Management in networks, second edition

“In an increasingly interactive world knowledge of how networks operate and evolve, and how they can be managed effectively, is increasingly important to students and practitioners of public administration, public management and public policy In the first edition of this excellent book, the authors developed the idea of “process management” – contrasting it with other forms of such as “project-based” management – highlighting the advantages of using a process lens as a guide to producing better public sector outcomes In this thoroughly revised and expanded new edition, the authors continue this pursuit, adding detail and nuance to their analyses of the best (and not-so-good) strategies that can be used to enhance collaboration between public, civil society and other actors in the pursuit of public value and the public good.” Michael Howlett, Burnaby Mountain Chair, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University and Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore “Management in Networks (second edition) is a fundamental guide for policy makers and managers who wants to consciously decide and act in today’s uncertain and complex world, where all decisions involve many actors, with different values and targets.” Giovanni Azzone, Professor of Management and Rector Emeritus, Politecnico di Milano, Italy “Theories of management and decision-making abound, but how we put these into practice? The new edition of this classic book reveals all the nuts and bolts to both practitioners and scientists.” Lasse Gerrits, Professor for the Governance of Complex and Innovative Technological Systems, Otto-Friedrich University Bamberg, Germany “Hans de Bruijn and Ernst ten Heuvelhof show how management can deal with uncertainty Their incredibly valuable ‘rules of the game’ for networked decision-making allow for the outcome of the process to emerge and for actors to subsequently ascribe coherence.” Arthur Petersen, Professor of Science, Technology and Public Policy, University College London This page intentionally left blank Management in Networks Getting what you want – even if you are the boss – isn’t always easy Almost every organisation, big or small, works among a network of competing interests Whether these are governments pushing through policies, companies trying to increase profits, or even families deciding where to move house, rarely can decisions be made in isolation from competing interests both within the organisation and outside it In this accessible and straightforward account, Hans de Bruijn and Ernst ten Heuvelhof cast light on multi-stakeholder decision-making Using plain language, they reveal the nuts and bolts of decision-making within the numerous dilemmas and tensions at work Drawing on a diverse range of illustrative examples throughout, their perceptive analysis examines how different interests can either support or block change, and the strategies available for managing a variety of stakeholders The second edition of Management in Networks incorporates a wider spread of international cases, a new chapter giving an overview of different network types, and a new chapter looking at digital governance and the impact of big data on networks This insightful text is invaluable reading for students of management and organisational studies, plus practitioners – or actors – operating in a range of contexts Hans de Bruijn is Professor of Organisation and Management at Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands His research is on networked, multi-actor governance, both between and within organisations Ernst ten Heuvelhof is Professor of Public Administration at Delft University of Technology, the Netherlands His research focuses on decision-making by actors – both public and private – who operate in networks and have diverse interests This page intentionally left blank Management in Networks Second edition Hans de Bruijn and Ernst ten Heuvelhof Second edition published 2018 by Routledge Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 Hans de Bruijn and Ernst ten Heuvelhof The right of Hans de Bruijn and Ernst ten Heuvelhof to be identified as authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 All rights reserved No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe First edition published by Routledge 2008 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Bruijn, J A de, 1962- author | Heuvelhof, E F ten (Ernst F.), author Title: Management in networks / Hans de