Q1 2011 www.businessmonitor.com VeneZueLa agribusiness Report INCLUDES BMI'S FORECASTS ISSN 2040-0489 Published by Business Monitor International Ltd VENEZUELA AGRIBUSINESS REPORT Q1 2011 INCLUDES 5-YEAR FORECASTS TO 2015 Part of BMI's Industry Report & Forecasts Series Published by: Business Monitor International Production Date: February 2011 Business Monitor International Mermaid House, Puddle Dock, London, EC4V 3DS, UK Tel: +44 (0) 20 7248 0468 Fax: +44 (0) 20 7248 0467 Email: subs@businessmonitor.com Web: http://www.businessmonitor.com © 2011 Business Monitor International All rights reserved All information contained in this publication is copyrighted in the name of Business Monitor International, and as such no part of this publication may be reproduced, repackaged, redistributed, resold in whole or in any part, or used in any form or by any means graphic, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping, or by information storage or retrieval, or by any other means, without the express written consent of the publisher DISCLAIMER All information contained in this publication has been researched and compiled from sources believed to be accurate and reliable at the time of publishing However, in view of the natural scope for human and/or mechanical error, either at source or during production, Business Monitor International accepts no liability whatsoever for any loss or damage resulting from errors, inaccuracies or omissions affecting any part of the publication All information is provided without warranty, and Business Monitor International makes no representation of warranty of any kind as to the accuracy or completeness of any information hereto contained Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 CONTENTS Executive Summary SWOT Analysis Venezuela Agriculture SWOT Venezuela Political SWOT Venezuela Economic SWOT 10 Venezuela Business Environment SWOT 11 Industry Forecast Scenario 12 Venezuela Grain Outlook 12 Table: Venezuela – Wheat Consumption & Trade 13 Table: Venezuela – Corn Production, Consumption & Trade 13 Table: Venezuela – Wheat Production, Consumption & Trade 16 Table: Venezuela – Corn Production, Consumption & Trade 16 Venezuela Coffee Outlook 17 Table: Venezuela – Coffee Production & Consumption 18 Table: Venezuela – Coffee Production & Consumption 21 Venezuela Sugar Outlook 23 Table: Venezuela – Sugar Production, Consumption & Trade 24 Table: Venezuela – Sugar Production, Consumption & Trade 26 Venezuela Cocoa Outlook 28 Table: Venezuela – Cocoa Production, Consumption & Trade 29 Table: Venezuela – Cocoa Production, Consumption & Trade 30 Venezuela Livestock Outlook 32 Table: Venezuela – Poultry Production, Consumption & Trade 33 Table: Venezuela – Pork Production, Consumption & Trade 34 Table: Venezuela – Beef & Veal Production, Consumption & Trade 34 Table: Venezuela – Poultry Production, Consumption & Trade 37 Table: Venezuela – Pork Production, Consumption & Trade 37 Table: Venezuela – Beef & Veal Production, Consumption & Trade 37 Venezuela Dairy Outlook 39 Table: Venezuela – Milk Production, Consumption & Trade 40 Table: Venezuela – Butter Production, Consumption & Trade 40 Table: Venezuela – Cheese Production, Consumption & Trade 41 Table: Venezuela – Whole Milk Powder Production, Consumption & Trade 41 Table: Venezuela – Milk Production, Consumption & Trade 44 Table: Venezuela – Butter Production, Consumption & Trade 44 Table: Venezuela – Cheese Production, Consumption & Trade 44 Table: Venezuela – Whole Milk Powder Production, Consumption & Trade 45 Competitive Landscape 46 Table: Agricultural Commodity Producers & Traders 46 Table: Agribusiness Suppliers 47 Table: Integrated Agricultural Producers 48 Commodity Price Analysis 49 Monthly Softs Update 49 Cocoa 49 Table: Cocoa 49 Coffee 50 © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Table: Coffee 50 Milk 51 Table: Milk 51 Sugar 52 Table: Sugar 52 Grains Update 53 Corn 53 Table: Corn 53 Rice 54 Table: Rice 54 Soybean 55 Table: Soybean 55 Wheat 56 Table: Wheat 56 Downstream Supply Chain Analysis 57 Industry Forecast Scenario 57 Consumer Outlook 57 Food 59 Total Food Consumption 59 Table: Venezuela Food Consumption Indicators - Historical Data & Forecasts 59 Canned Food 60 Table: Canned Food Value/Volume Sales - Historical Data & Forecasts 60 Confectionery 61 Table: Confectionery Value/Volume Sales - Historical Data & Forecasts 61 Mass Grocery Retail 63 Table: Venezuela Mass Grocery Retail - Value Sales by Format - Historical Data & Forecasts 63 Table: Sales Breakdown by Retail Format Type 64 Trade 64 Table: Venezuela Mass Grocery Retail - Value Sales by Format - Historical Data & Forecasts 65 Macroeconomic Forecast 66 Table: Venezuela - Economic Activity, 2008-2015 68 BMI Forecast Modelling 69 How We Generate Our Industry Forecasts 69 © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Executive Summary BMI View: Severe rains hit the northern and Andean regions of Venezuela from September through to December 2010, causing widespread damage, particularly to vegetable crops The floods have also led to severe disruption to distribution of food products throughout the country: both the country's road network and port operations have been affected by the rains, leading to an estimated reduction of 70-80% in the distribution of products The floods led the government to declare a state of emergency in the states of Falcón, Miranda, Vargas and the Capital District, including Caracas Subsequently, in mid-December, President Hugo Chávez requested special powers to legislate by decree for a period of one year in order to deal with the emergency caused by the heavy rains, which have left more than 130,000 homeless and affected up to 500,000 people Chávez has stated that he would use the special decree powers to increase Venezuela's sales tax rate from the current level of 12% to additional revenue to be spent on housing and infrastructure projects to help victims of the flooding He did not reveal the extent or duration of the tax increase Critics have, however, accused Chávez of seeking the emergency powers to undermine the gains made by opposition parties in the local elections