Expert failure (cambridge studies in economics, choice, and society)

Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information EXPERT FAILURE The humble idea that experts are ordinary human beings leads to surprising conclusions about how to get the best possible expert advice All too often, experts have monopoly power because of licensing restrictions or because they are government bureaucrats protected from both competition and the consequences of their decisions This book argues that in the market for expert opinion we need real competition in which rival experts may have different opinions and new experts are free to enter But the idea of breaking up expert monopolies has far-reaching implications for public administration, forensic science, research science, economics, America’s military-industrial complex, and all domains of expert knowledge Roger Koppl develops a theory of experts and expert failure, and uses a wide range of examples — from forensic science to fashion — to explain the applications of his theory, including state regulation of economic activity   is Professor of Finance in the Whitman School of Management at Syracuse University in New York, and a faculty fellow in the University’s Forensic and National Security Sciences Institute His work has been featured in The Atlantic, Forbes, and The Washington Post © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN ECONOMICS, CHOICE, AND SOCIETY Founding Editors: Timur Kuran, Duke University Peter J Boettke, George Mason University This interdisciplinary series promotes original theoretical and empirical research as well as integrative syntheses involving links between individual choice, institutions, and social outcomes Contributions are welcome from across the social sciences, particularly in the areas where economic analysis is joined with other disciplines such as comparative political economy, new institutional economics, and behavioral economics Books in the Series Terry L Anderson and Gary D Libecap, Environmental Markets: A Property Rights Approach 2014 Morris B Hoffman, The Punisher’s Brain: The Evolution of Judge and Jury 2014 Peter T Leeson, Anarchy Unbound: Why Self-Governance Works Better Than You Think 2014 Benjamin Powell, Out of Poverty: Sweatshops in the Global Economy 2014 Cass R Sunstein, The Ethics of Influence: Government in the Age of Behavioral Science 2016 Jared Rubin, Rulers, Religion, and Riches: Why the West Got Rich and the Middle East Did Not 2017 Jean-Philippe Platteau, Islam Instrumentalized: Religion and Politics in Historical Perspective 2017 Taisu Zhang, The Laws and Economics of Confucianism: Kinship and Property in Preindustrial China and England 2018 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information Expert Failure ROGER KOPPL Syracuse University © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information University Printing House, Cambridge CB2 8BS, United Kingdom One Liberty Plaza, 20th Floor, New York, NY 10006, USA 477 Williamstown Road, Port Melbourne, VIC 3207, Australia 314–321, 3rd Floor, Plot 3, Splendor Forum, Jasola District Centre, New Delhi – 110025, India 79 Anson Road, #06–04/06, Singapore 079906 Cambridge University Press is part of the University of Cambridge It furthers the University’s mission by disseminating knowledge in the pursuit of education, learning, and research at the highest international levels of excellence www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781316503041 DOI: 10.1017/9781316481400 © Roger Koppl 2018 This publication is in copyright Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press First published 2018 Printed in the United States of America by Sheridan Books, Inc A catalogue record for this publication is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-107-13846-9 Hardback ISBN 978-1-316-50304-1 Paperback Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for external or third-party internet websites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information To Maria, who brings joy © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information Contents Acknowledgments page xi Introduction          Is There a Literature on Experts? Introduction A Simple Taxonomy Berger and Luckmann Defining “Expert” 23 23 26 33 37 Two Historical Episodes in the Problem of Experts Introduction The Socratic Tradition Expert Witnesses in Law 43 43 44 56 Recurrent Themes in the Theory of Experts Power Ethics Reflexivity The Well-Informed Citizen Democratic Control of Experts Discussion Market Structure Information Choice in the Context of the Literature on Experts Closing Remark 68 68 73 76 80 84 85 88 89 92 vii © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information viii Table of Contents          Notes on Some Economic Terms and Ideas Spontaneous Order Competition 97 97 106 The Division of Knowledge through Mandeville Introduction The Division of Knowledge 116 116 118 The Division of Knowledge after Mandeville Vico to Marx Menger to Hayek After Hayek 133 133 139 142       The Supply and Demand for Expert Opinion The Economic Point of View on Experts Identifying the Commodity and Defining “Expert” Information Choice Theory Honest Error and Willful Fraud The Economics of Experts Fills a Niche The Demand for Expert Opinion The Supply of Expert Opinion 151 151 152 153 154 155 160 162 Experts and Their Ecology Motivational Assumptions of Information Choice Theory The Ecology of Expertise 163 163 180      10 Expert Failure and Market Structure Two Dimensions of Expert Failure Identity, Sympathy, Approbation, and Praiseworthiness Observer Effects, Bias, and Blinding 189 189 197 197 11 Further Sources of Expert Failure Normal Accidents of Expertise Complexity and Feedback Incentive Alignment The Ecology of Expertise Professions Regulation 201 201 202 204 204 205 211 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information Table of Contents Monopsony and Big Players Comments on the Market for Ideas Epistemic Systems Design 12 Expert Failure in the Entangled Deep State Expert Failure and America’s Entangled Deep State Closing Remarks References Index © in this web service Cambridge University Press ix 214 215 217 221 221 234 239 267 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information Acknowledgments Leonard Read taught us that no one knows how to make a pencil Something similar can be true of a book My name appears on the title page, but the true authors of this book are the participants in several scholarly communities I have had the honor of