The political economy of higher education finance

THE OF HIGHER EDUCATION FINANCE THE POLITICS OF TUITION FEES AND SUBSIDIES IN OECD COUNTRIES, 1945-2015 JULIAN L GARRITZMANN The Political Economy of Higher Education Finance Julian L. Garritzmann The Political Economy of Higher Education Finance The Politics of Tuition Fees and Subsidies in OECD Countries, 1945–2015 Julian L. Garritzmann University of Konstanz Department of Politics & Public Administration Konstanz, Germany ISBN 978-3-319-29912-9 ISBN 978-3-319-29913-6 DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-29913-6 (eBook) Library of Congress Control Number: 2016948423 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 This work is subject to copyright All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made Printed on acid-free paper This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG Switzerland To my parents, for all the love and support—and for all the opportunities ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Many people have helped me to start and finish this book First and foremost, I am deeply indebted to Marius Busemeyer Since we met at the Max Planck Institute in Cologne, Marius has supported me in many respects: he awakened my interest in education policy and the welfare state; he commented on numerous versions of my papers; and he offered me convenient research positions with long time horizons (very unusual nowadays) and generous funding (even more unusual), meaning that throughout my time as a graduate student I had the means to attend conferences and workshops and was able to afford a research stay at Harvard University Moreover, Marius created a highly productive work environment at the University of Konstanz; he kept my teaching load low and hardly ever bothered me with organizational matters so that I could focus on my own research Maybe most importantly, Marius always pushed me further with critical comments and tough deadlines, but also left me a lot of academic freedom and accepted that I often had to find my own way, sometimes disregarding good advice (of course, often regretting this later) In short, Marius was the ideal supervisor and, moreover, has become a good friend Christian Breunig has been the perfect second supervisor: always available when I needed advice, but never trying to push me in a direction in which I didn’t want to head; always very clear in his critique and concentrating on the big, critical questions Christian not only provided substantive advice but also pushed me to bring this book into a (hopefully) more easily accessible and shorter format, dropping many of the potentially interesting, but largely unnecessary, meanderings of the book vii viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS I am also enormously thankful to Torben Iversen I met Torben during two workshops in Bremen and Konstanz and was very impressed by his analytical precision and style of thinking about politics Right from the start he took a lot of time to have discussions with me and never treated me as the little graduate student that I was I am very grateful that Torben invited me to Harvard, where he paved my way, connecting me to other exciting scholars Moreover, Torben agreed to serve as a supervisor for my dissertation and took the time to comment extensively on single papers and on the final manuscript His view on my work—though I did not always follow it—has helped me to sharpen my analytical focus and simplify the argument as much as possible Finally, I thank Dirk Leuffen, who agreed—on short notice—to chair my dissertation defense committee, and I am grateful that he not only took the time to read through my lengthy dissertation but also to comment on it from an “outside angle,” which helped me to focus more on the main story Moreover, I wish to thank our entire team at the University of Konstanz: Aurélien Abrassart, Yvonne Aymar, Margot Beier, Michael Dobbins, Ulrich Glassmann, Susanne Haastert, Susanne Münn, Erik Neimanns, Roula Nezi, Raphaela Schlicht-Schmälzle, and Janis Vossiek I have always enjoyed the critical but constructive discussions in our group I am also grateful for all of the support from our student assistants who saved me a great deal of time by doing a lot of—sometimes annoying, but necessary—work: Dana Behrens, Sophie Fendrich, Maximilian Gahntz, Caspar Kolster, Tobias Tober, Léonie Trick, Marie Zeller, and, most of all, Lina Seitzl, who has been a great support during almost my entire time at the University of Konstanz I also wish to thank Kilian Seng, Peter Selb, and Susumu Shikano for their statistical advice During my time as a Visiting Fellow at Harvard, I experienced an enormously inspiring, creative, and energizing environment Besides Torben Iversen, a number of colleagues commented on my work and stimulated my thinking in various ways: Daniel Ziblatt, Dan Smith, and Gwyneth McClendon let me participate in and present at the Research Workshop in Comparative Politics, and had helpful comments Moreover, I am very thankful to Peter Hall and Kathy Thelen, who took time to discuss my ideas with me Furthermore, Jon Fiva, Jeff Frieden, Daniel Koss, John