in September 2010 The opposition parties came together as the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD) coalition and stood against Chávez's ruling Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (PSUV) The MUD made significant gains, with around 47% of the vote The PSUV won a majority of seats under the first-past-the-post system, but lost the two-thirds supermajority that it had previously enjoyed New legislators are to take power on January 2011, with 41% of seats held by opposition parties Key Forecasts 2009/10 was a difficult year for Venezuela's corn producers as the harvest was damaged by the most severe droughts seen in 37 years Production is estimated to have dropped by 23.3% yearon-year (y-o-y) to 1.38mn tonnes Output is forecast to rise by 7.6% y-o-y in 2010/11 to 1.49mn tonnes However, production will continue to be held back by regulated farmgate and retail prices, high production costs and rising inflation Coffee production is estimated to have fallen by 17.3% y-o-y to 744,000 60kg bags in 2009/10, as dry weather related to El Niño-Southern Oscillation in the Pacific damaged crops We forecast production to fall by a further 7.0% y-o-y in 2010/11 to 692,000 bags, as the failure of government-mandated prices to keep a pace with increasing costs continues to lead farmers to turn towards more profitable crops Domestic demand is expected to outstrip production for the third successive year, as consumption continues to grow, leading to an increased reliance on imports Demand increased by an estimated 4.7% y-o-y in 2010 and we forecast a further rise of 1.5% y-o-y in 2011 to 983,500 bags Out to 2015, we see demand growing by 10.0% to 1.07mn bags © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 We now estimate that poultry production declined for three successive years from 2008-2010, due to rising feed costs and strict price controls that have damaged profitability In 2010, we estimate that output fell by 6.9% y-o-y to 653,500 tonnes and forecast a further 3.2% y-o-y fall in 2011 to take production to 623,300 tonnes Demand has, however, begun to recover, after falling by 17.8% y-o-y in 2009 as the economy contracted We now estimate that poultry consumption grew by 7.1% y-o-y in 2010 to 922,000, as imports from Brazil and Argentina eased supply restrictions In 2011, we see poultry consumption stabilising at 926,000 tonnes With stronger opposition in Venezuelan politics, we believe that Chávez will be keen to reduce consumer price inflation (CPI) in the run up the 2012 presidential election, in order to increase his support High levels of inflation have been very unpopular of late, while serving as a key obstruction to economic expansion due to the consequent lack of private credit growth As a result, we expect 'inflation reduction' to remain a key policy focus over the next two years, and are forecasting CPI to fall from 27.6% y-o-y in October to 25.0% by end-2010 and 20.0% by end-2011 Key Trends And Developments Relations continue to improve between the Colombian and Venezuelan governments following the long-running dispute that led to the suspension of trade in July 2009 Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos met with Chávez in Caracas in November 2010 to discuss a free trade agreement (FTA) that will govern trade between the two countries following Venezuela's withdrawal from the Community of Andean Nations (CAN) in April 2011 The meeting was the first of six planned rounds of negotiations In October 2010, Chávez unveiled plans to turn Venezuela into a leading power in cocoa production and exportation Declaring cocoa a 'strategic product' of the national economy, Chávez revealed plans to increase cocoa production to 30,000 tonnes by 2012 and 60,000 tonnes by 2019 In order to achieve these ambitious goals, Chávez proposed rescuing abandoned plantations and requested Venezuela's Executive Vice President Elias Jaua to carry out research into suitable additional land for cocoa production Chávez also urged small plantation owners to band together as producers associated to the state In addition, Chávez announced that the government was in the process of building a chocolate plant with processing capacity of 25,000 tonnes On November 2010, the Venezuelan government announced an increase of 29% in the price paid to producers for green coffee The move will see the government-mandated price rise from VEF585 to VEF747 per quintal (45kg) and is backdated to October 2010 The increase will bring some relief to coffee producers who have seen their profit margins slashed by rocketing © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 inflation and rising production costs However, the increase is less than they had been hoping for and is unlikely to lead to any significant rise in production for the 2010/11 harvest In November 2010, French dairy producer Leche Pascual announced plans to build a yoghurt factory in Venezuela through a joint venture with local food producer Empresas Polar The two firms will invest US$104mn in the facility and have set a goal of gaining 50% market share over the next 10 years The factory is to focus on solid and liquid yoghurts and will be distributed by a new joint venture named Pascual Andina Leche Pascual and Empresas Polar have stated that their yoghurts will attempt to appeal to the country's middle and lower classes by offering longlife products that not require refrigeration BMI cautions, however, that the move by Leche Pascual carries with it significant risks With the Venezuelan economy in the grip of runaway inflation and disposable incomes increasingly tight, the new joint venture may struggle to persuade consumers to spend on what is perceived to be something of a luxury item In addition, Pascual Andina will face stiff competition from large state-owned companies Parmalat and Lacteos los Andes, which put downward pressure on prices In October 2010, Chávez ordered the seizure of 300,000 hectares (ha) of land and 120,0000 head of cattle owned by Compañía Inglesa, the Venezuelan arm of British food company the Vestey Group The company is owned by Lord Vestey's family, who first began trading in