Forging a regional security community a study of the driving forces behind ASEAN and east asian regionalism 1

CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION Whether or not the Asian-Pacific region will be able to develop a framework for common action, like the European Community, is the key question. Already many plans have been set forth for integrating Asia Ultimately, the issue is a cultural one in that no such community of nations will be viable without some shared language, some ideas and perspectives the participants have in common. Purpose and Scope of Dissertation Over the past half century, the steady rise of East Asia has been a notable feature in bringing about a perceptible shifting of the global balance of power. Since the postCold War era in the early 1990s, East Asian regionalism has accelerated. The central aim of a regional security community is to eliminate war among its member-states. A major issue is whether East Asia is becoming more integrated and peaceful, or whether the threat of inter-state armed conflict remains real. As Shambaugh has pointed out, “The dynamics of international relations in Asia are undergoing broad and fundamental changes that are reverberating around the world. Primary among the Akira Iriye, Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations. Chicago: Imprint Publications Inc., 2nd edition, 1992, pp. 391-92. The study of “regions” is contested, in terms of definitions and approaches. For example, is a “region” geographically defined or is it a mental construct? Controversial issues include the role of identity, culture, and institutionalisation. See Rick Fawn ed. Globalising the Regional, Regionalizing the Global, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 5-34. David L. Shambaugh, Power Shift: China and Asia’s New Dynamics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. James F. Hoge, “A Global Power Shift in the Making: Is the United States Ready?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 2, July/August 2004. Hoge argues that global power shifts ‘are rarely peaceful’. Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East. US: Public Affairs, 2008. John Malcolm Dowling, Future Perspectives on the Economic Development of Asia. Singapore: World Scientific, 2009. N.S. Sisodia and V. Krishnappa, Global Power Shifts and Strategic Transition in Asia, New Delhi: Academic Foundation in association with the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, 2009. The temporal scope of this study is end-February 2010. catalysts of change in the region is the rise of China as the engine of regional economic growth, as a major military power, as a significant voice in regional diplomacy, and as a proactive power in multilateral institutions.” The rise of East Asia started with Japan’s miracle growth in the 1950s and 1960s, followed by the ‘Asian Tigers’ of Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore in the 1970s. Malaysia, Thailand, and Indonesia followed in the 1980s. The late-1990s saw the rise of China and India. By the early-twenty first century, East Asia had emerged as the third pillar of the world economy, besides that of the United States (US) and the European Union (EU). This dissertation focuses on the main driving forces that are shaping the evolution of security regionalism in East Asia. ‘Regionalism’ refers generally to the top-down state-driven political process of promoting greater economic cooperation and political integration, either in a geographical area or a mental construct among states sharing common values, interests, identity, and goals. Regional political integration would include, as in the West European case, the establishment of a common identity, a common foreignsecurity policy, plus growing elements of supranationalism. The contemporary benchmark of regionalism will be the EU. In contrast, ‘regionalization’ refers to the role played by non-state actors in promoting greater economic linkages and regionwide production networks in specific regions around the world. Akira Iriye posits that a genuine regional political community must have both material and ideational bases: shared norms and identities about their visions and common strategic policies for their common destiny. The issue is: to what extent the East Asian states share such ‘commonalities’ as identity and foreign-security policy? The EU is generally Shambaugh 2005, ibid. “Description”, http://www.ucpress.edu/books/pages/10447.php. cited in regarded to have achieved the most advanced form of a security community. A Deutschian security community4 is forged when its member-states become so integrated that war among them becomes unthinkable. War and peace in International Relations should be conceptualized along a spectrum or continuum. If we think of war as being placed at the extreme left hand of the continuum, and peace at the right hand side, then the in-between categories would include militarized border clashes and skirmishes, “gunboat diplomacy”, the setting up of regional and international organizations, regional security complexes, security regimes, ‘zone of peace’ and military alliances. A ‘zone of peace’ is a geographical region in which armed conflicts and even war are thinkable but unlikely to occur. (See Figure 1). A security community can be conceptualized as both a process and an end product. The postCold War era has seen a revival of regional integration around the world. This is the result of increased globalization, an expanding world economy, the rise of economic blocs in the EU and NAFTA in the late 1980s, the rise of China and India in the 1990s, and the spread of democracy and democratization worldwide. Karl Deutsch et al. Political Community in the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957. According to Deutsch, there are two types of security communities, ‘amalgamated’ and ‘pluralistic’. The United States of America is an example of an amalgamated security community where its constituting entities lose their sovereignty. The EU is a pluralistic security community in that its member states retain their sovereignty. In this dissertation, we are referring to pluralistic security communities. See also Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell eds. