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Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com www.ebook777.com Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com HONG K NG under CHINESE RULE Economic Integration and Political Gridlock 8686_9789814447669_tp.indd 1/3/13 12:22 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com This page intentionally left blank www.ebook777.com b1500_FM.indd ii 3/5/2013 2:42:09 PM Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com HONG K NG under CHINESE RULE Economic Integration and Political Gridlock Editors Zheng Yongnian East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore Yew Chiew Ping East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore World Scientific NEW JERSEY • 8686_9789814447669_tp.indd LONDON • SINGAPORE • BEIJING • SHANGHAI • HONG KONG • TA I P E I • CHENNAI 1/3/13 12:22 PM Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com Published by World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224 USA office: 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601 UK office: 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Hong Kong under Chinese rule : economic integration and political gridlock /editors, Zheng Yongnian, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Yew Chiew Ping, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore, Singapore pages cm ISBN 9789814447669 Hong Kong (China) Economic conditions 1997– Hong Kong (China) Politics and government 1997– China Economic integration I Zheng, Yongnian II Yew, Chiew Ping DS796.H757H668 2013 951.2506 dc23 2012049836 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2013 by World Scientific Publishing Co Pte Ltd All rights reserved This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher For photocopying of material in this volume, please pay a copying fee through the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA In this case permission to photocopy is not required from the publisher In-house Editor: DONG Lixi Typeset by Stallion Press Email: enquiries@stallionpress.com Printed in Singapore www.ebook777.com Lixi - Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule.pmd 3/4/2013, 1:34 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com Preface The year 2012 marked the 15th year of Hong Kong’s return to China Close to one third of 50 years has passed, the period within which Hong Kong’s lifestyle shall see no change, as promised by China’s former leader Deng Xiaoping Yet at this juncture, an opinion poll shows that more Hong Kongers have lost confidence in governance by “one country, two systems” Why is this so? How has Hong Kong changed over the past 15 years? In what ways has it remained unchanged? What challenges lie ahead for both Hong Kong and Beijing? The timely publication of this edited volume by the East Asian Institute, a close watcher of events in Hong Kong, will help to address these important questions and puzzles The Institute’s past and current analyses on Hong Kong have been updated and organised into three broad categories spanning the city’s economic, social and political developments since the handover The sequencing of the chapters reflects a recurring theme: that rapid economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China has not been accompanied by political consolidation Part I “Integration and Interdependence” opens with an insightful contribution from Wang and Wong that provides a vantage point to interpret and understand Hong Kong’s evolution since 1997 The authors ask a pointed question that is still valid and highly significant in today’s context: “Can Hong Kong continue to operate a growing economic symbiosis with China while keeping a big political and social distance from it…?” Their observation that Chinese officials had scrupulously refrained from interfering in Hong Kong’s affairs in the first two years after the handover also contrasts starkly to the situation today, as other contributors have noted in subsequent chapters v b1500_FM.indd v 4/9/2013 6:11:00 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com vi Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Chapters and offer a comprehensive overview of China’s Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) with Hong Kong Economic integration between the city and mainland China was underway as early as 2003, according to Wong, when CEPA was signed to help revive the Hong Kong economy reeling from the aftermath of the severe acute respiratory syndrome The trade pact was also a carrot dangled by Beijing to placate disenchanted Hong Kongers who took to the streets in the year’s landmark July protest Since CEPA was first implemented in 2004, nine supplements had been added Wong and Zhang astutely note that deepening and broadening economic interactions have been mutually beneficial as Hong Kong investment in China also created jobs, on top of transferring knowledge and management techniques to the Mainland In Chapter 4, Zhang and Tong write about how Hong Kong swiftly countered the 2008 economic downturn with a series of measures and with the support of Beijing However, the authors observe that “closer integration with the