The KMP (peasant movement of the philippines) movement generation, activity, and continuity in philippine society 23

I present four critical conditions that continue to marginalize the peasants and manifest the historical neglect for rural development – landlessness and land concentration, agrarian ref

CHAPTER II Philippine Agrarian Landscape and the State

The 1997 financial crisis is instructive in that it highlights the importance of rural development, specifically in Southeast Asia Lauridsen for instance raised that

“Thailand’s economic crisis might, to some extent, be cushioned by other sectors, e.g., as agriculture” (1998: 155) On the other hand, the financial dry up in Indonesia was aggravated by food shortages (Montes and Ali Abdusalamov, 1998: 180) In the Philippines,

“As economic downturn occurs and a new administration takes over, it is a good

time to call for and consider an alternative development strategy one that should

prioritize rural and agricultural development, an approach neglected by the

Philippines By concentrating on rural development and urban-rural linkages,

economic development can be more equitable, less import-dependent and

ultimately, more sustainable” (Lim, 1998: 220)

The Philippine agrarian landscape has hitherto been one of the facilitating conditions of rural protest “Centuries of Spanish rule, followed by US conquest and tutelage, left the Philippines with perhaps the most polarized land distribution in Asia” (Fox, 1990: 6) The seemingly degenerative character of the agrarian system and its submission to oligarchic and foreign interests coupled with ineffective laws and programs for rural development all contribute to the persistence of armed and unarmed, open and secret peasant movements and organizations, which I will discuss

in the next chapter

In this chapter, I basically aim to achieve two things First, elaborate on the structural causes of rural grievances and protest in Philippine society today I present four critical conditions that continue to marginalize the peasants and manifest the historical neglect for rural development – landlessness and land concentration, agrarian reform laws, economic policies and programs, and land conversion These conditions specifically refer to agrarian process under the Marcos, Aquino, and

Ramos governments Second, provide a theoretical perspective of Philippine state and politics This consideration opens up historical arguments for movement emergence and development in Philippine society In this light, I discuss in the second part the nature and character of Philippine state and politics in a historical dimension The third part serves as a conclusion to the underscore the interplay between the structural causes of rural protest and the Philippine state as facilitating contexts of rural struggles

A A Philippine Agrarian Situationer

The defining character of the Philippine agrarian system owes much to the country’s colonial and neo-colonial history A fundamental characteristic of Spanish colonialism was the development and consolidation of feudalism Within this economic system, “the old rights of the conquered natives to land were extinguished

by the feudal rule that ‘everything of value’ in the colonies formed part of the estate

of the King of Castilla” (Corpuz, 1997: 2) In this social order, the encomienda (land grants) and hacienda (agricultural plantations) system created and promoted

landlordism based on land grants and massive land grabbing by the colonial

government, church, and principalia (descendants of datus) Under the American

colonial period, landlordism persisted The land laws implemented by the colonial government became a mere instrument that promoted land grabbing and concentration

1 Landlessness and land concentration

The Philippine agrarian system is primarily characterized by a structure of landlessness.24 Landlessness does not only refer to the condition of not owning the

24

Among others, see Putzel and Cunnington 1989; Hayami et al 1989; Putzel 1992; IRDF 1994; Riedinger 1995; CPAR Secretariat 1993; PIAF 1998; and PPI 1999

land a peasant toils on but it likewise refers to the absence of control over that land. 25According to PPI, from 1990-1991 owner-cultivators made up only 25 per cent of total agr icultural households, while landless tenants, marginal farmers and workers comprised some 70 per cent.26 This study confirms the earlier research center’s findings that small-owner cultivators made up only 31% (1,416 out of 4,483) thereby pointing to a landlessness rate of 68% (Flores, 1994: 2-4, 9) The latest account, however, shows that in 1999, 5.5% of the landowning class controls at least 60% of Philippine lands while 8.5 million out of 11.2 million peasants (76%) are landless tillers.27

The flip side of landlessness is the concentration of landownership in the hands of the few – the landlords and/or capitalists and foreign controlled corporations The Philippine landowning class, for instance, refers to the likes of the Lopez family, Eduardo and Jose Cojuanco, Tinio family, Victoria Delantar, Henry

Ng Siu Hong, and the Floirendo family among others.28 While at least 1.02 million small landowners control 1.23 hectares on the average, these selected seven landlords control 6,126 hectares on the average Moreover, the said small landowners represent

16 and 26 per cent of the total number of rural and agricultural families respectively

On the other hand, foreign corporations refer to TNCs/MNCs like Dole Corporation, Philippine Packaging Corporation, NDC-Guthrie, TADECO (Tagum Development Corporation), United Brands, Sumitomo/Dahitri, and etcetera. 29 These

25 For Riedinger, the term “landless” refers throughout to all cultivating relationships in which

cultivators work land without having ownership or owner-like rights in that land, whether they are called “tenants,” “agricultural laborers,” or something else (1995, pp 75-76, emphasis in the original) 26

PPI 1991a, p 115, cited in Putzel 1992, p 26 Putzel and Cunnington (1989, p 17) have also

indicated that there were at least 1.5 million marginal farmers occupy hilly lands

six corporations alone control at least 92,000 hectares in Mindanao Of the local and foreign corporations, 722 of them control at least 216.1 hectares of prime agricultural lands on the average They also enjoy ownership-like rights to at least 15 per cent of the total 3.4 million farms and at least 1.72 per cent of the total agricultural land area

of 9.6 million hectares In aggregate, these corporations effectively control 3,061,918

mh with the TNCs controlling at least 592,690 hectares and almost all export-crops industry.30

To further illustrate, landholdings in Southern Luzon are claimed to be concentrated in the hands of fifty-three (53) landlords/corporations who control at least 276,410 hectares, hence, with an average of 5,215 hectares per person or entity They are led by the Roxas family, Romeo Roxas, Llana, Ayala/Zobel, Dolor, Rubio,

de Villa, and Aguirre in Batangas; Yulo, de los Reyes, Reyes/Elea zar, and Sta Lucia Realty Co in Laguna; Alvarez/Pagdangan Timber Products, Nationwide Princess Timber Corporation, and Palawan Lumber Manufacturing Co in Palawan, de Borja, Meralco Foundation, Borjam De Vera/Philcomsat, and Torres in Rizal; Sandico, Interwood (Cojuanco), and Eduardo Cojuanco in Mindoro Occidental; and Escudero, Rodriguez, Segundo Matias, Uy, Guanzon, Conuanco (Interwood), Don Domingo Reyes, Malvar, Suleta, Juanito Tan, and Yao in Quezon.31

In Central Luzon (Bulacan, Tarlac, and Nueva Ecija), lands are allegedly concentrated in the hands of 39 landlords/corporations who control at least 70,876 hectares, hence, with an average of 1,817 hectares per person or entity They are led

by the Romeo Roxas family, Hacienda de Santos, Sabani Estate, Berong Tinio,

30

Alternate Resource Center, ARC Mindanao, cited in Descanzo in PPI 1990, pp 28 -34 In Mindanao

about 80% of the total cropland area (3.1 million hectares) are tilled by peasants, leaseholders, freeholding settlers, and farmworkers In the Visayas, around 70% of the total cropland area (2.5 million hectares) are not owned by the actual tiller-producers In Central Luzon, despite being the showcase for land reform , 70% of rice farmers and 50% of sugar farmers remain landless (KMP 1986)

31

KASAMA-TK Manifesto, “Landlords in Southern Luzon,” nd., pp.1 -2

Hacienda Roxas/Soriamont, Gonzales family, Joson family, Capt Herrera, Mabutol, Cenon Buencamino, Puyat Estate, Luis Lacalle, Vermuda Estate, and Doña Sisang de Leon in Nueva Ecija; the Puyat Estate (Manila Bank Co.), Greggy Araneta, Villafuerte family, Carlos Yu (Globe paper mill), Villa Rica family, Bautista family, Gokongwei/Robina, Lipana Estate, Valarao, S Perez, Pancho-Abadia, Ines Ramirez, Valentin Fernando, and the Sta Lucia Estate in Bulacan; and by the Cojuanco family, Herson, Sawit, Calma, Macaraeg, Reyes, Sembrano, Cancio, Fajardo, Onsiaco family, and Obiena in Tarlac.32

2 Land/Agrarian Reform Laws

Since the dawn of the twentieth century, at least eleven (11) major land reform laws/policies have been formulated and implemented.33 These legislative measures, however, have been insufficient to resolve landlessness, abate land accumulation, and develop the agrarian system First, the laws passed especially during the American period facilitated land grabbing and were used to increase the landholding of the elites.34