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. The idea of a ‘regional security complex’ is about how geographically proximate states intentionally or unintentionally affect each other’s security – see Johan Eriksson and Mark Rhinard, “The Internal-External Security Nexus”, Cooperation and Conflict 44 (3) 2009: 243267. See also Barry Buzan, “Security Architecture in Asia: the interplay of regional and global levels”, The Pacific Review 16 (2) June 2003: 143-173. Figure 1.1 Conceptualization of War and Peace along a continuum War (civil and interstate) Militarized border clashes Militarized border skirmishes “Gunboat diplomacy” or overt military displays of power against rivals Regional organizations Regional Security Complexes (armed conflicts are thinkable and likely) Security Regimes (armed conflicts are thinkable and possible) ‘Zone of Peace’ (Armed conflicts are thinkable but unlikely) Military Alliances Peace (Security Community, either at the regional or global levels) Source: Adapted from Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. David Lake, “Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Relations”, International Organisation, 50 (1996): 1-36; cited in Emanuel Adler and Patricia Greve, “When security community meets balance of power: overlapping regional mechanisms of security governance”, in Rick Fawn ed. Globalising the Regional, Regionalising the Global. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 63. I will re-examine a claim made by some constructivist scholars that ASEAN is either a nascent security community or is already one (Acharya 2001). This assessment is carried out by testing it against the two core features of the classic Deutschian regional security community concept: Existence of a ‘we-feeling’ community; and the rise of a ‘non-war’ community. These two features can be subdivided into the following six components of a regional security community: a. Mutual compatibility of values (like democracy), b. Strong economic ties and expectations of more (based on a strong sense of mutual fair-play and benefit), c. Multifaceted social, political and cultural transactions (strong positive feelings about one another), d. Growing degree of institutionalized relationships, e. Mutual responsiveness (sensitivity to one another’s legitimate interests), and f. Mutual predictability of behaviour, especially about the practice of peaceful settlement of disputes. It is important to re-examine this contentious claim because the parties in this scholarly debate (the ‘ASEANists’ and their critics) have for at least the past ten years seemed to talk past one another. Both sides have basically stuck to their positions, seemingly choosing to ignore the other party. This unhealthy situation needs to be remedied. Not surprisingly, the scholarly literature continues to accumulate the work of both parties, but without any clear resolution as to which claim is a better explanation of the driving forces behind the evolution of regionalism in East Asia. The scholarly debate has important implications which extend far beyond a mere Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: The problem of Regional Order. London: Routledge, 2001. The second edition of this book was published in 2009. Ken Booth and Nicholas Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Cooperation and Trust in World Politics, New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2008, pp. 191-196. intellectual discourse. It has implications for the development of regional integration in different regions, and international relations theory more generally. William Tow has suggested that a reason for studying the evolving Asian security order is its ‘regional-global nexus’: “such knowledge is increasingly compelling as international security problems are more and more shaping the dynamics of Asian security politics”. Premature and misleading claims need to be highlighted and better still, resolved so that the international relations discipline can be put on the right path. In October 2003 the governments of the ASEAN states formally adopted the goal of establishing a three-pillared ASEAN Community, based on the formation of an ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community, an ASEAN Economic Community, and an ASEAN Security Community (since re-named as ASEAN Political-Security Community) by the year 2020. Precisely because the ASEAN governments have decided on creating an ASEAN Security Community, it is vital that we are clear what is precisely meant by the notion of a security community. Second, this dissertation examines a claim by some constructivist scholars that the ‘ASEAN Way’ (characterized by features like consensual decision-making; informality; minimal institutionalization; sovereignty-orientation; non-intervention; and the non-use of force in settling interstate conflicts), also known as the ‘AsiaPacific Way’ or the ‘East Asian Way’, has played the major role in shaping post-cold war regional integration in Northeast Asia: “…Southeast Asian leaders and intellectuals speak of an ‘ASEAN Way’ of regional cooperation, which is being promoted by them as the organizing framework of multilateralism at the wider Asia8 William Tow, “Setting the context” in Tow ed. Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 4. For details on the ASEAN Political-Security www.asean.org/18741.htm. (Accessed on 31 January 2010). Community, see Pacific regional level.” 10 In other words, the ASEAN elites are seeking to extend the ASEAN Way of cooperative security to Northeast Asian regionalism. Peace, security, and regionalism in the geographically-proximate sub-regions of Southeast Asia and Northeast Asia are inextricably linked. There are a number of reasons why ASEAN became concerned with regional security trends in post-Cold War Northeast Asia: the closure of US bases in the Philippines in 1992; the unresolved territorial issues in the South China Sea; instability on the Korean Peninsula arising from Pyongyang’s ambitions to acquire nuclear weapons; and Sino-US tensions over Taiwan due to the rise of pro-independence forces there. 11 I examine this claim by considering other determinants which may offer better explanations of the growing momentum of Northeast Asian regionalism. These include the impact of globalization on state behaviour; the implications of the rise of China; Japan’s quest for ‘normal’ country status and its support for regional multilateralism; the leadership role of a middle power like South Korea, and the shifting US policy in support of an inclusive form of East Asian regionalism, especially since the late-1990s. Realists, like Aaron Friedberg, argue that Northeast Asia is ‘ripe for rivalry’, while constructivists like Amitav Acharya tend to be more optimistic. At an IISS-Asia Seminar in July 2010, Acharya characterized the evolving 10 Amitav Acharya 2001 op. cit. Acharya, “Ideas, Identity, and Institution-building: from the ‘ASEAN Way’ to the ‘Asia-Pacific Way’? Pacific Review 10(3) 1997: 31946. Timo Kivimaki, “The Long Peace of ASEAN,” Journal of Peace Research 38 (1) 2001: 5-25. Christopher Hughes, “New Security Dynamics in the Asia-Pacific: Extending regionalism from Southeast Asia to Northeast Asia”, The International Spectator, 42 (3) 2007: 319-335. 11 Jurgen Haacke and Noel M. Morada, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: origins and evolution”, in Jurgen Haacke and Noel Morada eds. Cooperative Security in the Asia-Pacific: The ASEAN Regional Forum, London and New York: Routledge, 2010, pp. 14-15. East Asian regional order as ‘consociational’, something between Confucian and Kantian. 12 This dissertation is basically a qualitative study. Its key objective is to reexamine the nature, dynamics, and implications of the main driving forces behind the process of post-Cold War East Asian regionalism. Given that Western Europe is generally regarded as having the most advanced form of regionalism in the world, it is inevitable that this study has to made broad references to it. But this study makes no attempt to a comparative study between West European and East Asian regionalism. 13 The main driving forces behind the rise of a security community in Western Europe will be highlighted in Chapter Two. 12 Aaron Friedberg, “Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia”, International Security 18(3) Winter 1993-94: 5-33. Richard Betts, “Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War”, International Security, 18 (3) Winter 1993-94: 34-77. Thomas Christensen, “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia”, International Security, 23 (4) Spring 1999: 49-80. See also Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analysing regional security strategies,” International Security 32 (3) 2007/8: 113-57. Hans H. Indorf, “ASEAN in extra-regional perspective,” Contemporary Southeast Asia (2) 1987: 86-105. Thomas Berger, “Set for Stability? Prospects for Conflict and Cooperation in East Asia’, Review of International Studies Vol. 26 (2006): 405-28. G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Between Balance of Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific’, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific (1) 2002: 69-94. Amitav Acharya, “Between Confucius and Kant: China’s Ascent and the Future of Asia’s Security Order”, IISS-Asia Seminar Series, Singapore, 21 July 2010 http://www.iiss.org/about-us/offices/iiss-asia-singapore/events-activities/iiss-asiaseminar-series-professor-amitav-acharya). 13 Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell eds. Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. “ASEAN” scholars also acknowledge this point. Peter J Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2005. Khong Yuen Foong, “ASEAN and the Southeast Asian Security Complex”, in David Lake and Patrick Morgan eds. Regional Order: Building Security in a New York, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston eds. Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007. Rationale for this Study There are a number of reasons for choosing this topic for investigation. First, East Asia is a vital part of the global political economy. Trends in East Asian economics, politics, and security are shaping the international security order. The growing importance of Asia in the regional and global balance of power is cogently captured by William Tow in the following manner: Asia has arguably become the most critical region in an evolving international order. Geopolitically, the region includes three of the world’s great powers — China, Japan and India — and two others, the United States and Russia, lie just beyond its peripheries and interact with it extensively. Demographically, over half of the world’s total population is Asian and that total is forecast to reach 60 per cent by 2050. Economically, it is projected that China and India alone will account for more than 50 per cent of global growth between 2005 and 2030. Militarily, four key players in the broader Asia-Pacific – the US, Russia, China and North Korea — are nuclear weapons states. Asian defence budgets constitute the world’s largest arms market (US$150 billion in purchases between 1990 and 2002) and the region’s “defence transformation” programmes are growing. 14 Second, the driving forces behind the evolution of East Asian regionalism are deeply linked to the basic issue of war and peace in the international system, and the emergence of a new East Asian security order. In this regard, Evelyn Goh posits that there are two key determinants linked to the nature of US-China relations: “Can the US be persuaded that China can act as a reliable ‘regional stakeholder’ that will help to buttress regional stability and US global security aims? Can China be convinced that the US has neither territorial ambitions in Asia nor the desire to encircle China, but will help to promote Chinese development and stability as part of its global security strategy? 15 Unlike realism, liberal and constructivist approaches argue that war is not necessarily inevitable in an anarchical international system. In particular, 14 15 William Tow ed. Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 1. Evelyn Goh, “Hegemony, hierarchy and order”, in William T. Tow ed. Security Politics in the Asia-Pacific: A Regional-Global Nexus? Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 119. constructivist scholars argue that a socially-constructed security community offers a promising way out of the security dilemma. Andrew Farrell has pointed out that in the nuclear age, the study of regionalism can make a meaningful contribution to understanding the building up of interstate tensions. 16 A study of non-Western regionalism has profound implications for regional order and for the growth of IR theory. If ASEAN is able to maintain its unity and makes progress in becoming integrated into a security community, it could facilitate, as pointed out by Acharya and Stubbs, the rise of a distinctive non-Western theory of international relations. 17 William Tow has made a similar argument: A study of the driving forces of regionalism is likely to be very useful in generating knowledge about the nature and unique features of the evolving East Asian regional security order. A study of the driving forces in ASEAN and Northeast Asian regionalism can facilitate the quest to develop a nonWestern theory of international relations. Two books edited by Muthiah Alagappa (1998, 2003) considered how “international relations theory can help explain the interrelationships of material power, ideational perceptions and order-building dynamics within Asia”. Another influential and constructive study of Asian security was edited by G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno and appeared in 2003 as International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific: it focused “on regional power relations as a component of the global security environment”. The Ikenberry/Mastanduno book highlighted “the ongoing weakness of existing Asian security institutions relative to their European counterparts. It posits that the United States’ early post-war decision to manage power in Asia not by institutionalisation (along the lines of NATO) but by hierarchy (through its bilateral system of alliances there), established path dependency” that has since inhibited the establishment of more robust Asian security institutions (Duffield 2003: 2568). Tow pointed out that if this interpretation is correct, American power has imposed constraints on Asian order-building that impede an Asian capability to shape and manage regional order autonomously, refuting the arguments of Kang and others who insist that more region-centric models can be applied to this process. On the other hand, American power endows the Asian region with “breathing space” for developing more self-reliant institutions and processes for achieving security. 18 16 Farrell op. cit. 2005: 9. See also Bruce Russett, Harvey Starr, David Kinsella, World Politics: Menu for Choice, Florence, KY, USA: Wadsworth Publishing, 2009. 17 Amitav Acharya and Richard Stubbs eds., Theorizing Southeast Asian Relations, London: Routledge, 2009. 18 Tow ed. 2009 op cit., pp. 5-7. 