Mainland also means tougher competition and higher risks from a mainland economic downturn” Indeed, economic integration between the city and the Mainland is not entirely a rosy picture Crossboundary projects unexpectedly evoked resistance from certain strata of the Hong Kong society As Yu writes in his chapter, “the cross-regional infrastructure construction such as the Hong Kong-Guangdong high-speed rail construction has triggered strong opposition and protests, and aroused public debate in Hong Kong” In tandem with closer economic integration with the Mainland, Hong Kong experienced governance crises from Tung to Tsang, and mounting social discontent especially from the year 2011 Part II “Governance Crises and Social Discontent” traces and sheds light on these developments Zheng and Tok have, remarkably, highlighted inherent contradictions in Hong Kong’s post-handover political institutions that have caused a gridlock besetting the city till this very day “The power of the office of chief executive is endowed by Beijing and is thus accountable to Beijing, whereas the LegCo enjoys greater popular-based legitimacy and is more answerable to the local population”, argue the authors “This contradiction becomes more acute when the LegCo lacks the institutional power to check and balance the office of chief executive under the Basic Law” In Chapter 7, Lee and Chan succinctly capture the predicament of Donald Tsang, Hong Kong’s second chief executive, that resulted in a worsening governance crisis as his term drew to a close The authors point out, www.ebook777.com b1500_FM.indd vi 4/9/2013 6:11:00 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com Preface vii “If Tsang yields to the local demand for popular election of the CE and the Legislative Council and makes promises about the timetable, he would be under the suspicion of colluding with the opposition…if he continues to reject democratisation and arouse strong protest from the opposition to the extent that a mass demonstration is staged, he would be deemed incompetent in the eyes of the central government in the handling of the opposition” The remaining chapters in Part II deal with the fissures in post-handover Hong Kong society that have culminated in pervasive social discontent Chapter and Chapter contributed by Chou, and Kwong and Yu respectively centre on the Hong Kong identity, which does not sit comfortably with the Chinese national identity While Chou’s chapter provides a concise overview of the evolution of the Hong Kong identity, Kwong and Yu’s contribution is an in-depth historical study of the same issue Both chapters point out the irony that economic integration appears to have “backfired” and estranged Hong Kongers from their mainland counterparts In Chapter 10, Yew details the debates and contention between different groups in the fight for a wage floor in laissez-faire Hong Kong Despite a yawning rich-poor gap and widespread social approval of a statutory minimum wage, it took Hong Kong more than a decade to legislate it, not least because of opposition from legislators in the business sector This apparent disconnect between Hong Kong’s political institutions and the populace is a central theme in Chapter 11 by Kwong and Yew The authors observe that Hong Kongers have misgivings over their chief executive who lacks popular mandate and whose power emanates from Beijing and a small electorate dominated by pro-Beijing business interests, so much so that 15 years after the handover, public confidence in the “one country, two systems” model of governance has attenuated and social disgruntlement over unresolved problems runs high Beijing’s wish to bring Hong Kong politically and socially closer to China with economic integration has not been realised Part III “Electoral Reforms and Democratisation” focuses on how Hong Kongers’ demands for universal suffrage and a representative government have been frustrated by the impasse in political reforms Zheng and Tok, in Chapter 12, argue that following the political and social tensions in early 2004, Beijing “seemed to have become more determined to exercise its political influence over Hong Kong’s democratisation” This was apparent in the National People’s Congress’ decree to rule out direct election in 2007/2008 b1500_FM.indd vii 4/9/2013 6:11:00 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com viii Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Three years later, in 2010, government-proposed political reforms on the 2012 election of the chief executive and the Legislative Council gained passage in the Legislature for the first time since the handover Chapter 13 scrutinises the reform package and its implications for Hong Kong’s democratisation Noting the lack of a clear roadmap to universal suffrage, the author asserts, “There is a pressing need for bolder and more resolute political reforms in Hong Kong — towards a government elected and empowered by the people and a legislature that is not tilted towards the protection of special interests — not least to prevent existing societal divisions from deepening.” Hong Kong’s elections from 2011 to 2012 are analysed in the remaining three chapters