The first five years of American colonialism saw the implementation of certain

“land legislation” measures that institutionalized land grabbing and accumulation The Philippine Bill of 1902 guaranteed the Americans the right to own and control agricultural lands in the Philippines; the Philippine Organic Act of 1902 limited the size

of public lands that could be acquired by individuals to 16 hectares (but later amended to

32 AMGL Manifesto on Landlessness, 1998

33 These land and agrarian reform laws pertain to the Philippine Bill of 1902, Philippine Organic Act

of 1902, Public Land Act of 1903, Land Registration Act of 1902, Friar Lands Act of 1904, Sugar Cane Tenancy Act of 1933 (Public Act No 4133) and Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1935 (Public Act

No 4054), Agricultural Tenancy Act of 1954 (R.A 1199), Land Reform Act of 1955 (R.A 1400), Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A 3844), Proclamation No 2 (R.A 6389 of 1971) and P.D 27, and the

CARP (RA 6657) See Wurfel in Ledesma, Makil, and Miralao 1983; Constantino and Constantino

1984; Ofreneo 1987; de la Cruz 1990, pp 43-59, Esguerra 1990, pp 93-114, Mariano 1990, pp

117-126, all in LINANGAN IV 1990; Putzel and Cunnington 1989, pp 69-73; Hayami et al 1990, pp

70-79; Putzel 1992, pp 58, 272-275; Riedinger 1995, pp 139-176)

34

Refer to Shalom 1987; Schirmer and Shalom 1986; Putzel and Cunningtion 1989; de la Cruz in

LINANGAN IV 1990; Putzel 1992; Hayami et al 1989; Riedinger 1995; and Corpuz 1997

100 hectares) and by corporations to 1,024 hectares; Public Land Act of 1903 allowed anyone to acquire 16 hectares of public land by establishing a homestead and cultivating

it for five years with payment of a nominal fee; Land Registration Act of 1902 (Act No 496) which created a court that would certify land titles under the Torrens system but registration was not compulsory, and until 1910 the titles distributed were only for big landholdings; and the Friar Lands Act of 1904 which provided for the acquisition and redistribution of friar lands that were sold at the cost of purchase.35

Second, the land reform programs of the Quezon, Magsaysay, Macapagal, and Marcos governments were basically limited to rice and corn farms More so, they have been more concerned in regulating tenurial arrangements such as land rent and other agrarian relations such as usury

In the 1930s, share tenancy became more widespread and reached the scale of 36 per cent compared to the 22 per cent noted in 1918 Constantino (1975) attributed this to

the decline of cash tenants (inquilinos), who were increasingly unable to pay fixed rents

demanded by the tenurial system Many inquilinos were thus compelled to become share

tenants (kasamas), providing labor and sharing the harvest on a 50- 50 basis after

deducting the planting and harvesting expenses The relationship is further aggravated by

an overpriced land use, usury, and the provision of free labor of various kinds at the discretion of the landowner (also cited in PPI, 1998: 57)

In this context, the Quezon government enacted land laws of limited scope First, the Rice Share Tenancy Act of 1933 (Public Act No 4054) called for a standardization of a 50-50 sharing agreement for tenants and was obviously applicable for rice farms and limited to improving tenurial arrangements This was only applicable, however, to those areas that would be petitioned by the municipal

35

See Shalom, 1987; Schirmer and Shalom, 1986; Putzel and Cunningtion, 1989; Esguerra 1990: 114; de la Cruz, 1990; Hayami et al., 1989: 70-79; Riedinger, 1995; Mariano, 1990: 117 -126; Putzel, 1992: 58, 272-275; Riedinger, 1995: 139 -176; and Corpuz, 1997: 270-73

93-council Second, the Sugar Cane Tenancy Act of 1934 (Public Act No 4133) obliged landlords to report or disclose to government the operations of their sugar centers – amount of harvest, quantity of sugar milled, etcetera.36

The government also enacted the law regarding the Expropriation of Landed Estates It stipulated the right of government to purchase vast tracts of land to be distributed to the farmers This measure was taken to appease peasant unrest and weaken the revolt of farmers in Central Luzon The law, however, did not prosper due to the lack of support services (PPI, 1998: 58) “For obvious reasons, such as the fact that many of his friends and supporters were from the landed class, Quezon could only proceed slowly with agrarian reform” (Caoili, 1986: 35 cited in Rivera, 1994: 113) Interestingly, landlords in 1936 started organizing private armies and resistance movements to refuse the implementation of Quezon’s tenancy laws (PPI

1998, p 59)

By 1952, the problem of usury and tenancy arrangements cropped up again as the traders had acquired dominance of the loans granted to peasants over the

landlords (De la Cruz, 1990: 48 cf Rivera and Panganiban 1975, p 47) In this

context, the Magsaysay government implemented the Agricultural Tenancy Act of

1954 (R.A 1199) and the Land Reform Act of 1955 (R.A 1400) The first, however, was confined to share tenancy, espousing a 70-30 sharing scheme, and restricted interest loans from 8-10 per cent The second law remarkably imposed a very high retention limit of 300 hectares for individuals and 600 hectares for corporation It also limited interest rate to 30 per cent This ‘land to the landless’ decree, however, will

36

de la Cruz, pp 43-59, Esguerra (pp 93-114), and Mariano (pp 117 -126) all in LINANGAN 1990;

Putzel and Cunnington 1989, pp 69-73; Hayami et al 1990, pp 70-79; Putzel 1992, pp 58, 272 -275; Riedinger 1995, pp 139-176

only be implemented in those areas petitioned by the majority of the tenants.37 These national laws, however, did not stop the creditors in exploiting the peasantry

Moreover, R.A 821 and R.A 720 respectively established the Agricultural Credit and Cooperative Farmers Association and rural banking system to extend rural credit to farmers By the end of the 1950s, however, the cooperatives and rural banking disappeared Instead, credit went to sugar from agriculture with the rice industry receiving only 23.2 per cent for production and 7.45% for trading Worse, only 20% per cent of agricultural credit went to small peasants that comprised 95% of the agricultural population And by 1958, the average interest rate was 126.8 per cent

per annum (de la Cruz, 1990: 48, cf Rivera and Panganiban 1975) Under the

presidency of Macapagal, the Land Reform Code of 1963 (R.A 3844) was implemented Similar with past laws, it only covered rice and corn farms and set a retention limit of 75 hectares, a considerable decrease compared to R.A 1400 nonetheless

In 1971, the Marcos regime decreed Proclamation No 2 (R.A 6389) imposing an ownership limit of 24 hectares while P.D 27 subjected 1.8 million hectares of rice and corn farms under land reform and set a lower retention limit of 7 hectares Again, however, the laws were in essence not very different from those passed under the Quezon, Magsaysay, and Macapagal governments In mid-1970s, these laws were succeeded by the implementation of MASAGANA ‘99 (for rice) and MAISAGANA ’97 (for corn) programs The Marcos government launched these

37

Ibid., pp 43-59; Esguerra (pp 93-114); Mariano in LINANGAN IV 1990, pp 117-126; Putzel and

Cunnington 1989, pp 69-73; Hayami et al 1990, pp 70-79; Putzel 1992, pp 58, 272-275; Riedinger

1995, pp 139 -176

programs to provide loans for farmers to buy capital inputs and set up the Agricultural Development and Input Financing Loan.38

Third, the trend of implementing land redistribution has followed the pattern where government buys the land from big landowners and sells it to the farmers But

as early as 1903, this has been the practice under the Friar Lands Act and in the final analysis the lands acquired go back to wealthy landowners, traders, and capitalists because the farmers cannot simply afford to pay the price Fourth, the implementation

of all land/agrarian reform programs and rural development has always been coupled with “counter -insurgency” measures, if not solely driven by such politico-military intent

Fifth, despite being limited in their scope (mostly to rice and corn farms and tenurial improvements), these programs have set generous retention limits for landlords and agribusiness corporations, especially the TNCs.39 And in the case of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), it is marred by comprehensive exemptions, the institutionalization of land use conversion, and alternative schemes of implementation that facilitate agrarian reform evasion

But what has the Philippine Government achieved in land redistribution for the last three decades? From 1972 to December 1998, a total of 4.8 million hectares (mh) of lands have been distributed through the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) DAR accounts for 60 per cent or 2.9 mh while DENR accounts for 40 per cent or 1.9 mh Approximately, 21 per cent of these lands or 1.04 mh were distributed under Marcos