Bruijn and Ernst ten Heuvelhof Description: Second Edition | New York : Routledge, 2018 | Revised edition of the authors' Management in networks, 2008 Identifiers: LCCN 2017045943| ISBN 9781138211421 (hbk) | ISBN 9781138211438 (pbk) | ISBN 9781315453019 (ebk) Subjects: LCSH: Decision making | Organizational behavior | Organizational sociology Classification: LCC HD30.23 B777 2008 | DDC 658.4/036–dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017045943 ISBN: 978-1-138-21142-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-138-21143-8 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-45301-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Taylor & Francis Books Contents List of illustrations Preface Our interconnected world and what it means for decision and policy making viii ix Srategies for making decisions in networks : The process 21 Strategies for making decisions in networks : The content 36 A process, not a project 52 Smart command and control 77 Strategic behaviour 98 Trust and rules of the games 111 Process and content 134 Bibliography Index 137 142 List of illustrations Figures 5.1 Principal and agent: project management versus process management 7.1 The trust-dilemma 88 112 Tables 1.1 1.2 1.3 2.1 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5 4.6 5.1 5.2 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 8.1 Main characteristics of an interconnected world Unstructured problems Comparison of decision-making in a hierarchy and in a network Typology of actors Problems in a project and in a process Goals in a project and in a process Information in a project and in a process Decision making in a project and in a process Implementation in a project and in a process Evaluation in a project and in a process Accountability, content and process Four types of threat Three friends and their preferred holiday destination Strategies and strategic behaviours Strategic behaviour: effectiveness and distribution of gains The diner’s dilemma Normative dilemmas 10 23 53 56 58 62 70 73 89 93 103 109 110 115 133 136 Preface This book is about decision-making and change processes in our interconnected world In an interconnected world with many players, often with wicked problems and with plenty of dynamism, decision-making or change is often nonlinear and erratic Sometimes decision-making even seems like a chaotic process, where no single pattern can be recognised In this book we unravel decision-making and show that there are patterns in this seemingly messy process We describe the strategies of the players involved in decision-making We show to what results the sum of these strategies lead – how they impact processes of decision-making and change We not only describe and analyse these strategies and processes, but we also answer the question concerning what effective strategies there are for making decisions and creating change in an interconnected world Many of these insights are contraintuitive for those who believe in linear, project-based decision-making This book is intended for anyone interested in decision-making and change, particularly for those who are subject experts in a specific area – whether that is infrastructure or the environment, safety or innovation – and who are surprised every time by the chaotic process of decision-making Hans de Bruijn Ernst ten Heuvelhof Processes and content 135 characteristics of a mafia It’s true that within networks certain game rules apply, but as their sole aim is to support the power game, they only have a utilitarian function Moreover, the mafia also has strict game rules that are equally utilitarian Their purpose is to preserve the organisation The opposite of this is an approach in which a problem is looked at from a content point of view and in which justice is done to facts and causalities There is no investment in power games; the investment instead is in careful analyses These analyses lead to outcomes that can clash with the interests of certain parties – possibly even with the interests of a majority of these parties A party with integrity will, however, be willing to learn from the analyses Such a learning process will give a party more than will the constant hawking of its own interests The adage ‘speaking truth to power’ is applicable here So which picture is correct? The answer depends on several factors, including the type of problems being discussed As soon as unstructured problems are involved, it becomes impossible to talk about THE problem and THE solution Multiple