7, 33, 154 Bhutan–India agreements and negotiations, 26, 122–23, 140–41t, 177n2ch2, 179n10 bilateral rivers: number of, 178n3; study’s focus on, 32 See also specific rivers Bishkek water agreement, 152–53 Blankespoor, B., 80 Böhmelt, Tobias, 33 border-creator (divide) rivers, 41, 54, 180n19 border-creator variable (treaty formation study), 54, 59, 67, 76 Brahmaputra River See Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin Brochmann, Marit, 27–28, 82–83, 181n1 Buhaug, H., 17 California Aqueduct, 179n12 Cambodia See Mekong River Basin Canada–U.S agreements and negotiations, 24–25, 120–22, 140–41t, 179n10 CASA-1000, 134 case studies See cooperation incentive analyses; treaty design analyses; treaty performance analyses; specific rivers and basins Caucasus: the Kura-Araks Basin, 138 Cedillo Dam (Spain), 157–58, 157fig CGIAR website, 50–51 Chayes, Abraham, 82 Chayes, Antonia Handler, 82 China: the Mekong River Basin, 95, 103–4, 105t; and Nile River Basin projects, 129–30; and out-ofbasin transfers, 133, 179n12 See also Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin Choucri, Nazli, 17 Chukkha Hydroelectric Project/Agreement, 122–23, 140–41t, 177n2ch2 civil wars, 10; Syrian war, 126 climate change and its impacts, 3–4, 5, 7, 17, 34, 83–84 See also droughts; floods; variability; specific countries and basins climate data and variables See precipitation data and variables; runoff data and variables Climate Research Unit (CRU) precipitation data, 50–51 CLIRUN-II runoff data, 48, 50 Colorado River, 26, 116–17, 140–41t, 162map, 165fig., 179n10; treaty performance analysis, 158– 59, 161–65, 166–67t Columbia River, 24–25, 120–22, 140–41t, 179n10 compensation mechanisms See side payments COMTRADE database, 52 Conca, Ken, 85–86, 98 conflict and conflict propensity, water-related, 2, 15–16; climate change as trigger, 5, 7, 17; examples of past conflict, 18, 20; geography and, 11–12, 15, 18–19, 26, 40–41; politics/governance and, 9–10, 15, 37–38, 171; power dynamics and, 15; trade relations and, 38– 39, 76, 178–79n8 See also conflict–scarcity/variability relationship; cooperation entries; militarized disputes conflict resolution mechanisms, 5, 89, 99, 100–101, 103, 173–74 See also institutional treaty mechanisms conflict–scarcity/variability relationship, 4–5, 16–21; academic studies and perspectives on, 6–8, 19– 20, 32–33; conclusions, 20–21; Malthusian perspectives, 16–17; realist and neorealist perspectives, 17–18, 23, 25–26; water wars rhetoric, 1–2, 6, 7, 17, 20, 169 See also cooperation– scarcity/variability relationship consultations between the parties, 87 contiguous rivers, 15 See also specific examples Convention for the Protection and Sustainable Use of Water in the Shared River Basins of Portugal and Spain, 157–58 cooperation and cooperation propensity, 2, 8–12, 31; basin size and, 27; climate change and, 5, 7; economic and political costs and, 29–30; economic incentives, 8, 23; geography and, 11–12, 15, 18–19, 26, 40–41, 62, 67, 171–72; interdependence asymmetries and, 23–24, 25; measuring cooperation levels, 44–45; non-treaty cooperation institutions, 81; politics/governance and, 9–10, 15, 37–38, 171; power dynamics and, 11, 15, 26, 41–42, 76, 78, 138–39, 171, 174; social ingenuity and, 21; trade and, 10, 21, 36, 38–40, 67, 171, 178–79n8; treaties as metric and tool for, 9, 43, 81–84 See also conflict entries; cooperation incentives; cooperation–scarcity/variability relationship; treaty entries cooperation incentive analyses, 124–38; Aral Sea Basin, 132–36; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 124–27; Kura-Araks Basin, 137–38; Nile River Basin, 127–31 cooperation incentives (treaty mechanisms), 5, 13, 109–42, 172; conclusions, 138–39, 142; introduction, 109–12; policy recommendations, 173–74 See also benefit sharing; cooperation incentive analyses; foreign policy considerations; issue linkage; side payments; treaty design and effectiveness cooperation–scarcity/variability relationship, 2, 21–30, 67–68, 78–80, 170–72; existing academic