Marshall, Arthur Spirling, and Carina Schmitt commented on several papers Finally, many thanks to Dominik Geering and Olaf van Vliet During our joint lunches almost every day I not only received a lot of ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix feedback, but also made two great friends that I unfortunately see much too seldom At the University of Cologne, where I graduated in 2011, I particularly wish to thank André Kaiser, who got me interested in comparative politics in general and in parties and party competition in particular During my time as a student assistant at his chair, he fundamentally shaped my perspective on political science and inspired me to think about the importance of time in this field I appreciate that I always find the door open (and often a free desk at which I can some work) when I come “back home.” Moreover, many people have commented on parts of the book at various stages: Sakari Ahola, Ben Ansell, Michael Braun, Margarita Gelepithis, Silja Häusermann, Anne-Marie Jeannet, Carsten Jensen, Jens Jungblut, Olli Kangas, Peter Maassen, Paul Marx, Traute Meyer, Stefan Thewissen, Pieter Vanhuysse, Wim van Oorschot, Peter Selb, Daniel Stegmüller, Christine Trampusch, Martina Vukasovic, and Claus Wendt Colleagues have also commented on the paper at various occasions such as at the CES Conferences in Amsterdam and Paris; the APSA Annual Meeting in Washington; the MPSA Conference in Chicago; the ESPAnet Meetings in Mannheim, Odense, and Oslo; Harvard’s various research workshops; the ECPR General Conference in Montréal; the HEIK seminar at the University of Oslo; the Cologne Center for Comparative Politics; and various occasions at the University of Konstanz Still, I’m pretty certain I have forgotten to mention someone, so I’m certain I owe drinks to some unmentioned but well-deserving friends, here’s a place where you can fill in your name while patting yourself on the back: _ (the next beer is on me!) Furthermore, I appreciate the generous funding I have received from several bodies, particularly from the German Research Foundation’s Emmy Noether Programme, the University of Konstanz’s Graduate School of Decision Sciences, and the German Excellence Initiative, which helped finance my stay at Harvard University Finally, those who know me at least a little, know that I’m a big fan of Aristotle and Hannah Arendt And those who know Aristotle or Hannah Arendt a little, know about the importance of friendship to connect science with life, philosophy with political science, and society with one’s personal eudaimonía Thus, a big shout out goes to all of my friends around the world who have helped me not to think about my work To name but a few (and again I probably have to buy some drinks), Jan Sahm has always 304 J.L GARRITZMANN ties to switch to their respective second-order preferences Therefore, the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory argues that not only who governs matters, but also how long parties govern for It follows from the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory that countries can conform to one of four regime paths In some countries (e.g., Finland), left parties were continuously strong during the entire post-war period Consequently, they established far-reaching subsidy systems and kept tuition at a minimum In other countries, right-wing parties were predominant during the entire post-war period (e.g., Japan), leading to high tuition fees and low subsidies In a third group of countries (e.g., Germany), left-wing governments were never in government long enough to durably establish subsidies As the subsidy systems could therefore not develop strong positive feedback-effects, subsequent right-wing parties found it easy to retrench the subsidies and to return to the low-tuition– low-subsidy starting point Finally, in some countries (exemplified by the USA), left parties managed to remain in office long enough to install and maintain generous subsidy schemes The resulting positive feedbackeffects forced right-wing parties to switch to their second-order preference of favoring tuition fees as a means to maintain quality, which they established when in power Consequently, this sequence and duration of parties in office can explain the high-tuition–high-subsidy constellation Taken together, I argue that a combination of partisan hypothesis, paying particular attention to the sequence and duration of parties in office, and positive feedback theory in a Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory can explain the historical origins and recent sustainability of the Four Worlds of Student Finance The five empirical chapters of this book probed this Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory in a multi-method design Chapter analyzed the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory across the entire empirical range of the Four Worlds of Student Finance by tracing the developments of four “diverse cases” (Seawright and Gerring 2008)— Finland, Japan, Germany, and the USA over the seven post-war decades Overall, the in-depth analyses revealed strong empirical support for the model The analysis of the Finnish