Forging a regional security community a study of the driving forces behind ASEAN and east asian regionalism 2

CHAPTER TWO LITERATURE REVIEW Synopsis The basic goal of forging a regional security community (SC) is to prevent wars among its members, an unconventional but timely aspiration given the dangers inherent in an age of weapons of mass destruction. The security community notion is closely related to the concepts of political integration and regionalism. The Deutschian security community is one where its members have become integrated, through deepening socio-economic and political transactions, such that the threat of war among them becomes unthinkable. Its two core features are a common ‘we-feeling’ identity, and a ‘non-war’ community among its members. This study re-examines these two core criteria to analyze the main driving forces behind the rise of security regionalism in East Asia. The Cold War antagonisms enhanced the dominance of realism and reduced the attractiveness of the Deutschian model for scholarly research from the 1960s to the mid-1990s. In 1998, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett revived interest in security community studies by taking a constructivist approach, focusing on the role of norm-socialization of peaceful interstate behaviour and identity building among elites in the forging of security communities. Since then, other constructivist scholars have applied the security community concept to examine its relevance for East Asia. The rise of a security community in Western Europe in the post-World War Two era was the result of both material (fundamental changes in the distribution of power at the regional and global systems) and ideational factors. In the former category would include the fear among European elites of the region’s marginalization with the rise of the two superpowers, and the threat of Soviet expansionism. The ideational determinants would include a new, strong determination among a remarkable group of visionary European elites of the need for political reconciliation leading to European unity and political integration, especially between France and Germany. A possible rise of a regional security community in East Asia should be approached by combining the insights of both the Deutschian and constructivist perspectives. Both material and ideational factors are important in giving us a more comprehensive understanding of the unique dynamics of the evolution of security regionalism in different regions of the world. 40 2.1 Introduction What is still missing in Asian community building is a common set of political values. Asian governments exemplify every category of governance known to the modern world. They range from democracy to dictatorship, from transparency to secrecy, from efficiency to nearparalysis, from dedication to the public good to outright exploitation….Until these gaps are significantly narrowed, a true East Asian Community is beyond reach.1 Regionalism has over the past twenty years seen a surge of renewed interest in different parts of the world. The regionalist phenomenon is the result of a number of inter-related developments. According to Fawcett and Hurrell, these factors include: the end of the Cold War and the erosion of the Cold War alliance systems; the recurrent fears over the stability of the GATT and the multilateral trading order during the long drawn out negotiation of the Uruguay Round; the impact of increasing economic integration and globalization; changed attitudes towards economic development in many parts of the developing world; and the impact of democracy and democratization.” Over the past half century, the regionalist project is often the result of push-and-pull factors, as national leaders calculate the costs and benefits of forging closer regional economic, political and security cooperation. How then we conceptualize regionalism? Most observers would agree that Western Europe today has the most advanced form of a regional security community. Is the European model applicable Ellen Frost, Asia’s New Regionalism, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p. 199. Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell eds. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995, p. 1, cited in Kjell A. Eliassen and Catherine Borve Arnesen, “Comparison of European and Southeast Asian Integration”, in Mario Telo ed. European Union and New Regionalism: Regional Actors and Global Governance in a Post-Hegemonic Era, England: Ashgate publishing limited, 2007, p. 204. 41 to East Asia, and if so, to what extent? What are the similarities and variations between the European and East Asian forms of regional integration? How should these regional variations be explained? Regionalism and national integration are closely linked. They represent different stages in a spectrum involving the development of states in an anarchical international system. Regionalism is a higher order form of political integration compared with the latter. Intuitively, regional integration can take place only after potential members have achieved a level of state and nation building. Only selfconfident and strong states are in a position to begin the process of establishing a genuine and durable security community. Weak or ‘failing states’ are unlikely to have the resources or the political will to successfully meet the rigorous demands necessary to forge a security community. The notion of a security community starts from an assumption that states are the major driving force in shaping the international system. From a state-centric approach, many government elites in the post-colonial multi-ethnic states in East Asia are still grappling with the delicate task of state- and nation-building, that is, the forging of a ‘strong state’. Unlike their counterparts in Western Europe, many East Asian states have still not become integrated into stable, self-confident entities with a strong sense of national identity and cohesion. In contrast, West European states have moved beyond the post-Westphalian stage of national socio-economic and political development. Hence, sovereignty remains an Benjamin Miller has argued that the “state-to-nation balance” and the level of state strength affect its “war proneness”. See his States, Nations and the Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2007. Richard Cooper, “Worldwide Regional Integration: is there an Optimal Size of the Integrated Area?” in Ross Garnaut and Peter Drysdale, eds., Asia Pacific Regionalism, Pymble: Harper Educational, ANU, 1994. 