perspectives, 2, 5–6, 21–23, 24, 26–28, 32–33; liberal and neoliberal perspectives, 23–26; as nonlinear, 9, 12, 28–30, 29fig., 36, 43, 62, 74, 75, 78, 170–71; overall conclusions, 78–80, 170–72; policy implications, 80, 172–74 See also conflict–scarcity/variability relationship; cooperation incentives; treaty formation study Correlates of War dataset, 53 Corruption Perception Index, 51 cost-benefit allocations, 59, 172 cost-sharing arrangements, 93, 147; Rhine River, 119–20; Tijuana and New Rivers, 123–24 country claims, 27, 83 CRU (Climate Research Unit) precipitation data, 50–51 dams: Aral Sea Basin, 135; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 113, 114, 126; Nile River Basin, 97, 129, 130, 131; runoff data and, 68; Syr Darya River, 155; Tagus/Tajos River, 156, 157 See also hydropower; water development projects; water storage Daoudy, Marwa, 124–25 data exchange mechanisms See information exchange mechanisms Dead Sea, 148 democracy and democratic institutions See governance democracy and governance variables (treaty formation study), 51–52, 59, 74, 75 democratic peace theory, 38 desalination projects, 145, 148 De Stefano, Lucia, 5, 99–100, 142 Deudney, Daniel, 22 Dinar, A., 31n, 33, 35, 46, 91–92, 106; Mekong River Basin study, 95, 103–4, 105t Dinar, S., 31n, 33, 35, 41, 45, 46, 59, 93–94, 100, 101 diplomatic relations, 10, 74, 76, 82, 171, 173 See also foreign policy considerations diplomatic relations variable (treaty formation study), 53, 54, 74 direct allocation mechanisms, 86, 88t, 100, 102, 107t, 173 discount rates (shadows of the future), 93, 110, 124 divide rivers See border-creator rivers Dokken, Karen, 22 Dombrowsky, I., 94, 95 domestic conflict, 10, 126 domestic politics and institutions See governance; institutional strength and development “Do Nations Go to War over Water?” (Barnaby), 1, 170 Drieschova, A., 86–87 drought resilience, treaty design and, 97 droughts, 17, 42, 47, 143; Jordan River Basin, 145, 147; Rio Grande and Colorado Basins, 162, 164– 65, 186n2; Spain and Portugal, 158 See also scarcity economic costs, cooperation propensity and, 29–30 economic power asymmetries, 90, 92–93, 109–10, 111, 171, 173 See also power dynamics and asymmetries economic power variable (treaty formation study), 53–54, 74, 76 Egypt: out-of-basin water transfers in, 179n12; recent political change and regional water politics, 130–31 See also Nile River Basin Elhance, A., 15, 113 Ellingsen, T., 10 enforcement mechanisms, 87, 90, 100–101, 102, 103, 173–74 See also institutional treaty mechanisms; self-enforcement mechanisms environmental protection: asymmetries and, 92–93, 110–11; as legal principle, 85–86 See also pollution and pollution abatement equitable utilization principle, 85, 86 Eritrea, 185n26 See also Nile River Basin Espey, Molly, 26–27, 33, 76–77 Ethiopia See Nile River Basin EU (European Union): and the Kura-Araks Basin, 138; Turkey and, 125 Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 19, 20, 142; background and current hydro-politics, 112–16, 182n1,3,5ch5, 185nn21,22,23; incentivizing future cooperation, 124–27; stipulations summary, 140–41t European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 134 European Investment Bank, 134–35 European Union See EU Faisal Islam, M., 151 Falkenmark, Malin, 16 Farraka Barrage, 149–51, 149map Fischhendler, I., 86–87, 100 flood protection, 172; Columbia River agreement, 24–25, 120–22; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 126; increasing focus on, 56, 79, 175; Nile Basin, 96, 131, 185n30; treaty content distribution over time, 55–56, 58t; treaty mechanisms for, 97, 101 floods, 17, 42, 47, 101, 143; Nile floods, 131, 185n30 foreign policy considerations, treaty cooperation and, 112–19; Aral Sea Basin, 117–19; Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers, 116–17; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 112–16, 125–26 See also issue linkage Framework Agreement on the Syr Darya, 136 France: Rhine River, 119–20, 140–41t, 184n20 freedom variables (treaty formation