case (Sect 3.6) showed how constantly strong left-wing parties installed and extended generous financial aid systems while they abolished tuition fees to enhance equality of opportunities and socio-economic upward mobility The Japanese case (Sect 3.7) provided a prime example of the opposite constellation by demonstrating how a predominant conservative party has formed the tuition-subsidy system according to its viewpoint: by keeping subsidy spending at a minimum and CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 305 strictly limiting access to its elite public higher education institutions, the predominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) “outsourced” enrollment expansion into the tuition-dependent private sector, resulting in today’s high-tuition–low-subsidy regime In addition, the analysis of the German case in Sect 3.8 demonstrated how not only the partisan composition of government but also the duration of parties in office has played a major role in the development of the Four Worlds of Student Finance Until 1969, right-wing governments dominated German politics and Germany’s development resembled the Japanese LDP’s restricted-access policy quite closely Yet, when the social-liberal coalition took over office and established progressive policies in the 1970s, Germany developed rapidly in the direction of the low-tuition–high-subsidy regime, resembling the Finnish case However, the left government was only in office for a short time, and was plagued moreover by a fierce economic recession; therefore, it did not manage to establish the subsidy system in the long run, and thus failed to develop strong positive feedback-effects among the general public Accordingly, the subsequent Christian democratic government had no problems retrenching the subsidy system in the 1980s, leading Germany back to its low-tuition–low-subsidy starting point, where it has remained ever since The development of the diametrically opposed ideal-typical hightuition–high-subsidy case, the USA, was studied in-depth in Sect 3.9 The analysis showed how and why the Democrats were successful in their aim to establish far-reaching subsidies in the long run: in contrast to some of the other countries studied, they governed much more durably and often controlled unified governments, enabling them to expand subsidies Thus, over time their subsidies generated strong positive feedback-effects on the mass public level and consequently on the level of elected elites, which made it increasingly costly for the Republicans to retrench the subsidies Therefore, the Republicans switched to their second-order preference and allowed tuition fee increases, which were, in turn, impossible for the Democrats to undo Section 3.9 also traced in detail how and why the USA has continued further along this high-tuition–high-subsidy path ever since, making radical change increasingly unlikely These analyses of the four diverse country cases over 70 years provide strong support for my Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory and its assumed mechanism Chapter concluded with a comparative perspective on the case studies, and also discussed the introduction of tuition fees in England 306 J.L GARRITZMANN as a seeming outlier to the model (Sect 3.10) The discussion showed, however, how even this case underpins the implications of the TimeSensitive Partisan Theory Chapter extended these findings to a large-n sample by investigating party positions on higher education finance empirically What parties want when it comes to (higher) education? Do parties hold distinct positions on higher education at all? Who favors tuition fees? Who favors subsidies? Are these issues at all important for parties? The chapter provided an overview on the existing literature regarding these questions and showed that the majority of studies have simply assumed parties to hold certain positions without investigating these empirically To counter this gap, I exploited a new expert survey on party positions across Europe and a genuine dataset on the party positions of all major parties in England over 40 years created by my colleagues and by my colleagues and myself. The main results showed that parties hold distinct positions on higher education finance, clearly differing between the left and the right: parties of the left (i.e., greens, socialists, social democrats, and left-leaning liberals) favor publicly financed higher education, while right-wing parties (i.e., Christian democrats, conservatives, and right-leaning liberals) want a mixture of public and private or even purely private higher education spending Additionally, the analyses confirmed my explanation for the existence of positive feedback-effects by showing that parties’ positions are re-shaped by the existing tuition-subsidy systems: in high-tuition regimes, left parties become less opposed to private education spending over time; in highsubsidy regimes, vice versa, right parties increasingly become more supportive of subsidies A brief case study on party positions in England also confirmed the causal feedback arguments in a time-series analysis over four decades Finally, Chap