42 obsession for most East Asian states. This is one factor we need to bear in mind as we ponder the question of why sovereign states would want to come together to forge regional community-building and institutions: what are the driving forces, their motivations? A general answer can be seen in the explanation offered by Craig Synder: “Throughout the history of the twentieth century, states have looked to their immediate and near neighbours as well as key external or regional powers as potential sources of threat or of protection.” It is clear that state actors play a major role in driving and thereby determining the nature and dynamics of regionalism. In terms of a theoretical framework, the idea of a ‘security community’ (SC) runs counter to the dominant school of realism. The realist perspective in IR argues that war is an inherent part of inter-state relations given an anarchical international system. Advocates of the security community idea disagree: they argue that pacific feelings and preferences can be learned so that states will realize that it is ultimately in their self-interest to turn away from the use of armed violence. Supporters of the SC idea see it as a unique pathway to eliminate war from inter-state relations. From the earliest times, tribes and then states have fought and destroyed one another, thereby helping to shape the political contours of the world. Two thousand four hundred years ago, the ancient Greek strategist Thucydides wrote about the Peloponnesian Wars between Athens and Sparta, an account which inspired modern Realist thought in International Relations. In the non-Western world, the ancient Chinese strategist Sun Tzu wrote a timeless manual on the Art of War, that is, on how Craig S. Synder, Contemporary Security and Strategy, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008, p. 227. Joseph S. Nye, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Education, 2006 (6th edition). 43 to defeat your enemy and stay in power. The ancient Indian strategist Kautilya is remembered today for his quotation, “the enemy of my enemy is my friend”. The two most catastrophic wars in human history, World War One and World War Two, occurred in Europe basically because of bitter national and imperialistic rivalries for global dominance and hegemony among the European Powers. The resulting destruction of Europe was, however, largely self-inflicted. From a realist perspective, the notion of a “security community” would appear to be misplaced. For a long time, scholars have speculated about how war can be minimized or eliminated from international relations. There is no shortage of ideas. Such ideas have ranged from setting up a liberal-Kantian ‘World Federation of Free States’ to using Balance of Power mechanisms like military alliances to deter potential enemies from committing aggression, the “democratic peace” thesis (that democracies not wage war against one another), to the notion by Karl Deutsch and his associates of a “non-war” security community where war among its member-states is unthinkable. 10 The implication here is that these states had a history of Geoffrey Stern, The Structure of International Society: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations, London and New York: Continuum Books, 2000 (2nd edition). John O’Neal and Bruce Russett, “The Kantian Peace: The Pacific Benefits of Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organisations”, 1885-1992”, World Politics 52 (1) October 1999: 1-37. Sorpong Peou, “Security community-building in the Asia-Pacific” in William T. Tow ed. Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 145-46. 10 Karl Deutsch et al. Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the light of historical experience. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957. 44 interstate conflicts and war, and now want to turn away from war towards durable peace. As states are the key driving force behind the evolution of a security community, it is important to note that ‘regime-type’ would be a relevant factor to consider. According to Sorpong Peou, “the type of ‘state-centric’ groups that collaborate to form regional security communities is a critical aspect of overall international security politics.” 11 There are three distinct groups of states that may bind for security cooperation: Hobbesian, Lockean, and Kantian. 12 Hobbesian states are prone to forge alliances of ‘collective-defence’; states are assumed to exist in the ‘state of nature’, and only the ‘fittest’ states survive. Military power remains the most important means of national security and balance-of-power or military-alliance systems the basic mechanism for ensuring national survival. 13 Contemporary North Korea is arguably a Hobbesian state; it faces an acute security dilemma from internal state weakness and what Pyongyang calls the ‘US threat’. Alternatively, states may form Lockean collective-security regimes: here, states have a more relaxed view of their national security. They not treat each other as enemies, but as partners who are capable of entering into social contracts with each other to enhance their common prosperity. Lockean states ‘are less anxious about their national survival and thus more secure than those under Hobbesian anarchy. They also tend to be pro-status quo and only respond to others’ threats defensively…The collective-security regime rests upon the preponderance of collective power exercised by members of the 11 Peou 2009 op cit., p. 146. The points made in this paragraph are adapted from Peou’s chapter. 12 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999; cited in Peou 2009, p. 147. Peou 2009 op cit., p. 147. 13 45 international community. 14 ASEAN in the early 21st century can plausibly be regarded as a regional grouping of Lockean states. In contrast, Kantian states “can go beyond forming collective-defence and collective-security regimes to construct ‘security communities’. States instead see one another as ‘friends’ or ‘team players’ whose collective norms – namely, non-violence and altruism – guide their mutual relations.” 15 The EU can be considered as an example of a Kantian community. There is still no fail-proof way to eliminate interstate wars from international relations. Yet in the nuclear age, the idea of eliminating interstate wars remains as relevant as ever. It is in this sense that the ideas of Karl Deutsch, a US political scientist who fled Hitler’s Germany as a youth in the 1930s, of forging a security community becomes truly significant. Deutsch and his associates asked a basic question in their 1957 study: why did the West European states stop fighting one another? A logical question arises: To what extent can the idea of a Deutschian security community be applied to the non-Western world? What are the driving forces and independent variables which affect the rise of a security community? Is it desirable and practical for East Asia to become integrated into such a regional security community? In the post-Cold War era, the East Asian strategic environment is uncertain. Both the driving forces of regional integration and fragmentation are present at the same time. Whether East Asia will remain peaceful and stable will depend to a great extent on the complex interaction between these two broad driving forces. On the one hand, there were initial fears in the early-1990s of a lessening of the US commitment 14 Peou 2009 op cit., p. 147. 