Venezuela in 1909 The move forms part of the Chávez government's 'Socialist Revolution' to bring large swathes of land and industry under state control It is not the first time that the Vestey Group has been targeted by Chávez' government In 2005, it nationalised four farms owned by the Vestey Group, including the 33,600-acre Charcote estate south of Caracas, with 13,000 head of cattle In late September 2010, the government announced the seizure of Spanish-owned Agroisleña Agroisleña is the largest private agricultural supply distributor in Venezuela, with a large network of rural stores supplying pesticides, fertiliser, tools and machinery etc It also controls around a third of the country's grain storage capacity Chávez argued that Agroisleña had become an oligopoly in the market of agriculture inputs, contrary to the provisions of the Constitution He stated that the seizure would further the progress of his agricultural reform programme and would further his government's ambitions to improve food security and lower production costs However, should the services provided by Agroisleña become disrupted or fall foul to state mismanagement, the expropriation may compromise the output of domestic producers who have been reliant on Agroisleña's provision of goods and services The move may prove one further obstacle for Venezuela's grain producers, who are already struggling to cope with rising prices and farmgate price controls © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 SWOT Analysis Venezuela Agriculture SWOT Strengths Weaknesses Opportunities Threats Venezuela's tropical climate allows for production of a diversified range of agricultural products Venezuelan cocoa and coffee are known for their high-quality and cocoa especially is sought after by producers of premium chocolate Despite having large areas of fertile arable land, lack of investment in agriculture has left Venezuela a major food importer High food price inflation and frequent supply shortages have dampened growth in food consumption Price controls in place since 2003 squeeze the profits of producers and are a disincentive to invest in increasing production The government has shown interest in revitalising coffee and cocoa production after years of decline The government has introduced a number of programmes to help small holders increase production including finance and subsidies Falling oil revenues are bringing more attention to increasing agricultural production to reduce the cost of food imports The threat of land seizures and nationalisation inhibits investment in agriculture in Venezuela Falls in the oil price will severely limit the amount of money the government will be able to spend on agriculture © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Venezuela Political SWOT Strengths Weaknesses Setting Venezuela apart from its neighbours, the country has enjoyed a long tradition of democracy, with elections held regularly since 1959 A consistently high electoral turnout points to a strong level of public participation in politics The military has traditionally played a dominant role in politics and possible future intervention by disgruntled officers - especially following the attempted coup in 2002 - is not beyond the realms of possibility The meltdown of the traditional party structure has left something of a political vacuum where the opposition should be Relations between President Hugo Chávez and the US remain strained, as Chávez has accused Washington of interfering in Venezuela's domestic affairs and threatened to cut off oil supplies to the US Opportunities Given prudent investment, areas such as infrastructure and education could flourish thanks to the fiscal windfalls brought by devaluation of the bolivar and elevated oil prices, bringing longer-term stability to the economy and diminishing the risks of civil turbulence Threats President Chávez's ability to rule by decree continues to undermine the country's democratic institutions The national assembly has pushed through a number of laws that were previously overturned in the constitutional referendum in 2007 The weakening of democracy in the country threatens to raise political risk and poses a threat to private business activity Tensions between Venezuela and Colombia remain heightened owing to the former's belligerent rhetoric Although, we continue to view the possibility of outright military conflict as improbable given underlying economic interdependencies © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 In response the government has Zero Growth In US$ Terms nationalised large parts of the domestic Venezuela Food Consumption food and drink industry This process began with the government purchasing large tracts of agricultural land and dairy processing facilities However, the process has recently been accelerated with the government seizing control of Venezuelan plants owned by US food giant Cargill, Venezuela's largest food firm Empresas Polar and Mexican tortilla producer Gruma This nationalisation drive has not yet had any noticeable impact on runaway inflation and is in fact likely to have made the NB nominal growth rate; exchange rate for US$ values varies with year; e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI problem worse, as the increased risk of appropriation means that producers have further scaled back their operations and reduced investment Consumption Under Pressure Our forecasts for food consumption highlight the impact of the current stagflationary environment While total food consumption is expected to advance rapidly in nominal, local currency terms the inflationary environment is expected to continue to erode the value of the Venezuelan bolívar, meaning that in US dollar terms food consumption is expected to fall significantly in 2010 and register little growth over the next five years In a high inflationary environment our US dollar figures, derived from our forecasts for the future exchange rate, provide a truer reflection of the underlying growth rates Upside Consequences of Leadership Change Despite the difficult environment, BMI does not believe that Venezuela is beyond reprieve and