provided evidence that higher education policies are far from irrelevant for political parties: in fact, parties place a lot more emphasis on higher education policies than skeptical readers might expect Chapter took these findings as the starting point and investigated the impact of political parties—particularly their sequence and duration in office—on the developments of the tuition-subsidy systems in 21 advanced democracies Graphical, cross-sectional, and time-series–cross-sectional analyses revealed strong support for my Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory, as current public spending levels on subsidies and private household education spending were found to be strongly associated with the historical partisan composition of government In countries where left-wing parties had been predominant during the early post-war decades, low-tuition– CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 307 high-subsidy regimes emerged In contrast, right-wing predominance at this time led to high tuition fees and low subsidy spending Moreover, the regressions revealed that governments’ leeway in re-designing the tuitionsubsidy systems has decreased over time: in line with the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory, the government composition during the four decades immediately post-war was a much better predictor of the current tuitionsubsidy systems than the government composition during more recent decades This finding is underpinned further by time-series–cross-section regressions investigating a recent 15-year period (1995–2010) in depth: across different model specifications and two different settings (countryyears and cabinets as the unit of analyses), the results did not reveal any effects of governments on the tuition-subsidy systems during the 15 years to 2010—rather, countries have followed further along their respective paths during recent decades, potentially due to positive feedback-effects as the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory posits The final empirical chapter, Chap 6, turned from the analysis of the historical origins of the Four Worlds of Student Finance towards their recent sustainability Utilizing public opinion survey data for up to 22 countries over two decades, Chap analyzed individual-level preferences towards subsidies and revealed strong support for my Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory in several respects Firstly, underpinning the model’s micro-level assumptions, the results of multi-level ordered logit models indicated that individuals indeed behave in a self-interested manner As such, students strongly favor subsidies, as their parents; in contrast, those paying for the spending and those not expecting to benefit oppose such aid Secondly, the results demonstrated that, even when controlling for respondents’ preferences towards redistribution and education spending in general, respondents’ partisan identifications have a significant effect on their preferences: left-wing voters are much more likely to support subsidies than right-wing voters, which provides the empirical micro-foundation of my Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory Finally, and most importantly, Chap demonstrated that, controlling for a large variety of micro-level determinants, there is evidence for positive feedback-effects on the macro-level In countries with generous subsidy systems (several operationalizations were tested), public support for subsidies is also higher Thus, the argument that positive feedback-effects on the mass-public level make radical departure from the respective regime paths increasingly costly for political parties receives strong empirical backing 308 J.L GARRITZMANN Overall, the various quantitative and qualitative analyses lend considerable support to my Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory on the historical origins and recent sustainability of the Four Worlds of Student Finance By combining arguments from the public policy literature, party politics studies, the political economy of skill formation literature, and public opinion research into a new theoretical model—grounded meta-theoretically in a combination of rational choice and historical institutionalism—and by testing crucial empirically observable implications of this Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory in a multi-method design on the micro-, meso-, and macro-level on the basis of data from various sources and on different units of analyses, this book seeks to offer an encompassing explanation of the political economy of tuition fees and subsidies 7.2 OUTLOOK Naturally, this book has several shortcomings that future research could seek to address, the most crucial of which is—in my view—that due to the lack of comparative long-term time-series data, the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory could only be tested for the larger set of countries somewhat indirectly Future research could thus aim at making longer time-series data available and/or test the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory further in case studies of other countries In relation