38

By 1982, however, 66 per cent of total credit was still coming from “non-formal credit” The traders dominated the provision of loans up to the 1970s while the input dealers and some OCWs (overseas contract workers) dominated the 1980s The statistical figure almost equaled the average percentage of informal credit in 1960 (De la Cruz, 1989: 51)

39

Under Marcos, 500 corporations were able to gain control of 60,000 hectares of land (Putzel and Cunnington 1989: 15)

(1972-1986), 32 per cent or 1.57 mh under Aquino, while 47 per cent or 2.29 mh were distributed under the Ramos regime.40

What is even more interesting is that 82 per cent (2.6 mh) of the 4.3 mh under the jurisdiction of DAR are locked in 108,480 agrarian-related litigations in various courts, quasi-judicial and regular court proceedings involving cancellation, exemption, retention, ownership disputes, and conversion applications (SENTRA, 1997: 18) On top of this sticky situation, at least 18,759 CLTs (certificate of land transfer), 2,454 EPs (emancipation patents), and 326 CLOAs (certificate of land ownership awards) covering about 67,442.84 hectares have been canceled These cancellations have affected about 25,062 farmer beneficiaries as of December 1995 (ibid., 24).41 The situation explains the case of uninstalled farmer beneficiaries

Finally, the argument that CARL has not significantly addressed landlessness

as it has boastfully promised boils down to the analysis of its changing scope From its original scope of 10.3 mh, it has gone down to 8.1 mh in 1997 and 6.80 mh in

1998 (Flores, 1994: 2-4).42 In a ten-year period, the coverage has decreased by at least 34 per cent or 3.5 mh But still, the 1997 revised scope includes 3.8 mh of forest lands under the Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISFP) Hence, the actual coverage is only 4.3 mh which comprise a mere one-third of the total agricultural land of 12 mh.43

40 PARC Secretariat, cited in MTPDP 1998-2004, pp 3-61 to 3-62; Unofficial DAR, IMR-FOSSO

report, cited in Borras Jr 1999: 4-7; DAR 1997 Report, The Ramos Legacy in Agrarian Reform: A

Transition Report

41

From 1980 to December 1993, at least 10,598 CLTs (15,598 hectares), 9,133 EPs (8,198 hectares), and 2,302 CLOAs (8,243.9 hectares) have been canceled affecting at least 18,348 farmer beneficiaries (Ochoa 1993, p 6)

Aside from landlessness and land accumulation and ineffective agrarian reform laws, peasants have to endure exploitative and oppressive agrarian relations such as land rent, usury, unfavorable terms of trade, and low cost of labor, and low -level production In the 1990s, rice and corn sharecroppers pay 25-50 per cent of their harvest to the landowner with the latter incurring the production expenses (Putzel,

1992: 31) Under the kasama system, the tenants pay an average of more than 50 per

cent (Descanzo, 1990: 35) According to a KMP-PAMALAKAYA situationer (1999), land rent ranges from 50-80 per cent In coconut farms, the usual sharing

scheme is 1:2 or tersio (one-third) – one part for the farm worker and two parts for

the landowner

Moreover, current usurious lending rates range from 50-100 per cent in one harvest season (KMP-PAMALAKAYA Situationer, 1999) while in the aspect of

buying and selling their produce, peasants have to deal with unscrupulous traders

and trading monopolies that directly and indirectly exploit them (Lactao, 1990: 81) Citing government sources, KMP (1999: 13-14) states that farm workers in general earn more or less P112.76 a day in 1997 In corn farms, they earn a maximum

61-of P96.86 a day For those who work on a daily basis, they could earn only as much

as P87.10 and in Cagayan Valley, hired labor could cost as low as P69.86 a day

On top of these conditions, peasants have to likewise confront the increasing cost of production This pertains to the rent for carabaos and equipments (thresher and tractor accessories), transportation, seeds, irrigation, and fertilizers and pesticides that could cause harmful effects to them, the land, and environment The situation, however, is further aggravated by national economic policies and programs

Agreements And yet, only 1.078 mh of ISF areas were excluded from coverage in the 1998 PARC Secretariat report (AR Now! and PASCRES, 1998: 4)

that continue to undermine the importance of agrarian reform and rural development (ARRD) in national development

3 Economic policies and programs

The economic orientation and system under Spanish colonialism did not

“change” under the U.S colonial rule; rather it was transformed into an “economy of special relations” The U.S colonial government used Philippine society for the expansion of American tra de From 1910 to 1913, US exports to the Philippines grew

by 437% while Philippine exports to the US grew by 213% from 1910 to 1912 And

in 1940, Philippine exports and imports accounted for 44% and 56% respectively of the total foreign trade of almost P516 million Moreover, the country’s imports were still mainly manufacturers from the US, while exports continued to be in the form of the same cash crops and agricultural goods that had been dominant since the Spanish era In 1913, the Payne-Aldrich Act, which still contained some trade restrictions for Philippine exports, was abolished and replaced by the Underwood-Simmons Act establishing a complete free trade (Corpuz, 1997: 219-40).44

On the other hand, the period 1914 to 1929 saw the expansion of the economy

of special relations, with commercial banking resources expanding and foreign trade reaching its highest level during the occupation period The U.S involvement in World War I in 1916 strengthened the relations, manifested by the more-than-doubling of Philippine exports to the U.S between 1916 and 1918 The prices of imported coal soared and hit the railroad and infant manufacturing sector The war also caused a halt to external capital inflows Recession hit the Philippines in 1920 as export trade collapsed and imports exploded In 1921, low consumer demands led to failures of commercial and manufacturing establishments; there were lay-offs and

44

Data on exports and imports and foreign trade were also cited in PPI, 1998: 36, 37

labor strikes, while bank loans were either frozen or written off Recovery seemed complete in 1929 but the Great Depression foiled the momentum Hitting the Philippines in 1930, it first affected foreign trade first and then spread to agriculture, business, and government finances Under the Commonwealth government continued

to implement a policy that focused on export agriculture and relied on imports to fill

in supply shortfalls (ibid 235-52; PPI, 1998: 37)

Since the 1970s, broader socio-historical structures and processes like liberalization and globalization have been crystallized in national landscapes through economic policies and programs of respective governments In the last three decades, the Marcos, Aquino, and Ramos governments passed numerous laws to implement liberalization, especially in the agricultural sector

On 27 May 1974, the dictatorial regime enacted the Corporate Farming Act allowing foreign and local firms to buy or lease large tracts of land This policy primarily attracted TNCs and MNCs to dominate plantation agriculture in the Philippines It also became a legal basis for succeeding laws such as the Foreign Investment Act, Land Lease Act, and the Amendment to the Foreign Investment Act, among others The mid-70s also witnessed the launching of the Green Revolution that introduced modern imported technology to rice farming and promoted the use of high yielding varieties (HYVs) The unsustainable and ecologically damaging character, however, of this capital-intensive technology became evident as most soils become unresponsive to the massive doses of agro-chemicals (De la Cruz, 1990: 48; PPI, 1998: 39) On the other hand, at least 1,027 commodity goods have been subject

to import liberalization in the later years of the regime, from 1981 to 1986 (Lactao,

1990: 74).45

Upon Aquino’s ascendancy to power, her government formulated and implemente d CARP (R.A 6657) Under this program, commercial farms were placed under a 10-year deferment period (Sec 11) The policy has also institutionalized land conversion (Sec 65), granted the same privileges that private corporations or TNCs/MNCs enjoyed under the past regime (Sec 8, par b and c.), and stipulated alternative schemes of implementation that are being used to evade land reform

Moreover, the Aquino government lifted the ban on exporting copra and the construction of additional processing fac ilities that was implemented under the Marcos regime By virtue of deregulation, the former enticed multinational corporations to invest and set up their processing facilities in our country and in turn create employment This, however, did not materialize as the investors just bought existing facilities that were on the brink of bankruptcy (Lactao, 1990: 74) And In the first two years of her self -declared “revolutionary government”, the number of commodity goods put under import liberalization increased to 1,232 (ibid.)