engaging, as well as many journalists, reformers, forensic scientists, public defenders, intellectuals, family, friends, acquaintances, and passing strangers I will single out a few persons for thanks, but I know I have unwillingly omitted others no less deserving of gratitude and acknowledgment I thank them all Unfortunately, however, I cannot blame them for anything wrong with this book My wife, Maria Minniti, has been an unfailing source of love, support, and stinging criticism Peter Boettke has provided encouragement and helpful commentary I have profited from an ongoing conversation on experts with David Levy and Sandra Peart Stephen Turner helped me work out the contours of the literature on experts Ronald Polansky improved my understanding of Socrates and the Apology I have profited from exchanges with Simon Cole and from opportunities and generous help he has given me Alvin Goldman has given me some helpful lessons in social epistemology He is not to blame for my more synecological vision, however Lawrence Kobilinsky extended himself to eliminate errors and omissions from my first published paper on forensic science, which led to my work on the general problem of experts Our conversations have been helpful and stimulating Michael Risinger has provided many stimulating comments and conversations, along with general support and encouragement Phillip Magness and David Singerman both helped me understand J M Keynes’s opinions on eugenics and eugenic policy Phil also guided me to source materials on that topic Francisco Doria provided a manuscript copy of After Gödel, which was later published as Gưdel’s Way Chico xi © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Frontmatter More Information xii Acknowledgments has also helped me with computability theory Santiago Gangotena suggested the metaphor “experts all the way down.” I received help from many other people A few of them are Trey Carson, Jim Cowan, Alexander Wade Craig, David Croson, James Della Bella, William Butos, David Colander, Christpher Coyne, Abigail Deveraux, Itiel Dror, Teppo Felin, Christine Funk, Paul Giannelli, Nathan Goodman, Colin Harris, Keith Harward, Steve Horwitz, Keith Inman, Stuart Kauffman, Dan Krane, Robert Kurzban, Moren Lévesque, David Lucas, Thomas McQuade, Barkley Rosser, Norah Rudin, Meghan Sacks, John Schiemann, Vernon Smith, the late Ion Sterpan, William Thompson, Richard Wagner, and Lawrence Yuter I learned a lot at the Wirth Institute’s third biennial Austrian School of Economics Conference, “Austrian Views on Experts and Epistemic Monopolies,” which was held in Vancouver on October 15–16, 2010 Participants included David Croson, Arthur Diamond, Laurent Dobuzinskis, Rob Garnett, Steve Horwitz, Leslie Marsh, Sandra Peart, Emily Skarbek, Diana Thomas, and Alfred Wirth I appreciate the support Alfred Wirth and the Wirth Institute have given to this and other “Austrian” conferences Visits to George Mason University’s Mercatus Center as the F A Hayek Distinguished Visiting Professor helped my work on this volume by providing a stimulating work environment and many helpful conversations The discussion of Berger and Luckmann in Chapter draws on Roger Koppl, “The social construction of expertise,” Society, 47 (2010), 220–6 Parts of Chapter are close to parts of Roger Koppl, “Shocked disbelief,” in F A Doria (ed.), The Limits of Mathematical Modeling in the Social Sciences, 2017 Some parts of Chapter and Chapter were adapted from Roger Koppl, “Information choice theory,” Advances in Austrian Economics, 17 (2012), 171–202 The discussion of computability in Chapter is close to some passages in Roger Koppl, “Rules vs discretion under computability constraints,” Review of Behavioral Economics, 4(1) (2017), 1–31 The discussion of the ecology of expertise draws on Roger Koppl, “Epistemic systems,” Episteme: Journal of Social Epistemology, 2(2): 91–106 Chapter 10 draws on Roger Koppl, “The rule of experts,” in Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne (eds.), Oxford Handbook of Austrian Economics, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015 I gratefully acknowledge the financial support of Syracuse University’s Whitman School of Management © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org References 265 Villagra, Hector (2013) Release Secret Interpretation of the Patriot Act Albuquerque Journal, June 14, 2013 Downloaded January 13, 2017 from www.abqjournal.com/ 210388/release-secret-interpretation-of-the-patriot-act.html Vitali, Stefania, Glattfelder, James B., and Battiston, Stefano (2011) The Network of Global Corporate Control PLoS ONE, 6(10), e25995 Wagner, Helmut R (1963) Types of Sociological Theory: Toward a System of Classification American Sociological Review, 28(5), 735–42 Wagner, Helmut R and Psathas, George (1996) “Editors’ Introduction.” In A Schutz, Collected Papers IV The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, p 93 Wagner, Richard E (2006) Retrogressive Regime Drift within a Theory of Emergent Order Review of Austrian Economics, 19, 113–23 (2010) Mind, Society, and Human Action: Time and Knowledge in a Theory of Social Economy London and New York: Routledge Walras, Léon (1874–7) [1954] Elements of Pure Economics, translated from the Edition Définitive of 1926 by William Jaffé Homewood, IL: Richard D Irwin, Inc Walravens, Hartmut (2006) The Early East Asian Press in the Eyes of the West Some Bibliographical Notes In Walravens, Hartmut, ed., Newspapers of the World Online: U.S and International Perspectives Proceedings of Conferences in Salt Lake City and Seoul, 2006 München: K G Saur, pp 159–72 Washburn, Emory (1876) Expert Testimony and the Public Service of Experts Public Health Papers and Reports, 3, 32–41 Watts, Nicole F (1999) Allies and Enemies: Pro-Kurdish Parties in Turkish Politics, 1990–94 International Journal of Middle East Studies, 31(4), 631–56 Wassink, Alfred (1991) Inflation and Financial Policy under the Roman Empire to the Price Edict of 301 A.D Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 40(4), 465–93 Webb, Sidney (1912) The Economic Theory of a Legal Minimum Wage Journal of Political Economy, 20(10), pp 973–98 Webb, Sidney and Webb, Beatrice (1897) [1920] Industrial Democracy London: Longmans Green Weber, Max (1927) [1981] General Economic History New Brunswick and London: Transaction Books (1956) [1978] Economy and Society: And Outline of Interpretive Sociology Berkeley: University of California Press Weinstein, Michael M (2009) Paul A Samuelson, Economist, Dies at 94 New York Times, December 