definitions of the problem and the solution are possible If such a problem has to be solved in a network, the different perceptions the parties have of the problem or of its solution are justified It is then also wrong to talk about a personal interest versus a general interest Every party in a network has a justified interest This means that the images talked about above can change A ‘careful analysis’ of an unstructured problem can lead to a problem definition and solution that fits in with the perception of one of the parties There are, however, other careful analyses possible that lead to other problem definitions and solutions that fit in with the perceptions of other parties If a party carries out an analysis and then takes the standpoint that this means the problem and the solution are known, this does not justice to other perceptions and interests It makes one think of a form of Kremlinology: There is only one fixed definition of the truth that is imposed on others as far as possible The result is that learning is impossible A network approach is based on the concept that every party in a network has his or her own perception of the truth and, therefore, also has justifiable interests These interests are respected, and every party is entitled to bring his or her interests into the decision-making In so doing a party may behave strategically, as long as they play by the rules of the game These game rules are always aimed at cooperation and moderating the strategic behaviour of the parties in the network A decision that can count on sufficient support from the participating parties is arrived at in a process of negotiation Decisionmaking in networks thus approaches the democratic ideal: There is plurality, and a decision is made that reflects the diversity of problem and solution definitions and that is sufficiently widely supported The four images given here are, naturally, ideal-typed Table 8.1 makes it clear that decision-making in a network always involves the risk that it will develop into a pure power-game with mafia characteristics However, it also makes it clear that thinking of a network-approach as a deviant form of decision-making is wrong 136 Processes and content Table 8.1 Negative judgment Positive judgement Hierarchy and linear decision-making Kremlin: Unilateral decisionmaking is imposed on other actors Networks and messy decision-making Mafia: Power and interests determine the course of the decision-making process Speaking truth to power: Facts and analyses determine the course of the decision-making process The democratic ideal: All parties have legitimate interests, and decision-making reflects this plurality Bibliography Albright, M (2003) Madam secretary: A memoir New York: Miramax Andersson, M., & Mol, A P (2002) The Netherlands in the UNFCCC process–Leadership between ambition and reality International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, 2(1), 49–68 Andrews, K M., & Delahaye, B L (2000) Influences on knowledge processes in organizational learning: The psychosocial filter Journal of Management Studies, 37 (6), 797–810 Arrow, K (1951) Social choice and individual values Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons Arrow, K J (1963) Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care American Economic Review, 53(5), 941–973 Bendor, J B (1985) Parallel systems: Redundancy in government Berkeley: University of California Press Bó, P D (2005) Cooperation under the shadow of the future: experimental evidence from infinitely repeated games The American Economic Review, 95(5), 1591–1604 Bovens, M., Geveke, H., & Vries, J D (1993) Strikt vertrouwelijk: lekken in het openbaar bestuur Beleid en Maatschappij, 20(2), 61–80 Brands, H W (2004) George Bush and the Gulf War of 1991 Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34(1), 113–131 Brattström, A., & Richtnér, A (2014) Good cop–bad cop: Trust, control, and the lure of integration Journal of Product Innovation Management, 31(3), 584–598 Bruijn, H de (2017) The art of framing: How politicians convince us that they are right Haarlem, the Netherlands: Etopia BV Bruijn, H de, Heuvelhof, E F ten, & Kuit, M (1999) Sport 7: de opkomst en ondergang van een Nederlandse sportzender Antwerp, Belgium: Aristos Uitgeverij Bruijn, H de, Heuvelhof, E F ten, & Veld, R J in ’t (2000) Procesmanagement Over procesontwerp en besluitvorming the Netherlands: Academic Service Bruijn, H de, Heuvelhof, E F ten, & Veld, R J in’t (2010) Process management: Why project management fails in complex decision making processes (2nd ed.) 