study), 52, 74 future cooperation analyses See cooperation incentive analyses Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin, 149map; India–Bangladesh agreements and negotiations, 101, 148–51, 166–67t; India–Bhutan agreements and negotiations, 26, 122–23, 140– 41t, 177n2ch2, 179n10 GAP (Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi), 114, 124–27 Gartzke, Erik, GDP data, 52–53, 181n24 geographic variables: in past studies, 33; in treaty formation study, 54, 59, 74, 76, 180n19 geography and geographic asymmetries, 11–12, 15, 40–41, 171–72; basin size, 27; geographycooperation in treaty formation study results, 59, 62, 67, 76, 79, 171–72; geography type distribution in treaty formation study, 55, 56t; and power dynamics, 15, 18–19, 26, 41–42; and varying interests and tolerances, 111, 138–39, 174 See also specific basins Georgia: the Kura-Araks Basin, 137–38, 140–41t Gerlak, A., 98–99, 101–2 Germany: Rhine River, 119–20, 140–41t, 184n20 GGDC&CB dataset, 52, 53 Gilman, P., 91–92 Giordano, Mark, 20, 85, 86–87, 98–99, 101–2, 103 Giordano, Meredith, 184n17 Gleditsch, N P., 17, 19, 33, 40 Global Runoff Data Center (GRDC) data, 48, 50 Global Water Security: The Intelligence Community Assessment, 139 Goldstein, J., 178–79n8 governance, 9–10, 15, 37–38, 171; governance-cooperation in treaty formation study results, 59, 62, 74, 75, 79, 171; strengthening, 173 governance variables (treaty formation study), 51–52, 59, 74, 75 Grand Millennium/Renaissance Dam (Ethiopia), 97, 130, 131 GRDC (Global Runoff Data Center) data, 48, 50 Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP), 114, 124–27 Gurr, Ted, 29 Haas, Peter, 92 Hai River Basin, 179n12 Hamner, Jesse, 20, 86, 93 Hauge, W., 10 Hegre, Håvard, 19, 40 Hensel, Paul, 19, 27–28, 33, 82–83 Himalayan rivers See Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin historical water uses, 85, 114 Hobbes, Thomas, 16 Hoekstra, A Y., 39 Homer-Dixon, Thomas, 16–17 Hume, David, 22 Hung, P Q., 39 hydro-hegemony, 11, 18–19, 25–26, 41–42, 83 See also power dynamics and asymmetries hydrologic data quality, hydro-politics, defined, 15 hydropower, 8, 9, 16, 172; in the Aral Sea Basin, 118–19, 132, 134, 136, 151–55; Bhutan–India agreements, 26, 122–23, 140–41t, 177n2ch2; Columbia River agreement, 24–25, 120–22; decreasing focus on, 56, 79, 175; in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 114, 126; in the Nile Basin, 96– 97, 129–30, 131, 185n28; treaty content distribution over time, 55–56, 58t See also dams HydroSHEDS data, 48 IMFDOT database, 52 incentives See cooperation incentives India–Bangladesh agreements and negotiations, 101, 148–51, 166–67t India–Bhutan agreements and negotiations, 26, 122–23, 140–41t, 177n2ch2, 179n10 India–Pakistan agreement, 24 indirect allocation mechanisms, 86–87, 88t, 100, 102 Indus Waters Treaty, 24 informal cooperation, 41, 67 information exchange mechanisms, 92, 97–99, 101–2, 103, 174, 182n3ch4 infrastructure development, 37, 96, 97 See also dams; water development projects; water storage institutional strength and development, 9–10, 26, 37, 79 See also governance institutional treaty mechanisms, 87, 89–92, 100–101, 102–3, 106, 108, 139; analyses of, 106–8, 106t, 107t; policy recommendations, 173–74 See also specific types Intentionally Created Mexican Allocation, 165 interdependence dynamics and asymmetries, 23–24, 25, 34, 39 See also trade intergovernmental organizations, 81 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) Assessment Reports, 3–4 International Boundary Waters Treaty (U.S.