13, 2009 Whitacre, James and Bender, Axel (2010) Degeneracy: A Design Principle for Achieving Robustness and Evolvability Journal of Theoretical Biology, 263, 143–53 White, L H (2005) The Federal Reserve System’s Influence on Research in Monetary Economics Economic Journal Watch, 2(2), 325–54 Whitman, D Glen and Koppl, Roger (2010) Rational Bias in Forensic Science Law, Probability and Risk, 9(1), 69–90 Wible, James (1998) The Economics of Science: Methodology and Epistemology as If Economics Mattered London and New York: Routledge Wierzchosławski, Rafał Paweł (2016) Florian Znaniecki, Alfred Schutz, Milieu Analysis and Experts Studies In Elżbieta Hałas, ed., Life-World, Intersubjectivity, and Culture: Contemporary Dilemmas New York,: Peter Lang, IAP, pp 245–62 19:59:11 13 266 References Williams, Joan C (2016) What So Many People Don’t Get About the U.S Working Class Harvard Business Review, November 10, 2016 Downloaded November 29, 2016 from https://hbr.org/2016/11/what-so-many-people-dont-get-about-the-u-sworking-class Williams, Deirdre and Lankes, Tiffany (2017) Support, Criticism Surround HomeSchooling Mom’s Claims The Buffalo News, February 25, 2017 Downloaded February 26, 2017 from https://buffalonews.com/2017/02/25/homeschoolingmothers-claims-run-differing-reports-school-cps/ Williamson, Oliver (1976) Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies – In General and with Respect to CATV Bell Journal of Economics, 7(1), 73–104 Willingham v State, 897 S.W.2d 351, 357, Tex.Crim.App (1995 Wilson, Woodrow (1887) The Study of Administration Political Science Quarterly, (2), 197–222 Woodward, John (1902) Expert Evidence The North American Review, 175(551), 486–99 Wolfram, S (1984) Universality and Complexity in Cellular Automata Physica, 10D, 1–35 Wolinsky, Asher (1993) Competition in a Market for Informed Experts’ Services RAND Journal of Economics, 24(3), 380–98 (1995) Competition in Markets for Credence Goods Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 151(1), 117–31 Wolpert, David H (2001) Computational Capabilities of Physical Systems Physical Review E, 65(016128), 1–27 Wrona, Richard M (2006) A Dangerous Separation: The Schism between the American Society and Its Military World Affairs, 169(1), 25–38 Yamey, B S (1949) Scientific Bookkeeping and the Rise of Capitalism The Economic History Review, New Series, 1(2/3), 99–113 Yandle, Bruce (1983) Bootleggers and Baptists: The Education of a Regulatory Economist Regulation, 7(3), 12 Yeager, Leland B (1960) Methodenstreit over Demand Curves Journal of Political Economy, 63, 53–64 (1984) Henry George and Austrian Economics History of Political Economy, 16, 157–74 Yilmaz, Ihsan (2002) Secular Law and Emergence of the Unofficial Turkish Islamic Law Middle East Institute, 56(1), 113–31 Young, Allyn A (1928) Increasing Returns and Economic Progress The Economic Journal, 38(152), 527–42 Xenophon (2007) The Apology of Socrates Translated by H G Dakyns eBooks@Adelaide Zick, Timothy (2015) Professional Rights Speech Arizona State Law Journal, 48(4), 1289–1360 Zuccino, D (2006) Duke Case Worsens for Prosecution Los Angeles Times, December 16, 2006 Downloaded August 1, 2016 from http://articles.latimes.com/2006/dec/ 16/nation/na-duke16 Zuiderent-Jerak, Teun (2009) Competition in the Wild: Reconfiguring Healthcare Markets Social Studies of Science, 39(5), 765–92 19:59:11 13 Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information Index Apology (Plato), 45–7, 124–5 approbation, 165, 197 arbitrariness, party rule and, 16 Aristophanes, 25, 45, 47, 125 Aristotle, 48–9, 51–3, 55 Arnush, Michael, 46 Arthur, W Brian, 106, 161, 203 arts, division of knowledge and, 126–7 ASA See American Statistical Association asymmetric information, 145, 159 Athens, ancient, 44–5, 161 See also Socratic tradition Australia, 62 automobiles, spontaneous order and, 104 autonomy, 71, 90, 189–90, 195–7 epistemic, 37 AAFS See American Academy of Forensic Sciences Accetti, Carlo Invernizzi, Adewunmi, Bim, administration, Wilson and, 13–14, 85 administrative state, 13–17, 235–6 dismantling of, 16–17 party rule and, 16–17 advice, experts and, 39–40 Aiello, Leslie C., 160 Akerlof, George, 35, 145, 159, 165 Alexander of Macedonia, 48–50, 52–5 AMA See American Medical Association American Academy of Forensic Sciences (AAFS), 75 American football, 98–9 American Investment and Recovery Act of 2009, 157–8 American legal system, 209 American Medical Association (AMA), 152, 205–10 See also Flexner report, racism and American progressives, knowledge imposition and, 235–6 See also economics, Progressive American Statistical Association (ASA), 75 L’Amour médecin (Molière), 25–6 analytical egalitarianism, 78, 130, 152 ancient writers, spontaneous order and, 125–6 Anderson, James, 144–5 Anderson, Richard C., 176 anger, at experts, Anglo-American law, expert witnesses and, 56–67 anthill problem, 19–20, 78–9, 143, 236 Antiphon, 125 Barber, Michael D., 72–3, 81 barter, money and, 100 Bartley, W W., 121 Bastiat, Frederic, 103, 105 Bator, Francis M., 113–14 Baumol, William J., 205 Berger, Peter, 11, 24, 32–7, 55, 71–2, 116, 205 division of knowledge and, 143, 200 expertise and, 40–1 Hayek and, 34 monopoly and, 36–7, 88, 209 natural attitude and, 35 nihilation and, 36, 67, 191 social constructionism and, 33–4 spontaneous order and, 34 universal experts and, 36 Berger, Vance, 179 Bhaskar, Roy, 137 267 © in this web service Cambridge University Press www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information 268 Index bias, 156–7, 176, 199–200 See also expert errors, honest; willful fraud blinding and, 197–200 economics and, 157–8 leveraging of, 200 synecological, 19, 199–200 Bickerton, Christopher, Big Players, 215, 230 biology, 105 blinding, 197–200, 218 Bloor, David, 41–2 Boettke, Peter, 97, 102, 104, 113 Böhm-Bawerk, Eugen v., 140 boldness, forensic science and, 117–18 Boulding, Kenneth, 71 bounded rationality, 168–72 computability theory and, 171–2 motivations and, 175–6 observer effects and, 175–6 role effects and, 176 synecologically, 170, 175–7, 197, 199–200 Boyte, Harry, Bozdoǧan, Sibel, 223–4 Bradford, William C., 232–4 Brahe, Tycho, 168 Branchi, Andrea, 167 Brexit, British common law, 107–8 Britton, Roswell Sessoms, 143–4 Broad, William J., 46 Brock, William A., 203 Buchanan, James M., 79, 102, 153, 164 Buddhism, 192–4 Burney, Ian A., 59 Burr, Vivien, 33 businesses, division of knowledge and, 160–1 Butos, William N., 92, 215 The Calculus of Consent (Buchanan and Tullock), 91, 153, 164 Callon, Michel, 112–14 