In Chapter 14, Yew disputes the notion that the pandemocrats suffered a rout in the District Council election of November 2011 She suggests that results of the 2012 Legislative Council election would be telling of whether a new political landscape in terms of greater popular support for the pro-establishment camp is evolving The chief executive election in March 2012 shows how Beijing has shifted from a hands-off approach, as noted in this book’s opening chapter, to greater intervention in the governance of Hong Kong In Chapter 16, Yew highlights the “controversial nature” of the chief executive election “in which the selection of Hong Kong’s political leader was entirely dependent on the machinations of Beijing and the power tussles between factions in the electorate” The author also opines that the way Leung Chun-ying came to power, propped up by Beijing and in an unfavourable socio-political climate, means that his governing difficulties will be compounded This was proven true in the subsequent months leading up to September’s fiercely contested Legislative Council election which was covered in Chapter 16 The authors argue that the election results point to a shifting political landscape in Hong Kong with “a reshuffling in the prodemocracy camp, an increasingly fragmented legislature and a society moving towards a more contentious direction” It appears that Leung and his administration will face tough times down the road The governing conundrum that had beleaguered Leung’s predecessor will not abate and policy impasse may further erode public trust and confidence in the government In addition, Leung will be less able to the bidding of Beijing As a weak government, his administration has neither the necessary legislative support nor the popular mandate to bulldoze ahead with controversial policies such as the introduction of National Education and the legislation of Article 23 www.ebook777.com b1500_FM.indd viii 4/9/2013 6:11:00 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com Preface ix What can Beijing to end Hong Kong’s political gridlock? As past experiences show, further economic integration between Hong Kong and mainland China is not the solution Scholars and experts have long attributed Hong Kong’s governance challenges after the handover to institutional problems, one of which is the electoral systems which produce a leader with weak popular mandate and an increasingly divided legislature Allowing universal suffrage may not solve all the problems but will considerably ease Hong Kong’s governance challenges After going through several elections, Beijing’s more artful grasp of the rules and elaborations of electioneering should boost its confidence in holding a direct election for the chief executive in 2017 Garnering over two-thirds legislative support for the method to elect the chief executive is a daunting but not impossible task, as long as it is not designed to give pro-Beijing candidates an edge over the pan-democrats The ball is now in Beijing’s court b1500_FM.indd ix 4/9/2013 6:11:00 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com 260 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Table How Votes Translate into Seats (Hong Kong Island GC) Party List Votes Non-partisan: Hui Ching-on Seats Remaining Seats Total (1st round) votes (2nd round) seats 2,980 2,980 0 Democratic: SIN Chung-kai (+5 others) 40,558 40,558 1 Independent: Lo Wing-lok 16,900 16,900 0 People Power: Christopher LAU Gar-hung (+2 others) 18,667 18,667 0 DAB: Christopher CHUNG Shu-kun (+5 others) 33,901 33,901 1 Independent: NG Wing-chun 422 422 0 Labour: Cyd Ho Sau-lan (+2 others) 31,523 31,523 1 NPP: Regina Ip LAU Suk-yee (+2 others) 30,289 30,289 1 FTU: WONG Kwok-hing (+4 others) 27,336 27,336 1 Civic: CHAN Ka-lok + Tanya CHAN 70,475 23,223 343 343 0 Nonpartisan: Ho Kar-tai DAB: Jasper TSANG Yok-sing 36,517 36,517 1 Liberal: Miriam LAU Kin-yee (+2 others) 17,686 17,686 0 3,169 3,169 0 330,766 — LSD: Avery NG Man-yuen Total Hare Quota = 330,766 votes/7 seats = 47,252 votes Source: (accessed 11 September 2012) Compiled by Yew Chiew Ping is a veteran Its strategy is to bank on the popularity of the second candidate and gather sufficient votes to secure two seats Unfortunately, it fell short of 4,000 votes to qualify for a second seat As a result, 23,223 votes went down the drain Tactical errors aside, the split within the pro-democracy camp had also accounted for its poor showing Since the fallout among the pan-democrats over the 2010 political reform bill, the more radical People Power has vowed to make the Democratic Party, which had taken part in closed-door negotiations with the central government over the bill and eventually voted for its passage, pay for its action through [losing] votes In November 2011’s DC election, People Power pitted its members against those of the www.ebook777.com b1500_Ch-16.indd 260 3/5/2013 2:41:53 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com The 2012 Legislative Council Election 261 Democratic Party and dealt a severe blow to it.10 This time, People Power had urged supporters to boycott the poll for the super DC seats There is evidence that a significant number of