15 Peou 2009 op cit., pp. 147-48. 46 to stay engaged in Asia, the implications posed by a ‘rising China’, North Korea’s determination to develop nuclear weapons, and tensions over Taiwan arising from attempts by the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)-led pro-independence forces on the island from 2001 to early-2008. At the same time, the number of ASEANcentered regional integration organizations has accelerated since the mid-1990s. The Australian-initiated APEC was formed in 1989 to promote greater regional economic ties across the Asia-Pacific region. In 1990, then Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir proposed an Asians-only East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG). The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) made its debut in 1994, the first and only Asia-wide regional security grouping. The APT was formed in late-1997 in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis to promote greater intra-East Asian economic and financial cooperation in order to prevent a repetition of the financial crisis. The first EAS summit was held in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in December 2005. There are, however, also signs of underlying great power tensions in the region, especially among the US, Japan, and China. At the Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore in June 2005, US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 16 publicly raised concerns about China’s rapid military modernization, especially its focus on developing offensive power-projection capabilities. China’s defense budget was reported to have increased by double-digit growth rates for the past fifteen years (up to 2005). The Taiwan Issue 17, despite the passing of the Anti-Secession Law in March 2005 by the Chinese Parliament, remains a potential flash-point. Over the past 16 http://www.iiss.org/conferences/the-shangri-la-dialogue/shangri-la-dialogue-2005/2005 speeches/first-plenary-session-the-hon-donald-rumsfeld/. 17 See Christopher R. Hughes, “China’s membership of the ARF and the emergence of an East Asian diplomatic and security culture”, in Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada eds., Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum, London and New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 54-71. 47 few years, China-Japan relations have been soured by rising nationalist rivalry in both countries. Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi made it a point to make controversial annual pilgrimages to the Yasukuni Shrine (which honors Japan’s war-dead, including fourteen Class-A World War Two war criminals). There are very fundamental conflicts between North and South Korea over the reunification issue. 18 Basic Pyongyang-Tokyo disagreements exist over the abductees issue and the North Korea nuclear proliferation problem since 2002. There has been no major progress at the Six-Party Talks (SPT) in Beijing. The main reason for this failure is basic differences between the US and North Korea over Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. In October 2006, North Korea tested its first nuclear bomb. It was only in 2007 that an agreement was reached in which Pyongyang again promised to stop its nuclear weapons program in exchange for US economic and technical aid. For Stalinist North Korea, the development of nuclear weapons is an option that Pyongyang is unlikely to give up easily. 19 The nuclear option is North Korea’s only bargaining tool. Unless these intractable issues are sensitively managed by the Great Powers, it could escalate into war. 18 The security challenges posed by the Korean Peninsula are covered in greater detail in Chapter Four. 19 Marianne Hanson and Rajesh Rajagopalan, “Nuclear weapons: Asian case studies and global ramifications”, in William T. Tow ed., Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 228-246. 48 2.2 Aims of this Chapter This chapter has a number of aims. First, it will examine the meaning of key concepts like ‘region’, ‘regionness’, ‘East Asia’, ‘security’, ‘political community’, and ‘regionalism’, as well as the approaches to understanding regionalism and regional integration. This is important to prevent confusion. Second, it will analyze the concept of ‘security community’, especially the arguments of Deutsch, Adler/Barnett, and Acharya. Third, the origins and the driving forces of post-World War Two European integration will be highlighted. Fourth, it will evaluate the various international relations (IR) approaches to the understanding of the rise of regional security communities, that is, realism, liberalism, and constructivism. Fifth, a conceptual framework will be proposed to analyze the rise of regional security communities in Western Europe and East Asia, highlighting their similarities and variations. 2.3 Definition of key concepts: ‘region’ and ‘regionalism’ It is vital to be clear about what is being explained - processes of social or economic regionalization; the growth of regional identity; the formation of interstate regional institutions or state-promoted economic integration; or the emergence of politically cohesive regional blocs…20 In the study of international relations, the concept of ‘region’ is contested. The concept of ‘region’ can range from being a purely geographical concept to that of Ben Anderson’s ‘imagined community’. 21 In the traditional meaning, the term ‘region’ 20 Andrew Hurrell 1998, cited in Jason Ralph, Beyond the Security Dilemma: Ending America’s Cold War, England: Ashgate, 2001, p. 95. 21 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. London and New York: Verso, 1983. 49 influential individuals among their elites – demonstrated political leadership, the vision, the ingenuity, pragmatism, and entrepreneurship in policymaking and persistence in their pursuit of a closer union.” 