On 16 March 1989, the government approved the Letter of Intent (LOI), courtesy of IMF-WB pressures The LOI pushed for the import liberalization system and the commitment to pay the country’s foreign debts It also contains a 3-year economic program for government to raise the prices of fuel, rice, power, water and port services, cut public spending, fast track the selling of state companies, develop the collection of taxes, and implement reforms on financial and trade systems (Goño, 1995: 17)

In July 1991, the Aquino government started adopting the structural adjustment program (SAP) The SAP originated from the IMF-WB’s new credit program, the “structural adjustment loan” (SAL) that was introduced in 1979 By the middle of 1980, the Philippines is one of the four countries willing to accept the conditions that came with it (Broad and Bello, 1982: 166-167) Structural adjustment programs aim to implement a particular program of reform and contain the following elements (Bello, 2001: 11-13, 48-53, 80):

1 A radical reduction in government spendings

2 Liberalization of imports and removing restrictions on foreign investments

3 Privatization of state enterprises and radical deregulation

4 Currency devaluation to make exports more competitive

5 Controlling wages and elimination of mechanisms protecting labor The economic policies of the Ramos administration did not vary much from past governments Philippine political economy still treaded the path of unbridled liberalization and export-oriented development Under the infamous catchword

Philippines 2000, the administration aimed for economic growth as the sole

barometer for national development This vision embedded in the development strategy of the Medium Term Philippine Development Plan of 1993-1998 (MTPDP)

was to guide the country to NIChood - being a newly industrialized country by the end of the century After much realistic criticisms, however, the term “newly industrialized country” was reformulated to “newly industrializing country”

Embodied in the MTPDP, the Medium Term Agricultural Development Plan (MTADP) constituted the administration’s plan for agriculture Under the MTADP, the Key Production Approach stipulated the reduction of rice and corn lands from 2.5 million hectares each to 1.2 million and 0.7 million hectares respectively.46 These

46

KINAIYAHAN Bulletin June 1993 It should be noted that in 1977, around 3.7 million hectares of agricultural lands were devoted to rice production (Putzel and Cunnington, 1989: 29-31)

major agricultural crops were sacrificed to give way to the production of cash or export crops like cutflowers and asparagus (Institute of Political Economy, 1999: 10) and interestingly, golf courses.47

To this effect, the period 1992 to 1998 witnessed the implementation of laws

to “enhance” the economic competitiveness through liberalization – e.g R.A 765248, R.A 788149, R.A 790050, R.A 817851, R.A 817952, R.A 8180, FLA53, IFMA54, the New Mining Act of 199555, and the implementation of the structural adjustment program (SAP), among others Globalization and regionalization was characterized

by the country’s membership to multilateral institutions such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade – World Trade Organization (GATT-WTO) in 1994, the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) in 1996, and the eventual inclusion

of agriculture to the GATT-WTO.56 Among the post-martial law governments, the

47

Under the Estrada government, the landlord dominated Congress, according to Bello , allocated the Department of Agrarian Reform only P600 million for land acquisition and distribution in 1999, or half of the budget for 1998 (2001: 179)

Grants incentives, tax holidays, and infrastructure support for agribusiness corporations engaged in export production

51

Otherwise known as the Agricultural Tariffication Act, it abolishes quantitative restrictions on the importation of basic agricultural products sufficiently produced in the country as well as meat products This law nullifies at least five significant laws such as R.A 1296 of 1955 which prohibits the importation of onion, potato, garlic and cabbage; R.A 2712 which bans importation of coffee beans; R.A 1297 which provides for the centralized importation of beef; R.A 7607 or the Magna Carta for Small Farmers which prohibits the importation of agricultural products widely and sufficiently produced in the country; and R.A 7308 or the Seed Industry Development Act prohibiting the importation of sees produced in the Philippines (BAYAN 1996, pp 68 -74)

52 Amendment to Foreign Investment Act; allows foreign investors to own 100% of any business they want to establish in the country

53 Refers to Fishpond Lease Agreement and stipulates that private and foreign corporations can lease coastal lines and other bodies of water for fishpond purposes and prawn farms

Ramos government has, thus far, championed in the implementation of IMF-WB imposed economic programs

The aforementioned policies and programs have invariably affected Philippine agriculture, peasants, and the national economy in a very negative way The effects range from land conversion and land grabbing, agrarian reform evasion, land accumulation, worsening poverty and landlessness, land conflicts and rural activism, human rights violation, food insecurity, dependency, to rural and national underdevelopment, and the “institutionalization of stagnation” (Bello, 2001: 238)

4 Land conversion

The Philippines has a total land area of 30 million hectares Of this land area,

49 per cent or 14.66 million hectares are classified as alienable and disposable or devoted to agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, and other purposes, while the remaining 51 per cent or 14.02 million hectares are forested lands Of the alienable and disposable lands, 65 per cent or 9.607 million hectares are devoted for agricultural use (Descanzo, 1990: 28).57

In 1960, the average farm size was 3.6 hectares but it decreased by 1.4 hectares or 39 per cent in 1991 reflecting a general decrease in the average farm size

of the given major crops Rice farms grew smaller by 40 per cent or 1.8 hectares on the average while corn and coconut farms suffered a decrease of 20 (0.5 hectare) and

18 per cent (0.8 hectare) respectively On the other hand, sugarcane and tobacco accounted for the highest decrease of 49 (6.8 hectares) and 41 per cent (0.7 hectares) respectively (ibid.)

Farm law that was supposed to wean farmers from government subsidies (see “House passes farm bill”

in Associated Press, Thursday, May 2, 2:42 PM ET, by PHILIP BRASHER, AP Farm Writer;

http://agriculture.house.gov/farmbill.htm ; http://agriculture.house.gov/farmbill.htm ;

http://agriculture.senate.gov/Briefs/2001FarmBill/2001farmbill.htmlhttp://clerkweb.house.gov/cgi bin/vote.exe?year=2002&rollnumber=123

-57

Cited from The Bureau of Lands, December 31, 1985; see also The 1999 Philippine Statistic Yearbook, NCSB, p 3

Furthermore, the period of 1980-1991 shows that the average farm size of 2.81 hectares covering a total of 9.6 million hectares has decreased to 2.20 hectares

or by 22 per cent This signifies a loss of at least 2,113,487 hectares of prime agricultural lands with rice farms accounting for a 41 per cent decrease (863,811 hectares), corn farms by 449,650 hectares or 21 per cent, and coconut farms by 284,290 or 13 per cent These major crops accounted for the 1.59 million hectares or

75 per cent loss.58

But such an alarming decrease in prime agricultural lands is further aggravated by the onslaught of land use conversion Land conversion practically refers to the alteration of land use from agricultural to non-agricultural purposes such

as residential, industrial, commercial, and other uses But for the Philippine peasants,

it specifically refers to “an irreversible process that can mean a permanent loss of the soil’s capacity for agricultural production”.59 And in the Philippines, where at least

43 per cent of the population (31.29 million)60 and 63 per cent of the poor (16.9 million)61 traditionally depend on the sector for their livelihood (MTPDP, 1998: 3-2), misguided land conversion becomes virtually a crime

On the other hand, land conversion is a very convenient way of evading agrarian reform Remarkably, most of the lands converted and being converted are gazetted for distribution This explains the widespread cancellation of certificates of land titles62 and certificates of land ownership awards.63 Under the situation, the

In 1999, the poor population comprised about 36.8 per cent of the total population or 26,768,532 out

of 72.74 million (1999 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, NCSB, p 2-25) But in 1995, Ramos himself admitted in his speech (World Summit for Social Development) that poverty oppresses half of the

population of 66 million Under this assumption, there could be at least 22.9 million poor people

depending on the agricultural sector

62

These refer to the certificates of land rights distributed under the Marcos regime

Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) shoulders considerable responsibility in

“checking” anomalous land conversions with the assistance of the Department of Justice

But what is the extent of land use conversion in the Philippines?

What proved to be the landmark case for land conversion was the Lankaan Estate in Dasmariñas, Cavite The 232-hectare agricultural land was allegedly declared as suitable for commercial and industrial use under the Zoning Ordinance of

1980 The National Development Corporation (NDC) had leased this prime agricultural land to the Marubeni Corporation and in 1980 the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) reclassified the property as industrial The Aquino administration approved the conversion of the land favoring the Marubeni Corporation and the Japanese International Development Organization (JAIDO)

The decision was based on what is now called “DOJ Opinion 44” (infamously known as DOJ 44) which states that all applications for land use conversion which are approved by the HULRB before R.A 6657 was enacted could no longer be stopped.64 This case was further supported by the formal launching of the CALABARZON project (Cavite-Laguna-Batangas-Rizal Export Processing Zone) in October 1990 symbolizing the export-led industrialization program of the Aquino government This project covered around 1,622,866 hectares and 53 per cent of this area used to be agricultural lands.65

From 1991-1997, “legal” land conversion has witnessed an exponential growth of 1,098 per cent The number of applications processed increased by 503 per cent, from 468 to 2,823 The DAR-approved area increased by 606 per cent, from

63

These refer to the certificates of land rights distributed under the Aquino and Ramos regimes or under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program

3,089 hectares to 21,903 hectares On the other hand, the DOJ 44 covered area exceeded DAR’s performance by more than three times registering a conversion-approval growth rate of 2,005 per cent, from 7,665 hectares to 35,063 hectares.66

As of 31 March 1997, the batting average of DAR and DOJ 44 in approving land conversions is an outstanding 80 per cent (PIAF, 1998: 10) But the picture is worse if we compare the DAR data from other sources As of March 1997, DAR states that only 50,720 hectares have been legally converted but SENTRA (1997: 21) shows that in only three regions, at least 80,037 hectares of agricultural lands have been converted.67 Does it follow that the discrepancy spells the widespread practice

of illegal land conversion?