voters might have heeded the call and the election for the super seats yielded 80,000 blank or spoiled votes, which constituted 5% of 1.67 million votes in total.11 In addition, Albert Ho, chairman of the Democratic Party who resigned after the election to take responsibility for his party’s poor showing, won the last (fifth) seat in the super DC election by a slim margin This may be a result of voters penalising him for his leading role in the passage of the controversial political reform bill in 2010 Overall, the pan-democrats won three out of five seats in the super DC election Their vote share of 50.7%, however, was even lower than their overall vote share in the GC election Democratic Party is the biggest loser in this GC election and yet it secured two super DC seats Analysts suggest that pro-democracy supporters, who did not want the seats to go to proestablishment candidates, might have grudgingly voted for the Democratic Party In contrast to the dismal performance of the Democratic Party, the more “radical” parties within the pro-democracy camp, the League of Social Democrats (LSD) and People Power, won 14.6% votes in total, scoring a hefty 44.6% growth in vote share from 2008 in comparison to the Civic Party (+2.9%), DAB (−12.2%) and the Democratic Party (−37.7%).12 The total vote share of LSD and People Power even exceeded that of the Civic Party (14.1%) and that of the Democratic Party (13.7%) (Figure 2) This signalled that a growing group of pro-democracy supporters preferred the more contentious approach of the two parties to the more cautious and conservative approach of the moderates.13 10 “‘Wujiandao’ juji tongdao, fanmin xuanmin jieshu” (“Infighting within camp makes pan-democrats and voters the losers”), available at (accessed September 2012); “Xianggang lifahui xuanju qian minzhupai fenlie, minzhudang gaoji” (“Split in pro-democracy camp before LegCo election leaves Demo-cratic Party”), available at (accessed September 2012) 11 “Fanmin jinhuo 51% chaoqu xuanpiao” 12 Qingbao (Sky Post), 11 September 2012; Xianggang fazhan baogao 2012 (Annual Report on Development of Hong Kong 2012) Social Sciences Academic Press (China) 2012, pp 127–129 13 “Fanmin jijinpai taitou, renli sheminlian dashou zhichi” (“The rise of radicals among pandemocrats: great support for People Power and LSD”), available at (accessed 12 September 2012) b1500_Ch-16.indd 261 3/5/2013 2:41:53 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com 262 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Figure Vote Shares of Selected Political Groups Source: Qingbao (Sky Post), 11 September 2012; Xianggang fazhan baogao 2012 (Annual Report on Development of Hong Kong 2012) Social Sciences Academic Press (China) 2012, pp 127–129 Prepared by Kwong Kin-ming Veteran DAB politician Jasper Tsang opined that mud-slinging across and within each camp had intensified under the electoral system that promotes the splintering of parties and the carving up of party lists He observed that competition was stiffer within the pro-establishment camp this time For example, the Hong Kong Federation of Trade Unions (HKFTU) had gone solo in this election instead of combining its party lists with the DAB This made vote optimisation trickier.14 Skillful as the pro-establishment parties were in optimising votes, they too had committed tactical errors in the contest for the super DC seats, resulting in the loss of the fifth seat to the pan-democrats On the day before 14 Interview with Jasper Tsang in Hong Kong on September 2012 by Kwong Kin-ming www.ebook777.com b1500_Ch-16.indd 262 3/5/2013 2:41:53 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com The 2012 Legislative Council Election 263 the poll, Chan Yuen-han, a veteran of the HKFTU who was seen as a “shooin” in the election, angrily lambasted her ally the DAB for its “dirty tricks” to divert her votes to a DAB candidate Some also suggest that the surprising loss of DAB veteran Lau Kong-wah was due to a miscalculation that channelled too many votes from him to the DAB newcomer Shifting Political Landscape The mixed results of this election are indicative of a shifting political landscape in Hong Kong, with a reshuffling in the pro-democracy camp, an expanded DAB in a fragmented LegCo, and a society moving towards a more contentious direction If the election outcome is a scorecard for the Democratic Party which supported electoral reforms in 2010, then voters had also sent a clear message of their disapproval to the Democratic Party, in particular former party chief Albert Ho The Civic Party, which secured five GC seats through this election, has now overtaken the Democratic Party to become the leading pro-democracy party in the GC In the 2011 November DC election, the Civic Party, which championed the right of abode of domestic helpers and thus upset its middleclass supporters, suffered a 3.5% drop in vote share That it had rebounded from its performance in the DC election and even clocked a slight increase in its vote share from the 2008 LegCo election shows that its moderate approach still appeals to a core group of pro-democracy supporters Nonetheless, as mentioned earlier, more aggressive