94 Such rare leaders included French economic planner Jean Monnet (1888-1979), Schuman (1886-1963), Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967), Italian Prime Minister Alcide Degasperi (1881-1954), Dutch Foreign Minister Beyen, and Belgian leader Paul-Henri Spaak. Monnet firmly believed in the need for a united Europe. He worked tirelessly to get the support of European leaders for his functional approach. He skillfully forged political coalitions. In 1955, he formed the ‘Action Committee for the United States of Europe’ (ACUSE) to spread consciousness about European unity, and remained as its president until the 1970s. 2.7 Applying IR Theories to understanding the rise of regional security communities: Explanations for the creation of a security community According to Robert Jervis, there are three major explanatory frameworks that have been used by scholars to explain the rise of security communities: constructivist, liberal, and realist explanations for the establishment of a security community that although proceeding from different assumptions, involve overlapping factors. 95 Constructivism The constructivist school of thought points to the norms of non-violence and shared identities that have led the advanced Western democracies to assume the role of each other’s friend through the interaction of expectations and behaviour. Constructivism 94 Sherrill Wells op cit., p.29. 99 downplays the importance of material factors, and elevates ideas, images of oneself and others, and conceptions of appropriate interstate conduct. The ideas of Robert Jervis and Charles Tilly are relevant here. Jervis puts emphasis on a benign cycle of beliefs, expectations, and behaviour. 96 It assumes that people become socialized into attitudes, beliefs, and values that are conducive to peace as a result of constant interactions. Individuals within a security community may see their own country as strong and good, but they not espouse the virulent nationalism that was common in the past. For Western constructivists, the fact that all members of a security community are democracies is important for the sense of common identity that the similarity in political systems has generated. This point is also one made by the ‘democratic peace’ thesis, which argues that Western democracies not fight one another Bruce Cronin has pointed out that the formation of common identities has been central to national integration, and it stands to reason that it plays a major role in keeping states at peace but also in making war unthinkable. 97 According to constructivism, the notion of “learning” is important, as states and their leaders in the security community have come to see that war with each other is not a good way to solve their problems, that realist security policies can decrease security, and that more conciliatory and cooperative methods of behavior will serve them well. 98 One criticism against constructivism is that, as pointed out by Robert ___________________________________________________________________________________ 95 96 Robert Jervis, American Foreign Policy in a New Era. New York & London: Routledge, 2005, p. 16. Jervis 2005, op cit., p.16. Charles Tilly, Trust and Rule, Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005. 97 Bruce Cronin, Community under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999, cited in Jervis 2005, op cit., p.17. 98 Paul Shroeder, The Transformation of European Politics 1763-1848, New York: Oxford University Press, 1994; cited in Jervis 2005, p.18. 100 Jervis, it mistakes effect for cause: the learning, identities, images and self-images are superstructure, being the product of peace and of the material incentives present at that moment in time. What is crucial is not only people’s thinking, but the factors that drive it. The Constructivist perspective is useful, but only up to a point: A decision to go to war is based not only on ideational considerations like identities, but is also strongly influenced by cost-benefit calculations, which are based on material considerations. Constructivism, on its own, seems unable to offer us a comprehensive explanation for the rise of regional security communities. Or that it mixes up cause and effect; and does not show how and why common identities emerge. Liberalism The liberal explanation for the existence of a security community has received a lot of attention. There are several variants, but the main strands are the pacifying effects of democracy, economic interdependence, and joint membership in international organizations. There appears so far to be no conclusive evidence that ‘democracy’ per se promotes interstate peace. There is still no such empirical law in International Relations. Other scholars, like Bruce Cronin, argue that the key element lies in the realm of information: by having a relatively free flow of intelligence and encouraging open debate, (Western) democracies are less likely to make egregious errors in estimating what courses of action will maintain the peace. 99 The Liberal perspective stresses the role of economic interdependence and international organizations. With regard to interdependence, the argument here is that the high level of economic 99 Bruce Cronin, Community under Anarchy: Transnational Identity and the Evolution of Cooperation, New York: Columbia University Press, 1999; cited in Jervis 2005, p.17. 101 interdependence between states would facilitate a common identity and expectations of shared interests. This economic interdependence argument appears to have strong validity provided the parties involved are engaged in basically quite symmetric interdependence. In this case, both parties enjoy mutually-beneficial economic relations. The situation is likely to be quite different if the economic relationship is one of asymmetric interdependence. The criticism of this argument is that growing economic, trade and investment links between states not necessarily result in better political relations and cooperation, as can be seen in the frequent tensions between China and Japan over historical, territorial, and geopolitical issues. Regarding the pacific role of international organizations,100 the liberal view points to several causal mechanisms, including enhanced information flows, greater ability to solve interstate problems peacefully, increased stake in cooperative behavior linked to the risk of being excluded from the organization if the state behaves badly, and possibly a heightened sense of common identity. These arguments are also linked to claims that in an age of globalization, interstate warfare has become a ‘sunset’ industry. Since the end of the Cold War, interstate conflicts and war within the states of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have virtually disappeared. Such a situation has also occurred within the Southeast Asian and Northeast Asian regions. In both the OECD and the East Asian regions, interstate competition has focused on the economic arena. On the claim of the pacific role of international organizations, Jervis has pointed out that these so-called causal mechanisms are ‘harder to pin down but perhaps more important are processes by which joint membership alters states’ conceptions of their interests, leading them to 100 Jervis 2005 op cit., p. 24. 