Cameron, David, Campbell, Donald, 121 Canning, D., 171 Catholicism, 193 Cato, 126 Cato Institute, 225 central banking, US and, 190–1 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 226 central planning, 13, 29, 69, 104–5, 119, 136, 141, 190–2, 221, 234–5 See also knowledge imposition Chadwick, E., 61–2 © in this web service Cambridge University Press Chaerephon, 45–7, 124 Chalmers, David, 147 Charlton, David, 58, 179–80, 218–19 Child Protective Services (CPS), 2–4 children, division of knowledge and, 119 chimpanzees, 123 China, 143–4 Chroust, Anton-Hermann, 49–50, 52–4 CIA See Central Intelligence Agency cigarettes, as money, 100 Cimabue, 126–7 civil-military gap, deep state, entangled and, 231–4 Clark, Andy, 147 clergy, Mandeville and, 130 climate change, 41, 71–2 See also Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Clinton, Hillary, 226 Coase, Ronald H., 216–17 cognition, experts and, 12, 168–72 Colander, David, 83–4 Cole, Simon A., 14, 41, 73, 108–9, 111–12, 116–18, 201, 213 Collins, H M., 41–2, 77, 85–6 color vision, 168–9 commodities Marx and, 138–9 opinions as, 152 common sense, 53–4, 83–4 “Common Sense and the Scientific Interpretation of Human Action” (Schutz), 143 comparative advantage, division of labor and, 101 compassion, 167–8, 175, 208 competition, 97, 106–15, 156, 158, 237 See also expertise, ecology of expert failure and, 161, 189, 204 expertise, ecology of and, 217–18 free market, 106–14 judging and, 35 liberalism and, 227 market structure and, 91–2 restrictions and, 106–8 universal experts and, 36 competitive markets, 10–11, 37, 42, 88–9, 151 ethics and, 76, 90 as natural, 109–14 non-expert power and, 32 complex adaptive systems, spontaneous order and, 106 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information Index complexity expert failure and, 202–3 forensic science and, 202–3 complexity theory, 83–4 computability theory, bounded rationality and, 171–2 Conant, James B., 82, 85 conformity effects, 177 Consumer Reports, 195 consumer sovereignty, 216 Cook, Harold J., 59 corporations, 146, 226–8 court testimony, science and, 57 Cowan, E James, 74–5, 91–2, 165, 185 Cox, Brian, Cox, James C., 216 Coyne, Christopher, 70, 151 Coyne, Rachel, 151 CPS See Child Protective Services credence goods, 40, 159–60 criminality, eugenics and, 5–6, 70 Crito (Socrates), 47 de la Croix, David, 71 cultural studies, 68 cybernetics, 105 D’Agostino, F., 147 Daniel, James, 45 Darby, Michael R., 159–60 Darwinism, 82 Davenport-Hines, Richard, 59 Davies, William, 59 Debreu, Gerard, 102 deep state, entangled, 12, 18, 221–34 Big Players and, 230 corporations and, 226–8 democracy, pluralistic and, 234 experts, rule of, and, 230–1 free market and, 225–6 incentives and, 231 Koch brothers and, 224–5 regulatory capture and, 231 rule of law and, 226 secrecy and, 228–31 synecological redundancy and, 230 defense, expert witnesses and, 60 DeFoe, Daniel, 26 degeneracy See synecological redundancy “Degenerate Cosmopolitanism” (Martin, A.), 185 Delphic oracle corruption and, 45–6 Socrates and, 45–6, 124 demand, for opinions, 160–1 © in this web service Cambridge University Press 269 democracy, 14, 84–5, 91 participation and, 84, 86 pluralistic, 6–8, 17, 234 representative, 194–5 deregulation See regulation Descartes, René, 65, 135 Devins, Caryn, 16, 18, 83, 121, 218 Dewey, John, 82 Dicey, A V., 15–16, 226 disagreement, 75, 131 See also division of opinion expert witnesses and, 61–7, 117, 209 professions and, 63–4, 205 discipline, 31, 68 discussion, 85–8 economics and, 86–7 information choice theory and, 91 dispersed knowledge See division of knowledge divination, Socratic tradition and, 44 See also Delphic oracle, Socrates and division of knowledge, 11, 24, 70, 116–32, 133–47, 143, 200 See also Synecological, EvoLutionary, Exosomatic, Constitutive and Tacit knowledge arts and, 126–7 asymmetric information and, 145 bias and, 199–200 bounded rationality and, 170 businesses and, 160–1 children and, 119 corporations and, 146 division of labor and, 30, 103, 123, 133–4, 137–42 expert witnesses and, 61–2 experts, economic theory of, and, 11 Hayek and, 92–3, 119–20, 122–8, 141–3 Mandeville and, 119–20, 122–3, 128–33 Marx and, 30, 137–9 Marxism and, 144–5 Mises and, 141–2 morality and, 146 political economy and, 140–1 Schutz and, 118, 142–3, 169–70 skepticism and, 56 social constructionism and, 34 socialism and, 141 Socrates and, 124–5 spontaneous order and, 34, 116 unification and, 140 Vasari and, 121, 126–7 division of labor, 101–2, 138–9, 141–2 constitutive knowledge and, 134, 138 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information 270 Index division of labor (cont.) division of knowledge and, 30, 103, 123, 133–4, 137–42 experts, economic theory of, and, 10 spontaneous order and, 34, 101–3 division of opinion, 131, 134–6 DNA profiling, 32 doux commerce thesis, 132 Drizin, Steen A., 182–3 Dror, Itiel E., 58, 179–80, 183, 219 Dulleck, Uwe, 160 Dunbar, R I M., 160 Duncan, James, 145 Durant, Darrin, 85–6 Earl, P E., 88 Easterly, William, 1, 13, 69–70 “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth” (Mises), 141 Economic Systems Design, 219 economics, 86–7, 102, 157–8 See also experimental economics Austrian school of, 18, 33, 141, 221 Keynes and, 29–30, 55, 192 mainline, 97, 111 neoclassical, 109, 113–14 Progressive, 110–11 “Economics and Knowledge” (Hayek), 24, 122, 128, 141–2 Edelman, Gerald M., 184–5 education Mandeville and, 129 medical, 206–7 Edwards, Thomas R., 130–1 efficiency, experts, economic theory of, and, 152 egoistic rationality, 163–5, 175–6 Eisenhower, Dwight, 222–3 Eliasberg, W., 67 elitism, populism and, 6–7 Elizabeth (Queen), 203 Ellis, Lee, 5, 70, 80 Emons, Winand, 160 entrepreneurs, experts and, 154 epistemic systems, 180–2 epistemic systems design, 217–20, 237 equality compassion and, 208 experts, rule of, and, 19 liberty and, 18 ethics, 73–6, 90 See also moral character, expert witnesses and; virtue ethics, code of, 75–6, 90 © in this web service Cambridge University Press eugenics, 5–6, 39, 70–2 See also population policies; sterilization, forced experts, rule of, and, 189–90 Keynes and, 28–30, 192 minimum wage and, 110–11 reflexivity and, 80 Socratic tradition and, 51–2 Evans, Robert, 41–2, 85–6 expectations, observer effects and, 174–5 experimental economics, 77 See also Economic Systems Design; epistemic systems design expert dependent choice, 189, 192–4 expert errors, 158, 183, 210, 220 honest, 154–5, 172–4, 177, 179–80 incentives and, 12, 155, 172–80 principal-agent model and, 172–3 synecological redundancy and, 182–5 expert