Legal and illegal land conversions have covered at least 200,000 hectares of prime agricultural lands and affected about 130,000 farmers (PIAF, 1998: 6).68 Other

“unaccounted” cases are exampled by the conversion of 13,000 hectares in Central Luzon since 1992, another 7,000 hectares in Western Visayas since 1993, and 5,500 hectares more in SOCSARGEN area since 1994 (SENTRA 1997: 30).69 But

according to DAR in its 1997 report entitled The Ramos Legacy in Agrarian Reform:

A Transition Report, only 12,564 hectares were legally converted from July 1992 to

December 1997, while some 22,000 hectares were converted from 1987 to 1992 (p

66 Data for the years 1991-March 1997 was derived from the Philippine Institute for Alternative Futures 1998: 4, based on DAR CLUPPI Secretariat; Data for June 1997 - PPI 1998, a situationer based on DAR CLUPPI Secretariat reports

67

These regions pertain to the CALABARZON, Cebu, and the Cagayan -Iligan Industrial Corridor 68

In an earlier estimate, PPI stated that from June 1988 to March 1994, converted lands could reach

160,247 hectares (Ochoa 1994: 16; also cited in PIAF 1998: 6) Moreover, KMP (1998: 4) stated that

since 1987, 268,000 hectares of agricultural lands have been converted - 118,000 during the Aquino period and 150,000 under Ramos

69

Riedinger (1995: 182) citing a KMP study, further states that Section 20 of the Local Government Code that grants authority over land conversions to local governments is likely to cause the reclassification of 371,000 hectares of agricultural lands, which will then be exempt from the reform process

31).70 As for coconuts alone, at least 38,161,400 trees have been cut affecting about 190,807 hectares as of mid-1993 (Asprer-Grafilo in PPI, 1993: 16).71

On the other hand, not only does land conversion perpetuate landlessness but

it reinforces the country’s food insecur ity as well In converting prime agricultural lands, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) estimated that of the 40,644 hectares converted in 1993, 5,300 hectares of these lands could have yielded 180,000 tons of rice (PIAF, 1998: 8-9) As early as 1991, however, 118,000 hectares of

irrigated lands have been lost to non-agricultural uses (Balisacan et al, 1994, cited in

AR Now! and PASCRES, 1998: 3)

In a conservative estimate, if one hectare can produce 60 sacks of palay, the country have los t at least 7.08 million sacks or 3.54 million cavans of rice Another estimate states that 53 per cent of the converted rice lands (80 cavans per hectare at P250 per cavan) amounted to a loss of P133 million (ACSPPF-IDR-KAS, 1997: 34) Land conversions to a significant extent explain three things – why the country has to import 906 metric tons in 1996 and another 731 metric tons of rice in 1997,72 why has the country’s agricultural growth has exponentially dwindled by – 253 per cent, from 4.04 in 1980 to – 6.2 in 1998,73 and why has the country’s volume of agricultural production only grew by 0.66 per cent from 1980 to 1997.74

Land conversion fortifies and deepens the structure of landlessness and exacerbates existing agrarian problems Extant agrarian/land reform laws are simply

70 And according to other sources, the peasantry has been deprived of at least 3.772 million hectares of agricultural lands where 800,00 hectares have already been converted and the 3.1 million hectares are devoted to export crops (KMP-PAMALAKAYA Situationer Oct 21, 1999)

71

The breakdown is as follows - Northern Mindanao, 16.8 million trees affecting 84,000 has.; Central Visayas, 12.6 million trees affecting 63,000 hectares; Southern Tagalog, 3.1314 million trees affecting 15,675 hectares; Western Visayas, 2.850 million trees affecting 41,250 hectares; and Southern Mindanao, 2.78 million trees affecting 13,900 hectares

72

IPE 1999, p 10, cited from Bureau of Agricultural Statistics

73

Ibid cited from NCSB, CB, DOLE (selected years); NCSB, GNP and GDP by Industrial Origin,

January -September 1997 and 1998 (Growth Rates)

74

Ibid p 8

powerless against such contrivance But what makes the situation more incredible and contentious is that these conversions are legalized and legitimized by interesting legal provisions and orders Among others, these refer to the Preside ntial Decree No 2052;75 EO 129-A, Series of 1987;76 Sec 65 of CARP;77 Sec 8, par b and c of CARP;78 Sec 11;79 DAR A.O No 1, Series of 1990;80 DAR A.O No 2, Series of 1990;81 DAR A.O No 8, Series of 1990;82 Sec 20 of the Local Government Code;83DOJ Opinion No 44, Series of 1990;84 Malacañang A.O No 20, Series of December 1992;85 Memorandum Order No 54, Series of 1993;86 and E.O 124 of 1993.87Moreover, these legislative measures are further reinforced by liberalization laws that consent landlessness, encourage land reform without land redistribution, and promote

development based on exogenous factors – e.g R.A 7652, R.A 7881, R.A 7900,

Allows the indeterminate continuity of lease and management contracts executed with MNCs over lands already distributed to farmer-beneficiaries These have been used by Del Monte Phils Inc and NDC-Guthrie Phils Inc to continue controlling, through leaseback agreement, some 8,019 and 4,000 hectares of lands respectively (SENTRA, 1997: 10)

A reaffirmation of Section 65 of R.A 6657 and Section 20 of the Local Government Code Disallows LGUs from authorizing the reclassification of irrigated and irrigable lands But again invokes the provisions of Sec 20 of the LGC

87

Speeds up the approval of land conversion reducing the requirements and procedures to 10 steps from the previous 24

R.A 8178, R.A 8179, R.A 8180, and the New Mining Act of 1995, among others

(see discussions in the previous section )

The existence of the aforesaid laws and legal provisions explain significantly what Bello mentions as the successful legal actions by landlords in moving to cancel the emancipation patents (EPs) and certificates of land ownership awards (CLOAs) already awarded to farmer beneficiaries In the last four of Ramos, 17,534 EPs and CLOAs covering 40,677 hectares were nullified while 15,064 EPs and CLOAs covering 36,315 hectares were cancelled during Estrada’s first two years (Bello, 2001: 197)

“Land conversion”, hence, is perceived to have become the instrument of the unscrupulous to legally grab lands and perpetrate brute harassment and coercion among the farmers, fisherfolks, and indigenous peoples, and make profits from destroying the ecological balance of the country.88 Today, peasants and peasant-based formations continue to build organizations and networks, advocate their concerns,

and carry out collective action to fight the land conversion rush

The abovementioned conditions – landlessness and land concentration, ineffective land and agrarian reform laws, economic policies and programs, and land conversion – illustrate the very basis of grievance and protest by a multitude of peasant movements and organizations, nonetheless, in varying degrees and focus In another but very related dimension, these conditions impact on the growing violence

in the countryside The discussions on laws and economic policies and programs, moreover, clearly implicate the Philippine state as another subject and object of protest This entity, hence, requires a brief investigation

B Philippine State and Political Economy

88

PPI 1993, pp 4-5; Flores in PPI 1994, pp 6-7; SENTRA 1997; ACSPPF-IDR-KAS 1997, pp 38; PIAF 1998

32-I perceive the assertion of state autonomy in Philippine society as both theoretically and empirically problematic On theoretical grounds, to autonomize state from society is analogous to cutting the former’s umbilical cord State exists in society and it is impossible to have an ahistorical state – quite inconceivable to have

“states without societies, without either origins or conditions of reception (Chandhoke, 1995: 11) The state, moreover, “is a strategically selective terrain which can never be neutral among all social forces and political projects”

(Chandhoke, 1995: 71 cf Jessop 1990: 353) Moreover, the assertion of state

autonomy becomes a murky position if contextualized within Third World societies, which have histories of colonization and neo-colonization

Empirically speaking, the Philippine state has historically been “weak”; captured by foreign and domestic powerful forces The following political historical accounts aptly describe this statement – Lande’s “patronage politics” (1966); Bello, Kinley, and Ellinson’s “colonization without an occupation force”; Hutchcroft’s