–Mexico, 1944), 116–17, 140–41t international relations theory, 22–23 IPCC Assessment Reports, 3–4 Iran, and the Kura-Araks Basin, 137, 138 Iraq See Euphrates-Tigris Basin Islamic Development Bank, 134 Israel: National Water Carrier, 179n12 See also Jordan River Basin issue aggregation, 95 See also issue linkage issue linkage, 5, 36, 79, 92, 103, 174; in the Aral Sea Basin, 118–19, 132, 136; Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers, 116–17; and the Columbia River agreement, 121; in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 115–16, 125–26; existing studies, 93, 94–95; and foreign policy considerations (case studies), 112–19; to incentivize future cooperation, 125–26, 126–27, 138; in the Kura-Araks Basin, 138; in the Mekong River Basin, 95, 103–4, 105t See also cooperation incentives issue topics: single-issue treaties, 55; specific vs broad treaties, 93–94; treaty institutionalization and, 90–91; trends in, 55–56, 79, 103, 172; types and numbers over time, 55–56, 58t, 79 See also treaty content Janmatt, J., 10, 34 Johnston, Eric, 18 Johnston Plan, 18 joint commissions, 89, 99, 100–101, 102, 103, 173–74; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 113, 185n22; Nile Basin, 129, 185n25 See also institutional treaty mechanisms Jordan See Jordan River Basin Jordan River Basin, 18, 81, 144–48, 146map, 166–67t, 178n7 Just, R., 91 Karimov, Islam, 155 Katz, David, 20 Kazakhstan See Aral Sea Basin; Syr Darya River Kenya, 129 See also Nile River Basin Keohane, Robert, 92 Kliot, N., 131 Kramer, Annika, 20 Krutilla, J., 121 Kura-Araks Basin, 137–38, 140–41t Kurichhu River Agreement, 122–23, 140–41t, 177n2ch2 Kurukulasuriya, P., 31n, 33, 35, 46 Kyrgyzstan See Aral Sea Basin; Syr Darya River Lagash, 20 Lake Chad, 142 Lake Kineret, 145, 147fig Lake Mead, 162map, 164, 165 Laos See Mekong River Basin La Plata Basin, 91–92 lateral pressure theory, 17 Lautze, Jonathan, 85, 98–99, 101–2 Lebanon: Orontes River Agreement, 185n23 See also Jordan River Basin LeMarquand, David, 40, 116 Leviathan (Hobbes), 16 Levy, Marc, 92 liberal perspectives, 23–26 Lowi, Miriam, 41–42, 127 Maathai, Wangari, 169 Malthusian views, 16–17 management See treaty entries McCaffrey, S., 82 McDonald, S., 34 McKinney, D., 95 Meghna/Barak River See Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin Mei, Ciqi, 85–86, 98 Mekong River Basin, 95, 103–4, 105t Mexico–U.S agreements and negotiations See Colorado River; New River; Rio Grande (Rio Bravo); Tijuana River militarized disputes, 42, 83, 101, 102, 182n4ch4; Aral Sea Basin, 133; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 113; Nile River Basin, 130, 185n29 Minute 242, 116, 140–41t Minute 264, 25, 123–24 Minute 270, 25, 123–24 Minute 319, 164–65 Mitchell, Sarah McLaughlin, 19, 33, 101, 102 Moller, Lars Christian, 34–35 monitoring mechanisms, 87, 89, 90, 100–101, 103, 173–74 See also institutional treaty mechanisms Morsi, Mohamad, 130 Mubarak, Hosni, 130, 185n29 multilateral/basin-wide treaties, 91–92, 106, 108, 175 See also specific basins Myanmar, Mekong River Basin negotiations and, 104 Nagorno-Karabakh, 137 Naryn River dam projects, 134, 155 national security risks, 6–7 See also conflict entries; water wars rhetoric navigation: as treaty issue topic, 90 NBI (Nile Basin Initiative), 128–29, 185n26 needs-based water allocations, 84 neoliberal perspectives, 23–26 neorealist thinking, 17–18, 23, 25–26 Nepal See Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin Netanyahu, S., 91 Netherlands: Rhine River, 119–20, 140–41t, 184n20 Neumayer, E., 38 New River, 25, 117, 123–24, 140–41t Nigatu, G., 91, 106, 108 Niger Basin, 142 Nile Agreement (2015), 131 Nile River Basin, 19, 127–31, 185nn25,26,27,28,29; benefit-sharing proposals, 96–97; future variability in, 142; the Nile floods, 131, 185n30; out-of-basin transfers, 179n12; stipulations summary, 140–41t Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA), 129, 185n27 Nile Waters Agreement (1959), 19, 128 Nishat, Ainun, 151 North, Robert, 17 number of treaties variable (treaty formation study), 44, 45, 62, 75, 180–81n21 obligation not to cause harm, 86 obligation to consult, 85–86 obligation to exchange information, 86, 98 See also information exchange mechanisms O’Hara, Sara, 34–35 Okavango Basin, 142 Oregon State University Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 20, 48 Orontes River, 127, 185n23 Ostrom, E., 29 out-of-basin water transfers, 5–6, 42, 133, 148, 179n12 Pakistan: as customer for Aral Sea Basin electricity, 134; Indus Waters Treaty, 