failure, 12, 17–18, 197, 202–3 See also expert errors approbation and, 197 autonomy and, 195–7 Big Players and, 215 competition and, 161, 189, 204 deep state, entangled and, 12, 18, 221–34 expert dependent choice and, 189, 192–4 experts, quasi-rule of, and, 194–5 experts, rule of, and, 189–92 feedback and, 203–4 Flint water crisis as, 1–2 identity and, 197 information choice theory and, 153 justice system and, kids for cash case as, market structure and, 189–200 monopsony and, 214–15 normal accidents and, 201–2 praiseworthiness and, 197 professions and, 205–11 regulation and, 211–14 social work and, 2–5 sympathy and, 197 tightly-coupled systems and, 201–2 expert witnesses, 4, 9, 28, 43–4, 56–67 See also handwriting identification; medical witnesses; special juries Anglo-American law and, 56–67 defense and, 60 disagreement and, 61–7, 117, 209 hot tubbing and, 62 moral character and, 58–9 opinions and, 38, 57, 65 payment and, 59–61 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information Index prosecution and, 60 scientific assessor and, 61–2 universal experts and, 67 expertise, 8, 37–8, 40–2, 152 judging of, 35 monopoly and, 191 expertise, ecology of, 180–5, 205, 217–18 epistemic systems and, 180–2 synecological redundancy and, 205 experts, 1, 69, 79–82, 152–4 See also universal experts advice and, 39–40 cognition and, 12 as defined by contractual role, democracy, pluralistic and, 17 democracy and, 14 ethics, code of, and, 75–6 expertise and, 8, 37–8, 40–2, 152 experts, literature on, defining, 37–42 information choice theory defining, 89, 154 moral superiority of, 9, 55, 67, 235 moral superiority of in Keynes, 29, 55, 191–2 motivations of, 163–80 obedience and, 9, 44 opinions and, 8, 38, 42, 152–4 philosophers as, preferences and, 88, 195–6 Socrates and, 46–7 Socratic tradition and, 9, 43–56 utility maximization and, 12, 163–8 virtue and, 73–5 Wilson and, 27 experts, economic theory of, 8, 10–11, 152, 155 See also expertise, ecology of; information choice theory comparative institutional approach to, 12–13 competitive markets and, 10–11 experts, literature on, 8–10, 23–42, 76–80, 85–8, 234 See also Anglo-American law; Socratic tradition democracy and, 84–5 ethics and, 73–6 market structure and, 88–9 moralizing and, 38–9 non-expert power and, 9, 26–32 power and, 68–73 reliability and, 9, 26–32, 42 well-informed citizens and, 80–4 experts, quasi-rule of, 190, 194–5 experts, rule of, 19, 189–92, 230–1 democracy, pluralistic and, 6–8, 17 © in this web service Cambridge University Press 271 Keynes and, 29, 55, 191–2 knowledge and, 19 populism and, 6–8 rule of law and, 226 Socrates and, 27–8, 46–7, 73 Socratic tradition and, 46–55 explanation of the principle, social sciences and, 79–80 The Fable of the Bees: Or, Private Vices, Publick Benefits (Mandeville), 88, 130–1, 134, 166–7 See also Mandeville, Bernard false confessions, 182–3 false convictions, expertise, ecology of, and, 182–3 FBI See Federal Bureau of Investigation Feaver, Peter D., 231–2 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 226, 229 Federalist Papers, 135 feedback, expert failure and, 203–4 Feigenbaum, Susan, 156–7 Felin, Teppo, 168–9 Ferguson, Adam, 103 Ferraro, Paul J., 168 Feynman, Richard, 178–9 Fielding, Henry, 77 film critics, 160 Filonik, Jakub, 49 Fisher, R A., 177–8 Star Movement, Flexner, Abraham, 206–9, 235 Flexner report, racism and, 206–8 Flint water crisis, 1–2 Fontenrose, Joseph, 45 forensic science, 23, 39, 163–4 See also American Academy of Forensic Sciences; DNA profiling; handwriting identification; National Commission on Forensic Science; National Institute of Forensic Science bias and, 157 blinding and, 199 boldness and, 117–18 complexity and, 202–3 expert errors and, 158, 183, 210, 220 expert failure and, 17–18, 197, 202 incentives and, 179–80, 204 monopsony and, 214 payment and, 60 power and, 73 regulation and, 211, 213–14 virtue and, 74–5 willful fraud and, 154–5 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information 272 Index Foster, William L., 65 Foster v Chatman, 83 Foucault, Michel, 31, 68–9, 90 Fox, Renée, 144 Franklin, Allan, 177 Franklin, Benjamin, 194, 196, 198 Frazer, Persifor, 65–6 free development, experts and, 69 free entry, expertise, ecology of, and, 205 free market, 10–11, 106–14, 225–6 economics and, 102 market for ideas and, 216–17 free speech, 210, 217 Freedman, David, 27 Friedman, Milton, 110, 225–6 Front National (National Front), full-information decisions, competition and, 156, 158 Gally, Joseph A., 184–5 Galton, David, 51, 70 Galton, Francis, 28, 51 Garrett, Brandon L., 183 Gatewood, John B., 145–6 general equilibrium theory, 98, 102, 113–14 George, Henry, 119, 122, 140–1 Ghiberti, Lorenzo, 127 global warming See climate change Gökalp, Deniz, 224 Golan, Tal, 57, 62 Goldman, Alvin, 30, 32, 147, 216 Goldrich, Robert L., 232 Goodale, Melvyn A., 174 Gosseries, Axel, 71 gossip, 160 Gove, Michael, 1, government intervention, economics and, 102 governments, opinions and, 161 Grann, D., 182 Great Recession, 5, 190 Greenspan, Alan, Greenwald, Glenn, 17, 226, 228 Grosch, Eric N., 179 Gruber, Jonathan, Habermas, Jürgen, 31, 69, 85–6 Hall, Stuart, 16–17 Hamilton, Alexander, 135 Hand, Learned, 38, 56–7, 66–7 handwriting identification, 65–6 Harth, Phillip, 130–1 © in this web service Cambridge University Press Harward, Keith, 210 Haupt, Claudia E., 209–10 Hausman, Daniel M., 163 Hayek, Friedrich, 24, 33–4, 56, 110, 147, 192 corporations and, 227 division of knowledge and, 92–3, 119–20, 122–8, 141–3 division of labor and, 141–2 knowledge and, 11, 139 knowledge problem and, 69 reflexivity and, 79–80 Schutz and, 118, 142–3 spontaneous order and, 97, 105–6 height, average human, competition and, 110 Heiner Ronald A., 176 Henrich, Joseph, 132, 152 Henry the Sixth (Shakespeare), 25 Herodotus, 45 Herrick, Devon M., 209 Hewlett, A.W., 198 Hickey, Colin, 71 hierarchy knowledge and, 15, 116–18 Cole on, 73 polyarchy and, 14–15 Hirschman, Albert O., 132–3 historical materialism, Marx and, 137 History of England (Hume), 135 Holcombe, Randall, 196 home-schooling, 3–4 Hommes, Cars H., 203 Horwitz, Steven, 146, 190–1 hot tubbing, expert witnesses and, 62 Huber, Peter W., 38–9 Hume, David, 18, 119–20, 135 Hutchins, Edwin, 120, 147 Hutt, W H., 216 “I, Pencil” (Read), 103, 120 ICC See Interstate Commerce Commission identity, 165 expert failure and, 197 motivations and, 165 ideology, 30–1, 116 immigration, 111 impartial spectator, Smith, A., and, 166–8 incentives, 173, 179–80, 204, 231 See also conformity effects; observer effects; role effects alignment