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process-based 64–6 actor(s): activation of 95–6; behaviour of 7, 8–9, 10; double relationship with 101–2; interests of 22, 99–100; level of freedom of 68–9; power of 23, 23; power position of 97; power sources of 22–3, 45; with redundant relationships 29; resources of 22–3; responsiveness of 16–17; rules of game related to position of 116–24; selective activation of 102, 130; support and opinions of 22; system responsibility of 120; use of power by 119–21 actor analyses 21–5, 23 agent: justifying contents as well as process by 89, 89–90; and principal 87–97, 88, 89, 93; and tension between project and process management 87–9, 88 aggressive behaviour, hit-and-run strategy as 15 agreements: best alternative to negotiated 44–5; process 34–5 Albright, Madeleine 77, 117 allocation ambiguity, constructive 17–18 Arafat, Yasser 117 arenas, multiple 11 asynchronous dependencies Augustus (Emperor) 121 backstage activities 64–6, 85–6, 118 barriers to decision-making in network 13–16 BATNA (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement) option 44–5 behaviour: of actors 7, 8–9, 10; aggressive 15; cooperative 40–1; moderate 18; see also strategic behaviour Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA) option 44–5 biased rules and processes 102–3, 103 bilateral dependencies bilateral negotiations 41–2 Bismarck, Otto von 28–9 blockade power 22–3, 23, 37 Boddy, David 65 boundaries 106 bounded rationality 63 Buchanan, David A 65 budgeting, agreements related to 34–5 bureaucratisation, PDCA cycle and 67 Bush, George H W 116, 122 ‘by chance’ information 27–8 bypassing 101–2 Caesar, Julius 121 captive in decision-making process 39 catch as catch can strategy 50, 63, 121 change: emergent 69; indirect 17 ‘chaos power’ 37 checking of information 27 checks and balances 82 Clinton, Bill 117 coalitions 40–1; losers in 48, 49; normative dilemmas about 131 collaboration: command and control after failure of 80–1; evaluation of 131; normative dilemmas about 131 collective arrangement, withdrawal from 114–16, 115 Index command and control strategy(ies): activating actors in network as 95–6; clarifying damage of rejecting outcome to principal as 94–5; consultation and negotiation with 86; with critical mass of winners 84–5; dilemma sharing as 91; disadvantages of 77–8; expansion of issue as 96–7; footnotes on 97; good and bad guy as 84; implementing principal’s instructions as 95; as incentive for process 80; including principal in consultation and negotiation process as 90–1; interaction process with 86; justifying contents as well as process as 89, 89–90; like it or lump it as 96; with no agreement from principal 91–3; with offering space 82–3; patterns of 86; principal and agent in 87–97, 88, 89, 93; in public performance 85–6; smart 77–97; and tension between process and project management 87–9, 88; in terms of procedures 81–2; as threat to influence other actors’ perceptions of gain 78–9, 93, 93–4; times to use 78–86; unilateral action as conclusion to process with 86; using principal’s position as leverage as 93, 93–4; what doesn’t work about 19, 31; when collaboration has failed 80–1; when process is not going to plan 79–80 commitment, information and 90 communication: of decision 64–6; projectbased 64–6 compensation of losers 50–1, 108, 116 complexity and exchange 18 compromises 77 conflict management, agreements related to 34 confusion 15–16 consistency, lack of 12 constructive ambiguity 17–18 consultation: with command and control strategies 86; inclusion of principal in 90–3; rules about 122–3 content: incentives for relevant 33–4; justification by agent of 89, 89–90; problem 7, 11; process and 134–5, 136 content analysis 53, 54 content enrichment 18–19 content strategies 36–51 content unpredictability 13 content-based criterion in evaluation 132 content-related accusations 65 143 content-related information 27 contra-strategies 97 cooperation: incentive for 40–1; variety in network and 17 core values: in multi-issue game 45; of other actors 117–18; protection of 32–3 counterstrategies 50–1 critical mass of winners, command and control with 84–5 damage of rejecting outcome of negotiations 94–5 dancing table illustration of decisionmaking 7–9 data set 5, 60 deadlines, dysfunctionality of 63–4 decision(s), order of 103 decision-making: agreements related to 34; characteristics of 52–3; circumventing formal 69–70; communication of 