parties are also gaining grounds in the pro-democracy camp Furthermore, two candidates whose campaign slogans advocated a more protectionist, “locals-first” approach and objected to the “Mainlandisation” of Hong Kong — Gary Fan of the Neo-Democrats and Claudia Mo of the Civic Party — also made forays into the LegCo for the first time.15 Taken as a whole, it appears that more pro-democracy supporters are agitating for change in the modus operandi of the pan-democrats This is consistent with how the Hong Kong civil society is evolving to become more contentious and less afraid of changing the status quo, as evident in the frequency as well as the scale of protests in Hong Kong over the 15 See their respective pages available at www.ebook777.com 264 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule past year The younger generation of Hong Kongers is less averse to seemingly “radical” forms of contention, such as filibustering in the LegCo and hunger strike.16 The striking performance of LSD, People Power and prolocal candidates amid the overall poor showing of the pan-democrats indicates that this shifting political orientation is likely to become a trend with generational change in Hong Kong (Figure 2) This shifting political orientation is also a response to as well as a result of the current situation in Hong Kong, characterised by pervasive disgruntlement over socio-economic issues like high property prices, yawning rich-poor gap, the influx of Mainlanders competing for limited resources, which to some extent overlaps with the resistance against mainland China’s increasing encroachment upon Hong Kong’s autonomy The streams of social discontent have conflated into a few notable phenomena in the 15th year of the city’s return to China: a low level of confidence and trust in both the Hong Kong government and Beijing, the waxing of the Hong Kong local identity and the waning of the Chinese national identity, and growing anxiety over the “one country, two systems” model of governance.17 Widespread unhappiness and suspicion also beset the new CE CY Leung, seen as leaning too close to Beijing Leung was dubbed as a CE characterised by “three-lows” from the way he came to power in the March’s election, with low public support, low votes and low unifying power Unlike his predecessors, he was inaugurated on July with no honeymoon period and has been a lame duck government right from the beginning of his term.18 The turnout in annual protests since Leung became the CE-elect also broke records, signalling Hong Kongers’ growing unhappiness with Beijing and the government on the whole Both the June Tiananmen vigil and the July protest saw the biggest turnout, the latter in eight years.19 16 Sun Gaofeng, “Xianggang shehui de bian yu minzhupai de bubian” (“The changing Hong Kong society and the unchanging pro-democracy camp”), available at (accessed 10 September 2012) 17 Kwong Kin-ming et al, “Hong Kong in China: 15 Years after the Handover” 18 Yew Chiew Ping and Kwong Kin-ming, “The Hong Kong Chief Executive Election and its Aftermath”, EAI Background Brief No 713, 13 April 2012 19 “Hong Kong Leader Heckled a Week after Taking Office,” Channel News Asia, July 2012, available at (accessed September 2012); Alexis Lai, “Record Crowds Attend Hong Kong Tiananmen Vigil”, CNN, June 2012, available at (accessed September 2012) www.ebook777.com b1500_Ch-16.indd 264 3/5/2013 2:41:54 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com The 2012 Legislative Council Election 265 Figure Rating of Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying Source: HKUPOP, available at (accessed September 2012) The new CE’s credibility and integrity were further dented by a series of scandals Barely two weeks after he and his team took office, one of his top officials Mak Chai-kwong was arrested by the city’s anti-corruption agency ICAC for swindling housing allowances and was forced to resign Leung himself was also dogged by allegations of illegal structures in his mansion — ironically the same issue that brought about the fall of his rival Henry Tang in the CE election.20 The August 2012 poll by HKUPOP shows that the public rating of Leung had fallen below 50%, the lowest since he won the CE election in March 2012 (Figure 3) According to HKUPOP, the percentage of respondents who object to Leung being the CE rose to 48% and he is most unpopular among young respondents between 18 and 29 years old; more than 45% are unhappy with the HKSAR government performance, most of whom fall into the 30–49 age group.21 Considering that young Hong 20 “HK Leader in Hot Soup over Illegal Extensions in His Luxury Home”, Channel News Asia, 16 July 2012, available at (accessed September 2012) 21 “Gangda mindiao Liangzhenying minwang diezhi xindi” (“New low for Leung’s public approval rating according to HKUPOP”), available at (accessed September 2012) b1500_Ch-16.indd 265 3/5/2013 2:41:54 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com 266 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Kong voters between 18 and 30 years old only constituted 17.2% of total registered voter population in 2012, in contrast to the bulk of the voters above 51 years