of, 204 expert errors and, 12, 155, 172–80 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information Index honest errors and, 172–3, 177, 179–80 market structure and, 204 infinite regress, regulation and, 212 information, knowledge and, 144 See also asymmetric information; fullinformation decisions, competition and information aggregation services, 160 information choice theory, 11–12, 89–91, 151–62 asymmetric information and, 159 democracy and, 91 egoistic rationality and, 164–5 ethics and, 90 expert errors and, 172–3 market structure and, 91–2 monopoly and, 153–4 motivational assumptions of, 163–80 power and, 90 principal-agent model and, 157–8, 172–3 well-informed citizens and, 91 Ingold, Tim, 121 An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (Smith, A.), 133–4 institutions, 37, 180, 220 See also expertise, ecology of intelligence community See deep state, entangled Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 211–12, 215 See also climate change Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), 212 invisible hand See spontaneous order IPCC See Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change Iraq War, Islamic State (ISIS), 230 Isnardi, Margherita, 50, 53–5 Isocrates, 53–4 Jaeger, Werner, 54–5 Jakobsen, L S., 174 James, William, 169–70 Jasanoff, Sheila, 76–7, 82, 84–6, 190 Jobs, Steven, 154 Joung, Eun-Lee, 104–5 judging competition and, 35 of expertise, 35 junk science, 38–9 jury selection, 83 justice system, expert failure and, © in this web service Cambridge University Press 273 Kahneman, Daniel, 168–70, 176 Karni, Edi, 159–60 Kasaba, Reşat, 223–4 Kaye, David H., 27, 130, 168 Kaye, F B., 129–30 Keil, Frank C., 119 Kelsen, Hans, 48–9, 52–3 Kerkhof, Bert, 166 Kerschbamer, Rudolf, 160 Kessel, Reuben A., 206–7 Keynes, John Maynard disclaimer on, 30 on eugenics, morality, and planning and, 28–30 letter to Hayek and, 191–2 on superiority of experts, 55 kids for cash case, as expert failure, Kirzner, I M., 18 Knight, Frank H., 78, 86, 89 Knighton, Henry, 193 knowledge, 19, 134 See also division of knowledge; Synecological, EvoLutionary, Exosomatic, Constitutive and Tacit knowledge constitutive, 122–5, 133–4, 138 democracy, pluralistic and, evolutionary, 121, 128 exosomatic, 121–2, 145–6 hierarchy and, 15, 116–18 information and, 144 language and, 145–6 Mandeville and, 11, 121, 128, 131, 134, 139 power and, 31 prices and, 146 science and, 136, 140 social distribution of, 11, 24 speculative, 123–4, 133–4, 136, 140 synecological, 120–1, 235–6 tacit, 122, 131 knowledge imposition, 19, 31, 52, 54, 90, 170, 234–6 American progressives and, 235–6 moral superiority and, 235–6 knowledge problem, Hayek and, 69 Koch, Charles, 224–5 Koch, David, 224–5 Kohn, Richard H., 231–2 Koppl, Roger, 109, 113, 121, 157, 176, 185 bias and, 200 Big Players and, 215 competition and, 91–2 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information 274 Index Koppl, Roger (cont.) epistemic systems design and, 218–20 expert failure and, 204 identity and, 165 novelty intermediation and, 161 virtue and, 74–5 Krane, Dan, 58, 174, 183, 199–200 Kranton, Rachel E., 165 Kuhn, Thomas, 99 Kupers, Roland, 83–4 laboratory, experimental economics and, 77 laissez faire See competition, free market Langlois, Richard N., 111, 161 language, exosomatic knowledge and, 145–6 Law, John, 99–100 Laws (Plato), 51–2, 54–5 Lee, Gary, 100 Leo, Richard A., 182–3 Leonard, Thomas C., 110–11, 161, 208 A Letter to Dion, Occasion’d by his Book call’d Alciphron or the Minute Philosopher (Mandeville), 130 Levinson, Sanford, 83 Levy, David, 32, 39–40, 75, 86–9, 154 analytical egalitarianism and, 78, 130, 152 bias and, 156–7 experts, economic theory of, and, 155 incentives and, 173 motivations and, 165–6 Smith, A., and, 133–4 Lewis, Paul, 34 Ley, David, 145 liberalism, competition and, 227 liberty, equality and, 18–19 licensing restrictions, professions and, 205–10 Lincoln, Abraham, 163–4 Lindblom, Charles, 18 Lives of the Painters, Sculptors and Architects (Vasari), 126–7 Lloyd-Jones, Hugh, 46 local truth, epistemic systems and, 180–1 Lofgren, Mike, 225–6 long bomb phenomenon, spontaneous order and, 98–9 Longo, Giuseppe, 121 Lotka, Alfred J., 121–2 Lovejoy, Arthur, 166 Luban, David, 146 Luckmann, Thomas, 11, 24, 32–7, 55, 71–2, 116, 205 © in this web service Cambridge University Press division of knowledge and, 143, 200 expertise and, 40–1 Hayek and, 34 monopoly and, 36–7, 88, 209 natural attitude and, 35 nihilation and, 36, 67, 191 social constructionism and, 33–4 spontaneous order and, 34 universal experts and, 36 Lutz, Donna J., 119 Lynch, Micael, 41 Macedonia, Aristotle and, 52–3 See also Alexander of Macedonia; Philip of Macedonia Madison, James, 135 magical thinking, 216 man on the street, Schutz and, 80–2 Mandeville, Bernard, 102, 127, 129–30, 230 compassion and, 167–8, 175, 208 disagreement and, 131 discussion and, 87–8 division of knowledge and, 119–20, 122–3, 128–33 division of labor and, 138 division of opinion and, 131, 134 knowledge and, 11, 121, 128, 131, 134, 139 manners and, 129, 131–2 motivations and, 166–8 the poor and, 129–30 pride and, 166–7 reflexivity and, 87–8 satire and, 130–1 skepticism and, 56 spontaneous order and, 128 manners, Mandeville and, 129, 131–2 Mannheim, Karl, 30–1, 116 A Manual of Medical Jurisprudence (Taylor, A S.), 57–8 Marco Polo, 25 Margolis, Howard, 168 market failure, 113–14 market for ideas, 215–17 market structure, 88–9, 91–2, 189–200 See also competitive markets; monopoly incentives and, 204 as product of design, 111 Martin, Adam, 185 Martin, David, 34 Marx, Karl, 30, 137–9 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information 275 Index Marxism, 77, 144–5 Matthews, J Rosser, 179 Mayfield, Brandon, 158, 165, 211 McCullagh, Declan, 229 McKelway, St Clair, 38 McKeon, Michael, 118 McPherson, Michael S., 163 McQuade, Thomas J., 215 medical witnesses, 57–61 medicine, 36–7 See also American Medical Association Mendel, Gregor, 177–8 Menger, Carl, 33, 99–100, 139–40 Merlan, Philip, 53–4 Merton, Robert, 31–2, 72–3, 84, 117 Mesmer, Franz Anton, 198 Michelangelo, 126–7 Middle Ages, 30 Milgrom, P., 86, 88, 156, 158 military-industrial complex, 222–3 See also deep state, entangled Mill, John Stuart, 86 Miller, James C III, 17 Miller, Jeff, 52–3 Millikan, Robert, 178–9 Milner, A David, 174 minimum wage, 107, 110–11 Mises, Ludwig von, 16, 19, 100, 119 division of knowledge and, 141–2 social constructionism and, 33 Mnookin, Jennifer L., 14, 66 Molière, 25–6 monarchy, Aristotle and, 48–9, 52–3 money, 99–100 barter and, 100 cigarettes as, 