24 Palestinian Authority, 148 See also Jordan River Basin partial coalitions, 91–92 per capita water availability, 33, 35, 46; water scarcity function based on, 46, 179n16 Pham Do, K H., 95, 103–5, 106t Picnic Table Talks (Israel-Jordan), 81 Pochat, V., 91–92 policy recommendations, 80, 172–74 political costs, cooperation propensity and, 29–30 political regime types, 38 political regime type variables (treaty formation study), 52 political stability, 37, 99–100, 179n15 See also governance polity variables (treaty formation study), 52, 74, 75 pollution and pollution abatement: Colorado River, 26; cost-sharing arrangements and side payments, 93, 94–95; geography and, 23–24; increasing focus on, 56, 79, 172, 175; Kura-Araks Basin, 138; polluter-pays principle, 120, 124; pollution levels and cooperation propensity, 178n6; Rhine River, 119–20, 184n20; Tijuana and New Rivers, 25, 123–24; treaty content distribution over time, 55–56, 58t; types of pollution treaties, 184n17; varying levels of pollution tolerance, 110–11 See also environmental protection; water quality Population Action International data, 46, 53 population data, 46 population growth, 16, 46 Portugal: Tagus/Tajos River, 155–58, 156map, 157fig., 159fig., 166–67t poverty See economic power power asymmetry variables (treaty formation study), 53–54, 74 power dynamics and asymmetries, 11, 15, 26, 41–42, 76, 78, 138–39, 171, 174; geography and, 15, 18–19, 26, 41–42; reducing asymmetries, 173; treaty design/effectiveness and, 90, 92–93, 109–10; treaty existence and, 83 See also economic power asymmetries; specific countries and basins precipitation and precipitation variability, 3, 4, 19, 20; precipitation-runoff correlation, 68 See also specific basins precipitation data and variables (treaty formation study), 50–51, 54, 68, 69, 76 principal component analysis, 179–80n17, 181n24 principal component variables, 47, 59, 60t principles of allocation, 87, 100 prioritization of uses, 87 property rights, 7, 10, 22, 37; treaty design and property rights conflicts, 93–94, 95 Protocol on Matters Pertaining to Economic Cooperation between the Republic of Turkey and the Syrian Arab Republic, 114–15, 124, 140–41t Ragland, Sean, 117 Rahman, Muhammad M., 151 Raleigh, C., 10 Rawls, John, 28–29 realist thinking, 17–18, 23, 25–26 reciprocity, 13, 109, 117, 127, 139 Red Sea–Dead Sea project, 148 relative gains, 18 Renaissance Dam (Ethiopia), 97, 130, 131 Rhine River, 119–20, 140–41t, 184n20 Rio Conchos, 160map, 161, 186n2 Rio Grande (Rio Bravo), 5, 116–17, 140–41t, 158–65, 160map, 164fig., 166–67t, 186n2 river basin organizations, 5, 26 See also joint commissions river basins: location database, 20, 48; number of international basins, 178n3; as study unit of analysis, 43, 48, 49map See also specific basins river configuration See geography river salience, 27–28 Rogun Dam, 135 Ruijs, A., 10, 34 runoff data and variables (treaty formation study), 48, 50, 51, 68 Russia: as investor in Aral Sea Basin projects, 134; and the Kura-Araks Basin, 138 See also USSR Rwanda, 129 See also Nile River Basin Sadat, Anwar, 128 SADC (Southern African Development Community), 81 Salman, Salman M A., 101 scarcity: current scarcity levels, 79, 172; long-term vs short-term, 42; national-level vs basin-level, 42; scarcity/abundance extremes, 28–29; storage as mitigation of, 34; trends and potential future tensions, 139, 142, 143 scarcity asymmetries, 23, 30, 36, 43 scarcity-conflict contention, 16–21, 31; water wars rhetoric, 1–2, 6, 7, 17, 20, 169 See also conflict, water-related; conflict–scarcity/variability relationship scarcity-cooperation contention, 2, 21–30, 35 See also cooperation–scarcity/variability relationship scarcity data and variables: in earlier studies, 27–28, 32–33, 34, 35; economic scarcity measures, 179n14; in treaty formation study, 46–47, 54, 59, 62, 67–68, 78, 179n16 scarcity-variability relationship, 28 self-enforcement mechanisms, 84, 92, 101, 174 See also benefit sharing; issue linkage; side payments Serageldin, Ismail, 169 shadows