The KMP (peasant movement of the philippines) movement generation, activity, and continuity in philippine society 23

KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 54 CHAPTER II Philippine Agrarian Landscape and the State The 1997 financial crisis is instructive in that it highlights the importance of rural development, specifically in Southeast Asia. Lauridsen for instance raised that “Thailand’s economic crisis might, to some extent, be cushioned by other sectors, e.g., as agriculture” (1998: 155). On the other hand, the financial dry up in Indonesia was aggravated by food shortages (Montes and Ali Abdusalamov, 1998: 180). In the Philippines, “As economic downturn occurs and a new administration takes over, it is a good time to call for and consider an alternative development strategy -- one that should prioritize rural and agricultural development, an approach neglected by the Philippines. By concentrating on rural development and urban-rural linkages, economic development can be more equitable, less import-dependent and ultimately, more sustainable”. (Lim, 1998: 220) The Philippine agrarian landscape has hitherto been one of the facilitating conditions of rural protest. “Centuries of Spanish rule, followed by US conquest and tutelage, left the Philippines with perhaps the most polarized land distribution in Asia” (Fox, 1990: 6). The seemingly degenerative character of the agrarian system and its submission to oligarchic and foreign interests coupled with ineffective laws and programs for rural development all contribute to the persistence of armed and unarmed, open and secret peasant movements and organizations, which I will discuss in the next chapter. In this chapter, I basically aim to achieve two things. First, elaborate on the structural causes of rural grievances and protest in Philippine society today. I present four critical conditions that continue to marginalize the peasants and manifest the historical neglect for rural development – landlessness and land concentration, agrarian reform laws, economic policies and programs, and land conversion. These conditions specifically refer to agrarian process under the Marcos, Aquino, and KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 55 Ramos governments. Second, provide a theoretical perspective of Philippine state and politics. This consideration opens up historical arguments for movement emergence and development in Philippine society. In this light, I discuss in the second part the nature and character of Philippine state and politics in a historical dimension. The third part serves as a conclusion to the underscore the interplay between the structural causes of rural protest and the Philippine state as facilitating contexts of rural struggles. A. A Philippine Agrarian Situationer The defining character of the Philippine agrarian system owes much to the country’s colonial and neo-colonial history. A fundamental characteristic of Spanish colonialism was the development and consolidation of feudalism. Within this economic system, “the old rights of the conquered natives to land were extinguished by the feudal rule that ‘everything of value’ in the colonies formed part of the estate of the King of Castilla” (Corpuz, 1997: 2). In this social order, the encomienda (land grants) and hacienda (agricultural plantations) system created and promoted landlordism based on land grants and massive land grabbing by the colonial government, church, and principalia (descendants of datus). Under the American colonial period, landlordism persisted. The land laws implemented by the colonial government became a mere instrument that promoted land grabbing and concentration. 1. Landlessness and land concentration The Philippine agrarian system is primarily characterized by a structure of landlessness.24 Landlessness does not only refer to the condition of not owning the 24 Among others, see Putzel and Cunnington 1989; Hayami et. al. 1989; Putzel 1992; IRDF 1994; Riedinger 1995; CPAR Secretariat 1993; PIAF 1998; and PPI 1999. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 56 land a peasant toils on but it likewise refers to the absence of control over that land. 25 According to PPI, from 1990-1991 owner-cultivators made up only 25 per cent of total agr icultural households, while landless tenants, marginal farmers and workers comprised some 70 per cent. 26 This study confirms the earlier research center’s findings that small-owner cultivators made up only 31% (1,416 out of 4,483) thereby pointing to a landlessness rate of 68% (Flores, 1994: 2-4, 9). The latest account, however, shows that in 1999, 5.5% of the landowning class controls at least 60% of Philippine lands while 8.5 million out of 11.2 million peasants (76%) are landless tillers. 27 The flip side of landlessness is the concentration of landownership in the hands of the few – the landlords and/or capitalists and foreign controlled corporations. The Philippine landowning class, for instance, refers to the likes of the Lopez family, Eduardo and Jose Cojuanco, Tinio family, Victoria Delantar, Henry Ng Siu Hong, and the Floirendo family among others. 28 While at least 1.02 million small landowners control 1.23 hectares on the average, these selected seven landlords control 6,126 hectares on the average. Moreover, the said small landowners represent 16 and 26 per cent of the total number of rural and agricultural families respectively. On the other hand, foreign corporations refer to TNCs/MNCs like Dole Corporation, Philippine Packaging Corporation, NDC-Guthrie, TADECO (Tagum Development Corporation), United Brands, Sumitomo/Dahitri, and etcetera. 29 These 25 For Riedinger, the term “landless” refers throughout to all cultivating relationships in which cultivators work land without having ownership or owner-like rights in that land, whether they are called “tenants,” “agricultural laborers,” or something else (1995, pp. 75-76, emphasis in the original). 26 PPI 1991a, p. 115, cited in Putzel 1992, p. 26. Putzel and Cunnington (1989, p. 17) have also indicated that there were at least 1.5 million marginal farmers occupy hilly lands. 27 Kampilan, Vol., 1, No. 1, September-October 1999. 28 From the Cojuancos to Hong, see PPI 1998: 28-33; for the Lopez family, see Corpuz 1997: 149; and for the Floirendo family, see Putzel and Cunnington 1989. 29 For Dole, Del Monte, and Guthrie, see PEACE-PCPS 1989: 5; for Tadeco, United Brands, and Sumitomo, see Hayami et. al. 1990: 137-138. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 57 six corporations alone control at least 92,000 hectares in Mindanao. Of the local and foreign corporations, 722 of them control at least 216.1 hectares of prime agricultural lands on the average. They also enjoy ownership-like rights to at least 15 per cent of the total 3.4 million farms and at least 1.72 per cent of the total agricultural land area of 9.6 million hectares. In aggregate, these corporations effectively control 3,061,918 mh with the TNCs controlling at least 592,690 hectares and almost all export-crops industry. 30 To further illustrate, landholdings in Southern Luzon are claimed to be concentrated in the hands of fifty-three (53) landlords/corporations who control at least 276,410 hectares, hence, with an average of 5,215 hectares per person or entity. They are led by the Roxas family, Romeo Roxas, Llana, Ayala/Zobel, Dolor, Rubio, de Villa, and Aguirre in Batangas; Yulo, de los Reyes, Reyes/Elea zar, and Sta. Lucia Realty Co. in Laguna; Alvarez/Pagdangan Timber Products, Nationwide Princess Timber Corporation, and Palawan Lumber Manufacturing Co. in Palawan, de Borja, Meralco Foundation, Borjam De Vera/Philcomsat, and Torres in Rizal; Sandico, Interwood (Cojuanco), and Eduardo Cojuanco in Mindoro Occidental; and Escudero, Rodriguez, Segundo Matias, Uy, Guanzon, Conuanco (Interwood), Don Domingo Reyes, Malvar, Suleta, Juanito Tan, and Yao in Quezon. 