old (48%), young vociferous critics of the government are likely to make their voice heard through more effective platforms such as protests other than voting for pro-democracy candidates into the LegCo.22 Political Gridlock and Governance Crisis Despite the DAB’s dominance in the LegCo with its total win of 13 seats in this election, Leung’s governance of Hong Kong in the next five years is likely to be fraught with difficulties As of now, his governing conundrum is already evident in the way his government’s restructuring and expansion plans had been stalled due to filibustering by a handful of pro-democracy legislators in the LegCo.23 Besides Leung’s own deficit in credibility and integrity leading to his low public approval rate, the government’s strength is attenuated by institutional problems in the LegCo, namely, the fragmentation of the LegCo into many small parties, and a disjuncture between the vote share and the seat count of the pro-democracy camp, both resulting from the design of the electoral system The current “party list proportional representation” system, which succeeds the “single-seat first-past-the-post” system used before 1997, is crafted to curb the dominance of the Democratic Party in LegCo In 1995, the Democratic Party swept 12 out of 20 directly elected LegCo seats whereas the pro-Beijing DAB and Liberal Party won three seats altogether This led the pro-Beijing Wenweipo to comment that the electoral system was “unfair” and intended to allow “one-party dominance” by the Democratic Party Qian Qichen, then China’s vice premier and foreign minister also criticised the electoral system as unfair.24 In changing the electoral system to the current one, Beijing has successfully maintained its executive dominance over 22 Data available at (accessed 10 September 2012) 23 “Xianggang xinzhengfu yingchuang sanguan qiugaizu guoguan, re minyi fandui” (“Hong Kong’s new government went ahead with restructuring amid opposition from the public), available at (accessed September 2012) 24 See Ma Ngok and Ivan Choy, Xuanju zhidu de zhengzhi xiaoguo (“The Political Effects of the Electoral System”) (Hong Kong: City University of Hong Kong Press 2003), p 23 www.ebook777.com b1500_Ch-16.indd 266 3/5/2013 2:41:54 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com The 2012 Legislative Council Election 267 the legislature by constraining the Democratic Party’s dominance in LegCo However, a new set of problems has evolved The party list proportional representation system has fragmented the LegCo Under the single-seat single-vote system, a candidate has to win the support of the majority in order to secure a seat in LegCo This means a candidate has to choose a middle path in his stance on various issues to appeal to most of the voters In contrast, under the current system, the threshold for getting elected is lower and “radical” parties can secure seats by appealing to a niche group of supporters such as the angry youths, the homosexuals and so on.25 This encourages the splintering of political parties, which extends to both the pro-democracy and the pro-Beijing camps over the years For instance, splintered parties and groups among the pan-democrats include the Labour Party founded in 2011, People Power that was established in 2011 by former LSD members, and the Neo-Democrats which was established by former Democratic Party members From the pro-Beijing camp, the Economic Synergy was formed by breaking away from the Liberal Party, the pro-middle class interests New People’s Power was founded in 2011, and there are also a number of pro-Beijing independent candidates As a result, there are now 17 political parties and groups in the legislature, not including a number of independents leaning towards either camp This encumbered the work of the executive because of the arduousness in negotiating with the diverse groups even within the pro-establishment camp in order to secure the passage of a motion in LegCo (Figure 4).26 The presence of 13 legislators — including five Liberal Party members, three members of Economic Synergy and five independents in the FCs — who are loyalists of Leung’s rival Henry Tang may pose additional problems too.27 Hong Kong’s proximity to mainland China and its rule of law system have fostered its strategic importance as an offshore destination or a transit 25 Interview with Regina Ip in Hong Kong on September 2012 by Kwong Kin-ming See also “Zhuanfang Cai Ziqiang: Jijinpai taitou, deguo moshi shi chulu” (“Interview with Ivan Choy: The rise of radicals and the German model as a way out”), 27 August 2012, available at (accessed 10 September 2012) 26 Ivan Choy, “Gangshi bili daibiaozhi ruhe dizao sifenwunlie zhengju” (“How Hong Kong style proportional representation creates a fragmented political scene”), 23 August 2012, available at (accessed 10 September 2012) 27 Shen Shuaiqing, “Zhengtan chuge shangchang, yihui gushi xian xinye” (“Rookie politicians make debut and turn new page in the story of LegCo”), 12 September 2012, available at (accessed 12 September 2012) b1500_Ch-16.indd 267 3/5/2013 2:41:54 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com 268 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Figure