of the future, 93, 110, 124 Sharaf, Essam, 130 share of water allocation issues measure (treaty formation study), 44–45, 59, 62, 180–81n21 side payments, 5, 79, 92, 103, 174; Aral Sea Basin, 135–36, 153–54; in asymmetrical situations, 11, 36, 109–11, 171; and benefit-sharing mechanisms, 95–96; Columbia River agreement, 122; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 126; existing studies, 93–94, 95; Himalayan rivers agreements, 122–23; Mekong River Basin, 104; Rhine River agreements, 120; Tijuana and New Rivers agreements, 123– 24 See also cooperation incentives Siegfried, Tobias, 7, 154 Sisi, Abdel Fatah el-, 130 social ingenuity, 21 Song, Jennifer, 33 Southeastern Anatolia Project (GAP), 114, 124–27 Southern African Development Community (SADC), 81 South Sudan, 129 See also Nile River Basin Soviet Union See USSR Sowers, Thomas, 19, 33 Spain: Tagus/Tajos River, 155–58, 156map, 157fig., 159fig., 166–67t Stein, A., 39 Stinnett, Douglas M., 7, 27, 89–90, 101 strategic alliance, 5–6 successive rivers, 15 See also upstream-downstream riparians; specific basins Sudan See Nile River Basin Swain, Ashok, 185n28 Switzerland: Rhine River, 119–20, 140–41t, 184n20 Syr Darya River, 152map, 153fig.; background and current hydro-politics, 117–19, 132–35; existing study, 34–35; incentivizing future cooperation, 135–36; stipulations summary, 140–41t; treaty performance analysis, 151–55, 166–67t See also Aral Sea Basin Syria, 18, 19; Syrian Civil War, 126 See also Euphrates-Tigris Basin; Jordan River Basin Tagus/Tajos River, 155–58, 156map, 157fig., 159fig., 166–67t Tajikistan See Aral Sea Basin; Syr Darya River Tala Hydroelectric Agreement, 122–23 Tanzania, 129 See also Nile River Basin TECCONILE (Technical Cooperation Committee for the Promotion of the Development and Environmental Protection of the Nile Basin), 185n25 Tekezze River, 185n28 TFDD (Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database), 20, 48 Thailand See Mekong River Basin Theisen, O M., 17 through-border (transverse) rivers, 41, 54, 180n19 through-border variable (treaty formation study), 54, 59, 62, 67, 76 Tibet See Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin Tigris River, 20 See also Euphrates-Tigris Basin Tijuana River, 25, 117, 123–24, 140–41t, 161 Tir, Jaroslav, 7, 27, 33, 38, 76, 89–90, 101 Toktogul Reservoir, 133, 135, 153fig Toset, Hans Petter Wollebæk,, 19, 40 Towfique, Basman, 26–27, 33 trade and trade relations, 10, 36, 38–40, 171, 178–79n8; trade as enforcement mechanism, 39; trade-cooperation in treaty formation study results, 59, 62, 67, 74, 76, 79, 171; trade issue linkage in the Mekong River Basin, 103–4, 105t; treaty institutionalization and, 90; virtual water trade, 21, 39–40, 79 trade data (treaty formation study), 52, 181n24 trade sanctions, 111 trade variables (treaty formation study), 52–53, 54, 59, 67, 76, 171, 181n22 Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database (TFDD), 20, 48 transverse rivers See through-border rivers treaties: as cooperation-incentivizing institutions, 26, 81–84; number signed since 1900, 20; treaty defined, 43 treaty content: as cooperation measure, 44–45; issue types and numbers over time, 55–56, 58t, 79, 172; single-issue treaties, 55; trends and research needs, 56, 103, 172, 175 See also issue topics treaty design analyses, 13, 111–42; Aral Sea Basin, 117–19, 132–36; Colorado and Rio Grande Rivers, 116–17; Columbia River, 120–22; conclusions, 138–39, 142; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 112– 16, 124–27; Himalayan rivers, 122–23; incentivizing future cooperation, 124–38; institutional mechanism analyses, 106–8, 106t, 107t; issue linkage and foreign policy considerations, 103–5, 112–19; Kura-Araks Basin, 137–38; Mekong River Basin, 103–4, 105t; Nile Basin, 127–31; Rhine River, 119–20; side payments, cost-sharing schemes, and benefit-sharing strategies, 119–24; stipulations summaries, 140–41t; Tijuana and New Rivers, 123–24 treaty design and effectiveness, 5–6, 13, 84–102, 170, 171; additional mechanisms, 