10 regional challenges and perceptions of security threats, the challenges of nationbuilding and ethnic-and religious anti-government rebellions. The founding visions and political declaratory goals of the ASEAN governments are also important considerations to examine in the quest to explain the pattern of East Asian regionalism. In the West European case, the strong support of an external Great Power, i.e. the US, for a united Europe, appears to be necessary for the forging of a regional security community. The driving force behind the strong US support for European regional integration was the protection of US national interests against the Soviet Threat. The context was the bipolar Cold War rivalry between the democratic US and the communist Soviet Union. Both the US and Western Europe shared the same values of free and open societies based on democratic capitalism. US hegemony meant that Washington would be able to cap any threat of revived German militarism, and thereby assure other European states, especially France. In contrast, the US pursued a divide-and-rule, hub-and-spokes alliance strategy from 1945 till the late1980s in East Asia to contain communism, thereby preventing the spread and emergence of any pan-Asian communist bloc that might threaten US primacy and hegemony in the region. Second, is ASEAN a genuine regional security community, as claimed by some constructivist scholars? I will attempt to answer this question by a qualitative study of the two core criteria of a security community: existence of a ‘we-feeling’ and a ‘non-war’ community. A related debate here has to with the linkage between democracy and the rise of a security community. Sorpong Peou has made several interesting comments as to the reasons why democratic regimes are more likely to want and be able to establish durable security communities: 24 .that various studies show that ‘alliances between democracies … appear to be more durable’ …, while others demonstrate that international security regimes with non-liberal members are less robust than those with liberal democratic members. Democracies … tend to resolve their disputes in a manner short of war. Two of the most important mechanisms for doing this are peaceful dispute settlement and legal equality. Among themselves, liberal states that adopt the norm of self-restraint and non-violence tend to favour negotiation and compromise. They are highly institutionalised and thus tend to rely on legal means as the way to resolve conflict. 42 Proponents of the democratic peace thesis, like Sorpong Peou, have pointed out that the liberal norms of self-restraint and non-violence may prove important in the process of security community-building among democracies, but norms relatively more capable of promoting mutual trust among democratic states are the liberal values of political and racial equality (major elements of modern liberalism). Democratic state leaders who treat others states, including democracies, as politically or racially inferior not have a clean record of self-restraint and non-violence. 43 Peou argued that because of their shared liberal norms and values, democracies — whether powerful or weak — may cooperate with one another more effectively than autocracies. A powerful democracy tends to enjoy more legitimacy with other democracies than a powerful autocracy with weaker autocracies. This is because political leaders within any democracy tend to enjoy political legitimacy from their populations. Powerful democracies may find it easier to deal with other democratic states than with non-democratic ones and are thus more willing and able to provide 42 Sorpong Peou, “Security community-building in the Asia-Pacific”, in Tow ed. 2009 op cit., p. 150. 43 Peou 2009, ibid., pp. 150-51. 25 community leadership. Peou argued that security communities can be maintained on the basis of such legitimacy. 44 Third, what is the extent of the role that the ‘ASEAN Way’ has played in promoting Northeast Asian regionalism and the rise of a relatively stable ‘zone of peace’ there? What are the other important explanations? Fourth, can there be a non-Western pathway to forging a regional security community? The Western model focuses on the importance of liberal democracy and the rule of law. The experience over the past forty-three years appears to show that the ‘ASEAN Way’ can also be useful in steadily forging more peaceful inter-state relations in East Asia. A controversy here is whether ASEAN is already a security community or something much less than that. Perhaps it is still too early for a conclusive answer given that ASEAN was established in 1967, but formal West European political integration could be said to have started in 1952 with the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. If ASEAN has not yet become integrated into a security community, then the independent variables of liberal democracy and the rule of law may turn out to be very critical driving forces. Ideational considerations are relevant here. In their founding document of August 1967, the ASEAN leaders made clear in the Bangkok Declaration their strong determination to achieve ‘One Southeast Asia’ (ASEAN unity) and their preference for ‘regional solutions to regional problems’ (to reduce the pretext for external Great Power interference in ASEAN affairs). But the ASEAN Way appears to have major limitations as a mechanism to forge a truly regional security community. An obsession with national sovereignty (and an unwillingness to promote political pluralism) may actually function as a hindrance to the achievement of a level of regional integration that will lead to the rise of a 44 Peou 2009, ibid., p. 151. 