the risks to our forecast are therefore weighted to the upside Although the Venezuelan economy is likely to experience a tough time over the next two years, we believe that the country's significant oil reserves and well-educated population means that there is significant economic growth potential over the long term Should Chávez remain in power beyond the 2012 presidential elections, we expect a further deterioration in the country's investment outlook and economic growth potential However, if we see a change of leadership in 2012 and a shift to a more moderate administration, we believe that the Venezuelan economy has the potential to experience solid rates of economic expansion over the long term, with subsequent positive implications for food and drink spending © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 58 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Food Total Food Consumption BMI is currently forecasting that Venezuela Food Consumption inflation will come in at 40% by 2007 - 2015 the end of 2010 The spiralling cost of consumer goods has eliminated many of the benefits of President Hugo Chávez's wealth-redistribution programmes and is reflected in our lacklustre forecasts for consumption In US dollar terms, per capita food consumption (food and drink, excluding alcoholic drinks) is now expected to increase by NB nominal growth rate; exchange rate for US$ values varies with year; e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI only 15% over the forecast 20102015 period , although it will increase by a staggering 208% in local currency terms Table: Venezuela Food Consumption Indicators - Historical Data & Forecasts 2007 2008 2009e 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f Food consumption (VEBbn) 34.0 36.9 42.6 51.8 70.1 94.5 121.7 148.2 171.6 Food consumption (US$bn) 15.86 17.21 19.88 12.04 15.07 15.74 15.22 14.82 14.92 Per capita food consumption (VEB) 1,237 1,321 1,502 1,795 2,393 3,178 4,035 4,843 5,531 Per capita food consumption (US$) 576.9 615.9 700.5 417.4 514.6 529.6 504.4 484.3 480.9 Total Food consumption y-o-y growth (local currency, %) 10.21 8.51 15.57 21.36 35.40 34.81 28.86 21.74 15.81 Per capita food consumption growth (y-oy) 8.40 6.76 13.74 19.47 33.32 32.79 26.98 20.01 14.21 Food consumption as % GDP 6.94 5.73 5.13 4.64 4.31 4.03 3.87 3.79 3.75 NB nominal growth rate; exchange rate for US$ values varies with year; e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 59 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Canned Food Canned Food Market Over the 2004 to 2009 review period, 2007 - 2015 canned food value rose from VEB646mn (US$301.2mn) to a projected VEB695mn (US$324mn) The values in 2009 suffered owing to the impact of inflation (hence the diminishing US dollar values) and falling consumer purchasing power, despite the economical nature of canned foodstuffs and their durability, which have increased their attractiveness in times of economic downturn Nevertheless, 2009 volume sales fell on e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI 2008 levels, which we not foresee being reached again until the end of the forecast period The value of canned foods will post a 135% increase in local currency terms, although the bolívar devaluation will result in a 12% value reduction in US dollar terms, through to 2015 Table: Canned Food Value/Volume Sales - Historical Data & Forecasts 2007 2008 2009e 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f 356.5 359.3 357.4 354.5 355.9 357.0 358.1 359.5 360.9 Canned food sales (VEBmn) 678 680 695 793 933 1,116 1,338 1,590 1,863 Canned food sales (US$mn) 316.4 316.9 324.0 184.4 200.5 186.0 167.3 159.0 162.0 Canned food sales (000 tonnes) e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 60 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Confectionery Total Confectionery Market Between 2004 and 2009, 2007 - 2015 confectionery sales value in Venezuela increased by over 40% in US dollar terms to US$437mn In 2009, 52% of the overall market was accounted for by chocolate confectionery, followed by sugar confectionery and gum with market shares of 41% and 7% respectively A young population and busier lifestyles have led to growing demand for on-the-go snacks, but NB nominal growth rate; exchange rate for US$ values varies with year; e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Venezuelan consumers have been Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI forced over recent years to adapt consumption patterns to cope with rising prices and limited product availability For many consumers, confectionery has thus returned to being a luxury product, with product availability through the government-subsidised Mercal network, which is intended to provide discount food staples for the impoverished, being at best limited Therefore, we forecast a virtual stagnation of confectionery volumes in the 2009-2014 period, with growth of only 9% over the five years in question Additionally, the figure of 29,960 tonnes sold in 2008 will not be repeated until after the end of the forecast period, as the sector's development is negatively impacted by the expected reduction in volume sales during 2009 and 2010, of 3.78% and 3.73% respectively Table: Confectionery Value/Volume Sales - Historical Data & Forecasts 2007 2008 2009e 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f Total confectionery sales (000 tonnes) 26.40 26.96 25.66 24.48 24.99 25.64 25.83 26.30 26.77 Total confectionery sales growth, tonne, (y-o-y) 5.60 2.12 -4.83 -4.60 2.10 2.58 0.77 1.81 1.76 Total confectionery sales (VEBmn) 815 851 937 1,089 1,381 1,776 2,218 2,645 3,022 Total confectionery sales growth, VEB, (y-o-y) 5.56 4.48 10.08 16.18 26.79 28.66 24.88 19.24 14.27 Gum sales (VEBmn) 55.8 57.6 62.4 70.6 86.4 107.9 131.8 155.0 175.4 © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 61 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Table: Confectionery Value/Volume Sales - Historical Data & Forecasts Sugar confectionery sales (VEBmn) 343 356 388 447 561 715 887 1,053 1,200 Chocolate confectionery sales (VEBmn) 416 438 487 571 733 953 1,199 1,437 1,647 Total confectionery