92–99, 101, 102, 103, 139, 174, 182n3ch4; ambiguity and, 93–94, 100, 101–2, 145, 146, 173, 182n3ch4; conclusions, 102–3; determining treaty effectiveness, 99–102; fairness/equity and, 84, 85, 86, 93; flexibility and, 5, 100, 101–2; introduction, 81–84; legal principles and allocation mechanisms, 5, 84–87, 88t, 100, 102, 107t, 173; major institutional mechanisms, 87, 89–92, 100–101, 102–3, 106, 106t, 108, 139, 173–74; mechanisms for dealing with shortages, 145; multilateral vs bilateral treaties, 91–92, 106, 108, 175; policy recommendations, 173–74; and response to change, 56, 83– 84, 85; self-enforcement capability, 84, 92, 101; specific-action vs general treaties, 93–94; subbasin vs basin-wide approaches, 91–92 See also cooperation incentives; treaty design analyses; treaty performance analyses; specific basins treaty formation: basin size and, 27; bilateral vs multilateral rivers, 32; as cooperation metric, 9, 43, 139; domestic institutions and governance and, 37; geography and, 40–41; increase trend, 79; nonemergence in the presence of scarcity, 37, 178n7; past studies of, 32–35; political regime type and, 38; power asymmetries and, 41–42; scarcity and, 27, 32–33, 34, 36–37; trade, interdependence, and, 10, 34, 38–40; variability and, 33–35 See also treaty formation study treaty formation study, 12–13, 31–80; analytical framework, 42–45; background and overview, 31–36; empirical framework, 36–42; hypotheses, 43 —data and empirical specifications, 45–55; diplomatic relations, 53, 54, 74; domestic institutions and governance, 51–52, 59, 74; functional forms and estimation issues, 54–55; geographic types and variables, 54, 59, 74, 76, 180n19; number of treaties, 44, 45, 62, 75, 180–81n21; political regime type, 52; power asymmetry, 53–54, 74; precipitation and runoff data, 48, 50–51, 76; trade data and variables, 52–53, 54, 59, 67, 76, 171, 181nn22,24; treaty cooperation measures, 44–45, 180–81n21; treaty dataset, 32, 45; water scarcity data and variables, 46–47, 54, 59, 62, 67–68, 78; water variability data and variables, 48, 50–51, 54 —results, 55–80; conclusions, 78–80; current scarcity levels, 79, 172; diplomatic relations and cooperation, 74, 76, 171; econometric analysis, water-quantity scarcity, 59–68; econometric analysis, water-variability scarcity, 68–78; general background and descriptive results, 55–58, 67– 68, 78; geography and cooperation, 59, 62, 67, 76, 79, 171–72; geography type distribution, 55, 56t; governance and cooperation, 59, 62, 74, 75, 79, 171; policy implications, 80, 172–74; potential study extensions, 80; power asymmetries, 74, 76–77; principal component analysis, 59, 60t, 181n24; regression analyses, 54, 61t, 62, 63–66t, 67, 74; scarcity and cooperation, 59, 62, 67–68, 78; trade and cooperation, 59, 62, 67, 74, 76, 79, 171; treaty distribution per river, 55, 57t; treaty signing year distribution, 55, 57t; variability and cooperation, 69, 69t, 70–73t, 74–75, 78 treaty mechanisms See cooperation incentives; treaty design and effectiveness; specific types of mechanisms treaty performance analyses, 13, 144–65, 166–67t; conclusions, 165, 168; Ganges River (India– Bangladesh), 148–51, 166–67t; introduction, 144; Jordan River Basin, 144–48, 166–67t; Rio Grande/Rio Bravo and Colorado Rivers, 158–65, 166–67t, 186n2; Syr Darya River, 151–55, 166– 67t; Tagus/Tajos River, 155–58, 166–67t Turkey: and the Kura-Araks Basin, 137, 138 See also Euphrates-Tigris Basin Turkmenistan See Aral Sea Basin Uganda, 129 See also Nile River Basin Umma, 20 UN COMTRADE database, 52 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, 87, 98 U.S.–Canada agreements and negotiations, 24–25, 120–22, 140–41t, 179n10 U.S.