“patrimonial plunder” (1991); Anderson’s “cacique democracy” (1988); McCoy’s

“clientelistic politics” (1988); Wurfel’s “development and decay” (1988); Guttierez’s

“the ties that bind” (1991); Rivera’s “landlords and capitalists” (1994); Villacorta’s

“curse of the weak state” (1994); and Buendia’s “a nation that failed to become” (1994)

Three academic literatures succinctly capture the nature and character of

Philippine state and politics Buendia’s (1994) article, “The Philippines”, raised the

uncertainty of lasting development in a nation that failed to become He traced the country’s political and economic subservience of the state from the country’s colonial past and neo-colonial status He further characterized Philippine politics as neo-colonial, patron-clientelistic, elitist, personalistic, run by pragmatism and

opportunism, and participated by political butterflies In a similar vein but with an

internal focus, Villacorta’s (1994) article, “The Curse of the Weak State: Leadership Imperatives for the Ramos Government”, traces the weakness of the Philippine state

to its inability to dissociate itself from the interests of oligarchy – the landed elites, which likewise dominates the industrial sector He further stated that the weak state and the perceived weak leadership are systemic – actually rooted in the iniquitous social structure as well as the refusal of past governments to confront this social structure Nonetheless, Villacorta underlined the country’s colonial and neo-colonial history as an important factor in considering Philippine state and politics

The concrete reference to the historical “weakness” of the Philippine state

could be summed up based on what Rivera, in his book Landlords and Capitalists: Class, Family, and State in Philippine Manufacturing, claims as the four enduring

social features caused by a protracted colonial rule: “1) a resilient oligarchy rooted in land and export agriculture; 2) a tradition of authoritarian-clientelistic political leadership in a politically fractured polity; 3) a history of significant popular opposition movements erupting at critic al conjunctures; and 4) continuing marked dependence on foreign external resources” (1994: 112) In particular, he examined the dominance of landlords -and-capitalists in the Philippine manufacturing sector Similar with Buendia and Villacorta, he also emphasized how the country’s colonial and neo-colonial legacy contributed to the “underdevelopment” of state and politics.89

The aforesaid perspectives are further elaborated by the following political historical accounts of Philippine political development Spanish rule did not in any

89

For a special issue about varying accounts of the Philippine state and economy, refer to

KASARINLAN’s issue of “Rethinking the State and the Economy”, 1994, Vol 10, No 1, TWSC –

UP, Diliman

way move to establish an integrated, national system of government Spain’s only interest in developing the Philippine trade system was anchored on the expansion of the Peninsular’s economy (Fast and Richardson, 1979: 5) Regarded as exploiters, the Spanish officials, friars and local officials were not respected and the landlords assumed the role of benefactor and protector (Villacorta, 1994: 68) This historical condition sowed the seeds of patronage politics

Patronage politics is a political economic category that pertains to the relationship of a landlord and a tenant – the landlord being the patron and the tenant being the client In a political set-up, the patron wields power and the client in return provides personal services and dedicates unconditional loyalty, e.g., in the form of votes The dyadic ties are vertical relationships, i.e., the bond between prosperous patrons and their poor and dependent clients The patron-client relationship further underpins a kinship dimension, with the paternalistic landlord acting as the father and the tenants as his children (Lande, 1966; Villacorta, 1994: 68; Buendia, 1994: 92)

“Democracy” was the political value that the Americans claimed to have imparted to the Filipinos for self -government They introduced liberal democracy and its accompanying political institutions such as the electoral process, party system, the three branches of government and their independence from each other, and the professional civil service (Wurfel, 1988: 10-11; also cited in Buendia, 1994: 86) This democracy and the institutions that came with it, however, only proved beneficial to the elites The electoral system, which started in 1907, for instance was used by the landed elites to expand and consolidate further their power, ensuring their transformation into a national oligarchy (Rivera, 1994: 112; see also Villacorta, 1994: 69) Moreover, how can elections be translated into political participation if suffrage

is the privilege of those who had held office under the Spaniards, the educated class, and the propertied class (Tancangco, 1988: 81-82; also cited in Buendia, 1994: 86)?

The civil service under the Americans did not likewise appear to be professional “Civil servants frequently owed their employment to legislator patrons, and up to the end of the American era the civilian machinery of state remained weak and divided” (Anderson, 1988: 12; also cited in Rivera, 1994: 113) And by the 1930s, the party system established by the Americans became the instrument of dominant, landed families They used quasi-feudal techniques to capture the electorate and national power through the system of one-party dominance (Wurfel, 1988: 11; also cited in Buendia, 1994: 86)

The unreal intent of American democracy and its amalgamation with the values formed and reinforced by Spanish colonialism perhaps contributed to the claim that “in spite of the trappings of civil and political institutions introduced by the Americans, ancient familialism, personalism, and parochialis m persisted and failed to develop among the Filipinos the concept of ‘social well-being or national welfare’” (Abueva, 1971: 1-24; also cited in Buendia, 1994: 87)

Under Quezon’s Commonwealth, cronyism perpetrated through “clientelistic politics” and reached perfection (McCoy, 1988: 119; also cited in Rivera, 1994: 112) Quezon manipulated and dictated over the branches of government, while remaining subservient to the American flag (Brillantes, 1988: 117; also cited in Buendia, 1994: 87) As the “middlema n” between the state and private business, Manila’s millionaires made large donations to Quezon’s Nacionalista faction and generous gifts to the President himself in lieu of government contracts, loans, or regulatory intervention (McCoy, 1988: 132; also cited in Rivera, 1994: 112-113)

After the Philippine flag has finally been permitted to be raised on 4 July

1946, American control over Philippine politics and economy continued Under the Roxas government, the 1935 “American Constitution of the Philippines” was revised

to include an equal rights agreement or the infamous “Parity Rights” After Article XVIII, the “ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE 1935 CONSTITUTION” states:

“[T]he disposition, exploitation, development, and utilization of all agricultural,

timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum,

and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of

the Philippines, and the operation of public utilities, if open to any person, be open

to citizens of the United States and to all forms of business enterprises owned or

controlled, directly or indirectly, by citizens of the United States in the same

manner as to, and under the same conditions imposed upon, citizens of the

Philippines or corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the

Philippines.90

In 1962, Macapagal adopted the Decontrol Program, which abolished foreign exchange controls on imports and devalued the peso almost 100% relative to the dollar The decontrol and devaluation were part of the IMF’s strategy of

“liberalization” and foreign exchange controls As a result of the decontrol program, foreign debt grew four times form US$150 million in 1962 to US$600 million after three years the program was adopted (Bello, Kin ley and Ellinson, 1982: 21; Buendia, 1994: 90; Rivera, 1994: 115-116)

In 1970, Marcos devalued the peso by over 60% relative to the dollar and adopted the floating rate system in exchange for a US$37 million stabilization foreign loan from IMF (Bello, Kin ley, and Ellinson, 1982: 58-59; Buendia, 1994: 90) By the end of the 1970s, however, the WB-IMF Group through its “Poverty Mission” found that the reason behind the 50 per cent decline in the real wages of urban and rural workers from the early 1960s to 1975 was the 60 per cent devaluation The mission’s findings confirmed clearly the human costs of the

90

Lifted from the “1935 Philippine Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines”, refer to The Chan Robles Virtual Law Library, http://www.chanrobles.com

strategy of liberalization and export-led growth (Bello, Kinley, and Ellinson, 1982: 58-59)

While the Philippines received only US$326 million in World Bank assistance between 1950 and 1972, it acquired more than US$2.6 billion from the same agency between 1973 and 1981, the martial law years (Rivera, 1994: 119) By end of 1981, the country was over US$15 billion in debt to foreign creditors and virtually bankrupt According the IMF’s latest report, servicing external debt alone would require US$2.3 billion alone in 1982 and US$3.1 billion in 1984 (Bello, Kinley, and Ellinson, 1982: 66)

During the dictatorship, the US government, IMF-WB Group and foreign investors gave their material, financial, and military support to Marcos in exchange for governmental/political policies which guaranteed foreign investments, repatriation of profits, liberalization of imports, and free trade – e.g., adoption of the floatin g rate system (Lichauco, 1988: 203; also cited in Buendia, 1994: 91) In sum, the World Bank’s forceful interventions in Philippine affairs had two objectives: “to stabilize the deteriorating political situation, especially in the countryside; and to completely open up the economy t the free flow of foreign capital and commodities” (Bello, Kinley, and Ellinson, 1982: 38)