31 In Central Luzon (Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija), lands are allegedly concentrated in the hands of 39 landlords/corporations who control at least 70,876 hectares, hence, with an average of 1,817 hectares per person or entity. They are led by the Romeo Roxas family, Hacienda de Santos, Sabani Estate, Berong Tinio, 30 Alternate Resource Center, ARC Mindanao, cited in Descanzo in PPI 1990, pp. 28 -34. In Mindanao about 80% of the total cropland area (3.1 million hectares) are tilled by peasants, leaseholders, freeholding settlers, and farmworkers. In the Visayas, around 70% of the total cropland area (2.5 million hectares) are not owned by the actual tiller-producers. In Central Luzon, despite being the showcase for land reform , 70% of rice farmers and 50% of sugar farmers remain landless (KMP 1986). 31 KASAMA-TK Manifesto, “Landlords in Southern Luzon,” nd., pp.1 -2. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 58 Hacienda Roxas/Soriamont, Gonzales family, Joson family, Capt. Herrera, Mabutol, Cenon Buencamino, Puyat Estate, Luis Lacalle, Vermuda Estate, and Doña Sisang de Leon in Nueva Ecija; the Puyat Estate (Manila Bank Co.), Greggy Araneta, Villafuerte family, Carlos Yu (Globe paper mill), Villa Rica family, Bautista family, Gokongwei/Robina, Lipana Estate, Valarao, S. Perez, Pancho-Abadia, Ines Ramirez, Valentin Fernando, and the Sta. Lucia Estate in Bulacan; and by the Cojuanco family, Herson, Sawit, Calma, Macaraeg, Reyes, Sembrano, Cancio, Fajardo, Onsiaco family, and Obiena in Tarlac. 32 2. Land/Agrarian Reform Laws Since the dawn of the twentieth century, at least eleven (11) major land reform laws/policies have been formulated and implemented. 33 These legislative measures, however, have been insufficient to resolve landlessness, abate land accumulation, and develop the agrarian system. First, the laws passed especially during the American period facilitated land grabbing and were used to increase the landholding of the elites. 34 The first five years of American colonialism saw the implementation of certain “land legislation” measures that institutionalized land grabbing and accumulation. The Philippine Bill of 1902 guaranteed the Americans the right to own and control agricultural lands in the Philippines; the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 limited the size of public lands that could be acquired by individuals to 16 hectares (but later amended to 32 AMGL Manifesto on Landlessness, 1998. These land and agrarian reform laws pertain to the Philippine Bill of 1902, Philippine Organic Act of 1902, Public Land Act of 1903, Land Registration Act of 1902, Friar Lands Act of 1904, Sugar Cane Tenancy Act of 1933 (Public Act No. 4133) and Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1935 (Public Act No. 4054), Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (R.A. 1199), Land Reform Act of 1955 (R.A. 1400), Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A. 3844), Proclamation No. (R.A. 6389 of 1971) and P.D. 27, and the CARP (RA 6657). See Wurfel in Ledesma, Makil, and Miralao 1983; Constantino and Constantino 1984; Ofreneo 1987; de la Cruz 1990, pp. 43-59, Esguerra 1990, pp. 93-114, Mariano 1990, pp. 117126, all in LINANGAN IV 1990; Putzel and Cunnington 1989, pp. 69-73; Hayami et. al. 1990, pp. 7079; Putzel 1992, pp. 58, 272-275; Riedinger 1995, pp. 139-176). 34 Refer to Shalom 1987; Schirmer and Shalom 1986; Putzel and Cunningtion 1989; de la Cruz in LINANGAN IV 1990; Putzel 1992; Hayami et. al. 1989; Riedinger 1995; and Corpuz 1997. 33 KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 59 100 hectares) and by corporations to 1,024 hectares; Public Land Act of 1903 allowed anyone to acquire 16 hectares of public land by establishing a homestead and cultivating it for five years with payment of a nominal fee; Land Registration Act of 1902 (Act No. 496) which created a court that would certify land titles under the Torrens system but registration was not compulsory, and until 1910 the titles distributed were only for big landholdings; and the Friar Lands Act of 1904 which provided for the acquisition and redistribution of friar lands that were sold at the cost of purchase. 35 Second, the land reform programs of the Quezon, Magsaysay, Macapagal, and Marcos governments were basically limited to rice and corn farms. More so, they have been more concerned in regulating tenurial arrangements such as land rent and other agrarian relations such as usury. In the 1930s, share tenancy became more widespread and reached the scale of 36 per cent compared to the 22 per cent noted in 1918. Constantino (1975) attributed this to the decline of cash tenants (inquilinos), who were increasingly unable to pay fixed rents demanded by the tenurial system. Many inquilinos were thus compelled to become share tenants (kasamas), providing labor and sharing the harvest on a 50-50 basis after deducting the planting and harvesting expenses. The relationship is further aggravated by an overpriced land use, usury, and the provision of free labor of various kinds at the discretion of the landowner (also cited in PPI, 1998: 57). In this context, the Quezon government enacted land laws of limited scope. First, the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933 (Public Act No. 4054) called for a standardization of a 50-50 sharing agreement for tenants and was obviously applicable for rice farms and limited to improving tenurial arrangements. This was only applicable, however, to those areas that would be petitioned by the municipal 35 See Shalom, 1987; Schirmer and Shalom, 1986; Putzel and Cunningtion, 1989; Esguerra 1990: 93114; de la Cruz, 1990; Hayami et. al., 1989: 70-79; Riedinger, 1995; Mariano, 1990: 117 -126; Putzel, 1992: 58, 272-275; Riedinger, 1995: 139 -176; and Corpuz, 1997: 270-73. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 60 council. Second, the Sugar Cane Tenancy Act of 1934 (Public Act No. 4133) obliged landlords to report or disclose to government the operations of their sugar centers – amount of harvest, quantity of sugar milled, etcetera.36 The government also enacted the law regarding the Expropriation of Landed Estates. It stipulated the right of government to purchase vast tracts of land to be distributed to the farmers. This measure was taken to appease peasant unrest and weaken the revolt of farmers in Central Luzon. The law, however, did not prosper due to the lack of support services (PPI, 1998: 58). “For obvious reasons, such as the fact that many of his friends and supporters were from the landed class, Quezon could only proceed slowly with agrarian reform” (Caoili, 1986: 35 cited in Rivera, 1994: 113). Interestingly, landlords in 1936 started organizing private armies and resistance movements to refuse the implementation of Quezon’s tenancy laws (PPI 1998, p. 59). By 1952, the problem of usury and tenancy arrangements cropped up again as the traders had acquired dominance of the loans granted to peasants over the landlords (De la Cruz, 1990: 48 cf Rivera and Panganiban 1975, p. 47). In this context, the Magsaysay government implemented the Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (R.A. 1199) and the Land Reform Act of 1955 (R.A. 1400). The first, however, was confined to share tenancy, espousing a 70-30 sharing scheme, and restricted interest loans from 8-10 per cent. The second law remarkably imposed a very high retention limit of 300 hectares for individuals and 600 hectares for corporation. It also limited interest rate to 30 per cent. This ‘land to the landless’ decree, however, will 36 de la Cruz, pp. 43-59, Esguerra (pp. 93-114), and Mariano (pp. 117 -126) all in LINANGAN 1990; Putzel and Cunnington 1989, pp. 69-73; Hayami et. al. 1990, pp. 70-79; Putzel 1992, pp. 58, 272 -275; Riedinger 1995, pp. 139-176. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 61 only be implemented in those areas petitioned by the majority of the tenants.37 These national laws, however, did not stop the creditors in exploiting the peasantry. Moreover, R.A. 821 and R.A. 720 respectively established the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Farmers Association and rural banking system to extend rural credit to farmers. By the end of the 1950s, however, the cooperatives and rural banking disappeared. Instead, credit went to sugar from agriculture with the rice industry receiving only 23.2 per cent for production and 7.45% for trading. Worse, only 20% per cent of agricultural credit went to small peasants that comprised 95% of the agricultural population. And by 1958, the average interest rate was 126.8 per cent per annum (de la Cruz, 1990: 48, cf Rivera and Panganiban 1975). Under the presidency of Macapagal, the Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A. 3844) was implemented. Similar with past laws, it only covered rice and corn farms and set a retention limit of 75 hectares, a considerable decrease compared to R.A. 1400 nonetheless. In 1971, the Marcos regime decreed Proclamation No. (R.A. 6389) imposing an ownership limit of 24 hectares while P.D. 27 subjected 1.8 million hectares of rice and corn farms under land reform and set a lower retention limit of hectares. Again, however, the laws were in essence not very different from those passed under the Quezon, Magsaysay, and Macapagal governments. In mid-1970s, these laws were succeeded by the implementation of MASAGANA ‘99 (for rice) and MAISAGANA ’97 (for corn) programs. The Marcos government launched these 37 Ibid., pp. 43-59; Esguerra (pp. 93-114); Mariano in LINANGAN IV 1990, pp. 117-126; Putzel and Cunnington 1989, pp. 69-73; Hayami et. al. 1990, pp. 70-79; Putzel 1992, pp. 58, 272-275; Riedinger 1995, pp. 139 -176. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 62 programs to provide loans for farmers to buy capital inputs and set up the Agricultural Development and Input Financing Loan. 38 Third, the trend of implementing land redistribution has followed the pattern where government buys the land from big landowners and sells it to the farmers. But as early as 1903, this has been the practice under the Friar Lands Act and in the final analysis the lands acquired go back to wealthy landowners, traders, and capitalists because the farmers cannot simply afford to pay the price. Fourth, the implementation of all land/agrarian reform programs and rural development has always been coupled with “counter -insurgency” measures, if not solely driven by such politico-military intent. Fifth, despite being limited in their scope (mostly to rice and corn farms and tenurial improvements), these programs have set generous retention limits for landlords and agribusiness corporations, especially the TNCs. 39 And in the case of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), it is marred by comprehensive exemptions, the institutionalization of land use conversion, and alternative schemes of implementation that facilitate agrarian reform evasion. But what has the Philippine Government achieved in land redistribution for the last three decades? From 1972 to December 1998, a total of 4.8 million hectares (mh) of lands have been distributed through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). DAR accounts for 60 per cent or 2.9 mh while DENR accounts for 40 per cent or 1.9 mh. Approximately, 21 per cent of these lands or 1.04 mh were distributed under Marcos 38 By 1982, however, 66 per cent of total credit was still coming from “non-formal credit”. The traders dominated the provision of loans up to the 1970s while the input dealers and some OCWs (overseas contract workers) dominated the 1980s. The statistical figure almost equaled the average percentage of informal credit in 1960 (De la Cruz, 1989: 51). 39 Under Marcos, 500 corporations were able to gain control of 60,000 hectares of land (Putzel and Cunnington 1989: 15). KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 63 (1972-1986), 32 per cent or 1.57 mh under Aquino, while 47 per cent or 2.29 mh were distributed under the Ramos regime. 40 What is even more interesting is that 82 per cent (2.6 mh) of the 4.3 mh under the jurisdiction of DAR are locked in 108,480 agrarian-related litigations in various courts, quasi-judicial and regular court proceedings involving cancellation, exemption, retention, ownership disputes, and conversion applications (SENTRA, 1997: 18). On top of this sticky situation, at least 18,759 CLTs (certificate of land transfer), 2,454 EPs (emancipation patents), and 326 CLOAs (certificate of land ownership awards) covering about 67,442.84 hectares have been canceled. These cancellations have affected about 25,062 farmer beneficiaries as of December 1995 (ibid., 24).41 The situation explains the case of uninstalled farmer beneficiaries. Finally, the argument that CARL has not significantly addressed landlessness as it has boastfully promised boils down to the analysis of its changing scope. From its original scope of 10.3 mh, it has gone down to 8.1 mh in 1997 and 6.80 mh in 1998 (Flores, 1994: 2-4). 42 In a ten-year period, the coverage has decreased by at least 34 per cent or 3.5 mh. But still, the 1997 revised scope includes 3.8 mh of forest lands under the Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP). Hence, the actual coverage is only 4.3 mh which comprise a mere one-third of the total agricultural land of 12 mh. 43 40 PARC Secretariat, cited in MTPDP 1998-2004, pp. 3-61 to 3-62; Unofficial DAR, IMR-FOSSO report, cited in Borras Jr. 1999: 4-7; DAR 1997 Report, The Ramos Legacy in Agrarian Reform: A Transition Report. 41 From 1980 to December 1993, at least 10,598 CLTs (15,598 hectares), 9,133 EPs (8,198 hectares), and 2,302 CLOAs (8,243.9 hectares) have been canceled affecting at least 18,348 farmer beneficiaries (Ochoa 1993, p. 6). 42 See also PARC Secretariat, cited in MTPDP 1998-2004, p. 3-61 - 3-62; DAR Reports, 1997. 43 Of the 3.8 million hectares of forest lands, at least 3.337 million hectares are note likely to be covered by agrarian reform. First, 1.5 million hectares of the said lands are under 35 timber licensing agreements (TLAs). Second, 927,000 hectares are under 22 suspended and inactive TLAs. Third, 653,000 hectares are under 460 Industrial Forest Management Agreements, Industrial Tree Plantation Agreements, and Tree Farm Leases, while anot her 257,000 hectares are under Pasture Lease KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 117 Romerico Flores (a retired official of the PC). In the 1970s, the organization collaborated with the Marcos government but continued its organizing and mobilization work among the peasantry (Esguerra, 1989: 112). Meanwhile, the AMA (Aniban ng Manggagawa sa Agrikultura ) in 1976 rejuvenated the MASAKA (PHILINK, 1999 cf Baltazar, 1998) and carried out legal efforts to ensure the promotion of peasant rights and the implementation of PD 27. The organization led a 14,000-strong demonstration in January 1977 with delegates coming from Central, Southern, and Northern Luzon and the Bicol region (PPI, 1998: 66). 