sales (US$mn) 380.0 397.0 437.0 253.2 296.9 296.0 277.3 264.5 262.8 Gum sales (US$mn) 26.00 26.84 29.09 16.43 18.58 17.98 16.48 15.50 15.25 Sugar confectionery sales (US$mn) 160.0 165.9 181.1 104.0 120.7 119.2 110.9 105.3 104.4 Chocolate confectionery sales (US$mn) 194.0 204.3 226.8 132.8 157.7 158.9 149.9 143.7 143.2 e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 62 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Mass Grocery Retail The country's mass grocery retailers benefited from high GDP growth rates between 2004 and 2007, as proceeds from the windfall oil revenues were redirected into the non-oil economy This increased the disposable incomes of the poorer segments of the population, although poverty and underemployment rates remained high However, the ongoing contraction in investment in Venezuela and slowdown in private consumption support BMI's view that the country's economy will contract in 2010 In real terms, per capita consumption of food is expected to contract in 2010, with consumers affected by runaway inflation, which is particularly high for food and drink products Even when the economic uncertainties are omitted, the competitive environment in Venezuela is perhaps the toughest in Latin America, with private-sector retailers going head-to-head with the governmentsubsidised Mercal grocery chain As the firm does not operate on a profit-and-loss basis, and has almost unlimited (for now) access to expansion capital, its existence creates quite a challenge for the country's other retailers Because of the slowdown in the economy, local currency devaluation and ongoing supply problems, consumer confidence has taken a hit Therefore, in the five years to 2015, total MGR sales are expected to grow by just 2% in US dollar terms, despite a 173% increase in local currency, to reach VEB96.9bn (US$8.4bn) In overall value terms, the supermarket format is expected to be the main beneficiary of this projection, although a large proportion of this growth will be accounted for by Mercal Table: Venezuela Mass Grocery Retail - Value Sales by Format - Historical Data & Forecasts 2007 2008 2009e 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f Supermarkets (VEBbn) 9.870 10.660 12.011 14.064 17.725 22.834 28.526 33.974 38.792 Hypermarkets (VEBbn) 14.541 15.704 17.685 20.535 25.799 33.073 41.204 49.009 55.901 Convenience (VEBbn) 0.415 0.529 0.689 0.839 1.115 1.466 1.801 2.055 2.214 24.826 26.893 30.385 35.437 44.639 57.373 71.531 85.039 96.907 9.85 8.32 12.98 16.63 25.97 28.53 24.68 18.88 13.96 Supermarkets (US$bn) 4.602 4.971 5.600 3.271 3.812 3.806 3.566 3.397 3.373 Hypermarkets (US$bn) 6.780 7.323 8.246 4.776 5.548 5.512 5.151 4.901 4.861 Convenience (US$bn) 0.193 0.247 0.321 0.195 0.240 0.244 0.225 0.206 0.193 11.576 12.540 14.168 8.241 9.600 9.562 8.941 8.504 8.427 Total mass grocery retail sector (VEBbn) Total mass grocery retail sector growth, VEB, (y-o-y) Total mass grocery retail sector (US$bn) e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 63 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Table: Sales Breakdown by Retail Format Type 2009 2019f Organised/MGR 55% 61% Non-organised/Independent 45% 39% Source: BMI Trade Venezuela's trade balance, as expressed in US dollar terms, will stagnate at around US$-2.4bn over most of the forecast period Both imports and exports will be negatively impacted by the domestic and global economic crisis and currency devaluation, with the latter also suffering due to the worsening political situation In the period between 2010 and 2015, the value of exports is expected to post a 19% drop in US dollars, with imports growing at 10% Diplomatic relations with neighbouring Colombia are rocky, with the conflict also potentially spilling over into commerce, despite the notable contribution of Colombian imports as a share of overall imports into Venezuela Trade between Venezuela and Colombia reached around US$7bn in 2008, with goods imported from Colombia including milk and other food items that have often been in short supply due to government-imposed price controls Additionally, the threat to appropriate Colombian assets in Venezuela could affect several Colombian food and drink firms Firms which have interests in Venezuela include dairy producer Alpina and food producer Grupo Nacional de Chocolates, which owns Venezuelan meat firm Industrias Alimenticias Hermo Venezuela Venezuela Trade 2007 - 2015 e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Dependent On Colombia Venezuela Imports 2008 f=BMI forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI Page 64 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Even more significant would be a long-term decline in trading relations between the two countries For example, Grupo Nacional de Chocolates currently generates around 10% of its sales in Venezuela and an official or unofficial boycott of Colombian products would significantly affect revenues Any action would likely be met with retaliation in Colombia, with Venezuelan Empresas Polar one firm that could be damaged by a retaliatory boycott Table: Venezuela Mass Grocery Retail - Value Sales by Format - Historical Data & Forecasts 2007 2008 2009e 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f Exports (food, drink & tobacco) (US$mn) 122.7 120.3 82.1 79.1 76.2 73.2 70.3 67.3 64.3 Imports (food, drink & tobacco) (US$mn) 2,659 2,722 2,429 2,353 2,398 2,444 2,493 2,543 2,595 -2,537 -2,601 -2,347 -2,274 -2,322 -2,371 -2,422 -2,475 -2,531 Balance (US$mn) e/f=BMI estimate/forecast Source: National Institute of Statistics, BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 65 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Macroeconomic Forecast Slow Recovery Beyond 2010 BMI View: We have revised our real GDP growth forecasts for Venezuela, now projecting -2.0% in 2010, 1.9% in 2011 and 2.3% in 2012 (from -3.8%, 3.2% and 2.8% respectively) While we are still forecasting steady real GDP growth beyond 2010, we caution that structural imbalances in the economy are only likely to deepen as there is little to suggest that President Hugo Chávez's distortive policy mix will let up anytime soon We have revised