to this, the book’s focus was on advanced economies (again mostly due to data availability); future research could thus investigate whether the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory holds equally for other countries To give an example, Peralta and Pacheco (2014) analyzed three Latin American countries (Chile, Venezuela, Brazil), and found that political parties did not seem to make a difference in higher education policies in the last decade From a standard partisan hypothesis perspective, this is surprising However, it clearly fits with the predictions of my Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory, as it seems to be the case that past policies have positive feedback-effects that shape the current range of parties’ options For example, Pinochet’s neo-liberal policies in Chile led its higher education system on a high-tuition–lowsubsidy path (similar to Japan’s) that current (left-wing) governments find extremely difficult to break with This and related cases thus seem very worthwhile of studying from the perspective of my Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory (and might even imply that the theory can also travel to non-democracies as the pre-democratic phase also seems to generate path dependencies that affect later democratic governments) CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 309 Secondly, the arguments and empirical analyses of this book are focused on higher education However, we know that different education sectors are of course interrelated and historically have been developed during similar periods and shaped by similar actors (cf., for example, Busemeyer [2015] for vocational and secondary education and Thelen [1999] for vocational education) Accordingly, the relationship between higher education and other education sectors is extremely interesting and could be studied much more explicitly In particular, investigating the relationship between higher education and secondary education (funding) seems worthwhile, as well as probing the connection of higher education and vocational education (funding) While some scholars have already attempted to analyze these interrelations (e.g., Busemeyer 2015; Nikolai and Ebner 2012), much remains to be done, particularly when it comes to higher education finance For example, how does the higher education tuition-subsidy system affect the development of vocational education and training (VET), and how the VET systems, in turn, affect the development of higher education (finance)? How pupils, students, voters, and parties form their preferences, educational decisions, and strategies regarding tradeoffs between higher education and VET? Our understanding of education systems and policies could benefit significantly from combining the presented results on higher education with studies on other education sectors Thirdly, and related to this, future research could connect the analyses of education policies closer with the analyses of social and fiscal policies, as already proposed by the Varieties-of-Capitalism framework (Estevez-Abe et al 2001; Hall and Soskice 2001; Iversen 2005) How policy-makers combine education, social, and fiscal policies to achieve their respective goals? Are education and social policies complementarities or rather as substitutes (Allmendinger and Leibfried 2003; Busemeyer and Nikolai 2010; Heidenheimer 1973; Marshall 1964)? And how does this relationship vary across countries and time? The arguments and results presented here could be placed into a much broader picture Finally, although the topic has reappeared continuously throughout the book, the analyses concentrated on causes and largely disregard the effects of the tuition-subsidy systems Effects, such as persisting or increasing socio-economic and educational inequality, have been discussed, but largely only by relying on existing studies in the (economics of education) literature Yet, many questions on the social, economic, and political consequences of the Four Worlds of Student Finance remain unanswered 310 J.L GARRITZMANN and seem very worthwhile of being addressed in future research (cf also Busemeyer 2015; Garritzmann 2015) 7.3 ZOOMING OUT FROM HIGHER EDUCATION: CAN THE TIME-SENSITIVE PARTISAN THEORY TRAVEL TO OTHER POLICY FIELDS? The major theoretical contribution of this book to the comparative politics and comparative political economy literature more generally is that it develops a leading theory of comparative politics further, namely partisan hypothesis (Hibbs 1977; Alt 1985; Castles 1982; Chappell and Keech 1986; Hicks and Swank 1992; Schmidt 1996; Tufte 1978) Partisan hypothesis is a strong theory, widely used in—to name but a few fields—the public policy literature, welfare state research, studies on party politics, and the comparative political economy literature more generally However, one of the theory’s major shortcomings is that it is difficult to derive expectations for cases that have not been governed constantly by either left-wing or right-wing parties, but instead parties have altered in office In these cases, empirical studies often simply conclude that “parties don’t matter,” as