102 see membership not only as calling for cooperative reciprocations but also as extending over a longer time horizon and including benefits to others.’ 101 One criticism here is that the direction of causality is difficult to establish. Realist Explanations Political realism is a philosophical approach to the study of international relations that is widely regarded as the most influential in the field. There are different strands of realism. Generally, most realists see states as the key actors in world politics. They emphasize international anarchy in which there is no central authority to protect them from one another. Realist theories see the insecurity of states as the main problem in international relations. Realism depicts the international system as one of ‘self-help’: states must provide security for themselves because no other state can be trusted to so. Broadly, realism defines ‘security’ as the security of the state and place special emphasis on the preservation of the state’s territorial integrity and the physical safety of its citizens. A state is regarded as ‘secure/safe’ if it can defend itself against or deter a hostile attack and prevent other states from compelling it to adjust its behavior in significant ways or to sacrifice core political values. 102 This is what is known as ‘traditional security’. 101 102 Jervis 2005 op cit. An opposing view regarding the role of international organizations in world politics is that advanced by the realist scholar, John J. Mearsheimer. See his article “The False Promise of International Institutions”, International Security 19 (3) Winter 1994/95: 5-49. Reprinted in Michael Brown et al., eds., The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995. Stephen M. Walt, “Realism and Security” in Robert A. Denemark ed., The International Studies Encyclopedia. UK: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010: 6077-6078. 103 Realist explanations are linked to the idea of counter-balancing to prevent the emergence of a hostile, preponderant Power. During the Cold War, the perceived menace of the USSR was central to the origins of the West European security community. In the post-Cold War era, a criticism is that it is hard to see the current threats from Russia and China as being central. The realist explanations centre on the role of American hegemony and the impact of nuclear weapons on International Relations (the discussion in this section is based on points made by Robert Jervis 2005). Regarding the role of US hegemony, one realist variant is that US dominance facilitated the rise of a West European security community. The US spends more on defense than all the other states of the world combined. 103 America’s allies within NATO not have to fear attacks from each other: their militaries, especially Germany’s, are so truncated that they could not fight a major war without US aid or attack each other without undertaking a big military buildup that would give a great deal of warning. The European members of NATO, for example, seek to harness and constrain US power, not displace it. Increased European and Japanese strength need not lead to war, contrary to the expectations of standard theories of hegemony and great-power rivalry. 104 Jervis has criticized this explanation by pointing out that the current peace arising from US dominance seems un-coerced and accepted as legitimate by most states, which does not fit totally well with realism. Regarding the pacifying role of nuclear weapons, the argument is that nuclear weapons, if possessed in sufficient numbers, make military victory impossible; hence, 103 104 Economist, “Arming Up: The world’s biggest military spenders by population”, June 2009. Jacek Kugler & Douglas Lemke, eds., Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of The War Ledger, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996. Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981; cited in Jervis 2005, op cit., pp. 24-25. 104 war is no longer a viable option. But Jervis has commented that a nuclear war would be the worst possible outcome for both sides as it does not automatically lead to uncoerced peace, let alone to a security community. 105 A Synthetic Interactive Explanation Jervis has pointed out that a necessary condition for a SC is the belief that conquest is difficult and war is terribly costly. When conquest is easy, aggression is encouraged and the security dilemma operates with particular viciousness since even defensive states need to prepare to attack. But when states have modern armies and, even more, nuclear weapons, it is hard for anyone to believe that war could make sense. A second condition is the belief that peace and prosperity bring within the SC many economic benefits for the member-states. The consciousness of such benefits by national leaders is critical in providing the impetus to steadily forge closer regional multilateralism. A third condition is that calculations of costs and benefits are subjective. Such calculations depend on values held by the political elites. Changes in values and perceptions of such values are critical. For example, during World War Two, Hitler was prepared to put everything at risk in order to seek a dominant position for Germany and the ‘Aryan race’. A fourth condition is a decline in militarism: compromise, consideration for the interests of others, respect for law, and shunning of violence all are values that underpin democracy and are cultivated by it. A Deutschian security community is relatively homogeneous in that its members are all democracies and have values that are compatibly similar. A system filled with states that all believed that war and ___________________________________________________________________________________ 105 The account in this section is based on the explanation given by Jervis 2005. 