3. Mobilization, Arenas of Struggle, and Actions Microstructural factors are vital to mobilize people into collective political actions (Snow, et. al., 1980: 787-801; Gould, 1991: 716-729; McAdam and Paulsen, 1993: 640-667; Mueller, 1994: 234-263). The Tondo Conspiracy, and the Bancao, Diego Silang, and Palaris uprisings in particular all relied on interpersonal or kinship networks to rally people into their cause. Other uprisings, by virtue of the instigators’ social position likewise utilized informal and formal networks that made it possible to mobilize thousands of followers and supporters. The Katipunan revolution, for instance, gained a national status by soliciting the support of existing guerilla movements or organizations in the islands of Visayas and other parts of Luzon. Moreover, the Tanggulan-Kapatiran links demonstrate how formal but secret networking contributes to the organization of collective action. It is noteworthy that only in the 1930s did the setting up of formal political parties become a venue to express grievance and protest. Tactical it may be for the Sakdalistas, the forming of a political party was a function of the political space existed during the period. Under Spanish rule, the political system was definitely closed for such political undertaking and should have the system been open it would KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 118 not be hypothetical to say that political parties could have long been part of the Filipino political culture. Nonetheless, the primary arena where dissent has been channeled primarily was the non-legal arena. The use of armed means was prevalent from the Spanish to the American colonial periods. Interestingly, the combination of legal and non-legal struggles started during the Katipunan Revolution where the protest culture of operating and maintaining aboveground and underground societies likewise evolved. This was evident with the Kapatirang Magbubukid, Tanggulan, Sakdal, the PKP, Huks, and HMB, PKM, MASAKA, and the CPP-NPA-NDF. It would not then be baseless to argue that how a movement responds to existing political opportunities or system significantly depends on its elaborate or specific organizational objectives and strategies. From the 1600s to the 1900s, Philippine peasants have resorted to various actions to defend and promote their interests. Under colonialism (1565 to mid1940s), armed struggles or uprisings characterized the major component of peasant actions. From the mid-1935 to 1940, however, agrarian dissent in Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Ilioilo, and Negros endured. Teodoro Asedillo and Nicolas Encallado launched a peasant-based armed struggle in Laguna and Tayabas (Constantino, 1997: 439, 440-441); tenants formed committees to coordinate rent strikes in Tarlac; peasants carried out demonstrations and raided landlords’ rice granaries in Nueva Ecija; farmworkers in Bataan, Iloilo, and Negros burned hectares upon hectares of sugarcane farmlands after the landlords refused to grant them higher wages and to enforce the 8-hour workday; and around 800 tenants successfully opposed their eviction by the Tunasan Estate in San Pedro, Laguna despite police intervention. Within the same period, at least twelve peasant strikes erupted in KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 119 Talaver, Nueva Ecija. Meanwhile, the government established the Peasant Commission in 1937, a forum aimed to “represent” peasant organizations of various political and ideological positions. Consequently, Juan Feleo was elected Executive Secretary by the majority of the 30,000-strong peasant movement represented in the commission. (PPI, 1998: 58-61) In 1939, Bulacan, Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, and Pampanga landowners collectively attempted to evict indiscriminately insistent and organized tenants. Pedro Abad Santos saw self-arming as the defense against their hired thugs and ex-convicts and the peasants set up a United Peasant Center with Feleo as secretary. Upon threat of a general strike the landlords called off their plans. The following incidents of uprising or conflict summed up the decade (1930-1940) – 193 in Pampanga, 178 in Nueva Ecija, 119 in Bulacan, 35 in Tarlac, 30 in Pangasinan, and 26 in Bataan (PPI, 1998: 58-61 cf Mangiduyos, 1977). In the 1940s, the KPMP in its heyday was able to mobilize rallies participated by over 50,000 farmers. Mostly launched in provincial towns and cities of its areas of operation, the KPMP advanced the issues of fair harvest sharing, land security, and rights to gathering and carried out provincial rent strikes (Esguerra, 1990: 102; Constantino, 1997: 434; PPI, 1998: 56-57; Agoncillo, 1990: 445; A Home Page of the Community Organizing School, http://www.locoa.net/program/COSchool/ZOTO%20case.htm). With the disintegration of the PKP and HMB in the 1950s, armed struggle seemed to have lost its popularity, coupled by the establishment of various legal peasant organizations and movements. In the late 1960s, however, the establishment of the CPP-NPA revived the tradition of armed revolution, which interestingly holds to date. As Tarrow critically points out: “violence as one of the major aspects of publicly mounted contention is the oldest and most direct” (1998: 6-7). KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 120 Nonetheless, the historical participation of peasants in political actions could be understood according to Shanin’s typology. According to him, three main types or patterns of peasant political action could be pinpointed: “independent class action, guided political action, and fully spontaneous, amorphous political action” (1971: 255-262). Shanin explains these actions and I quote: “[I]ndependent class action is where a social class crystallizes in the course of conflict, creates its ow n nationwide organization, works out its ideology, aims, and symbols, and produces leaders from within… A guided political action is where the social group concerned is moved by an external uniting power-elite… and fully spontaneous, amorphous political action that may take one of two forms: local riots or peasant passivity…” (ibid. 257-258). A close-knit application, however, is problematic as these actions are specifically located in historical contexts and thus often interface with one another. For instance, not until the late 19th century Philippines could we pinpoint the emergence of a national ideology and revolution as espoused by the Katipunan. Moreover, it was not until the 1920s did communist, socialist, and anarchist ideals proliferated. If this would be the case, would it suffice to conclude that all uprisings or revolts before the Katipunan were fully spontaneous, amorphous actions? Or will it also suffice to say that all peasant actions after regional and national organizations started to emerge in the 1920s and after social movements and NGOs became active in engaging the peasants in political activities from the 1930s up to the 1990s were all politically guided? Another interesting account through which peasant actions could be analyzed is Tilly’s classification of contentious repertoires in Great Britain between 1758 and 1834 (1995: 15-42). He analyzed the difference