partisan effects are ambiguous and difficult to detect Drawing on key contributions in the historical institutionalist literature, this book argued that for a better understanding of the policy-making process (in these cases) we need to take time and timing, particularly the sequence and duration of parties in office, more seriously That is, I extended partisan hypothesis using a time-dimension to create a TimeSensitive Partisan Theory The Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory makes explicit why time matters, by pointing at the importance of effects of policies on politics via positive feedback-effects, which become increasingly important as the share of the population affected by this policy increases over time The empirical chapters showed that the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory has considerable explanatory power for higher education policies A major question and potential endeavor for future research is thus to probe whether the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory only applies to this single policy field or whether it can explain variation in other (social) policy fields also While it is certainly beyond the scope of this book to test the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory in other policy domains, I believe that the theory could be a powerful tool to also explain the developments in CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 311 other (social) policy fields To test this, future research could apply the proposed theoretical model to the study of (seemingly well-understood) policy areas such as healthcare policies, pension policies, unemployment benefits, (active) labor market policies, early childhood education and care policies, leave policies, or privatization policies in more general terms—to name but a few examples Naturally, the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory has several scope conditions (such as the existence of a functioning democratic party government and the existence of differing party positions) Nonetheless, I believe that the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory could apply well to other fields, as many other (social) policy areas show a similar historical development to higher education policies Often, the countries’ systems and policies looked very similar in the 1940s and 1950s and diverged in different directions only afterwards For example, Rothstein (1998) and Iversen (2005: 15) (among others) noted this in regards to social spending, Immergut (1992) showed that this holds for healthcare systems, and Busemeyer (2015) for secondary—and partly vocational—education systems Policy-makers in the late 1940s and early 1950s often found highly similar circumstances and developed the systems in very different directions during the 1950s–1980s Moreover, it is a crucial finding of the historical institutionalist literature that path dependencies have become increasingly prevalent in the more recent phase and the effects of parties (and other politico-economic actors) have become increasingly difficult to detect in many policy areas The historical institutionalist literature points at positive feedback-effects/ increasing returns to explain these However, in turn, historical institutionalists have often downplayed the role of politico-economic actors, particularly of political parties in shaping the policies that set countries on the respective paths in the first place In this regard, scholars in a rational choice tradition have developed stronger accounts The strength of the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory is that it brings the arguments and findings from both the rational choice perspective and the historical institutionalist perspective together and combines them into a single model that can help make sense of policy-making processes over time In summary, the Time-Sensitive Partisan Theory developed here to explain the historical origins and the recent sustainability of the Four Worlds of Student Finance is a promising perspective that could equally also be applied to explain policy-making processes in other policy domains 312 J.L GARRITZMANN REFERENCES Allmendinger, J., & Leibfried, S (2003) Education and the welfare state: The four worlds of competence production Journal of European Social Policy, 13(1), 63–81 Alt, J. E (1985) Political-parties, world demand, and unemployment: Domestic and international sources of economic-activity American Political Science Review, 79(4), 1016–1040 Busemeyer, M. R (2015) Skills and inequality: Partisan politics and the political economy of education reforms in western welfare states Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Busemeyer, M. R., & Nikolai, R (2010) Education In F. G Castles, S. Leibried, J. Lewis, H. Obinger, & C. Pierson (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of the welfare state Oxford: Oxford University Press Castles, F. G (1982) The impact of parties on public expenditure In F. G Castles (Ed.), The impact of parties: Politics and policies in democratic capitalist states (pp. 21–96) London: Sage Chappell, H.  W., & Keech, W.  