On one hand, subservience to the dictates the IMF-WB Group and the U.S government characterized the neo-colonial character of the Marcos government On the other hand, cronyism illustrates the condition wherein domestic particularistic interests have captured the state Under the Marcos government, the dispensation of spoils and patronage became concentrated, in fact, in a narrower circle of interests – the ruling family and associate landlords-capitalists (Rivera, 1994: 117) Anderson (1988: 22; also cited in Rivera, 1994: 121) states that the “notorious ‘cronies’ were,

sociologically, a mixed bag, including not only relatives of Ferdinand and Imelda, but favoured oligarchs and quite a few ‘new’ men”

Moreover, an earlier account of Marcos cronysim stressed that:

“[T]hese cronies had a unique role in Philippine society, particularly in the martial

law economy This circle of friends and relatives of the president were called

“bureaucrat capitalists by the left because of the way they exploited their ties with

Marcos and public agencies to build private empires The cronies constituted one

of the three pillars of the regime, the other two being the technocrats and the

military” (Bello, O’Connor, and Broad, 1982: 185)

The hopes, however, of a significant political change loomed in the air upon the ascendancy of Aquino into power through extra-parliamentary means in 1986 The implementation of a “Freedom Constitution” and the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program in 1987 and the expansion of political space seemed to be a realization of an enduring change The results, however, of the 1987 Congressional election demonstrated once again the dom inance of elite and traditional politics “Of the 22 senators, only one is not a multi-millionaire Five of the wealthiest senators belong to the families of landed oligarchs and the prominent political class that have dominated the country for many years In the House of Representatives, more than three-fourths are millionaires and out of the 200 representatives 130 belong to traditional political clans and 39 relatives of traditional clans” (Caoili, 1989: 111; also cited in Buendia, 1994: 96)

On the economic side, the Aquino government’s policies remained to be export-oriented and import dependent, adherence to the floating rate system, privatization of government owned and controlled corporations, and boosting the economy through foreign borrowings and encouraging foreign investments Buendia (1994: 91) asserts that these policies “adhere even more closely to the philosophy of the free market economics and free trade rather than the Marcos regime Evidently, the economic, trade, and fiscal policies remain to strengthen the neo-colonial

character of the Philippine state” From a dual perspective, “Aquino put class interest and foreign banks ahead of the national interest” (Bello, 2001: 253)

As for the Ramos government, it radicalized the liberalization process through accelerated privatization, deregulation, and liberalization of trade, investment, and finance It remained submissive to IMF’s prescriptions, e.g., capital account liberalization, which resulted in massive inflows of speculative capital into the financial and real estate sector This explained why the real estate business

“bloomed” during his presidency This was the same reason, however, why billions

of dollars exited the country at the onset of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and

1998 Globalization for the government and its allies in business and the academe is the solution to Philippine underdevelopment This perspective, however, was based wrongly on the analysis that the Asian tigers were able to achieve an industrialized status through free market policies instead of strategic state interventions in the market (Bello, 2001: 52, 254, 262-63)

C Conclusion

The structural basis of protest is manifest in Philippine society On one hand, landlessness and land concentration, ineffective land/agrarian laws, unfavorable economic policies and program, and land conversion characterize the Philippine agrarian landscape These conditions point to the historic negligence of evolving and implementing agrarian reform that other Asian countries have effectively accomplished, e.g., China, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Japan Moreover, the agrarian quagmire is reflective of a damaging development path taken by Philippine society – that which primarily relies on exogenous factors rather than strengthening the endogenous structures and institutions

On the other hand, landlords -capitalists and foreign interests continue to govern Philippine state and politics This condition explains significantly why a meaningful agrarian reform has never been implemented The grassroots sectors and

a significant segment of the middle class have no or little space in the elitist and foreign orientation of economic policies and programs To date, the Philippine state has yet to demonstrate functional independence from the oligarchy and its patron superpower The situation is aggravated further by the intensification of harmonizing Asian, African, Eastern European, and Latin American countries

A precarious mixture of the aforesaid conditions creates an almost constant conductor not only of agrarian dissent and resistance but of cosmopolitan protest as well The more or less “permanent opposition” (Boudreau, 2000: 18-22) in Philippine society is borne by these micro- and macro- social processes and structures A host of movement organizations, in turn, take advantage of the political opportunities offered by social, economic, and political events and carry out short-lived and protracted or sustained challenges to the Philippine state or its government,

the elites, or the social system in toto

The nature and character of the agrarian landscape and Philippine state and politics are historical conditions They facilitated the emergence and development of various peasant movements and organizations throughout the country’s history The rich, militant tradition of peasant uprisings illustrates further the active involvement

of peasants in organized or spontaneous collective political actions The next chapter provides a political historical account of Philippine peasant movements and politics

Chapter III Philippine Peasant Politics and Movements in Retrospect

Peasant politics encompasses the issues of class, gender, ethnicity, identity, human rights, environment, and rural political participation These issues continue to represent a variety of important concerns not only in the Southeast Asian region but

in others as well In general, peasant politics pertains to the political behavior of peasants, their political culture and identity, political economy, moral economy, agrarian reform and rural development, mobilization, organization, ideology, history, nationalism, agency, social structure, rural collective struggle and resistance (armed and unarmed, direct and indirect), the intervention of external organizations and actors, and other issues that concern the rural society and population.91

In the Philippines, the axis of peasant politics seems to be the issue of agrarian reform and rural development The country’s contemporaries in implementing land reform in the 1940s have already carried out the reform successfully.92 On the other hand, Philippine governments for the past 70 years have passed and implemented at least 11 land reform or agrarian reform laws but the majority of the peasantry has yet to reap their concrete benefits

The dyna mics of Philippine peasant politics have been interesting, as many peasant and non-peasant actors and social and political movements and organizations

of varying ideological orientations have intervened to advance their respective interests The country’s political history also shows significant junctures that

91

These subjects of peasant politics are derived from Fanon 1965; Wolf 1966; Hobsbawn 1973 & 1980; Migdal 1975; Tilly (p p 13-41), Wasserstrom (pp 42-56), Adas (pp 75-105), Roseberry (pp

106-131); Migdal (pp 57 -74), Thaxton (pp 132-156), and Skocpol (pp 157-179) all in Weller and

Guggenheim 1982; Thane et al 1984; Rahman 1986; Shanin 1987; Fanon pp 384-385, de Janvry pp 391-404, Wolf pp 367 -374, Scott pp 304-310 and 343-345, Hobsbawn pp 338 -339, and Alavi pp

185-196, all in Shanin 1987; Scott 1976 & 1985; and Isaacman in Cooper et al 1993; and Hodgkin

1957, Ranger 1968a, and Young 1965 cited in Isaacman 1993; Mohanty et al 1998; among others

92

See also Esguerra, 1990: 93-116 cf Getubig and Ledesma 1988; Villacorta, 1994

demonstrate how peasant and peasant -based collective actions and movements complicate rural or agrarian politics Moreover, the state is likewise a major actor and contestant in peasant politics

Distinct not only from its neighbors but also from the majority of nations in

the world, Philippine political history embodies a rich tradition of revolts and militant

mass struggles against colonialism and neo-colonialism It was the first Southeast Asian country to launch a national revolution against Western colonialism inspiring perhaps future leaders in the region Today, Philippine civil society is invariably described by outside political observers as “the most dynamic in Southeast Asia, with Thailand’s a close second” (Serrano, 1993: 43).93

This chapter seeks to underline the historical roots of present -day peasant politics and movements in Philippine society To this effect, I investigate a range of peasant uprisings and struggles from the Spanish colonial period (1565) to the 1970s Utilizing various theories and perspectives on peasant politics and social movements, I underscore the phenomena of movement emergence, activity, and continuity I basically argue that agrarian or agrarian-based protests could not

be interpreted through a single theory or perspective but rather entails a holistic framework to comprehend their emergence and development

The first section analyzes agrarian protest by employing a range of approaches to peasant politics, that is, the “moral economy model” (Scott, 1976),

“expansion-of-capitalism approach” (Migdal, 1974; Wolf, 1969), “rational economy model” (Popkin, 1979), and “class struggle approach” (Paige, 1975), and the role of state processes, nationalism, and revolutionary or ganizations (Skocpol, 1982) Specifically, I will demonstrate how the interplay of moral economy, capitalism, state formation and operation, and broader processes influence or shape spontaneous and

organized protests The second section deals with movement processes and structures critical to the emergence and development of peasant politics I will underscore the relevance of grievances, consciousness, and ideology, organization, resources, and political opportunities, and mobilization strategies and tactics, and movement outcomes in the different struggles and uprisings Lastly, I will synthesize the discussions by underpinning the interface of theories and perspectives on peasant politics and social movement in light of the Philippine experience

