Asia Eur J (2010) 8:427–434 DOI 10.1007/s10308-010-0283-6 O R I G I N A L PA P E R The South China Sea security problem: towards regional cooperation Quang Minh Pham Published online: 19 November 2010 # Springer-Verlag 2010 Abstract The year 2009 marked many dynamic developments in the South China Sea which attracted the attention of the international community The main objective of this paper is to analyze these recent security developments by examining the following questions: why tensions are rising in the South China Sea, how challenging is the problem, and what can be done to promote regional cooperation among the countries involved? The paper argues that in order to preserve regional stability, a comprehensive approach must be developed, beginning with confidencebuilding measures through cooperation in solving non-traditional security problems Introduction The second decade of the twenty-first century has begun with a series of security concerns centered in the Asia-Pacific region, including disputes in the South China Sea area On March 8, 2009, the clash between U.S.N.S Impeccable and five Chinese vessels 75 miles off Hainan Island was the first serious maritime confrontation between these two countries in a sensitive area (Bateman 2009) In the same month, the Philippine Congress passed a baseline law intended to assert its sovereignty In April 2009, Malaysia and Vietnam jointly submitted to the U.N Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (UNCLCS) a proposal asserting that their respective continental shelves extended beyond the standard 200 nautical mile limit (Duong 2009) In May 2009, China announced a three-month moratorium on fishing in the South China Sea (Yan and Xiaohuo 2009) On June 16, 2009 China seized three Vietnamese boats and 37 fishermen near the Paracel (Xisha) Islands (Trung Quoc 2009), announcing that they had entered Chinese territory In August 2009, two Vietnamese boats with 25 fishermen were detained by Chinese authorities when they sought shelter from a storm in the Paracels (Deutsche Presse-Agentur 2009) Q M Pham (*) Department of International Studies, College of Social Sciences and Humanities, Vietnam National University, Hanoi, Vietnam e-mail: phqminh@hotmail.com 428 Q M Pham The importance of the South China Sea is in no doubt Being the shortest route connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans, this corridor holds tremendous maritime strategic value Geographically from the south to the north, it stretches from the western coast of Singapore in the southeast to Taiwan in Northeast Asia, straddles the Vietnamese coast in the West, and the Philippines and parts of Malaysia in the East For the economies of China, Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea, the South China Sea serves as an irreplaceable “maritime pipeline” transporting oil from the Middle East, Africa and South America Over half the world's oil tankers move through the South China Sea every year (The South China Sea 2009), and the northeast Asian powerhouse economies transport their goods through some of the region's (and in some cases the world's) busiest ports (Kaohsiung, Hong Kong, and Singapore to name but three) The South China Sea (Eastern Sea [Bien Đong] in Vietnamese) occupies an area of about 648,000 square miles It includes two major island-chains: the Paracels and the Spratlys While the Paracels are the object of bilateral disputes between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Vietnam, claims to the Spratlys are contested either entirely or in part by six parties, including Brunei, Chinese Taipei, Malaysia, the People's Republic of China, the Philippines, and Vietnam Except for Brunei, all the claimants have more or less a physical presence in the South China Sea Among the claimants, Vietnam ranks first by occupying 21 islands and reefs The Philippines ranks second with nine occupied islands Seven reefs and shoals are currently occupied by the PRC, some of which have facilities Malaysia ranks fourth, occupying five areas in the Spratlys Although Taiwan occupies only one island named Itu-Aba, this is the largest island and the one with the most facilities among the occupied islands Challenges The complication of the problem lies partly as a legacy of the past, partly because of the different interpretations of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,1 partly because of the lack of institutions, and last but not least, because of the complex multilateral nature of the issue (see also Sun in this issue).There is not a standard and recognized formal process for each party to assert its individual sovereignty claims.2 Article 121, paragraph of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea says that “rocks which cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of their own shall have no exclusive economic zone or continental shelf” The question arises whether certain small islands in the South China have such sustainability China’s