R (1986) Party differences in macroeconomic policies and outcomes American Economic Review, 76(2), 71–74 Estevez-Abe, M., Iversen, T., & Soskice, D (2001) Social protection and the formation of skills: A reinterpretation of the welfare state In P.  A Hall & D. Soskice (Eds.), Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage (pp. 145–183) Oxford: Oxford University Press Garritzmann, J.  L (2015) Higher education tuition fees and socio-economic inequality Paper presented at the research workshop in comparative political economy, University of Konstanz Hall, P. A., & Soskice, D (2001) Varieties of capitalism: The institutional foundations of comparative advantage Oxford: Oxford University Press Heidenheimer, A. J (1973) The politics of public education, health and welfare in the USA and Western Europe: How growth and reform potentials have differed British Journal of Political Science, 3(3), 315–340 Hibbs, D.  A (1977) Political parties and macroeconomic policy American Political Science Review, 71, 1467–1487 Hicks, A., & Swank, D (1992) Politics, institutions, and welfare spending in industrialized democracies, 1960–1982 American Political Science Review, 86, 658–674 Immergut, E.  M (1992) Health politics Interests and institutions in Western Europe Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Iversen, T (2005) Capitalism, democracy, and welfare Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Marshall, T.  H (1964) Class, citizenship, and social development Garden City: Doubleday CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK 313 Nikolai, R., & Ebner, C (2012) The link between vocational training and higher education in Switzerland, Austria, and Germany In M.  R Busemeyer & C. Trampusch (Eds.), The political economy of collective skill formation (pp. 234– 258) Oxford: Oxford University Press Peralta, J.  S., & Pacheco, T.  P (2014) Resisting ‘progress’: The new left and higher education in Latin America Political Science and Politics, 47(3), 620–623 Rothstein, B (1998) Just institutions matter: The moral and political logic of the universal welfare state Cambridge: Cambridge University Press Schmidt, M.  G (1996) When parties matter: A review of the possibilities and limits of partisan influence on public policy European Journal of Political Research, 30(2), 155–183 Seawright, J., & Gerring, J (2008) Case selection techniques in case study research: A menu of qualitative and quantitative options Political Research Quarterly, 61(2), 294–308 Thelen, K (1999) Historical institutionalism in comparative politics Annual Review of Political Science, 2, 369–404 Tufte, E (1978) Political control of the economy American Political Science Review, 69, 812–826 INDEX A agenda, 7, 114, 121, 131, 143, 172, 173, 224 Aho, Matti L., 108, 109 Allies/Allied forces, 116, 118–19, 120, 121, 137 asumislisä, 105 B BAföG/Bundesausbildungsförderungsgesetz, 39, 93n9, 133, 143, 145–54, 155, 159, 196n12 Baumol (cost disease argument), 9, 10 Blair, Tony, 193, 194 Bologna/Bologna process, 12 C Clinton, Bill, 185–7 cluster analysis, 57, 78–91, 93n11, 93n13, 95n25 CMP (Comparative Manifestos Project), 210, 231 coordinated market economy, 30, 103 D debt aversion, 1, 21, 72, 189, 273 decentralization, 119, 120, 232 E electoral system, 13, 14, 101, 103 employer(s), 119 employment/unemployment, 110, 126, 165, 168, 170, 252, 281, 284, 311 enrollment, 2, 11, 17–22, 26, 28, 33, 37–41, 46, 92n4, 100, 102, 104, 106–8, 112–14, 116–24, 126–32, 136–40, 142, 147, 159–65, 170–2, 174, 179, 181, 188–90, 195n6, 196n7, 196n9, 210, 216, 227–30, 270, 273, 277, 301, 305 © The Author(s) 2016 J.L Garritzmann, The Political Economy of Higher Education Finance, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-29913-6 315 316 INDEX error-correction model, 250, 253, 261, 265n7 Esping-Andersen, Gøsta, 60 expert survey(s), 5, 42, 211–13, 224, 231, 306 globalization, 7, 8, 15, 252 governance/Higher education governance, 9, 45n5, 68, 85, 115, 210 grants/student grants, 1, 2, 20, 36, 38, 69, 72–7, 78, 84, 86, 89, 90, 93n8, 95n25, 105, 108–11, 125, 130, 132, 134, 138, 145, 147, 148, 151, 159, 162, 163, 165, 170, 171, 173–88, 190, 193, 228–30, 243, 248, 252, 253, 276, 289 F federalism/federalist, 11, 156 feedback effect(s), 24, 99, 182, 186–8, 219–22, 227–32, 275–7 negative feedback effect(s), 29, 178, 276, 279, 291 positive feedback effect(s), 4–6, 25, 26, 28–30, 32, 33, 35–7, 41–3, 106, 109, 111, 112 134, 153, 154, 157–60, 162, 169, 171, 174, 177–9, 181, 188, 192–4, 209–11, 221–3, 237–9, 241, 249, 253, 257, 261, 262, 267–94, 303–5, 308, 310, 311 financial crisis, 124, 187, 188 Finland, 1, 5, 8, 23, 26, 42, 60, 74, 76, 84, 89–92, 94n20, 95n25, 103, 104–13, 115, 136, 138, 141, 147, 159, 160, 191, 195n6, 220, 237, 304 fiscal austerity, 8, 10, 106, 114, 129, 302 further education, 7, 210, 228 I inequality, 7, 38, 41, 126, 132, 181, 189, 224, 233n4, 270, 302, 309 International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), 43, 268–9, 270, 277, 280, 281, 284, 292 issue emphasis, 209, 213, 214, 223–6, 233n5 G Germany, 2, 3, 5, 8, 9, 12, 23, 25, 27, 39, 42, 60, 61, 65, 68, 70, 78, 92, 93n9, 99, 103, 108, 109, 113, 118, 133–60, 165, 190–2, 195n6, 195n7, 