100 monopoly, 36–7, 88, 90, 153–4, 191, 209 competitive markets and, 88–9 expert failure and, 12 monopsony, 214–15 moral character, expert witnesses and, 58–9 moral superiority, knowledge imposition and, 235–6 morality, division of knowledge and, 146 moralizing, experts, literature on, and, 38–9 Morgenstern, Oskar, 171 motivations, 163–80 See also information choice theory, motivational assumptions of approbation and, 165 egoistic rationality and, 164–5 © in this web service Cambridge University Press identity and, 165 praiseworthiness and, 165–6 sympathy and, 165 Mudde, Cas, 6–7 Mudie, Robert, 136–7 Mueller, Dennis, 164 Mueller, Robert, 229 Müller, Gerhard, 54–5 Musacchio, J.M., 169 Nadler, Jerrold, 229 NAS See National Academy of Sciences “NAS Report,” 117 National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 117, 211–13 National Commission on Forensic Science, 213–14 National Front See Front National National Institute of Forensic Science (NIFS), 211–13 national security See secrecy national security state, 223 See also deep state, entangled natural attitude, 35 Neisser, Ulrich, 175 Neumann, John von, 171 The New Science (Vico), 133 Nifong, Michael, 214 NIFS See National Institute of Forensic Science nihilation, 36, 67, 191 Nilsson, Martin, 44 Nock, Arthur Darby, 45 non-expert power, 9, 26–32 See also well-informed citizens normal accidents, expert failure and, 201–2 normative turn, STS and, 41 North Korea, 104–5, 110 novelty intermediation, 161, 195–6 Obamacare, obedience, 9, 44 See also experts, rule of observer effects, 58, 174–6 blinding and, 197–200 precautions against, 177–9 Odling, William, 62, 117 Ojakangas, Mika, 51 On Liberty (Mill), 86 O’Neill, Brian C., 71 opinions, 38, 57, 65, 152, 160–2 See also common sense as credence goods, 159–60 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information 276 Index opinions (cont.) experts as paid for, 8, 38, 42, 152–4 governments and, 161 optimality, market failure and, 113–14 Orchard, Lionel, 164 The Organization of Inquiry (Tullock), 173 Ostrom, Vincent, 13–14 Owen, Robert, 135–7 Pak, Sunyoung, 110 Palmer, William, 59–61 Pareto, Vilfredo, 113–14 partial redundancy See synecological redundancy participation, democracy and, 84, 86 party rule administrative state and, 16–17 arbitrariness and, 16 populism and, 16 payment, 59–61 See also opinions, experts as paid for Pearson, Karl, 28, 51–2, 80, 82 Peart, Sandra, 32, 39–40, 75, 86–9, 154 analytical egalitarianism and, 78, 130, 152 experts, economic theory of, and, 155 incentives and, 173 motivations and, 165–6 praiseworthiness and, 165–6 Smith, A., and, 133–4 Peasant Revolt of 1381, 25 Penrose, Clement B., 65 Perrow, Charles, 201–2 The Phenomenology of the Social World (Schutz), 142 Philip of Macedonia, 48–50, 52, 54 philosophers as experts, See also Socratic tradition Pichert, James W., 176 Pinker, Steven, 132 Plato, 45–8, 51–2, 54–5, 124–5 Platonic Academy, 49–50 Plutarch, 49 Podolsky, Scott H., 197–8 Poisons in Relation to Medical Jurisprudence and Medicine (Taylor, A S.), 60 Polansky, Ronald, 45 Polanyi, Michael, 122 political economy, division of knowledge and, 140–2 Politics (Aristotle), 48, 51 © in this web service Cambridge University Press polyarchy hierarchy and, 14–15 tyranny and, 15 the poor, Mandeville and, 129–30 Popper, Karl, 117, 122 population policies, 71–2 populism, 6–8, 16 positive predictive value (PPV), expertise, ecology of, and, 183–4 Posner, Richard A., 212 Potts, Jason, 88, 161 poverty See also technocratic illusion rights and, 13, 69 Socrates and, 47 power, 68–73, 90 See also non-expert power Foucault and, 31, 68–9 knowledge and, 31 PPV See positive predictive value praiseworthiness, 165–6, 197 preferences, experts and, 88, 195–6 Prendergast, Renee, 122, 128, 131 Price, David H., 223 prices, knowledge and, 146 pride, Mandeville and, 166–7 principal-agent model, 157–8, 172–3 Principles of Psychology (James), 169–70 prison system, eugenics and, 5–6, 70 privatization, 109 professions disagreement and, 63–4, 205 expert failure and, 205–11 licensing restrictions and, 205–10 prosecution, expert witnesses and, 60 Protestantism, 194 psychiatry, 23 public choice theory, 11, 153, 163 egoistic rationality and, 163–5 utility maximization and, 164–5 racism, 2, 206–8 Radford, R.A., 100 Radnitzky, Gerard, 121 Rahula, Walpola, 193 railroads, 212 randomly chosen citizens, well-informed citizens and, 82–3 rationality, Weberian, 24–5 See also bounded rationality; egoistic rationality Rawls, John, 85–6 Read, Leonard, 103, 120–1 Reagan, Michael D., 223 Reason, James, 201–2 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information Index “Reconstruction in Europe: An Introduction” (Keynes), 55 Reeve, C.D.C., 45–6 reflexivity, 79–80, 87–8, 236 experimental economics and, 77 experts, literature on, and, 76–80 information choice theory and, 90–1 reliability and, 76 satire and, 77–8 self-exemption and, 77 regulation, 18–19, 211–14, 225–6 See also government intervention, economics and; restrictions, competition and forensic science and, 211, 213–14 infinite regress and, 212 market for ideas and, 216–17 regulatory capture and, 212–14 regulatory capture, 91, 212–14, 231 Rehg, William, 211–12 Reid, Sue, relative unanimity, experts and, 79 reliability, 9, 26–32, 42, 76 competitive markets and, 37, 151 institutions and, 37 virtue and, 73–4 religion, 192 See also Buddhism; Catholicism; Delphic oracle; Protestantism competition and, 76, 192–4 expert dependent choice and, 192–4 Socratic tradition and, 44–6, 54–5, 194 rent control, 151 Republic (Plato), 46, 48 restrictions, competition and, 106–8 Reynolds, Russell, 62–3 Rieder, Travis, 71 rights, poverty and, 13, 69 Risinger, Michael, 66, 154–5, 170, 174–7, 183 rivalry, expertise, ecology of, and, 205 The Road to Serfdom (Hayek), 192 della Robbia, Luca, 127 Roberts, J., 86, 88, 156, 158 Robertson, Christopher T., 199, 218 role effects, 176–7 Rome, ancient, 112 Rosenthal, Robert, 58, 174 Ross, Stephen A., 157–8 Roucek, Joseph, 173 Rubel, Alexander, 44–5, 54 rule of law, 226 administrative state and, 15–17 experts, rule of, and, 226 Ryle, G., 122 © in this web service Cambridge University Press 277 Salter, Alex, 216 Samuelson, Paul, 47 Sandford, Jeremy, 40 satire, 77–8, 130–1 Savage, Deborah A., 63 Schiemann, John, 31 Schumer, Chuck, 229 Schutz, Alfred, 19–20, 33, 40, 80–2, 162, 236 division of knowledge and, 118, 142–3, 169–70 Hayek and, 118, 142–3 well-informed citizens and, 80–2, 118 science See also forensic science; junk science; National Academy of Sciences; social sciences court testimony