argument for its sovereignty is based mostly on the claim of prior discovery and the decision made by the 1951 San Francisco Conference to require Japan to turn islands back to the PRC Vietnam bases its sovereignty claims in the South China Sea on two pillars The claim on the Paracel Islands is based on historical documents issued by the Nguyen Dynasty in the nineteenth century (see Tim thay Sac chi co ve Hoang Sa 2009), while its claims over the Spratlys have been seen as a continuation of a claim held by the French colonial regime after 1933 The Philippines’ claim was strengthened by two facts: prior discovery by Tomas Cloma in the 1950s, and the declaration made by Carlos Garcia and Ferdinand Marcos in 1957 and 1971, respectively Malaysia bases its claim on the basis of its continental shelf Taiwan claimed the whole South China Sea and stated that this is its “historical maritime territory.” The South China Sea security problem 429 The situation in the South China Sea has therefore become more complicated because there is no mechanism to resolve these problems The single regional security mechanism is the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) which was established in 1994 However, neither ASEAN nor the ARF is able to solve these disputes The single achievement made to date on the security front vis-à-vis the South China Sea was the signing of a Declaration on a Code of Conduct by ASEAN and China, many countries' claimants in the South China Sea (DOC), on November 4, 2002 during the 8th ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh It took about years for the DOC to be officially signed, starting from the Declaration on the South China Sea signed in Manila in 1999 (Tran 2009) The DOC consists of three main parts, including fundamental principles for interstate relations and dispute management, confidence-building measures, and cooperation between the parties (ASEAN Secretariat 2002) For example, points and stress the duties of the parties to resolve their territorial disputes by peaceful means, without resorting to the threat or the use of force, and to exercise selfrestraint from activities that would complicate and escalate disputes and affect the peace and stability of the region Point maintains that “The Parties concerned stand ready to continue their consultations and dialogues concerning relevant issues, through modalities to be agreed by them, including regular consultations on the observance of this Declaration, for the purpose of promoting good neighbourliness and transparency, establishing harmony, mutual understanding and cooperation, and facilitating peaceful resolution of disputes among them.” The significance of the DOC is multifaceted First, it was the first time that China agreed to join with ASEAN in signing such a document on a multilateral basis, reflecting the “new security concept” presented by China on August 1, 2002 at the ASEAN meeting (Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia 2003.) Second, it prevents all parties from enlarging their current area of occupation, and from using force in resolving disputes However, signing the DOC also prevents ASEAN from involving the U.S more closely in the dispute Until now the main argument of China was to solve the disputes bilaterally because according to China the DOC was signed by the governments of the member states of ASEAN and the government of the PRC So any other countries including the US would not be involved Although the DOC does not forbid the involvement by other countries, the document used uniquely only the term “the parties” for the governments of the member states of ASEAN and the government of PRC throughout In addition, the DOC did not prevent the parties from building up facilities on their occupied islands As a consequence, all parties tried to reinforce their presence in the Spratlys For example, Vietnam consolidated its construction on Lagos (or Spratly Island), Pugad Island, or Pentley Reef The island with the most extensive facilities occupied by the Philippines is PAG-ASA, which together with other islands occupied by the country, belongs to the Municipality of Kalayaan Among the Chinese-occupied islands in the Spratlys are Mischief Reef and Johnson Reef, which have more physical infrastructure and equipment Malaysia has facilities on its two occupied islands, namely the Swallow Reef (or Layang-Layang) and Ardasier Reef As mentioned above, Taiwan's one island, ItuAlba, is the largest with the most facilities, including over 50 buildings and a very modern helipad (Banlaoi 2009) 430 Q M Pham Although ASEAN has been successful in its role as the driving force for regional integration, it has failed to settle the dispute among claimants in the South China Sea Sixteen years after its establishment, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) still remains at the first stage of confidence-building measures As its 2001 “Concept and Principles” note, such “confidence-building,” along with the “development of preventive diplomacy and elaboration of approaches to conflicts” is of great importance (ASEAN Secretariat 2001) The ARF has proposed three ways of confidence building including: the definition and clarification of positions on regional and global issues; the extension of the “ASEAN way”; and the promotion of transparency, networking, and cooperation The first mode of confidence building is exercised in both formal and informal contacts of participants in the annual ARF Ministerial Meeting and the ARF Senior Official Meetings Due to the extremely large number and broad subjects of their agenda, the meetings are very insufficient, lacking focus, depth, and concrete outcomes However, the meetings serve as a forum for views and position exchanges, a networking of contacts and deduction of misunderstandings The second mode of confidence building, the acknowledgment of the ASEAN way, extends the visibility of ASEAN to other non-ASEAN members of the ARF, including countries as far apart geographically as Canada, Mongolia, and India The informal, non-binding, non-confrontational character has now become the ARF's way ASEAN leaders were convinced in their ways because they were proved by ASEAN experiences: “ASEAN's well established practices of consultation and consensus (musyawarah and mufakat) have been significantly enhanced by the regular exchanges of high-level visits among ASEAN countries This pattern of regular visits has effectively developed into a preventive diplomacy channel In the Asian context, there is some merit to the ASEAN approach It emphasizes the need to develop trust and confidence among neighbouring states” (ASEAN Secretariat 2001) The last mode of confidence building includes the promotion of transparency in military affairs, networking, and joint activities which could include the issuing of defence white papers, exchanges of military officials, and observation or participation in joint military exercises In short, confidence building is the first and most important step of the ARF, although there have been many challenges and critics (see p 116 in Lim 1998) This notwithstanding, as Rodolfo Severino has noted, the ARF “can build confidence to the extent that it brings some light and air to these questions and, where possible, sorts them out so as to reduce the mutual suspicion and uncertainties inherent in a region where power relationships are in flux” (see p 33 in Severino 2009) The weak response of ASEAN to the rising disputes in the South China Sea can be attributed to several factors First, countries in the region share a commonly held attitude that prefers to keep the environment peaceful and stable to allow continued economic development, especially in dealing with China as a rising power Despite having disputes or tension with China, every country in the region wants to have a good relationship with the country In this new context, economic relations have transitioned from a zero-sum game to a win–win cooperative situation In 2008, the trade volume between China and ASEAN grew increasingly Since the ChinaASEAN FTA took effect in January 2010, bilateral trade between China and the individual countries in Southeast Asia has strengthened and increased (People's The South China Sea security problem 431 Daily Online 2010 Table shows how important ASEAN trade is with China in comparison with that with Japan To give some context, Japan provided some 70.9% of regional GDP in 1990, China and ASEAN together, 16.4%; in 2007, Japan had slipped to 42.1% while China and ASEAN correspondingly rose (Zhao 2007); in 2010, China outpaced Japan to become the world's second largest national economy While trade relations between ASEAN and China continue apace (as the 2010 FTA shows), in other respects, a common position among the ASEAN members (including both disputants as well as non-disputants) about how to deal with China over the disputes in the South China Sea is not so clear Since 2007, China has increased its efforts to query the claims of others in the disputed areas By the end of 2007, China created within Hainan province a new district-level city named Sansha that included the Paracel and Spratly Islands In 2007–2008, China protested against British Petroleum and American Exxon Mobil because they cooperated with Vietnam to explore oil and gas fields in the South China Sea, and eventually both suspended their work In the beginning of 2009, China also protested to the Philippines when the country enacted its revised March 2009 baseline law As mentioned above, China protested against the joint submission by Vietnam and Malaysia to the U.N Until today, China has been successful in preventing ASEAN from acting together with a common voice by arguing that the disputes in South China Sea must be discussed through bilateral negotiations (between China and each of the four ASEAN claimants) During the 2009 ASEAN-China Summit in Cha-am (Thailand), the security problem in the South China Sea was absent