Lectures on the history of moral philosophy john rawls

L   H  M P L   H  M P J  R Edited by Barbara Herman    Cambridge, Massachusetts, and London, England  Copyright   by the President and Fellows of Harvard College    Printed in the United States of America Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Rawls, John, – Lectures on the history of moral philosophy/John Rawls ; edited by Barbara Herman p cm Includes bibliographical references and index ISBN --- (alk paper)—ISBN --- (pbk : alk paper)  Ethics, Modern—th century  Ethics, Modern—th century  Ethics, Modern—th century I Herman, Barbara II Title BJ.R  ′.′′—dc - C E’ F A N   T I: M M P, –        A Difference between Classical and Modern Moral Philosophy The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy The Relation between Religion and Science Kant on Science and Religion On Studying Historical Texts           H  M P   P   Background: Skepticism and the Fideism of Nature   Classification of the Passions   Outline of Section  of Part III of Book II   Hume’s Account of (Nonmoral) Deliberation: The Official View    R D   R  R  Three Questions about Hume’s Official View  Three Further Psychological Principles  Deliberation as Transforming the System of Passions  The General Appetite to Good  The General Appetite to Good: Passion or Principle?                  J   A V  The Capital of the Sciences  The Elements of Hume’s Problem  The Origin of Justice and Property  The Circumstances of Justice  The Idea of Convention Examples and Supplementary Remarks  Justice as a Best Scheme of Conventions  The Two Stages of Development            T C  R I  Introduction  Some of Clarke’s Main Claims  The Content of Right and Wrong  Rational Intuitionism’s Moral Psychology  Hume’s Critique of Rational Intuitionism  Hume’s Second Argument: Morality Not Demonstrable         T J S  Introduction  Hume’s Account of Sympathy  The First Objection: The Idea of the Judicious Spectator  The Second Objection: Virtue in Rags Is Still Virtue  The Epistemological Role of the Moral Sentiments  Whether Hume Has a Conception of Practical Reason  The Concluding Section of the Treatise Appendix: Hume’s Disowning the Treatise          L  H M P  Introduction  Leibniz’s Metaphysical Perfectionism  The Concept of a Perfection  Leibniz’s Predicate-in-Subject Theory of Truth  Some Comments on Leibniz’s Account of Truth [  ]                 S  A S: T F  The Complete Individual Concept Includes Active Powers  Spirits as Individual Rational Substances  True Freedom  Reason, Judgment, and Will  A Note on the Practical Point of View       K  G: P  P I  Introductory Comments  Some Points about the Preface: Paragraphs –  The Idea of a Pure Will  The Main Argument of Groundwork I  The Absolute Value of a Good Will  The Special Purpose of Reason  Two Roles of the Good Will           T C I: T F F        Introduction Features of Ideal Moral Agents The Four-Step CI-Procedure Kant’s Second Example: The Deceitful Promise Kant’s Fourth Example: The Maxim of Indifference Two Limits on Information The Structure of Motives            T C I: T S F        The Relation between the Formulations Statements of the Second Formulation Duties of Justice and Duties of Virtue What Is Humanity? The Negative Interpretation The Positive Interpretation Conclusion: Remarks on Groundwork II:– (–) [  ]                   T C I: T T F       Gaining Entry for the Moral Law The Formulation of Autonomy and Its Interpretation The Supremacy of Reason The Realm of Ends Bringing the Moral Law Nearer to Intuition What Is the Analogy?         T P  R   O   M L       Introduction The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good The Second Three Conceptions of the Good Autonomy and Heteronomy The Priority of Right A Note on True Human Needs          M C  Rational Intuitionism: A Final Look  Kant’s Moral Constructivism  The Constructivist Procedure  An Observation and an Objection  Two Conceptions of Objectivity  The Categorical Imperative: In What Way Synthetic A Priori?           T F  R  Introduction  The First Fact of Reason Passage  The Second Passage: §§– of Chapter I of the Analytic  The Third Passage: Appendix I to Analytic I, Paragraphs –  Why Kant Might Have Abandoned a Deduction for the Moral Law  What Kind of Authentication Does the Moral Law Have?  The Fifth and Sixth Fact of Reason Passages  Conclusion      [  ]                 T M L   L  F  Concluding Remarks on Constructivism and Due Reflection  The Two Points of View  Kant’s Opposition to Leibniz on Freedom  Absolute Spontaneity  The Moral Law as a Law of Freedom  The Ideas of Freedom  Conclusion           T M P   R, B I      The The The The The Three Predispositions Free Power of Choice Rational Representation of the Origin of Evil Manichean Moral Psychology Roots of Moral Motivation in Our Person  T U  R  The Practical Point of View  The Realm of Ends as Object of the Moral Law  The Highest Good as Object of the Moral Law  The Postulates of Vernunftglaube  The Content of Reasonable Faith  The Unity of Reason              H  H R  Introduction  Philosophy as Reconciliation  The Free Will  Private Property  Civil Society   E L  L  Sittlichkeit: The Account of Duty  Sittlichkeit: The State [  ]                   Sittlichkeit: War and Peace  A Third Alternative  Hegel’s Legacy as a Critic of Liberalism    A     : C    O     I     [  ] ... Modern Moral Philosophy The Main Problem of Greek Moral Philosophy The Background of Modern Moral Philosophy The Problems of Modern Moral Philosophy The Relation between Religion and Science Kant on. .. L       Introduction The First Three of Six Conceptions of the Good The Second Three Conceptions of the Good Autonomy and Heteronomy The Priority of Right A Note on True Human Needs ... conception in human life: how it organizes moral reasoning, the conception of a person that it presupposes, and the social role of the moral conception Along with a substantive account of the right,