64–6; duty to 128; formal vs negotiated 62; as go or no go moment 62–3; vs implementation 68–9; information gathering and 60; as ongoing process 62; open-ended 63; planning and deadlines and 63–4; poor content in 16; project-based vs process-based 61–4, 62; rounds of 62; rules of game related to 124–30; tempo changes in 64; win-win vs winlose 63; withdrawal from 128 decision-making in interconnected world 7–13; dancing table illustration of 7–9; erratic process of 9, 10, 13; and incentives to define problem as unstructured 11–12; in irregular rounds instead of regular phases 10; with multiple arenas and unclear starting and finishing points 11; with shifting problem content 11; strategic behaviour in 10; unpredictability and no consistency in 12; unstructured, nonlinear vs structured, linear 9, 10; what doesn’t work for 19–20 decision-making in network 13–19; barriers to 13–16; opportunities of 16–19 Deming, W Edwards 67 dependence and hit-and-run strategy 15 dependencies see interdependencies depolarisation, incentive for 40 diffused power position 23, 23 dilemmas, normative 130–2, 133 dilemma-sharing 91 diner’s dilemma 114–16, 115 144 Index disagreeable information, withholding of 105 disaster, losers and risk of 49 disincentives for opportunism and horsetrading 66 dissatisfaction in complex decisionmaking processes distortion of effects 107–8 ‘distributed power’ situation 37 diversity in network and impact and success of intervention 16–17 divide-and-conquer strategy 17 double relationship 101–2 double-checking of information 27 dynamic dependencies dynamics 6–7; in actor analysis 23; of multi-issue games 42–4 effect(s), distortion of 107–8 effectiveness: law of diminishing 74–5, 97; of strategic behaviour 110, 110 either/or decision-making 36 either/or process 33, 38 emergent change 69 emergent result Engels, Friedrich 77 ‘enlarge the shadow of the future’ 47–8 entry, agreements about 34 entry option 39 erratic process of decision-making in interconnected world 9, 10, 13 evaluation: of collaboration 131; contentbased criterion in 132; of fairness 73, 132; as goal-based activity 71; of learning 72, 132; as ongoing process 73––74; of problem solving 72; procedural criteria in 131–2; project-based vs process-based 71–4, 73; of relationships 72–3; of satisfaction 72, 131 exchange: complexity and 18; normative dilemmas about 131 exclusion of losers from decision 49 exit, agreements about 34 exit option: ban on 128; in multi-issue game 39–40, 45 expansion of issue 96–7 expectations, information and 91 expertise, management by 19, 31 exploitation of other parties, hit-and-run strategy as 15 failed process, command and control after 80–1 fairness, evaluation of 73, 132 fence-sitter 23 fine-tuning 14 finishing point, unclear 11 framing 102, 107–8 free for all fight 59 freedom, level of 68–9 frontstage activities 64–6, 85–6, 118 functional relationships 25–6 funnelling 68–9 future gain, prospects of 108 gain(s): prospects of future 108; from strategic behaviour 110, 110; threatening command and control to influence actors’ perceptions of 78–9, 93, 93–4 give and take, incentive for 40 glory, reflected 85–6 goal(s): broad and vague 56–7; clear 55–6; project-based vs process-based 55–7, 58 goal-based activity, evaluation as 71 good faith, precontractual 128 good guy/bad guy strategy 84 guaranteed outcome 43–4 ‘herding cats’ 77 hierarchy: interdependencies vs 2–4; shadow of 79–80, 93 hit-and-run strategy 15 Hobbes, Thomas 129 horse-trading 66, 104, 119 hub-spoke model 41–2 Huntington, Samuel 121 implementation: decision follows action in 69–70; decision-making vs 68–9; as new round with new opportunities 70; of principal’s instructions 95; projectbased vs process-based 68–71, 70; strategic choices and points of no return with 70–1 incentives: command and control as 80; to continue participating 39–40; for cooperative behaviour 40–1; for depolarisation and for give and take 40; for learning process 41; moral 39; to participate in process 39; for peer pressure 41–2; for progress 33; for relevant content 33–4 inconsistency 12 indirect change 17 inertia, PDCA cycle and 67 influence over other parties 17 information: ‘by chance’ 27–8; checking and double-checking of 27; and Index commitment 90; content-related vs strategy-related 27; dispensed in small doses 105–6; and expectations 91; hidden 98, 100; leaking of 100; and learning 90; and negotiated knowledge 58–61; nice-to-know 61; project-based vs process-based approach to 58–61, 62; redundant relationships and 