between the 18th century repertoire and the the 19th century repertoires and I quote: “[T]he eighteenth century repertoire was parochial because most often the interests and action involved were confined to a single community. It was particular because forms of contention varied significantly from one place, actor, or situation to another. It was bifurcated because when ordinary people addressed KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 121 local issues and nearby objects they took impressively direct action to achieve their ends, but when it came to national issues and objects they recurrently addressed their demands to a local patron or authority who might represent their int erest, redress their grievance, fulfill his own obligation, or at least authorize them to act (ibid. 33). [T]he nineteenth century repertoires were national in often referring to interests and issues that spanned many localities or affected centers of power whose actions touched many localities. They were modular in that the same forms served many different localities, actors, and issues. They were autonomous in beginning on the claimants' own initiative and establishing direct communication between the claimants and those nationally significant centers of power. Yet they involved less direct action and immediate redress of grievances than their eighteenth-century predecessors” (ibid. 34). Like Shanin’s typology, applying Tilly’s classifications to Philippine experience should be qualified. First, the uprisings and revolts in the Philippines from the 17th century to the early 20th century except for the KKK Revolution are parochial not in the sense that they were confined to a single community but rather they were district, provincial, or region wide protests. They could not strictly be called particular but rather modular because armed uprising, as a form of contention, became the “regular” course of action. Third, three instances demonstrate how peasant actions could acquire a national scope through a formal organization and ideology – the Katipunan Revolution of 1896, the PKP-HUKBALAHAP/HMB of 1942, and the CPP-NPA of the late 1960s. 121 Fourth, autonomous actions basically characterized peasant and agraria n-based protests when the setting up of formal organizations was not yet a practice. From the 1920s, however, politically guided actions became more frequent notwithstanding the occurrence of self-initiated protests. Fifth, direct action was always an option to seek immediate redress not only from the 17th to the early 20th centuries but extended up to the 1990s. 4. Movement Outcomes and Consequences and Continuity The colonial and neo-colonial character of Philippine history is instructive in that contemporar y theories or perspectives of movement outcomes and consequences 121 For a side-by-side account of the evolution of the PKP and CPP, see the book of Alexander (1999) entitled International Maoism in the Developing World. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 122 that emerged from the 1960s could not be neatly applied to the analysis of peasant struggles and uprisings. More so, they are at times inappropriate on the following grounds. First, the upris ings and revolts from the 1600s up to the mid -1900s were not directed towards a redistribution of power. They were more directed against the exploitative and oppressive policies of foreign aggressors. While almost all of them were extinguished by force, their very success could be gauged based on the challenge they put up against colonialism and resultant processes. Moreover, radical peasant organizations from the 1920s to the 1960s sought radical social changes rather than reforms. Second, immediate redress was the primary concern of the parochial struggles and was manifest in the form of actions peasants participated in. Direct actions such as the physical elimination of the oppressor or exploiter, attacks on granaries, burning of sugar haciendas, and land occupations were the usual recourse to channel their demands. Third, though isolated, the Palaris uprising demonstrated how intimidation or direct political pressure could lead to concrete political success. At least for two years (1762-1764), Pangasinan witnessed the installation of local native officials in the provincial administration. Fourth, the Dagohoy “rebellion” that was able to liberate Bohol from Spanish rule for 85 years could already be claimed as a significant victory against colonialism. Fifth, though the numerous uprisings and revolts were defeated another aspect that is noteworthy to emphasize is the concept of movement spillover. As Meyer and Whittier (1994: 277-298) argue: “Movements not necessarily conclude with policy victories or defeats or with the demise of particular movement organizations. Later movements may express predecessors’ concerns and absorb their activists; movements seemingly in decline may be reflected and transformed in ongoing social and political struggles”. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 123 Several cases could be cited to underscore social movement influence in the context of the spontaneous uprisings – the Sumuroy revolt (1649) overflowing to the provinces of Sorsogon and Camarines in Bicol, the Silang revolt (1762) inspired by that in Pangasinan, the Iglesia movement (1890) which started in Pampanga and spread to Bulacan, Pangasinan, and Tarlac, and as far as Laguna and Cavite, the recurrence of the 1745 agrarian revolts in 1822 that was led by the Tulisanes, Parang, and Juan Upay (Agoncillo, 1956: 113-114; Corpuz, 1989: I xix, 373, II 8, 510), and the Pulahanes uprising (1890s) in Samar whose remnants went to Mindanao and started the colorum uprising in the 1920s. Lastly, the intervention of movement adversaries is another critical component that needs to be looked at in assessing movement outcomes and consequences. As Fitzgerald and Rodgers cite, “organizations that openly promote antiestablishment values and practices become the subject of study, surveillance, and attack. Their failures may have been partially or directly caused by successful attacks” (2002: 586 cf Acker, 1995). For instance, the classic divide and rule tactic was the key that enabled the Spaniards in extinguishing the Tamblot, Sumuroy, and Diego Silang uprisings. The popularity of the Kapatiran in Bulacan and other Central Luzon provinces in the 1920s influenced or directly caused the establishment anti-union and counterorganizations in Pampanga and Bulacan122. And similar with most uprisings, the Magindanaon and Tausug revolts demonstrate how a movement’s failure could be directly caused by successful attacks of counter-movements or the “state” (Fitzgerald 122 Landlords in San Miguel formed the ant i-union Katipunan Mipanampon, which originated in Pampanga and was founded by Zoilo Hilario. In lower Bulacan, Don Emilio Rustia of Baliuag similarly established the Samahan ng Magsasaka at Nagpapasaka (Association of Farmers and Landowners). “In San Miguel, as elsewhere, the landlords who organized these unions were connected with the ruling Nacionalista Party, whereas the unionists supported rival Democrata, Sakdal, and Frente Popular candidates” (Fegan, 1982: 109-10). KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 124 and Rodgers, 2002: 586 cf Acker, 1995) while Piven and Cloward (1977: 33) demonstrated how outside forces could infuse factionalism and disillusionment within the movement. These uprisings were similarly extinguished through the use of spies and collaborationists 123. In the case of the HUKBALAHAP, the U.S. maneuvered to disband the people’s army violently. For instance, Squadron 77 (a platoon size army unit) was disarmed and on the way home American soldiers ambushed the HUKs. Others were imprisoned in Malolos, Bulacan and during nighttime they were “taken” out one by one and nothing was heard from them again. 