105 domination were good would not be peaceful. An impulse to war is the desire to change the other country. The likelihood of armed conflict is likely to diminish if political values among states are shared, especially liberal-democratic values. A fifth condition for the rise of a security community is the decline of territorial disputes. Territory has been the most common cause and object of conflicts in the past. Germans no longer care that Alsace and Lorraine are French; the French are not disturbed by the high level of German presence in these provinces. Here, Jervis is pointing out the importance of mindset changes in the perceptions of national leaders/elites. The destructiveness of war, the benefits of peace, and the changes in values interact and reinforce each other. In comparison, territorial and disputes over resources remain salient geopolitical issues in Southeast Asia, as seen in renewed tensions between Thailand and Cambodia since 2007 over the disputed Preah Vihear temple, as well as potential conflicts over oil and natural gas in the Bay of Bengal between Myanmar and Bangladesh. In parallel, expectations of peace allow states to value each other’s economic and political successes. Although these may incite envy, they no longer produce strong security fears, as was true in the past. However, a security community can unravel as a result of changes in the values held by domestic and external elites. Jervis has argued that another important condition is that progress of the West European security community was path-dependent, in that without the Cold War, it is unlikely that France and Germany could have overcome traditional fears and rivalries. The conflict with the USSR produced US security guarantees and an unprecedented sense of common purpose among the states that form the EU. Since the coalition could have been undermined by social unrest or political instability, each member sought to ensure that the others were well off and resisted the temptation to solve its 106 own problems by exporting them to its neighbors. Members of a security community are truly sensitive to each other’s legitimate interests. This may not be the case with regard to ASEAN as seen, for example, in the persistence of the regional haze problem, caused by annual forest fires in Indonesia, since 1997. Since the coalition would have been disrupted had any member developed strong grievances against other members, each has reason to moderate its own demands and to mediate when conflicts developed between others. To ensure that relations would remain good in the future, leaders consciously portrayed the others as partners and sponsored the socialization practices. The US willingness to engage in extensive cooperation abroad, the European willingness to go far down the road of integration, and Japan’s willingness to tie itself closely to the US were improbable without the Cold War. These forms of positive and mutually beneficial interstate cooperation among the US, the EU, and Japan, set off positive feedback loops and are now quite self-sustaining. Since the end of the Cold War, community building within Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia has also started to gain momentum, especially in the case of the ASEAN member states. 2.8 Conceptual Framework My argument is that over the past forty three years, intra-ASEAN trade has progressed to about 23 per cent of their total trade with the rest of the world, but there has been minimal regional political integration, let alone the building of a security community (Chapter Three). Similarly, I argue in Chapter Four that despite the persistence of historical enmity and contemporary nationalist rivalries and territorial disputes, Northeast Asia can actually be regarded as a relatively stable ‘zone of peace’ over the past decade. Sino-Japanese mistrust and rivalry need not be permanent. 107 Changes in circumstances and given the requisite political will can result in mutually beneficial cooperation. Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama (early September 2009) has stated publicly that his DPJ government intends to put priority on improving bilateral relations with Beijing, and to work together with China to actively promote the establishment of a unified Asian community. 106 Chapter Four will examine the claim that the ‘ASEAN Way’ is the most important factor in promoting Northeast Asian regionalism. To what extent is this claim valid? In reality, are there actually other factors that are playing far more important roles in the evolution of Northeast Asian regionalism? Chapters Three and Four are inter-related for a number of reasons. Since the 1960s, Southeast Asian elites know that the peace and security of both sub-regions are closely linked. Historically China and Japan have played influential roles shaping the security environment in Southeast Asia. Most of the states in the East Asian region shared the impact of imperialism and colonialism. The Northeast Asian states have more powerful economies compared to their Southeast Asian counterparts. In the post-Cold War era, both Southeast and Northeast Asia have become more economically interdependent amid the challenges posed by globalization. Peace and security in Southeast Asia can only be truly understood in the broader context of developments and trends in Northeast Asia. It is not very meaningful to discuss the nature and dynamics of Southeast Asian regionalism without at the same time placing it in the overall East Asian context. The two subregions together constitute a regional security complex. 106 The foreign policy “Japan PM proposes East Asian community to China”, www.channelnewsasia.com. 22 September 2009. Chinese President Hu Jintao is reported to have responded positively. 108 orientations of China, Japan, and South Korea have serious consequences for the wellbeing and security of Southeast Asian states. My methodology is to examine various authoritative opinion polls/surveys of popular views in East Asian and Western states, as well as Western states, as well as studies undertaken by specialists on this topic. Has Southeast Asia become integrated into a “non-war” community? Are there any official war plans or contingency plans for the use of force against neighboring states? Given that national military establishments are by nature very secretive, it may be quite difficult to truly decipher their intentions regarding the possible use of force against threats and rivals or enemies. Still, given the history of interstate disputes and conflicts in Southeast Asia over cultural, socio-economic and political issues, we should be alert to the real possibility that the Southeast Asian militaries have preparations for such military contingencies. Are there clear patterns and trends in the military expenditures of East Asian states, especially the persistent acquisition of advanced, power-projection, and offensive-oriented weaponry? It is of course true to argue that ongoing weapons acquisitions can be for legitimate self-defense and need not signal ill intentions toward other states. But it is important to remember that weapons are by their nature of a dual character. Weapons have both defensive and offensive features. Moreover, if it can be established that arms acquisition patterns in East Asia have led to a vastly enhanced power-projection capability, then we can quite safely argue that this type of pattern should be a legitimate cause for regional concern. It may indicate underlying unease and distrust among regional states about the possible use of force to settle interstate disputes, especially in times of severe economic or political crises, as has happened periodically in East Asia in recent years. We will also assess the 109 effectiveness of the “ASEAN Way” as a model to promote security regionalism in East Asia (Chapter Four). 