from the agenda Third, the Chinese navy has undergone significant modernization At this moment, no single ASEAN country can compete with Chinese naval strength China has advanced past neighboring countries in both the quality and quantity of submarines, destroyers, patrol boats, and frigates; this allows China to dominate in the disputed areas All countries in the Asia-Pacific region are concerned about the size and growth of China's military budget For example, Australia's 2009 Defence White Paper expressed the following concern about China's military transformation and modernization: “We would be concerned about the emergence of a security environment dominated by any regional power, or powers, not committed to the same shared goals It would be in our strategic interests in the decades ahead that no power in the Asia-Pacific region would be able to coerce or intimidate others in the region through the employment of force, or through the implied threat of force, without being deterred, checked or, if necessary, defeated by the political, economic Table Comparison of ASEAN Trade with China and with Japan (as 15 July 2009) (in US thousand) Value of trade Percentage of total Exports from ASEAN Imports by ASEAN Total trade Exports from ASEAN Imports from ASEAN Total trade China 81,591,028.2 96,594,336.8 178,185,365.0 10.1 13.3 11.6 Japan 78,068,589.7 82,795,138.7 160,863,728.4 9.6 11.4 10.5 ASEAN secretariat (2009) 432 Q M Pham or military responses of others in the region” (Australian Government Department of Defence 2009) Since late 2007, the construction of a naval base at Sanya by China has raised tension in the region Through satellite imagery, it was clear that a Chinese Type 094 Jin-class submarine was present The presence of this class of submarine marked “the first permanent deployment to China's Southern Fleet” (Thayer 2009) Suggestions for cooperation The situation in the South China Sea will become more complicated if problems are not thoroughly resolved Statements such as “setting disputes aside in order to pursue common exploitation” seem unrealistic because no party seems willing to put aside their claims in order to project a common solution Each respective government would be criticized by their population for not being able to protect their country The legitimacy of the government will be in doubt for not fulfilling its responsibility to safeguard national sovereignty Among the countries with disputes over the South China Sea, the division among ASEAN members has diminished a sense of a common objective in this area and has provided advantages for China in dealing with ASEAN, as from unity comes a greater bargaining position China's actions are partially at least coordinated to the reactions of external actors So ASEAN might strive to increase the engagement of global players Along with the UN itself, among these actors the United States is considered the most important Among many suggestions, it is important that all parties respect the DOC, neither expanding their occupation, nor using force or the threat of force in dealing with each other Although the DOC is only a non-binding document, it is considered a step toward a code of conduct The DOC can at least help to keep the South China Sea a relatively cooperative and stable environment—which all countries need Second, ASEAN should continue its diplomatic endeavors to resolve differences through dialogue and confidence-building measures Among other things, the countries in the region might promote and increase Track II diplomacy, considered an approach appropriate to the ASEAN way Given that resolving the problems in the South China Sea remains a long-term challenge, ASEAN and other countries in the region might arrange more workshops, seminars, and meetings of experts, researchers, and professors where a discussion and exchange of views and research can take place In 1994, Track II diplomacy became an integral part of ASEAN documents In fact, the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and International Studies, established on 1988 with the participation of strategic and international relations institutes of ASEAN countries, has been recognized as fulfilling a valuable function to this end (Luan 2010) Third, in the long term, ASEAN might include the status of the DOC in its agenda, considering this a common regional issue, both for claimants and nonclaimants As long as the DOC does not become a fully fledged Code of Conduct (COC) for all parties, the security situation remains vulnerable The greatest difficulty, as mentioned above, is that there has been no consensus among ARF members While China tries to keep the situation in the South China Sea at status quo by calling to “set aside disputes and pursue joint development” (Ministry of The South China Sea security problem 433 Foreign Affairs of PRC 2000; see also Duong 2010) and opposing internationalizing the issue, ASEAN wants to establish a formal code of conduct in the South China