our economic growth forecasts for Venezuela following the release of better-thanexpected Q310 real GDP data (driven by government consumption and investment, factors we previously highlighted as upside risks, see our online service, September 15, 'Recession Easing') We are now forecasting real GDP growth to come in at -2.0% in 2010 (up from -3.8%), and a more moderate rebound of 1.9% in 2011 (down from 3.2%) and 2.3% in 2012 (down from 2.8%) While the outlook for growth is relatively positive beyond 2010, there is little to suggest that President Hugo Chavez's distortive economic policies will let up before the presidential election in 2012, after which, a large cloud of uncertainty surrounds future economic policy and growth trajectory Private Consumption To Pick Up: We believe that high inflation is the key determinant of private consumption in Venezuela due to its detrimental influence on bank lending While we expect inflation to remain elevated over the medium term, we are forecasting a gradual decline in the headline figure over the coming years, which is likely to aid a mild recovery in private credit growth (with inflation at 25.0% y-o-y by end-2010, 20.0% by end-2011 and 17.5% by end-2012, see our online service, November 11, 'Inflation To Fall, At Any Cost') As a result, we have pencilled in a 2.5% y-o-y rise in private consumption in 2011 and a 2.0% rise in 2012, with the former boosted by the base effects derived from two consecutive years of contraction These growth figures translate to a 1.8 and 1.4 percentage point (pp) contribution to GDP in 2011 and 2012 respectively Dichotomy In Investment: While the outlook for gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) originating from the private sector is very weak, future investment from politically-allied countries such as China, Turkey, Russia, Turkey is looking quite positive We believe Venezuela's investment profile will become increasingly divided for two reasons For one, the persistent threat of state appropriation acts as a major deterrent for most private companies to make investments Secondly, political ties are likely to remove the risks of appropriation for foreign direct investment (FDI) made by state-connected enterprises from abroad Given that there is considerable growth potential in both the petroleum (Orinoco belt) and nonpetroleum sectors (telecoms, infrastructure and autos in particular) - made more lucrative by years of underinvestment - we believe net growth in investment in 2011 and 2012 will be positive Therefore, although Venezuela is highly unlikely to see a return of GFCF from oil majors such as Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips or other companies with expropriated assets, we expect it to receive further © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 66 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 investment into projects similar to the US$7.5bn railway and US$600mn Puerto Cabello port renovation (sourced from China) Indeed, the Venezuelan government recently signed an energy deal with the Turkish energy minister in order to promote joint investment projects, with much focus on Orinoco belt Furthermore, even though the outlook for investment from most privately-owned domestic companies is weak due to the risk of nationalisation, for businesses that are too small to be appropriated (for example sole traders), declining inflation should have a positive impact on investment due to the consequent uptick in bank lending This adds further support to our projections for GFCF to expand by 2.0% y-o-y in both 2011 and 2012, each exerting a 0.6pp contribution to GDP Government Consumption Geared Towards Election: In the face of declining popularity, demonstrated by the comeback of the opposition in the legislative election held on September 26, we expect Chávez to ramp up social expenditure in order to build support before the presidential vote in 2012 Although Venezuela has a quite a small debt load, with external debt at approximately 18% of GDP, we believe the government will seek alternative funding to finance further budget deficits, due to the US$2.50bn - US$3.25bn that we expect it to raise each quarter in 2011 and 2012 just to maintain the fixed exchange rate As a result, we anticipate further sale of major oil concessions for a myopic shortterm rise to government consumption With this uptick in government consumption, we are projecting a 0.2pp contribution to growth in 2011 and 0.5pp in 2012 before the election External Demand Boosted By Oil Given that 95% of Venezuelan exports are composed of petroleum products, we expect more robust oil prices - our Oil and Gas team is forecasting the price of Brent crude to average US$82.5 per barrel (bbl) in 2011 US$87.6bbl in 2012, up from US$79.4bbl in 2010 - to boost export growth over the medium term Coupled with a complex exchange rate system that we believe will continue to restrict the volume of imports over the coming quarters, and we are forecasting net exports to have a positive impact on real GDP expansion in 2011 and 2012, with a 0.9pp and 0.5pp contribution to growth respectively That said, we note that the steady erosion of domestic capacity resulting from numerous nationalisations is going to place an increasing reliance on imports over the longer term, as the economy falls further away from selfsufficiency Risks To Outlook Most risks to this outlook for Venezuela are to the downside Firstly, there is the issue of inflation and whether the government will maintain the fixed exchange rates While our core scenario rules out a bolívar devaluation, it is highly probable that one could occur, which would significantly increase inflation and lead to a major reduction in the bank lending that we expect to fuel private consumption in 2011 and 2012 Secondly, lower than expected oil prices could lead to dramatic deterioration in economic activity, given that petroleum activity accounts for 11% of GDP To the upside, we believe the risks are less pronounced However, the opposition in government may be able to limit Chávez's distortive economic policy mix and prompt the return of investment from large