Sources: The Basic Law; “Legislative Council Procedures”, available at (accessed September 2012) Prepared by Yew Chiew Ping point for the financial assets of China’s privileged class Because Chinese tycoons with assets stowed away in Hong Kong need their own loyalists to safeguard their interests, they may have fuelled the proliferation of smaller parties.28 A veteran pan-democrat also observes that there has been a change in the central government’s attitude from 2004 It no longer concentrates on nurturing and propping up a single big party like the DAB but has been diversifying its attention and investment in various political groups and individuals In this way the various pro-establishment groups can check each other, thus forestalling a runaway situation in which a single dominant proestablishment party defies Beijing’s wishes.29 28 According to Bloomberg, even the next Chinese President Xi Jinping has stashed his wealth in Hong Kong See “Xi Jinping Millionaire Relations Reveal Fortunes of Elite”, 29 June 2012, available at (accessed September 2012) See also Sun Gaofeng, “Xianggang shehui de bian yu minzhupai de bubian” 29 Interview with Leung Kwok-hung in Hong Kong on September 2012 by Kwong Kin-ming www.ebook777.com b1500_Ch-16.indd 268 3/5/2013 2:41:54 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com The 2012 Legislative Council Election 269 Apart from the fragmentation of the LegCo, the incongruity between the executive and the legislature also adds to governance difficulties Although the pan-democrats obtained a majority vote share, they only garnered 27 seats in total Hong Kong’s political system since the handover has produced an executive that lacks popular mandate and a semi-democratically elected legislature empowered by the people Yet the legislature that has greater legitimacy is unable to check the power of the executive.30 The pandemocrats not hold enough seats to push for new policies and can, at the most, veto certain government motions and bills as shown in Figure This means that the will of the majority cannot be reflected through their representatives in LegCo, and the disgruntled will make their voice heard through protests and other channels to pressure the government Moreover, even pro-establishment parties cannot totally cast aside popular opinion On the controversial National Education Plan, for instance, the pro-establishment Liberal Party and prominent DAB members such as Jasper Tsang also expressed reservations, proposing to postpone its introduction in schools.31 In sum, there will be foreseeable difficulty in getting the necessary support for government policies due to opposition both within and beyond the LegCo This will trigger a vicious cycle as policy impasse leads to greater public dissatisfaction and lower confidence in the government Leung had recently announced a series of populist measures to mitigate Hong Kongers’ unhappiness with his government The new government will spend HK$8 billion in social welfare such as increasing the amount of handouts to the elderly and subsidising the construction of youth hostels for NGOs.32 However, there is a limit to how far the government can “buy” popularity and win trust through populist measures According to a politician and a scholar interviewed, the business interests dominating the FCs will not support such a move because they may have to foot the bill once the reserves are depleted.33 30 Eliza Lee, “Governing Post-Colonial Hong Kong: Institutional Incongruity, Governance Crisis, and Authoritarianism”, Asian Survey, Vol 39, No (1999), pp 940–959 31 “Zeng Yucheng chang guomin jiaoyu yantui zhanqi” (“Jasper Tsang proposes postponing introduction of National Education”), 26 July 2012, available at (accessed September 2012) 32 “Liang Zhenying paitang jianya, shenceng maodun daijie” (“Leung Chun-ying hands out sweeteners to allay public pressure, deep-seated conflicts yet to be resolved”), 17 July 2012, available at (accessed September 2012) 33 Interview with Leung Kwok-hung in Hong Kong on September 2012 by Kwong Kin-ming; Interview with Joseph Cheng in Hong Kong on September 2012 by Kwong Kin-ming b1500_Ch-16.indd 269 3/5/2013 2:41:54 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com 270 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Hence Leung and his governing team will face tough times ahead The governing conundrum that had beleaguered his predecessor Donald Tsang is unlikely to abate As a weak CE, Leung would be committing political suicide in the manner of Tung Chee-hwa if he pushes for the legislation of Article 23 during his term How well Leung manages the differences both within the legislature and in society in the next five years will determine the likelihood of a second term for him Judging from the outcome of this election alone, Beijing’s increasingly artful grasp of the rules and elaborations of electioneering may boost its confidence in holding a direct election for the CE in 2017 However, the details of the CE and LegCo direct elections have to first gain passage in the legislature where the pan-democrats still hold a one-third veto power Considering how the Democratic