27–8; right 61; withholding of disagreeable 105 information asymmetry 100 information gathering: and decisionmaking 60; on need to know basis 58; on nice-to-know basis 61 interaction: with command and control strategies 86; rules about 122–3 interconnected world 1–2; decisionmaking in 7–13; dynamics in 6–7; examples of 1; interdependencies in 2–4; structure of 2, 2–7; unstructured, wicked problems in 4–6, interdependencies 2–4; bilateral vs multilateral 3; differing by topic 3–4; hidden 4; hierarchy vs 2–3; opportunities through 18–19; single vs multidimensional 3; static vs dynamic 3; synchronous vs asynchronous 3; types of interests: of actors 22, 99–100; of other players 109 intervention(s): limited impact and success of 16–17; reinterpretation of 15, 17–18; responsiveness of actors to 16–17; variety and tailor-made 14 intrinsic damage 94 irregular rounds, decision-making in 10 issues: expansion of 96–7; selective activation of 102 judgments based on PDCA cycle 67 justification by agent of contents as well as process 89, 89–90 ‘keep-options-open’ strategies 126–7 Kissinger, Henry 28–9, 77 knowledge, negotiated 58–61, 105–7 Krummenacher, Heinz 123 launch window 55 law: of diminishing effectiveness 74–5, 97; shadow of 79–80 lead, being in the 57–8 learning: evaluation of 72, 132; incentive for 41; information and 90 145 lender of last resort 99 level of freedom 68–9 leverage, use of principal’s position as 93, 93–4 like it or lump it 96 Lindblom, Charles 77 linear decision-making 9, 10 losers: behaviour patterns of 48–50; ‘catch as catch can’ strategy of 50; compensation of 50–1, 108, 116; counterstrategies of 50–1; exclusion of 49; management of 48–51; in multiissue games 46–51; relationships with 50; respect for 116; rights acquired by 116; strategies aimed at 107–8 loss: for all parties 51; perception of 46–7 Lubbers, Ruud 85 lying 111–16, 112, 115 major disaster, losers and risk of 49 manageability, pushing boundaries of 14 management: conflict 34; by expertise 19, 31; of losers 48–51; see also process management; project management manoeuvring room 28–9 market leaders 17 moderate behaviour, incentives for 18 Moore, Jo 124 moral incentive 39 ‘muddling through’ 77 multidimensional dependencies multi-issue agenda, design of 38, 44 multi-issue games 33, 36–51; adding issues to create 38; anticipation of 43; BATNA option in 44–5; core values in 45; counterstrategies in 50–1; design of 44; dynamics of 42–4; example of 37–9; expansion of 43; formulation of problem in 38; guaranteed outcome in 43–4; incentive for cooperative behaviour in 40–1; incentive for depolarisation and for give and take in 40; incentive for learning process in 41; incentive for peer pressure in 41–2; incentive to continue participating in 39–40; incentive to participate in 39; intelligent playing of 44; losers in 46–51; oneissue vs 36–7, 38; perception of profit and loss in 46–7; post-decision opportunism in 47–8; power paradox in 45; in real world 42; synergy vs win-win situations in 46; see also multi-issue games multi-issue portfolio, selective 104 146 Index multi-issue strategies 103–4 multilateral dependencies multiple arenas 11 multiple sourcing 28 need to know basis 58 negotiated agreement, best alternative to 44–5 negotiated knowledge 58–61; strategies for accomplishing 105–7 negotiated success 74 negotiating logic 64, 66 negotiation process 60–1; with command and control strategies 86; inclusion of principal in 90–3 Netanyahu, Benjamin 117 network(s): decision-making in 13–19; definition of 26–7; redundant relationship 26–9; strategic behaviour in 100; variety in 16–17; world as network approach, objections to 134–5, 136 nice-to-know information gathering 61 non–decision-making 81 nonfunctional relationships 25–6 nonlinear decision-making 9, 10 norm(s), accepted 12 normative dilemmas 130–2, 133 Octavianus, Gaius Julius Caesar 121 offering space, command and control with 82–3 one-issue game 36–7, 38 ongoing process, evaluation as 73––74 openness in process management 32 opinion of actors 22 opportunism: and ability to legitimatise content of outcome 119; and law of diminishing effectiveness 75–6; postdecision 47–8; in project management 65, 66 opportunistic switching 101 opportunistic treatment of dilemmas 132, 133 opportunities of decision-making in network 16–19 order of decisions 103 organisation of process, agreements related to 34 outcome: ability to legitimatise content of 118–19; guaranteed 43–4 package deal 43 participation: incentive for 39; incentive to continue 