privately-owned companies © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 67 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Net Error Errors: With net errors accounting for -13.3pp of growth in Q309 and 4.5pp in Q310, it was the greatest contributing component of Venezuelan GDP by expenditure Given that such a major part of economic expansion (contraction) can only be labelled as a 'net error', we believe this unknown element of the economy poses the most considerable risk to our growth forecasts This wide margin of uncertainty means that even if we are right about the other components of growth, the headline figure could be significantly distorted by the 'net errors' category Table: Venezuela - Economic Activity, 2008-2015 2008 2009e 2010f 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f Nominal GDP, VEFbn 643.7 830.8 1045.4 1277.7 1515.8 1781.1 2068.7 2379.1 Nominal GDP, US$bn 300.2 386.4 348.5 255.5 216.6 197.9 188.1 198.2 3.2 -1.8 -3.8 3.2 2.8 2.6 3.0 2.8 10606 13402 11865 8541 7105 6374 5946 6153 27.9 28.4 28.8 29.3 29.7 30.2 30.6 31.0 Industrial production index, % y-o-y, ave 4.8 1.0 1.3 2.3 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.9 Unemployment, % of labour force, eop 8.3 8.8 9.5 10.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 11.5 Real GDP growth, % change y-o-y GDP per capita, US$ Population, mn e f Notes: BMI estimates BMI forecasts Sources: BCV, IMF BMI Calculation; World Bank/BMI calculation/BMI; BCV © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 68 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 BMI Forecast Modelling How We Generate Our Industry Forecasts BMI’s industry forecasts are generated using the best-practice techniques of time-series modelling and causal/econometric modelling The precise form of model we use varies from industry to industry, in each case being determined, as per standard practice, by the prevailing features of the industry data being examined BMI mainly uses OLS estimators and in order to avoid relying on subjective views and encourage the use of objective views, BMI uses a ‘general-to-specific’ method BMI mainly uses a linear model, but simple non-linear models, such as the log-linear model, are used when necessary During periods of ‘industry shock’, for example poor weather conditions impeding agricultural output, dummy variables are used to determine the level of impact Effective forecasting depends on appropriately-selected regression models BMI selects the best model according to various different criteria and tests, including, but not exclusive to: R2 tests explanatory power; Adjusted R2 takes degree of freedom into account Testing the directional movement and magnitude of coefficients Hypothesis testing to ensure coefficients are significant (normally t-test and/or P-value) All results are assessed to alleviate issues related to auto-correlation and multi-collinearity BMI uses the selected best model to perform forecasting It must be remembered that human intervention plays a necessary and desirable role in all of BMI’s industry forecasting Experience, expertise and knowledge of industry data and trends ensures that analysts spot structural breaks, anomalous data, turning points and seasonal features where a purely mechanical forecasting process would not Within the Agribusiness industry, this intervention might include, but is not exclusive to, technology development that might influence future output levels (for example greater use of biotechnology), dramatic changes in local production levels due to public or private sector investment, the regulatory environment and specific areas of legislation, such as import and export tariffs and farm subsidies, changes in lifestyles and general societal trends, the formation of bilateral and multilateral trading agreements and political factors The following two examples show the demand (consumption) and the supply (production) of rice Note: the explanatory variables for both of them are quite similar, but the underlying economic theory is different Example of Rice Consumption Model: © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 69 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 (Rice Consumption)t = β0 + β1*(Real Private Consumption per capita)t + β2*(Inflation)t + β3*(Real Lending Rate)t + β4*(Population)t + β5*(Government Expenditure)t + β6*(Food Consumption)t-1 + εt Where: β are parameters for this function Real Private Consumption per capita has a positive relationship with Rice Consumption, if rice is a normal good in a particular country If rice is an inferior good in a country, the relationship is negative So the sign of β1 is determined by a specific product within a specific country When Inflation is high, people with rational expectations will consume ‘today’ rather than wait for ‘tomorrow’s high price to come Higher rice demand in Year t due to higher inflation in that year leads to an assumed positive sign of β2 The relationship between Real Lending Rate and Rice Consumption is expected to be negative When real lending rates increase, disposable incomes, especially for those with mortgage burdens etc, will decrease So the sign of β3 is expected to be negative Of course, other things being equal, growth in rice consumption can also be caused by growth in population Consequently, positive sign of β4 is expected Government Expenditure typically causes total disposable incomes to rise So the sign of β5 is expected to be positive Human behaviour has a trend: A high level of food consumption in previous years means there is very likely to be a high level of food consumption the next year So the positive sign of β6 is expected ε is the error/residual term Example of Rice Production Model: (Rice Production)t = β0 + β1*(Real GDP per capita)t + β2*(Inflation)t + β3*(Real Lending Rate)t + β4*(Rural Population)t + β5*(Government Expenditure)t + β6*(Food Production)t-1 + εt Where: The same as above, the relationship between Real GDP per capita and rice production depends on whether rice is normal or inferior good in that country If high inflation is caused by food prices increasing, farmers will be more profitable