and, 57 social structure and, 72–3 speculative knowledge and, 136, 140 science and technology studies (STS), 41, 92 science studies, 76–7, 112, 220 scientific assessor, expert witnesses and, 61–2 scientific witnesses See expert witnesses Scott, Peter Dale, 224–5, 229 secrecy, 5, 228–31 SELECT See Synecological, EvoLutionary, Exosomatic, Constitutive and Tacit knowledge self-exemption, reflexivity and, 77 selfishness See egoistic rationality self-rule See autonomy Senn, Peter R., 100 The Sensory Order (Hayek), 79–80 Shakespeare, William, 25 Shaw, Julia, 235–6 Sherif, Carolyn, 177 Sherif, Muzafer, 177 Simon, Herbert A., 144, 146, 168–70 Singerman, David Roth, 28–9, 191–2 skepticism, 56 slavery, 15, 109–10 Small, Albion, 140 Smith, Adam, 34, 76, 78, 98, 103, 119–20 approbation and, 165 autonomy and, 196 division of knowledge and, 133–4, 137–9 division of labor and, 101–2, 138–9 impartial spectator and, 166–8 Levy and, 133–4 Menger and, 139–40 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information 278 Index Smith, Adam (cont.) Peart and, 133–4 religion and, 192 slavery and, 109–10 speculative knowledge and, 134 sympathy and, 165, 167–8, 208 Vasari and, 127 Smith, Adam C., 105, 228 Smith, Nicholas D., 45 Smith, R Angus, 61–2, 74 Smith, Vernon, 18, 120, 218 Snowden, Edward, 231 The Social Construction of Reality (Berger, P., and Luckmann), 33 social constructionism, 33–4 social distribution of knowledge See division of knowledge social sciences anthill problem and, 19–20, 78–9, 143, 236 explanation of the principle and, 79–80 social services, UK, 4–5 social structure, science and, 72–3 social work, 2–5, 72 socialism division of knowledge and, 141 impossibility of rational planning in, 221 sociological ambivalence, Merton and Barber and, 72–3 Socrates, 27–8, 45–7, 73, 124–5 Delphic oracle and, 45–6, 124 as expert, 46–7 poverty and, 47 Socratic tradition, 9, 43–56, 194 See also Aristotle; Plato; Platonic Academy divination and, 44 eugenics and, 51–2 experts, rule of, and, 46–55 knowledge imposition and, 235 Sokal, Alan D., 232 “Some Academic ‘Rackets’ in the Social Sciences” (Roucek), 173 Song of Roland, 232–3 Soros, George, 225 South Korea, 110 Soviet Union, 104 special juries, 56 spectators, spontaneous order and, 98–9, 104 spontaneous order, 34, 97–106, 128 as abstract, 105–6 ancient writers and, 125–6 as complex, 105 complex adaptive systems and, 106 division of knowledge and, 34, 116 © in this web service Cambridge University Press division of labor and, 34, 101–3 experts, economic theory of, and, 10 general equilibrium theory and, 98, 102 Hayek and, 97, 105–6 long bomb phenomenon and, 98–9 money and, 99–100 as without purpose, 106 spectators and, 98–9, 104 unintended consequences and, 106 sterilization, forced, 28–9, 70–1, 80 Stigler, George J., 226 stock markets, 141, 203 Strauss, Peter L., 13 Stretton, Hugh, 164 Strudler, Alan, 146 STS See science and technology studies supply, of opinions, 162 Svorny, Shirley, 209 symmetry principle, 41–2 sympathy, 165, 167–8, 197, 208 See also compassion; praiseworthiness Synecological, EvoLutionary, Exosomatic, Constitutive and Tacit knowledge (SELECT), 120–2, 146–7, 176, 234 synecological redundancy, 182–5, 205, 230 Taleb, Nassim, 185 Taylor, Alfred Swaine, 57–8, 60–1 Taylor, John Pitt, 58 Taylor, Laura O., 168 technocracy, populism and, technocratic illusion, 13, 69–70 testability, 236–7 testimony, 32 See also court testimony Thatcher, Margaret, 16–17 Themistius, 48 The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Smith, A.), 166–8 Thompson, William C., 108–9, 111–12, 201, 203 Tiebout, C., 194–5 tightly-coupled systems, expert failure and, 201–2 Tom Jones (Fielding), 77 transnational corporations See corporations transparency, 39–40, 75 The Travels of Marco Polo (Marco Polo), 25 Treatise on the Law of Evidence (Taylor, J P.), 58 Triplett, Jeremy S., 204 Trump, Donald, 1, 229 truth See also local truth expertise and, 41–2 market for ideas and, 215–16 www.cambridge.org Cambridge University Press 978-1-107-13846-9 — Expert Failure Roger Koppl Index More Information 279 Index social constructionism and, 33–4 utility maximization and, 163–4 Tsuji, M., 171 Tullock, Gordon, 153, 164, 173 Turkey, 223–4 Turner, Stephen, 23, 31–2, 35, 78, 190 cultural studies and, 68 democracy and, 84–5 Habermas and, 85–6 normal accidents and, 201–2 normative turn and, 41 Pearson and, 80 science studies, 76–7 well-informed citizens and, 82 Tversky, A., 176 tyranny, polyarchy and, 15 Uexküll, Jakob von, 169 unification, division of knowledge and, 140 unintended consequences, spontaneous order and, 106 unitary mind, honest errors and, 174 United Kingdom (UK) See also AngloAmerican law; British common law social services and, 4–5 United States (US), central banking and, 190–1 See also Anglo-American law; Child Protective Services; deep state, entangled; specific topics universal experts, 36, 67 Ünsar, Seda, 224 US See United States “The Use of Knowledge in Society” (Hayek), 142 used cars, 35, 159 utility maximization, 12, 163–8 © in this web service Cambridge University Press Vasari, Giorgio, 121, 126–7 Velupillai, Vela, 171–2 Vico, Giambattista, 133 virtue, 73–5 Vitali, Stefania, 227–8 voucher programs, 194 Wagner, Richard E., 105, 185, 228 Walras, Leon, 98, 102, 113–14 Washburn, Emory, 63 Wasserman, David, 146 Watts, Nicole F., 223 Weber, Max, 24–5 well-informed citizens, 80–4, 91, 118 White, L H., 191 Whitman, D Glen, 157, 176 Wierzchosławski, Rafał Paweł, 40 willful fraud, 154–5 Williams, Joan C., Williamson, Oliver, 109 Willingham, Cameron Todd, 182 Wilson, Woodrow, 13–14, 27, 84–5, 235 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, 56, 147 Wolpert, David H., 172 Woodward, John, 38 word of mouth, 160 Wrona, Richard M., 231–2, 235 Wycliffe, John, 193 Wyden, Ron, 228–9 Xenophon, 46–7 Yeager, Leland B., 111, 141, 215 Yilmaz, Ihsan, 224 Zain, Fred, 163–4 Zick, Timothy, 210 Zuiderent-Jerak, Teun, 112 www.cambridge.org ... Supply and Demand for Expert Opinion The Economic Point of View on Experts Identifying the Commodity and Defining Expert Information Choice Theory Honest Error and Willful Fraud The Economics of Experts... University This interdisciplinary series promotes original theoretical and empirical research as well as integrative syntheses involving links between individual choice, institutions, and social outcomes... the opinions of experts in many areas, including engineering, accounting, and finance Investigating police officers require forensic scientists to tell them whether there were “latent” fingerprints