39–40 partners, unfaithfulness to 101 peer pressure, incentive for 41–2 plan, command and control when process is not going to 79–80 plan-do-check-act (PDCA) thinking, risks of 66–8 planning: agreements related to 34–5; dysfunctionality of 63–4; in project 53 points of no return 71 polarisation, incentive for 40 policy effectiveness 65 policy expressiveness 65 Pollard, Jonathan 117 positional damage 94 post-decision opportunism 47–8 power: of actors 23, 23; blockade 22–3, 23, 37; chaos 37; and decision-making 134–5, 136; distributed 37; and longterm relations 121; loss of mysticism of 120–1; and perception of profit 47; production 22–3, 23; redundant relationships and 28–9; relationship 37; restraint of 119–21; use of 119–21 power paradox 45, 119–20 power position of actors 97 power sources of actors 22–3, 45 precontractual good faith 128 predictability, redundant relationships and 29 principal: and agent 87–97, 88, 89, 93; clarifying damage of rejecting outcome of negotiation to 94–5; implementing instructions of 95; inclusion in consultation and negotiation process of 90–3; and tension between project and process management 87–9, 88; use of position as leverage for actors with 93, 93–4; what to when no agreement from 91–3 problem(s): connecting solutions to 54–5; redefinition of 11; unstructured vs structured 4–6, 6, 11–12, 58–9 problem content 7, 11 problem demarcation 53–4 problem formulation: broad vs narrow 38, 53–4; project-based vs processbased 53, 53–5; and solution 54–5; timing of 53, 55 problem perception 53–4 problem solving, evaluation of 72 procedural accusations 65 procedural criteria in evaluation 131–2 procedures: command and control in terms of 81–2; respect for 129–30 Index process(es): biased 102–3, 103; and content 134–5, 136; justification by agent of 89, 89–90; negotiation 60–1; respect for ritual of 124–6; scope of 57–8; unpredictability of 13 process agreements 34–5; and strategic behaviour 102–3, 103; when no agreement from principal 91–3 process management 30–4; communication in 64–6; decision-making in 61–4, 62; evaluation in 71–4, 73; goals in 55–7, 58; implementation in 68–71, 70; incentives for progress in 33; incentives for relevant content in 33–4; information in 58–61, 62; and law of diminishing effectiveness 74–6; openness in 32; problem formulation in 53, 53–5; project vs 52–76; protecting core values in 32–3; and risks of plan-docheck-act thinking 66–8; scope in 57–8; tension between principal and agent in 87–9, 88; what doesn’t work in 31–2 process manager 35 process strategies 21–35; actors and actor analyses in 21–5, 23; disadvantages of 77–8; process agreements in 34–5; and process management 30–4; relationships and relationship management in 25–9; warnings on 30 process-based activity 64–6 production power 22–3, 23 profit: perception of 46–7; timing of payout of 47–8 profit/loss account 46 progress, incentives for 33 project, scope of 57–8 project management: communication in 64–6; decision-making in 61–4, 62; evaluation in 71–4, 73; goals in 55–7, 58; implementation in 68–71, 70; information in 58–61, 61; and law of diminishing effectiveness 74–6; problem formulation in 53, 53–5; process vs 52–76; and risks of plan-do-check-act thinking 66–8; scope in 57–8; tension between principal and agent in 87–9, 88; why it doesn't work for 19–20, 31, 52 project-based communication 64–6 proportionality 123–4 prudent treatment of dilemmas 132, 133 public performance: command and control in 85–6; process vs project-based approach in 65 147 rationality, bounded 63 Rawls, John 81–2 reciprocity 123 redefinition of problem 11 redundancy, strategies for 101–2 redundant relationships 26–30; and attractiveness of actor 29; defined 26–7; and information 27–8; and moderation of behaviour 29; and power 28–9; and predictability 29; and room to manoeuvre 28–9; strategic behaviour with 101–2; and trustworthiness 30; use of 30; warnings about 30 reference framework 28 reflected glory 85–6 reframing 107–8 regret minimisation 82–3 regular phases, decision-making in 10 reinterpretation of intervention 15, 17–18 Reker, Jan 75 relationship(s): evaluation of 72–3; formation of 26; functional vs nonfunctional 25–6; functions of 25; with losers 50; power and 37, 121; redundant 26–30, 101–2; strong vs weak 26; types of 25–7 relationship management 25–9 relationship power 37, 121 relevant content, incentives for 33–4 reliability: command and control and 97; strategic behaviour and 111–16, 112, 115 repertoire-building 28 reputation 23 reputation