2.9 Summary and Conclusion The core aim of the security community concept is to minimize or eliminate the likelihood of ruinous interstate wars. By implication, the assumption is that when a group of states is able to forge a regional security community, the happy result is regional peace, stability, and prosperity. This assumption has so far proven to be valid. Since the end of World War Two, only a few security communities have risen: Western Europe; the US and Canada; the North Atlantic region (Europe and North America). Constructivists would plausibly argue that the US and Japan also form a regional community. The notable feature is that contemporary regional security communities are all democracies. Deutsch’s security community concept has three main characteristics and can be summarized as follows. First, the member-states of a security community have unambiguously become integrated to such an extent that they have very strong expectations of peaceful change, without resort to the use of force in the settlement of serious inter-state conflicts. Within such a security community, war is no longer a policy option of the state. The use of force becomes illegitimate. Second, the rise of a ‘we-feeling’ community can arise from prolonged and sustained inter-state interactions and communications through economic, financial, and investment exchanges. They are also assumed to share similar or compatible ideological and political values like democracy, and are mutually sensitive to each other’s legitimate national interests. The third feature is the emergence of a ‘non-war’ community, 110 where the members are open and transparent about their national defense budgets, and they not have emergency war-plans targeted at their neighbours. The main arguments made by Adler and Barnett can be summarized as follows: First, using a constructivist lens, Adler and Barnett wrote about the important role of norms and socialization among the leaders and officials of states. Increased and sustained interactions would lead to greater knowledge about one another, and help shape their perceptions and identities. The interests and identities of states and their leaders are not a given; they are powerfully shaped by norm socialization through the interactions and communications among the leaders and officials of member-states, what Adler has called a ‘communitarian’ approach to international relations. 107 In 1998, Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett revived Deutsch’s security community concept using a Constructivist lens. They focused on the social interactions, norms and common identity that are constructed and forged when national leaders meet and discuss interstate issues. The success of European integration and the rise of the European Union since the early 1990s have stimulated greater scholarly interest in the applicability of Deutsch’s ideas to the non-Western world. Second, Adler and Barnett made useful refinements to Deutsch’s security community concept. They argued that there are three stages in the rise of a regional security community, marked by a number of characteristics. A nascent security community contains a number of ‘triggering mechanisms’ including threat perceptions, expected trade benefits; shared identity; and organizational emulation (learning from the experience of other multilateral organizations). An ascendant 107 Adler 2005, op cit. 111 security community is marked by higher military coordination; reduced fears on the part of one actor that others within the group represent a threat; and the beginnings of cognitive transition toward inter-subjective processes and collective identities that begin to encourage dependable expectations of peaceful change. A mature security community is marked by greater institutionalization; supra-nationalism; a high degree of trust; and low or no probability of military conflicts. A mature stage may be ‘loosely coupled’ (a minimalist version) or ‘tightly coupled’ depending on the degree of trust and institutionalization of the community. “Tightly coupled” security communities have very stringent standards, including a ‘mutual aid society’ providing for collective and cooperative efforts to help each other and offer joint solutions to common problems. They should also have some characteristics of supra-nationalism, which might include common national institutions as well as supranational and transnational institutions, and some form of collective security agreement. 108 In 2001, Amitav Acharya innovatively applied the Adler-Barnett security community framework to the Southeast Asian context. He argued that the peaceful norms of the ASEAN Way had enabled ASEAN to forge regional cohesion and identity and become integrated into a nascent security community. The three main IR schools of thought that explain the rise of regional security communities are realism (inter-governmentalism), liberalism (neo-functionalism), and constructivism (norm-socialization and the building of common identities). In the case of West European integration, inter-governmentalism argues that it has been the result of a series of inter-governmental bargains made by the political elites of sovereign states. This school highlights the central role of states in providing the impetus for European integration. But I would add that structural factors like basic 112 changes in the regional and global distribution of power are particularly important in shaping the perceptions, calculations, and policy responses of state elites to regionalist projects. Neo-functionalism (a variant of liberalism) argues that the evolution of European integration has been the result of a series of ‘spillover’, progressing from the ‘low-politics’ issues of promoting regional economic, trade, and technical cooperation, and as a result of greater mutual confidence, spilling over into the ‘highpolitics’ areas of regional political and security cooperation. Constructivism