–Mexico agreements and negotiations See Colorado River; New River; Rio Grande (Rio Bravo); Tijuana River Uprety, Kishor, 101 upstream-downstream riparians, 12, 15, 40, 41–42; directional environmental problems, 111; geography and treaty institutionalization, 90; historical water rights in upstream-downstream treaties, 85; issue-linkage strategies and successes, 95, 115–17; power dynamics and, 15, 18–19, 41–42, 92, 179n10 See also geography; specific countries and basins Urdal, H., 10 USAID, 134 USSR: Soviet-era hydro-politics and water management, 118, 137 Uzbekistan See Aral Sea Basin; Syr Darya River Vakhsh Dam project, 155 Vamvakidis, A., 52 variability, 3–5, 9, 20, 33–35, 83–84, 99–100, 143; Ganges River, 149, 150fig.; high-variability basins, 100, 142; Jordan River Basin, 144–45, 147fig.; Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers, 159–61, 186n2; Syr Darya River, 152, 153fig., 155; Tagus/Tajos River, 155, 156, 157fig., 158 See also conflict– scarcity/variability relationship; cooperation–scarcity/variability relationship variability-cooperation relationship: as nonlinear, 69, 74, 75; study results, 69, 69t, 70–73t, 74–75, 78 See also cooperation–scarcity/variability relationship variability data and variables: in past studies, 33–35; in treaty formation study, 48, 50–51 variability management mechanisms, See also adaptability mechanisms variability-scarcity relationship, 28 Vietnam See Mekong River Basin virtual water trade, 21, 39–40, 79 voice variables (treaty formation study), 52, 74 Waltz, Kenneth, 18 Wangchu River Agreements, 122–23, 140–41t, 177n2ch2 Ward, B., 181n23 warfare, 7, 17, 178–79n8; lateral pressure theory, 17 See also conflict entries; militarized disputes warming, See also climate change Warner, Jeroen, 11 water agreements See cooperation; treaty entries water allocations: decreasing focus on, 56, 79, 175; Ganges River (India–Bangladesh), 150–51, 151fig.; Jordan River Basin, 145, 147; Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers, 160–65; share of water allocation issues measure (treaty formation study), 44–45, 59, 62, 180–81n21; treaty content distribution over time, 55–56, 58t See also allocation mechanisms water availability See per capita water availability; scarcity; variability water borrowing mechanisms, 5–6 See also Colorado River; Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) Waterbury, John, 128 water development projects: Aral Sea Basin, 134–35, 153–54, 154–55; desalination projects, 145, 148; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 112–13, 114, 124–27; Nile River Basin, 129–30, 185n29; Rio Conchos/Rio Grande Basin, 162 See also dams; infrastructure development; water storage water prices/values, as scarcity measure, 179n14 water quality, 16, 90–91, 116 See also environmental protection; pollution; water quantity: as treaty issue topic, 90 See also droughts; floods; per capita water availability; scarcity water rights, 8, 84–85, 114 See also allocation mechanisms water scarcity See scarcity entries water storage, 34; Aral Sea Basin, 133, 134, 135, 136; Euphrates-Tigris Basin, 113; Nile Basin, 96, 97, 131; Rio Grande and Colorado Basins, 160–61, 164 See also dams water supply See per capita water availability; scarcity; variability water transfers, out-of-basin, 5–6, 42, 133, 148, 179n12 water wars rhetoric, 1–2, 6, 7, 17, 20, 169 See also conflict entries welfare power variable (treaty formation study), 53–54 West Bank See Jordan River Basin Whittington, Dale, 33 Wikileaks, 185n29 Wolf, Aaron, 20, 84–85, 93, 181n23 World Bank, 125, 129, 134, 135, 155, 169 Wu, Fengshi, 85–86, 98 Yangtze River Basin, 179n12 Yoffe, Shira, 20, 181n23 Yolles, Peter, 117 Zambezi Basin, 142 Zawahri, N., 91, 101, 102, 106, 108 Zeitoun, Mark, 11 Zenawi, Meles, 130 ... Ariel, 1947- author Title: International water scarcity and variability : managing resource use across political boundaries / Shlomi Dinar and Ariel Dinar Description: Oakland, California : University.. .International Water Scarcity and Variability The publisher gratefully acknowledges the generous support to this book provided by the Stephen Bechtel Fund International Water Scarcity and Variability. .. Arrangements under Scarcity and Variability Incentives to Cooperate: Political and Economic Instruments Evidence: How Basin Riparian Countries Cope with Water Scarcity and Variability Conclusion and Policy