124 In the same year, however, the private armies that were organized about ten years ago have been reactivated. One of these was the “Civilian Guards” and many cases of peasant harassment, violence against rural women, and other acts of terror were attributed to these groups (Kerkvliet, 1977; PPI, 1998) 125. The U.S. supported Manuel Roxas (last president of the Commonwealth) and became its first post-war puppet republic, as the Philippine “independence” was granted on July 1946. The event provided “the Huks a concrete and experiential anti-imperialist foundation” (Boudreau, 2001: 25). In 1947, the PKP experiment of converting its anti-fascist credentials into electoral victory failed. Having won six seats under the loose Democratic Alliance party, Roxas did not allow the 123 Datu Piang, Ali’s father-in-law, provided vital intelligence information to the aggressors while the other datus permitted their slaves to join the First Cotabato Company (the Moro Company of the Philippine Constabulary in 1904). In Jolo, Tausug mercenaries helped the U.S. forces in pinpointing Hassan’s hide out while the Sultan of Sulu provided the colonizers additional reinforcements. Hassan was killed in the Battle of Bud Bagsak on March 1904. In the case of Langkat, the District Supervisor used local soldiers to attend the movement’s rituals to spy on its activities and trace the camp (Rodil, 1990). See also Corpuz, 1989: II 515, 516-517; Agoncillo, 1990: 256, 258-259. 124 Interviews with former supporter of PKP and HUKBALAHAP and member of the PKM in Pampanga (name withheld). 125 In September 1945, some 50,000 men and women farmers and laborers staged a protest march to Malacañang. They demanded President Osmeña better tenancy conditions (e.g., a 60-40 sharing) and the release of their leaders imprisoned shortly after the entry of the U.S. forces. On 24 August 1946, the Civilian Guards kidnapped Feleo in Nueva Ecija murdered him. This happened under the “tight” watch of guards assigned by Malacañang to look after his safety (PPI, 1998: 63). KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 125 represe ntatives to assume their position. Roxas in turn outlawed the HUKBALAHAP in 1948 and after his death Elpidio Quirino, his successor, invited the PKP into a peace settlement. Negotiations failed and the PKP decided to take the path of insurrection, transforming the HUKBALAHAP into the HMB (Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan, National Liberation Army). And in the 1950s, the military campaign of “capturing power” within two years proved fatal to the PKP-HMB as they were confronted by a reorganized and more efficient US-backed Philippine Army. By 1954, the HMB has been decisively beaten (Weekly, 2001: 18-19, 27; Boudreau, 2001: 24-27). In the 1950s, aside from the formulation of agrarian reform laws to pacify rural unrest, the Magsaysay government moved to directly disband the PKP -HMB in a realpolitik sense. In 1957, it implemented the Anti-Subversion Law, which stipulated severe penalties to members of the PKP or its front organizations. The law also provided for the granting of amnesty for rebel surrenderees. Ironically, the PKP encouraged HMB members to accept the offer (Weekly, 2001: 18). Interestingly, the maneuvers of the Magsaysay government coincided with the activities of newly established peasant organizations. Aside from advocating agrarian reform, the FFF “tried to counter the communist-inspired peasant and labor movements” (David in Silliman and Noble, 1998: 31; Boudreau, 2001: 26). 126 The PRRM proved to be no different and “borrowed much of its rhetoric from the communist movement – Go to the People/Live among Them/Learn from Them/Serve Them and the conduct of self-criticism sessions” (Shalom 1986, p. 124). That the PRRM was CIA-initiated or had ties with the agency is not baseless on the fact that it served as one of the conduits of CIA funds to implement rural development projects 126 See also Wurfel, 1988: 65. KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 126 (ibid.). It is not surprising, therefore, that the concept of community development (CD) was popularized during the same period by the U.S. government through its Agency on International Development. The would be “NGOs” carrying out development work like the traditional civic and emergency relief activities, were either pressured or enticed to adopt the approach, since USAID was then the major source of funding and material assistance. 127 Coupled with the capture and surrender of its leaders, the disintegration of the PKP and HMB in the mid -1950s. After suffering big from its military adventure, the PKP abandoned armed struggle and shifted to parliamentary struggle. “At the start of the 1960s, the moribund communist party could little but watch independent or Church-led groups took charge of protests against the state” (Boudreau, 2001: 27). The politico-military strategy implemented by the Magsaysay government and the C.I.A. significantly contributed to its demise. Meanwhile, a debate was brewing between the old guards and young guards of the party. This debate led to an irreconcilable split within the core of the party, in sum, between Maoist and Sovietinspired and nominally labor -based strategy. The split midwifed the new Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) that was officially established on 26 December 1968 (the death anniversary of Mao Tse Tung) under the leadership of Jose Maria Sison, the leader of the split (ibid.). In the 1960s, members, leaders, and chapters of the FFF, however, underwent a process of ‘radicalization’. Among others, this was due to the courts’ inability to promptly resolve agrarian cases, the violent repression of 1957 leading to the death of 127 Through their practice, these private organizations were able to strengthen and enrich the community development (CD) approach “but the main source of insights and expertise came from the experience of the Presidential Assistance on Community Development (PACD), a government agency created during the Magsaysay administration. The principal sources of PACD funding were the CIA and the USAID”. Moreover, “an offshoot of the counterinsurgency experiment using the CD approach was the creation of local private organizations with links to covert organizations of the U.S. government” (CPD, 1991: 5-7). KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 127 leaders in Laguna, and the entry and development of new members and leaders from the student sector (Esguerra, 1989: 111-112; PPI, 1998: 66). Another factor points to the challenge posed by militant peasant groups vis-à-vis government and landlords. One example was the MASAKA (Free Farmers’ Association) organization (Esguerra, 1989: 112). Consequently, a significant number of FFF members, leaders, and chapters engaged with radical peasant movements. Not a few of them became members and cadres of the new communist party in the 1970s. Upon the declaration of Martial Law in 1972, however, the leadership collaborated with the Marcos government. 