Sea to avoid tension around the disputed territories ASEAN's idea is supported by the Association's non-ASEAN interested parties because many need a free and save sea route in the South China Sea At the 17th ARF Meeting on July 23 rd, 2010 in Hanoi, U.S Secretary of State Hillary Clinton made it clear: “The United States, like every nation, has a national interest in freedom of navigation, open access to Asia's maritime commons, and respect for international law in the South China Sea…The U.S supports the 2002 ASEAN-China declaration on the conduct of parties in the South China Sea We encourage the parties to reach agreement on a full code of conduct The U.S is prepared to facilitate initiatives and confidence building measures consistent with the declaration” (Clinton 2010) In the light of certain concerns of ASEAN members over China's apparent increasing assertiveness, Clinton's view finds a resonance in ASEAN Erlinda Basilio, Philippine foreign affairs under secretary for policy, has noted that it is time for the ARF to propose a more formal and legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea “to ensure that the South China Sea remains a peaceful and stable place where vessels can pass safely” (quoted in del Callar 2010) Fourth, ASEAN might increase the role of the ADMM (ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting)-Plus format in a way that this can take the initiative in addressing the security issues through the ARF The 2010 ADMM Meeting included the participation of 18 defence ministers, including those of the US and Russia, and took place in Hanoi in October With a new regional security discussion framework in place, new approaches to prevailing issues and concerns can be taken As presented elsewhere in this issue, the partners in the integration of a region extend in some cases far beyond the region itself, especially in a globalization context Regional stability is best therefore fostered and preserved with such a comprehensive approach in mind, an approach for which confidence-building measures through cooperation in solving non-traditional security problems are crucial References ASEAN Secretariat (2001) ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF): Concept and Principles of Preventive Diplomacy http://www.aseansec.org/3571.htm Accessed 13 August 2010 ASEAN Secretariat (2002) Declaration on the Conduct of the Parties in the South China Sea http://www aseansec.org/13163.htm Accessed 13 August 2010 ASEAN Secretariat (2009) External Trade Statistics http://www.aseansec.org/18137.htm Accessed September 2010 Australian Government Department of Defence (2009) Defending Australia in the Asia Pacific Century: Force 2030 Defence White Paper 2009 http://www.defence.gov.au/whitepaper/docs/defence_white_ paper_2009.pdf Accessed 13 August 2010 Banlaoi RC (2009) Renewed Tensions and Continuing Maritime Security Dilemma in the South China Sea: A Philippines Perspective Paper presented at the International Workshop: “The South China Sea: Cooperation for Regional Security and Cooperation” in Hanoi November 26–27 Bateman S (2009) Clashes at Sea: When Chinese vessels harass US Ship S Rajaratnam School of International Studies (NTU Singapore) Commentaries March 13 Online http://www.rsis.edu.sg/ publications/Perspective/RSIS1002009.pdf Accessed 13 August 2010 Clinton HR (2010) Remarks at the National Convention Center Hanoi, Vietnam July 23, 2010 U.S Department of State website http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/07/145095.htm Accessed 13 August 2010 434 Q M Pham del Callar MP (2010) Asean seeks formal code of conduct to prevent South China Sea disputes The Daily Tribune, Manila August 2010 http://www.tribuneonline.org/headlines/20100808hed6.html Accessed 13 August 2010 Deutsche Presse-Agentur (2009) ‘China detains Vietnamese fishermen fleeing storms’, August 2009 Duong Danh Huy (2009) Tan dung uu the Ngoai giao va UNCLOS (Taking Full Advantage of Diplomacy and UNCLOS.) http://www.tuanvietnam.net accessed on May 19, 2009 Duong Danh Huy (2010) “Gac tranh chap cung khai thac” kieu Trung Quoc (“Set Aside Dispute and Pursue Joint Development” a la Chinese.) http://www.tuanvietnam.net/2010-01-20 accessed on January 21, 2010 Embassy of the People's Republic of China in Australia (2003) China Offers New Security Concept at ASEAN Meetings http://au.china-embassy.org/eng/jmhz/t46228.htm Accessed 13 August 2010 Lim R (1998) The ASEAN Regional Forum: Building on Sand Contemporary Southeast Asia 20.2 Luan Thuy Duong (2010) Qua trinh hinh va phat trien cua kenh doi thoai khong chinh thuc ve an ninh va chinh tri cua ASEAN (Kenh 2) (The Process of Establishment and Development of NonOfficial Dialogue Channel on Security and Politics of ASEAN; 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However, neither ASEAN nor the ARF is able to solve these disputes The single achievement made to date on the security front vis-à-vis the South China Sea was the signing of a Declaration on a