method 23–4 reputational damage 94 resources: of actors 22–3; having vs using 23 ‘returning damage’ strategy 95 risks, passing on 106 room to manoeuvre 28–9 round(s): of decision-making 10, 62; implementation as new 70; strategic behaviour in 10, 100 rules 116–30; about ability to legitimatise content of outcome 118–19; biased 102–3, 103; about changes in rules 129–30; about consultation and interaction 122–3; about core values of other actors 117–18; about exit option and decision-making duty 128; intermediate changes in 129–30; about lying 111–16, 112, 115; nonadherence to 133; and normative dilemmas 130–2; about proportionality 123–4; about reciprocity 123; related to decision- 148 Index making process 124–30; related to position of actors 116–24; about respecting losers 116; about showing respect for process 124–6; about use of power 119–21; utilitarian nature of 132; about ‘wait-and-see’ or ‘keepoptions-open’ strategies 126–7 satisfaction, evaluation of 72, 131 scope, of process 57–8 ‘scope creep’ 57 scope optimisation 106 seize-every-opportunity game 100 selective activation of actors and issues 102, 130 selective multi-issue portfolio 104 sensitivity analyses 60 shadow of hierarchy 79–80, 93 short-cuts 124 Simon, Herbert 63 single dependencies slipstream 57–8 sluggishness 15–16 solutions connected to problems 54–5 sourcing, multiple 28 space, command and control with offering 82–3 specialisms stability, dynamics vs 6–7 standpoints of actors 22 starting point, unclear 11 static dependencies strategic behaviour 98–110; camouflage of 99; characteristics of 99; criticism of 109–10, 110; defined 98–100; effectiveness of 110, 110; functions of strategies in 99–100; impact of 98–100; intent of 99; in interconnected world 10; interests of actor in 99–100; and interests of other players 109; lying as 111–16, 112, 115; multi-issue strategies and 103–4; in networks 100; process agreements and 102–3, 103; processbased strategies and 98; in rounds 10, 100; strategies aimed at winners and losers and 107–8; strategies for accomplishing negotiated knowledge and 105–7; strategies for redundancy and 101–2; summary of 108, 109; and trust and reliability 111–16, 112, 115; as unacceptable 109 strategic choices in implementation 70–1 strategy(ies): for accomplishing negotiated knowledge 105–7; aimed at winners and losers 107–8; exposure of someone else’s 125, 126; for redundancy 101–2; see also process strategies strategy-related information 27 strong relationships 26 strong ties 26 structured decision-making 9, 10 structured problems, unstructured vs 4–6, 6, 11–12 success, negotiated 74 super-specialisms support of other actors 22 switching, opportunistic 101 synchronous dependencies synergy 46 system boundaries system responsibility of powerful actor 120 tailor-made interventions, variety and 14 tempo changes in decision-making 64 threat(s): of command and control 78–9, 93, 93–4; direct vs indirect 93; normative dilemmas about 130–1; types of 93, 93–4 tolerance criterion 72 topic, different interdependencies per 3–4 trade-off 91 ‘transparency’ 65 trustworthiness: incentive to continue participating and 40; redundant relationships and 30; rules of game and 116–30; strategic behaviour and 111–16, 112, 115 unanimity rule 85 uncertainties in actor analysis 23 unfaithfulness to partners 101 unpredictability 12, 13 unstructured decision-making 9, 10 unstructured problems 4–6, 6, 11–12, 58–9 van Breukelen, Hans 75 variety in network: and divide-andconquer strategy 17; and impact and success of intervention 16–17; and tailor-made interventions 14 ‘wait-and-see’ strategies 126–7 weak relationships 26 weak ties 26 weighting of factors 5–6 ‘wicked’ problems 4–6, 6, 11–12 Index Wildavsky, Aaron 54 window of opportunity 55 winners: command and control with critical mass of 84–5; enough prospects of profit by 51; strategies aimed at 107–8 149 win-win process, continuous 50 win-win situations 46 withholding of disagreeable information 105 zigzag course 57 ... process Goals in a project and in a process Information in a project and in a process Decision making in a project and in a process Implementation in a project and in a process Evaluation in a project... she had won, or was at least in a winning position, may see their win being washed away in the second round Think of the dancing table At a particular moment it may be in corner C For many of the... implemented In models the decision-making progresses in a linear fashion; 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