128 It became a member of the government-instigated NCFO (National Congress of Farmers’ Association), together with the PKSN 129, ARBA, FLRF130, and the Hukbalahap Veterans’ League led by Luis Taruc. Moreover, as the FFF adopted the “wait and see” attitude, there were accounts that this led to the exposure and capture of the progressive elements that joined the national democratic movement (PPI 1998, p. 69). Meanwhile, the activities of re maining units of the HMB under the (Taruc -) Sumulong leadership have degenerated toward gangsterism and extortion. A disillusioned Dante Buscayno bolted, taking a number of fighters with him. In January 1969, Buscayno’s unit was able to contact and regroup with Sison; and on 29 March 1969 the CPP formally established the New People’s Army (NPA) from the remains of the HUKBALAHAP and HMB (Boudreau, 2001: 27-29; Weekly, 2001: 128 This is further evidenced by the FFF’s 1972 revised constitution that “clearance from the government’s military intelligence service is a requirement for becoming an FFF leader” (Putz el 1992: 123). 129 National Organization of Village Associations, formed by virtue of Marcos’ instruction to his administration to lead in the organization of all Village Associations (Samahang Nayon ) in 1972 (PPI 1998, p. 68). 130 Federation of Land Reform Farmers’ Association, formed on 12 May 1970 and headed by Mac Fabian (PPI, 1998: 68). Fabian and Luis Taruc were also involved in the establishment of FARM (Filipino Agrarian Reform Movement) in 1958. This organization, comprised of intellectuals, journalists, and professionals, focused on congressional lobbying, organizing conferences, and publishing news in support for agrarian reform (ibid. 66; Esguerra, 1989: 112). KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 128 18-19, 27). The PKP, on the other hand, marginalized itself further when it acquired a legal status by signing the “National Unity Agreement” with the Marcos government in October 1974. “The platform of combining communism and support for Marcos proved unsalable and the agreement boosted the CPP over the PKP (Boudreau, 29). The FFF’s remaining members developed similar relations with the Marcos government, and thereby marginalized themselves as well” (ibid. cf Monk, 1990: 116-20). Interestingly, the National Democratic Front (NDF) was established in (April) 1973, less than year after the martial law declaration. It aims to provide “an organizational framework and channel for the unity of all progressive and revolutionary forces fighting for national freedom and democracy” (Hawes, 1990: 262 cf NDF brochure). The NPA, CPP’s military arm, is the major (or the only) armed unit within the umbrella organization. In its 19 years of existence, the NDF has significantly contributed to the growth of the CPP-NPA. C. Synthesis What makes peasants participate in collective political actions? The rich Philippine tradition of peasant uprisings and struggles demonstrate a multi-faceted response to this inquiry. At first sight, the moral economy model of Scott (1976) and its strong and mild versions seems to be the overarching explanation of peasant protests. This was manifest in the 1600s through the Tamblot, Bancao, Tapar, and Sumuroys uprisings, in the 1700s through the Silang, Palaris, Dagohoy, and Iligan uprisings, and in the 1800s and early 1900s through the Magindanaon, Tausug, Subanon, and Langkat and Lumad uprisings. The specificity and romanticist approach of this perspective, KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 129 however, tends to confine protest and the facilitative conditions within parochial bounds. The violations of the moral economy of the peasants should be contextualized in a broade r environment where market forces, state processes, and other politically critical factors are considered. The expansion-of-capitalism approach revealed how international commercialization directly fuelled agrarian disputes as it was in the case of the 1745 revolts. Moreover, the creation of (new) class alliances and strains is made explicit rather than treating it plainly as a function of the peasants’ moral political economy. And in the case of the Bagobo rebellion, the symmetrical increase of abaca plantations vis-à-vis the killing of Japanese planters clearly showed the link between capitalist expansion and agrarian dissent. Violations of the moral economy and capitalist penetration were, however, not separate from the processes of colonial state formation and consolidation. The imposition of the pueblo system, the polo , and the increasing church and state demands were necessary to embed colonialism. Furthermore, the 1896 Revolution demonstrated the important role of nationalism and revolutionary organiza tions in engaging peasants in collective political actions. Nationalism, since the late 1800s, became the motor force of several peasant organizations, which was revived by the establishment of the PKP and the HUKBALAHAP/HMB and passed on later to the CPP-NPA-NDF, nonetheless with significant breaks. Likewise the revolutionary organizations of the Katipunan, PKP, and CPP have immensely contributed to the politicization of the peasantry in their respective times. The participation of peasant in collective political actions is, however, not separate from processes and structures directly related to social movements that in the first place make such actions possible and sustainable. Grievances played an KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 130 overarching role in the eruption of spontaneous uprisings and were manifest in every uprising or struggle. Consciousness and ideology during most of the Spanish colonial period took the form of messianic and millenarian orientations and continued to characterize several uprisings during the American colonial. In the late 1890s, however, the ideology for national liberation evolved and was expressed through the Katipunan Revolution. Since then, ideology became an organizing weapon for peasant organizations that started to evolve in the 1900s and found its second national expression in the 1930s through the establishment of the PKP and its merger with the PSP in 1938. With the demise of the PKP in the 1950s and 1960s, the communist ideological line was revived under the CPP-NPA in the late 1960s. Resources, political opportunities, and organization likewise played significant roles in peasant uprisings and struggles. The importance of resources could be looked at in two different ways. First, the availability of meager resources on the one hand, e.g., crude weapons, and the abundance of human resources on the other hand were enough for the peasants to initiate and participate in uprisings. Second, the lack of resources like ‘modern’ weapons and organizational means proved critical in the defeat of most of the uprisings. Contrary to most claims, the closeness of political opportunity rather than its openness facilitated most of the peasant uprisings. Had there been political opportunities or institutional channels through which they can ventilate their grievances, the armed struggles during the Spanish and American colonial periods could have been less numerous. The spontaneous outbursts of agrarian dissent, moreover, could not have been possible if the protesting peasants did not have some level of organization. It was only in the late 1890s and in the second decade of the 1900s did peasant organizations started to mushroom. The Katipunan, PKP, and CPP organizations represented a different level KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 131 of organization where many peasants found the collective expression of their grievances and aspirations. In the organization