Then they will supply more agricultural product (e.g rice) to increase their marginal (extra) profit, although this is tempered by the rising cost of other inputs in line with inflation There is a global move towards corporate farming, away from small holdings, in order to achieve greater agricultural productivity Corporate farming means more investment in the modes of © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 70 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 production i.e agricultural machinery Higher real lending rates discourage investment, which in turn reduce production BMI assumes only the rural population has a positive effect on agricultural product supply With supportive government policy, other things being equal, rice production is expected to go up Government Expenditure is likely to play some role in supporting agribusiness Again, previous food production positively affects this year’s prediction y affects this year’s prediction © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 71 Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner Further reproduction prohibited without permission [...]... Business Monitor International Ltd Page 26 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Venezuela, with the first four to be completed by the end of 2009 Unless sugar cane production can be significantly raised, this will put further pressure on the countries already face tight sugar supplies © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 27 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Venezuela Cocoa Outlook BMI Supply View:... International Ltd Page 11 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Industry Forecast Scenario Venezuela Grain Outlook BMI Supply View: Venezuela is a major net importer of grain Though production rose rapidly through the first decade of the 21st century, consumption has also risen, fuelled by oil-driven economic growth Corn is Venezuela' s major grain crop The vast majority of Venezuela' s corn is grown... consumption of grain © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 16 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Venezuela Coffee Outlook BMI Supply View: The best Venezuelan coffee comes from the Maracaibo region, in the far west of the country, along the border with Colombia Favourable growing conditions led to a comparatively good coffee harvest in Venezuela in 2007/08, with production rising by 4.4% year-on-year... International Ltd Page 15 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Table: Venezuela – Wheat Production, Consumption & Trade Wheat Consumption, 1 '000 tonnes Wheat Net Trade 1 Balance, '000 tonnes e 2006 2007 2008 2009e 2010e 2011f 1700.0 1697.0 1526.0 1559.0 1536.8 1555.8 -1688.0 -1762.0 -1500.0 -1500.0 -1536.8 -1555.8 f 1 Notes: BMI estimates BMI forecasts Sources: USDA, BMI Table: Venezuela – Corn Production,... in 2010 as Venezuela suffered a second successive year of economic contraction With food prices still rising, consumers' budgets are likely to remain tight, and we see consumption stagnating in 2011 Out to 2014/15, we forecast cocoa consumption increasing by just 1.3% on the 2010 level to 13,990 tonnes © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 28 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Table: Venezuela. .. Brazil However, with much of Venezuela' s stock of cocoa trees fairly old, it remains vulnerable to the disease which would severely hamper attempts to revitalise the sector © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 31 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Venezuela Livestock Outlook BMI Supply View: After strong growth in the 1990s and the first few years of the 21st century, Venezuelan beef production... sector following the seizures will only make matters worse as investors In August, just after the seizures, Venezuela imported 25,000 bags of coffee © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 20 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 from Brazil, the first imports from that country since 2004 We see Venezuela becoming increasingly reliant on imports in the future as domestic production is unable to meet... relations Table: Venezuela – Coffee Production & Consumption 2006 2007 2008 2009e 2010e 2011f Coffee Production, '000 1 60kg bags 820.00 862.00 900.00 900.00 743.64 692.20 Coffee Consumption, 1 '000 60kg bags 740.00 790.00 860.00 925.00 968.50 983.27 e f 1 Notes: BMI estimates BMI forecasts Sources: USDA, BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 21 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Risks To Outlook... popularity on world markets as neighbouring Colombian coffee has done, then investment in the sector could increase © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 22 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Venezuela Sugar Outlook BMI Supply View: The Venezuelan sugar sector has declined dramatically in the past 24 months and the country has been facing severe sugar shortages Sugar production rose rapidly between... tonnes Out to 2015, we expect sugar consumption to grow by 9.3% on the 2010 level to reach 1.30mn tonnes © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 23 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Table: Venezuela – Sugar Production, Consumption & Trade 2010e 2011f 2012f 2013f 2014f 2015f 599.1 608.5 630.0 650.8 674.9 698.5 Sugar Consumption, '000 1 tonnes 1,188.6 1,196.1 1,221.0 1,246.2 1,272.4 1,299.0 Sugar ... tonnes -2 68.27 -2 93.56 -3 08.72 -3 13.25 -3 23.13 -3 33.56 e f Notes: BMI estimates BMI forecasts Sources: USDA, BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 33 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011. .. completeness of any information hereto contained Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 © Business Monitor International Ltd Page Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 CONTENTS Executive Summary ... Stocks-to-use (%) 50.1 53.2 43.1 40.0 40.2 38.5 38.8 39.8 Source: BMI © Business Monitor International Ltd Page 49 Venezuela Agribusiness Report Q1 2011 Coffee Front-month coffee pushed Front-Month