offers a novel way of understanding the rise of regional security communities: by focusing on the spread of common peaceful norms of interstate behaviour, and the building of shared identities of friendship and partnership between state elites. All these three schools of thought have their strong points. An eclectic approach of combining their respective strengths will provide us with a more comprehensive understanding of the unique dynamics shaping the origins, motivations, and evolution of regional security communities in Western Europe and East Asia. Overall, the “security community” concept is an alternative way of conceptualizing pathways to durable interstate peace. Liberal and constructivist theory, unlike that of realism, assumes that national leaders and states are capable of learning from past mistakes and turn towards pacific interstate behaviour. In particular, constructivism argues that the identity and interests of states are shaped by peaceful norms and inter-subjective values and beliefs, and not pre-determined. It further assumes that constant and reported inter-state interactions, based on these peaceful norms will lead to the rise of a sense of regional community. But the basic problem is how and why such interstate interactions must necessarily lead to the rise of a security community. In Chapter Three, we will examine whether ASEAN has ___________________________________________________________________________________ 108 Griffiths 2005, op cit., pp. 751-52. 113 really become integrated into a security community. Chapter Four will then analyze the claim that ASEAN Way is the most important factor in promoting Northeast Asian regionalism, and whether there are in fact other factors that are playing more important roles in determining the nature and dynamics of Northeast Asian regionalism. 114 [...]... the claim that the ASEAN Way is the most important factor determining the nature and dynamics of 71 Northeast Asian regionalism Is this specific claim exaggerated? Are there other factors that are actually more critical to the evolution of Northeast Asian regionalism? Theoretical Contributions made by Adler and Barnett The Deutschian security community concept made little headway during the Cold War... advocated in January 20 02 for the inclusion of Australia and New Zealand as core members of an East Asian community with the aim of counter-balancing China’s growing influence in East Asia At the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit in December 20 05, Australia, New Zealand and India were included as core members In 20 06, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also proposed the establishment of a ‘concert... Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 20 07 30 Amitav Acharya, A regional security community in Southeast Asia” In Regionalism and Multilateralism: Essays on Cooperative Security in the Asia Pacific Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, Marshall Cavendish, 20 03 54 socialization norms of peaceful inter-state behaviour 31 First, security measures should seek to promote reassurance, rather... is an indication of the high degree of West European common identity and ability to act as an international actor In contrast, ASEAN is clearly a far way off ASEAN did not have an effective common response to the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98, or the regional haze issue It remains basically ineffective regarding the human rights violations of the Myanmar military regime Members of a security community. .. Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, Debates on European Integration: A Reader New York: Palgrave-MacMillan, 20 06 Joseph S Nye, International Regionalism: Readings Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1968 62 Martin Griffiths, Encyclopedia of International Relations and Global Politics London and New York: Routledge, 20 05 Amitav Acharya, Constructing a security community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional. .. exclusively -Asian East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG) which would comprise only geographically East Asian nations, and excluding Australia, New Zealand and the US Mahathir’s proposal arose in reaction to the formation of potentially exclusive trade blocs like the EU and NAFTA Specifically, Mahathir’s EAEG proposal was an alternative to the US-led APEC (formed in 1989) Similarly, Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi advocated... of the driving forces that generate a security community, account for the various stages of their development and explain regional variations in the end product Specifically, Adler and Barnett identified three stages or phases in the development of a regional security community, each of which is marked by a number of characteristics The forging of a regional security community starts with the ‘nascent... Perspectives, 27 (1) 20 03: 26 1 -28 8; He Baogang, East Asian ideas 51 involves a combination of ‘integration’ and, more importantly, a strong sense of regional identity’ or regional bonding Here, the ideational-identity dimension of regionalism is critical For example, in this study, East Asian regionalism involves both an enhancement of greater regional cooperation (from cultural, economic, to political -security. .. ‘European integration’, ‘Asia’, and Asian integration’ are contested 27 The key issues to be examined are: Is there a sense of regional identity in East Asia? Do the East Asian elites and mass publics share a common strategic vision? East Asian states have different responses and relationships with the US, the world’s sole superpower _ of regionalism: a normative critique”,... ‘concert of democracies’, together with India and Australia, again to counterbalance the rise of Chinese power in East Asia In contrast, Beijing regarded the ASEAN Plus Three (APT) to be its preferred vehicle to establish an East Asian community Within the APT, China would clearly be able to play a dominating role 26 In my view, there is a direct relationship between regionalism and ‘integration’ Broadly, . membership of the ARF and the emergence of an East Asian diplomatic and security culture”, in Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada eds., Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum,. England: Ashgate publishing limited, 20 07, p. 20 4. 42 to East Asia, and if so, to what extent? What are the similarities and variations between the European and East Asian forms of regional. Zealand as core members of an East Asian community with the aim of counter-balancing China’s growing influence in East Asia. At the inaugural meeting of the East Asia Summit in December 20 05,