of collective political actions, leaders and organizers relied both on formal and informal ties. Micromobilization structures such as kinship and other interpersonal ties were important in coordinating and carrying out actions. Interestingly, armed uprisings or direct actions characterized the major and modular form of peasant actions. Physical attacks and confiscation of goods were regular means of seeking immediate redress. The armed struggles launched and participated in by peasants could not be neatly interpreted through Shanin’s (1971) and Tilly’s (1995) typologies. These actions swung between unarmed protest to armed uprisings; ranged from parochial to broader struggles; were propelled by a mixture of grievances and issues (political, economic, and cultural) crosscutting class and geographical boundaries; characterized by a combination of mystical, nativistic, or messianic, nationalist, and ideological goals; initiated or led by a host of actors – peasants, elites, colonizers, government, political movements; and directed against colonizers, religious orders, local and national elites, the national “state”, and peasants themselves, involving direct and indirect confrontations. Finally, the outcomes and consequences of the various peasant uprisings and struggles under colonialism and neo-colonialism could be perceived in several ways. First, they were concrete challenges posed against the said interstate and intersociety processes. Second, the defeat of the uprisings, which was accomplished almost always by brute force, demonstrated how external forces and conditions such as state and foreign intervention could directly cause the failure of movements. Similarly, the activities of oppositional movements or organizations could very well be slowed down or neutralized by the workings of counter-movements. Third, it would be more KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 132 fruitful and objective to assess radical movements or organizations based on their goals and orientation rather than on their impact to public policy or on other organizations. Lastly, histories not have an end. Movements may naturally grow old and perish but movement continuity does not. The militant uprisings and struggles in their collective sense, the Katipunan, the PKP-HUKBALAHAP/HMB, and the CPP-NPANDF all have significant organizational and ideological differences and breaks but their existence in different periods of Philippine political history jettisons an ahistorical view of social movements and society. As Isaacman (1993: 254) aptly puts it, “rural social movements are not just momentary aberrations, but are often part of a long oppositional history, which over time took many shapes and forms, part of a larger engagement in the political world”. On that note, it is then imperative to investigate peasant social movements in the late 20th century Philippines to investigate present-day movement dynamics. [...]... 90 The mission’s findings confirmed clearly the human costs of the Lifted from the “1935 Philippine Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines”, refer to The Chan Robles Virtual Law Library http://www.chanrobles.com , KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 82 strategy of liberalization and export-led growth (Bello, Kinley, and Ellinson, 1982: 58-59) While the Philippines... Section 65 of R.A 6657 and Section 20 of the Local Government Code Disallows LGUs from authorizing the reclassification of irrigated and irrigable lands But again invokes the provisions of Sec 20 of the LGC 87 Speeds up the approval of land conversion reducing the requirements and procedures to 10 steps from the previous 24 KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 76 R.A 8178,... regime 59 KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 72 Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) shoulders considerable responsibility in “checking” anomalous land conversions with the assistance of the Department of Justice But what is the extent of land use conversion in the Philippines? What proved to be the landmark case for land conversion was the Lankaan Estate in Dasmariñas,... trade reaching its highest level during the occupation period The U.S involvement in World War I in 1916 strengthened the relations, manifested by the more-thandoubling of Philippine exports to the U.S between 1916 and 1918 The prices of imported coal soared and hit the railroad and infant manufacturing sector The war also caused a halt to external capital inflows Recession hit the Philippines in 1920... asserts that these policies “adhere even more closely to the philosophy of the free market economics and free trade rather than the Marcos regime Evidently, the economic, trade, and fiscal policies remain to strengthen the neo-colonial KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 84 character of the Philippine state” From a dual perspective, “ Aquino put class interest and foreign... structures and institutions KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 85 On the other hand, landlords -capitalists and foreign interests continue to govern Philippine state and politics This condition explains significantly why a meaningful agrarian reform has never been implemented The grassroots sectors and a significant segment of the middle class have no or little space in. .. resources, and political opportunities, and mobilization strategies and tactics, and movement outcomes in the different struggles and uprisings Lastly, I will synthesize the discussions by underpinning the interface of theories and perspectives on peasant politics and social movement in light of the Philippine experience A Rural Struggles and Uprisings in the Philippines (1587-1970s): Perspectives on Peasant... pragmatism and KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 78 opportunism, and participated by political butterflies In a similar vein but with an internal focus, Villacorta’s (1994) article, The Curse of the Weak State: Leadership Imperatives for the Ramos Government”, traces the weakness of the Philippine state to its inability to dissociate itself from the interests of oligarchy... illustrates further the active involvement of peasants in organized or spontaneous collective political actions The next chapter provides a political historical account of Philippine peasant movements and politics KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 86 Chapter III Philippine Peasant Politics and Movements in Retrospect Peasant politics encompasses the issues of class,... struggle and resistance (armed and unarmed, direct and indirect), the intervention of external organizations and actors, and other issues that concern the rural society and population 91 In the Philippines, the axis of peasant politics seems to be the issue of agrarian reform and rural development The country’s contemporaries in implementing land reform in the 1940s have already carri d out the reform . KMP: Movement Generation, Activity, and Continuity in Philippine Society 54 CHAPTER II Philippine Agrarian Landscape and the State The 1997 financial crisis is instructive in that. the concentration of landownership in the hands of the few – the landlords and/ or capitalists and foreign controlled corporations. The Philippine landowning class, for instance, refers to the. grabbing and accumulation. The Philippine Bill of 1902 guaranteed the Americans the right to own and control agricultural lands in the Philippines; the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 limited the