196n9, 250, 304, 305 G.I. Bill, 26, 138, 165, 168–75, 192, 197n15 gender, 277, 284 J Japan, 2, 3, 5, 8, 10, 14, 18, 23, 26, 42, 65, 68, 69, 74, 76, 78, 83, 89, 92, 93n12, 99, 103–4, 108, 109, 113–32, 134, 136, 137, 190, 191, 195n6, 237, 240, 245, 248, 279, 304, 308 Johnson, Lyndon B., 173, 174, 187, 197n17 H high school(s), 39, 40, 119, 121 historical institutionalism, 6, 59, 308 INDEX K Kennedy, John F., 173 Kohl, Helmut, 25, 134, 135, 151–4, 155, 159 L Land/Länder, 146 liberal market economy, 103 loans/student loans, 1, 2, 20, 36, 58, 69, 72, 74–7, 84, 86, 89, 90, 93n8, 105, 108–11, 115, 130, 132–4, 140, 141, 148, 151, 155, 159, 160, 162, 168, 170, 173–6, 180–8, 193, 196n10, 212, 229, 243, 248, 252, 253, 289 M majoritarian voting system, 13, 14, 103 manifesto(s)/party manifestos, 5, 42, 111, 228–30 Merkel, Angela, 159 multi-level model, 43, 269, 278, 289 multi-method design, 5, 6, 301, 304, 308 N Nakasone, Yasuhiro, 129–30, 131 New Deal, 168 norms, 31, 274 O Obama, Barack, 160, 186–8 opintotuki, 105, 109, 195n4 opposition(s), 25, 43, 106, 116, 140, 143, 145, 150, 151, 158, 174, 175, 186, 187, 228–30, 273, 290 opposition power, 186 317 P partisan theory/hypothesis, 3–6, 14–27, 36–7, 100, 110, 209, 237–65 party/parties agrarians/agrarian parties, 106, 109, 216, 225 Christian democrat(s)/Christian democratic parties, 16, 17, 21, 25, 133, 134, 137, 138, 144, 159, 192, 215–17, 219–21, 231, 249, 252, 261, 305, 306 conservatives/conservative parties, 3, 12, 16, 21, 43, 70, 74, 103, 108–11, 113–16, 119–21, 122, 123, 126, 128, 129–32, 135, 137–45, 148, 150–2, 155, 157, 159, 168–9, 171, 173, 176, 181, 185, 191, 193, 194, 196n9, 216, 217, 219–21, 227, 229–30, 231, 240, 241, 244–9, 252, 253, 261, 280, 304, 306 greens/green party, 107, 154, 216, 217, 219, 221, 225, 226, 231, 306 liberals/liberal parties, 12, 16, 17, 21, 70, 103, 113–14, 121–9, 134, 138, 142, 193, 215, 216–21, 227–31, 305, 306, 308 nationalists/nationalistic parties, 216, 225 regionalalists/regional parties, 225 social democrat(s)/social democratic parties, 15, 16, 25, 70, 106, 107–9, 116, 134, 137, 144–6, 150, 171, 215–17, 219, 221, 225, 227, 231, 249, 252, 261, 306 socialists/socialist parties, 107, 216, 217, 219, 221, 224, 231, 252, 261, 306 path dependencies, 4, 24, 28, 29, 45n7, 119, 121, 262, 292, 308, 311 318 INDEX Pierson, Paul, 23–4, 28–9, 31, 46n11, 276 pre-primary education, 7, 210 primary education, 119, 210 proportional representation, 13, 14, 103 public debt, 15, 150, 182, 252, 253 public opinion, 6, 28, 29, 30, 32–4, 102, 110, 153, 154, 157, 158, 169, 170, 182, 197n15, 276, 307, 308 skills, 6–7, 9, 19, 90, 120, 144, 210, 217, 274, 292, 308 social investment, social policy/social policies, 44n2, 151, 160, 217, 272, 275, 278, 309–11 socio-economic strata (SES), 20–2, 38, 40, 72, 147, 155, 164, 170–1, 174, 183, 189, 190, 215, 228, 301, 302 stratification, 142 Q quality (of higher education), 21, 22, 25, 120, 126, 162, 181, 216, 227, 229, 303 T tax/taxes/taxation, 13, 16, 20, 21, 31, 33, 36, 92, 105, 115, 144, 148, 150–2, 155, 162, 176, 180–8, 194, 224, 233n4, 273, 275, 277, 279, 281 time-series–cross-section regressions, 5, 13, 14, 43, 238, 239, 249–61, 306, 307 time-sensitive partisan theory, 4–6, 23–7, 35, 37, 42–4, 59, 99, 110, 112, 121, 133, 154, 157, 158, 160, 189–90, 192–5, 196n9, 227, 230, 237–65, 267, 268, 285, 289, 292, 301, 303–8, 310–11 trade-off(s)/policy trade-off(s), 278, 279, 309 type of capitalism coordinated market economy, 30, 103 liberal market economy, 103 R rational choice, 5, 6, 28, 30, 31, 32, 268, 270, 276, 308, 311 Reagan, Ronald, 38, 151, 177, 180, 181–4, 188 redistribution, 7, 15, 16, 20, 41, 45n7, 182, 269, 270, 275, 278, 284–6, 292, 307 risk aversion, 21, 189, 273 Roosevelt, Frank D., 168–72 S saliency theory/saliency theoretical, 111, 225 Saukkonen, Jussi, 108 Schröder, Gerhard, 135, 146, 154–6, 159 secondary education, 13, 119, 144, 154, 210, 309 self-interest, 269, 272–4, 280–6, 292, 307 service economy, 9, 66 U union(s)/labor unions, 105, 139 United Kingdom/UK, 2, 60, 61, 66, 68, 76, 83, 89, 192, 219, 249 INDEX United States of America/USA, 1–3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 15, 23, 26, 27, 30, 38, 42, 44–5n5, 68, 77, 83, 84, 89, 92, 99, 103, 104, 113, 116, 118, 136, 138, 160–89, 191, 195n6, 197n18, 213, 237, 238, 249, 304, 305 V Virolainen, Johannes, 109 vocational education and training (VET), 7, 30, 145, 271, 274, 309 319 W wage(s), 10, 20, 41, 126, 141, 224, 226, 231 welfare, 66, 160, 184, 185, 249, 252 welfare states/welfare regimes, 6, 7, 12, 13, 70, 74, 79, 90, 103, 141, 211, 214–15, 231, 239, 261, 280, 310 .. .The Political Economy of Higher Education Finance Julian L. Garritzmann The Political Economy of Higher Education Finance The Politics of Tuition Fees and Subsidies... Fig 3.2 Fig 3.3 OF FIGURES The Four Worlds of Student Finance Schematic depiction of the different paths of the origins of the Four Worlds of Student Finance Schematic summary of the feedback-argument... for higher education) in 2002 Regarding higher education, they find that many factors play a role: the level of private education spending is higher the lower the level of public disbursement, the