A Rural Struggles and Uprisings in the Philippines (1587-1970s): Perspectives on Peasant Politics

Skocpol (1982) posed the question “What makes peasants revolutionary?” to

dig into the agency, structural and external aspects of peasant involvement in revolutionary actions After the successful revolutions in Russia, China, Vietnam, and Cuba, however, social revolutions (appear to) have lost its momentum and currency, albeit attempts to replicate these phenomena are still being carried out in the Philippines, Mexico, and other Third World countries In this regard, it is better (perhaps) to restart with a more basic point in understanding the political potentials of peasants

This section thus delves into a more basic line of inquiry: What makes peasants participate in collective political actions? The answers range from the

perception of peasants as capable of initiating their own actions to being passive receptors of ideas Others would base their answers on assumptions or initial assessments that peasants are, to use Huizer’s term in citing Wolf (1969) and Davidson (1967), “politically incompetent” (1999: 59) And the fact remains that peasants have always been subordinate to others in their societies (Wolf, 1969: 11) The political or apolitical nature of peasants, however, cannot be simply based on

perspectives or theories that aim to establish or start with a general pattern of peasant

behavior or mentality

1 The “Moral Economy” of Rural Protest

Spanish occupation of the archipelago in 1565 triggered not less than 200 uprisings and revolts (Esguerra, 1989: 97) Among others, the main propelling factors

of resistance were grievances relating to culture or religion, economic hardships, agrarian disputes, brutality, injustice, and rapacity of Spaniards, sovereignty and national liberation These factors, one or a combination of them, created conditions toward the proliferation of sporadic, short-lived, spontaneous, or protracted armed struggles against Spanish colonial rule

The Tondo Conspiracy (1578-1588), although abortive, was fuelled by the quest for “freedom” This freedom, however, was anchored on the grievance of dispossession where the political and economic privileges of the former local ruling class (e.g., datu) had been overtaken In the 1660s, three consecutive revolts erupted

in the Visayas Inspired by or channeled through religious motivations, the Tamblot (Bohol, 1621-1622), Bancao (Leyte, 1622), and Tapar (Panay, 1663) uprisings were basically a call to restore ancestral beliefs and practices, with Tamblot also protesting

about the policy of reduccion and Tapar against oppressive economic policies and friar abuses Tamblot, Bancao, and Tapar were all babaylans or native priests or

spiritualists It is also important to note that the Bancao uprising was a spillover of the Tamblot revolt.94

Most apparently, the basic way to explain or conceptualize these uprisings is

to evoke on the moral economy model Weller and Guggenheim (1982) points out two versions of the model On one hand, the strong version attribute s peasant actions (or their participation) to the violation of their moral economy, which consists of the

“principles of reciprocity and right to subsistence” (Scott, 1976: 167), in the defense

of an “alternative symbolic universe” (Thaxton, 1982: 4), or their “way of life” (Wasserstrom, 1982: 42-46) On the other hand, the mild version similarly perceives peasant actions like “social banditry as a traditional response to violations of accepted norms” (Hobsbawn, 1959), peasant food riots as a function of de privation based on

the belief that they had a moral and political right to food (Tilly, 1982: 13-41 cf Tilly,

1975: 389), or petitions, shifting to new patrons, flight or migration, entry to religious groups, cooperation with bandits, and rebellion as traditionally sanctioned repertoire

of unrest (Adas, 1982: 75-105)

Notwithstanding the specificity of the conditions from which they were conceptualized, the two versions of the moral economy model are evidently present

in the said uprisings or planned revolt First, the Spanish reorganization of the

preexisting social-geographical system of barangays into pueblos or colonial towns

or parishes drastically changed the “way of life” of the natives (see Chapter II) “A

pueblo was also a doctrina, a community undergoing lessons in the doctrine of the

new faith and being prepared for baptism as Christians” (Corpuz, 1997: 25)

Second, the Spanish colonizers did not consider the particular world that the natives lived in when they imposed Hispanic Christianity in the archipelago This particular world, the natives’ and peasants’ “alternate symbolic universe” (Thaxton, 1982: 4) instead found its expression in the messianic and nativist rebellions This line of argument is reinforced by the perspective of peasants havin g their own way of

dealing with external threats; e.g., joining or forming religious groups and instigating rebellion On the other hand, for the natives who converted to Christianity and who were even used to quell the uprisings, as in Tamblot’s case, the Spaniards may have succeeded in presenting the imposed religion as the natives’ alternative belief system

Third, the activities of Tamblot, Bancao, and Tapar were characterized by attacks on town centers, Spanish officials, and friars Hobsbawn’s (1959) negative outlook about the revolutionary character or potential of the peasantry would lead us

to interpret these as social banditry, one of the traditionally sanctioned type of peasant protests.95 Fourth, it said that Tapar and his followers also grieved about oppressive economic policies and friar abuses Then why did the uprising take on a religious form? Does this suggest that peasants are incapable of launching a revolution or acquiring true class consciousness and would rather seek other indirect means of dealing with their grievances? As Wasserstrom argues about the Indian uprisings in Southern Mexico under Spanish colonialism, “not economic exploitation alone, but rather the destruction of their way of life itself prompted people to reject colonial rule…” (1982: 43)

And how about the freedom -oriented goal of the Tondo conspiracy? Dispossession, however, likewise manifests Wasserstrom’s and Tilly’s concepts of a change in the way of life and of deprivation respectively The Spaniards subverted the freedom and authority once enjoyed by the chieftains Their willingness to collaborate with Japanese soldiers by giving them a percentage of the tributes to be collected once the Spaniards have been driven out is evident of their intent to simply restore their old privileges This, however, is also reflective of the rational economy model of Popkin (1979), which is a critique of the moral economy model The

95

For a critique of Hobsbawn’s concept of social banditry, see Joseph, 1990: 7-53

chieftains of Tondo and other plotters demonstrated that “norms are malleable, renegotiated, and shiftin g” (ibid.).96

Aside from triggering cultural antagonisms, the brutality, injustice, and rapacity of Spanish officials were likewise the causes of numerous upheavals, e.g., the Sumuroy (1649) and Palaris (1762-65) revolts against polo, the Silang revolt (1762) against the payment of tributes and abuses of friars and Spanish officials, the Dagohoy rebellion (1744-1829) against the rapacity and injustice of friars, the Iligan (1762-1764/65) mutiny against the brutality of Spanish officials.97

Among the aforementioned revolts, the Iligan uprising best illustrates the mild version of moral economy that peasants may have their own system of dealing with what they perceive as unjust.98 Despite being loyal converts and obedient subjects,

the indiscriminate and brutal whipping by the governors and principales goaded the

natives to rebellion In turn, they whipped the abusive authorities the way they have

whipped their victims (de Jesus, 1982: 27-28 cf Cortes, 1974: 182-185 and cf

Malumbres, 72) At the same time, the com mon leadership of the uprising qualifies the claim that peasants are least likely the initiators of revolts

Furthermore, a very plausible way of explaining the uprisings caused by and against the pueblo system is through Scott’s moral principles of “reciprocity and right

to subsistence” Scott explains them as follows: “Reciprocity serves as a central

96 For a concise review of Popkin’s “rational peasant” and Scott’s “moral peasant”, see Moise, 1982: 71-77

97 Sources: Agoncillo, 1990: 108, 109; Constantino, 1997: 108, 121-125, 127-134; Corpuz, 1989: I

306, 324-328, I 328-332, 334-346; Sturtevant, 1976; Agoncillo, 1962; Abueva, 1999: 8-24; Zaide, G.,

1949 (Volume I); http://www.emailpinoy.com/educational/philheroes4.shtml ;

http://www.geocities.com/CollegePark/Pool/1644/dagohoy.html ;

http://www.aenet.org/bohol/boholhis.htm#TAMBLOT ; DIVINA GRACIA R LUTRANIA (Diego Silang: Likas na Matapang) in http://www.kabayanonline.com/past/2002/1212/HIS/CHIS121201.htm ;

http://www.geocities.com/Tokyo/Harbor/1320/bbisilag.html ; “Bicolano”, by Diana Lyn Lopez, in

http://litera1no4.tripod.com/bicolano_frame.html : Source, CCP Encyclopedia of Arts and Literature

http://www.emailpinoy.com/educational/philheroes3.shtml ; http://mozcom.com/~urduja/towns/palaris htm ; http://www.geocities.com/sinupan/delacruzjuanpalaris.htm

98

Iligan was only the center of uprising The revolt extended to the Cagayan River, Tuguegarao, Chico River, Piat, Tabang and westwards to Malaoeg (ibid)