Party’s compromising stance in the 2010 political reform bill caused it to lose substantial voter support in this election, the other parties in the pro-democracy camp will be foolhardy to follow in its footsteps This means Beijing and Leung’s administration are unlikely to be able to get approval for a proposed direct election bill if it is designed to disadvantage pro-democracy candidates’ standing in the election www.ebook777.com b1500_Ch-16.indd 270 3/5/2013 2:41:54 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com The 2012 Legislative Council Election 271 Appendix Prepared by Yew Chiew Ping b1500_Ch-16.indd 271 3/5/2013 2:41:54 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com This page intentionally left blank www.ebook777.com b1500_Ch-16.indd 272 3/5/2013 2:41:55 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com Index 12th Five-Year Programme 138 abortive election bilateral trade Donald Tsang 92, 94, 99, 103, 105, 107, 112, 133, 143, 156, 166, 167, 170, 171, 192, 200, 201, 204–206, 210, 213, 219, 226, 239, 240, 243, 247, 270 75, 87, 240, 241 71, 74 economic cooperation 35, 74, 75, 77, 82, 87, 148 economic crisis 64 economic integration 21, 25, 33, 34, 49, 61, 64, 71, 75, 77, 79, 81, 82, 120, 123, 124, 125 Economic slowdown 56 election 99 Election Committee (EC) 237, 239, 249, 253 electorate 181, 222, 225, 238, 239, 242 employment 27, 28, 35, 47, 50, 59, 60, 61, 68, 153, 157, 159, 199 central government 22, 76–78, 80, 81, 85, 87, 99–101, 103–110, 112, 136, 138, 144, 147, 148, 174, 183, 206, 219, 220, 260, 268 CEPA 21–31, 33–38, 41, 42, 45–50, 66, 67, 73, 74, 77, 79, 85, 87, 106, 111, 123, 138, 148, 191 Chief Executive 99 China-Hong Kong relations 119, 145 Civic Party 105, 108, 179, 197, 210, 214, 215, 226–229, 231, 233, 235, 259, 261, 263 closer integration 53 core values 131, 168, 172, 175, 178, 179, 180, 182, 246, 247 counter-cyclical measures 60, 61, 68 Framework Agreement 75, 76, 78, 80, 83, 85, 87, 138 Functional Constituency (FC) 100, 155, 174, 209–211, 213, 215, 217, 218, 221, 232, 233, 246, 255, 256, 267, 269 Democratic Party 155, 194, 210, 222, 226–228, 230, 233, 256, 259, 260, 261, 263, 266, 267, 270 democratisation 92, 95, 96, 107, 108, 113, 127, 185, 187–190, 192, 195, 197, 199, 221–223 District Council (DC) 225–228, 231, 232, 234, 235, 249, 258, 260–263 governance crisis 91, 96–98, 266 Government Budget 62 Guangdong 27, 31–33, 45, 46, 67, 68, 71–83, 85–87, 136, 148, 176 273 b1500_Index.indd 273 4/20/2013 9:09:33 AM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com 274 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule handover 23, 49, 92, 95, 96, 100–102, 105, 116–119, 122, 125, 127–129, 131, 132, 143, 146, 165, 170, 172, 175, 180, 181, 188, 190, 191, 195, 200, 203, 209, 221, 269 Henry Tang 25, 121, 173, 220, 238, 239, 241, 243, 244, 247, 248, 249, 259, 265, 267 HKSAR government 109, 111, 113, 188, 205 Hong Kong Chapter 77, 80, 87 Hong Kong-China relations 247 Hong Kong politics 120 income gap 156, 159, 162, 174, 221 LegCo election 94, 169, 180–183, 192, 232, 234, 235, 246, 247, 255, 256–258, 263 legislation 153, 157, 158, 172, 182, 241, 248 Leung Chun-ying 121, 237, 259 local governments 86 local identity 122, 125, 127, 128, 129, 130, 133, 137, 138, 143, 144, 264 manufacturing sector 25, 27, 47 market forces 122 minimum wage 151–158, 161, 163, 164, 178, 181, 215, 216–218, 221, 223 national identity 115, 117, 119, 122, 124, 126, 127, 129, 264 one country, two systems 23, 33, 75, 80, 92, 93, 96, 98, 112, 128, 131, 135, 137, 166, 181, 190, 193, 196, 201–203, 205, 221, 243, 245, 246, 264 pan-democrats 158, 214, 226–230, 232, 233, 235, 246, 247 ,249, 25–253, 256, 257, 258, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 267, 270 Pearl River Delta 21, 47, 66, 71, 74, 76, 82, 103, 110, 111 politics 128, 154, 174, 183, 248 pro-establishment 100, 119, 169, 226, 229, 230, 232, 234, 237, 240, 246, 256–259, 261, 262, 267–269 SAR government 132, 140, 144, 145 scandals 252, 237, 238, 241, 248, 249, 265 service industries 21, 24, 73, 79, 85, 110, 123 small-circle election 237, 239, 241, 242, 247, 253 social discontent 165, 219, 222, 243, 264 social mobility 162, 163 trade in goods 37, 38, 49, 51, 52, 64, 66 trade in services 38, 47, 64–66 Tung Chee-hwa 23, 91, 92, 94, 99, 119, 120, 127, 156, 161, 167, 187, 208, 219, 239, 240, 241, 270 universal suffrage 99, 121, 169, 174, 181, 182, 188, 200, 201, 202, 210, 213, 218, 220, 221, 223, 243, 246, 247, 253 voters’ demographics 226 wage floor 151, 152, 158, 164 www.ebook777.com b1500_Index.indd 274 3/5/2013 2:37:36 PM ... decree to rule out direct election in 2007/2008 b1500_FM.indd vii 4/9/2013 6:11:00 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com viii Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Three... The Chinese Perspective”, The Nikkei Weekly, 18 November 1996 b1500_Ch-01.indd 3/5/2013 2:37:48 PM b1500 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule. .. Kong Under Chinese Rule Free ebooks ==> www.ebook777.com 14 Hong Kong Under Chinese Rule communism — and also as an open gesture for Taiwan The British endorsed it for fear of outright Chinese

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