26 regional security community: acceptance of ASEAN’s leadership by regional powers like China and Japan could be tactical given their mutual deep-seated political mistrust and geopolitical rivalry; rigid adherence to non-interference and sovereignty have been shown to be a consistent obstacle to crises where the core, vital interests of member states are adversely affected; and the lack of a common perception of external security threats. A related question is: what are the possibilities for the rise of a non-Western theory of forging regional security communities and International Relations Theory more generally? Conceptual Framework My conceptual framework for this dissertation will comprise the following components. First, I will make use of the major international relations theories of Constructivism, Realism, and Liberalism, and their related concepts. From Constructivism, I will make use of the two core features of a security: ‘we-feeling’ regional identity (extent of shared political values; degree of economic integration; degree of socio-cultural and political ties; degree of affinity and trust; nationalistic versus regional mindsets; and the overall state of bilateral relations) and a ‘non-war’ community (existence of contingency mobilization of military forces against neighbours; pervasiveness of militarized conflicts among members; patterns in regional arms acquisitions; existence of regional arms races). These two criteria are examined in detail in Chapter Three and Four. To answer the research questions, I will need to collect specific types of data and evidence. To answer the question whether ASEAN has become integrated into a ‘we-feeling’ community, I will need data such as the following: is there strong evidence of the existence of an ‘ASEAN Identity’? Do citizens of the ASEAN states 27 have strong positive perceptions of other states? Here, I will need to be able to find reputable opinion polls and surveys conducted by scholars and organizations including the ASEAN Secretariat. Next, I will examine data and studies carried out on the progress and extent of promoting an ASEAN Economic Community: what is the extent of intra-ASEAN regional trade and investment over the past decade as compared to the EU and NAFTA? Do the ASEAN elites expect a continuing rise in the pace of ASEAN regional economic cooperation? What are the constraints and limitations? I will also examine the progress being made by the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) and assess its significance. I will also need studies carried out on the following areas: What is the progress being made in terms of promoting greater ASEAN military-security cooperation? What is the extent of bilateral security cooperation among groups of ASEAN states? Are there any signs of growing multilateral regional security cooperation? The inaugural meeting of ASEAN Defence Ministers (ADMMS) started in 2007; what progress has been made? What is its significance? Finally, there is growing talk among regional elites of constructing a new regional architecture for both East Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region, as seen in the proposals by Japanese Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. This question is an integral part of the whole issue of the future direction and evolution of East Asian regionalism, especially the issues of its membership and leadership. I will also need to collect data which answers the question: What is the overall progress being made at forging an ASEAN Community and its significance for the evolution of East Asian regionalism. 28 Plan of the Dissertation This dissertation is divided into five chapters. The introduction starts with an explanation of the purpose, scope, and rationale for the two main research questions to be examined, followed by a brief overview of the meanings of ‘regionalism’ and the ‘security community’ concept. It is followed by a section on approaches to understanding regionalism and ‘security communities’. The next section will focus on applying the security community theory to Southeast and Northeast Asia. In the Methodology section, I explain my approach in research design, and obtaining the sources to assess whether Southeast Asia is evolving into a regional security community and the determinants of Northeast Asian regionalism. There is a voluminous literature by scholars writing about the evolution of regionalism in East Asia. With the Internet and Google-Search, it is relatively easy to gain access to the huge amount of secondary sources of data. In a larger sense, I am re-visiting and doing a re-assessment of the main driving forces behind the patterns in the evolution of regional integration in East Asia. I intend to achieve my objective mainly by reexamining a number of studies made by scholars, public opinion polls and surveys conducted by Asian and Western organizations; public statements and speeches made by senior ASEAN officials and national leaders. In Chapter Two, the Literature Review, I start by clarifying the meaning(s) of the key concepts of ‘regional integration’, ‘security’, ‘community’, and ‘security community’. I then discuss the classic ideas about ‘security community’ made by Karl Deutsch and his associates (1957), followed by the modifications introduced by Adler and Barnett (1998), Amitav Acharya (2001), and Rizal Sukma (2003), and arguments made by critics. Chapter Two includes a section analysing the main driving forces behind the rise of a regional security community in Western Europe in 29 the immediate aftermath of World War Two. A ‘security community’ in East Asia should be conceptualized along both material and ideational dimensions. The two analytical chapters are in Chapter Three and Chapter Four. In Chapter Three, I analyse the main driving forces behind the nature of the evolution of ASEAN regionalism over the past forty-three years. Specifically, I re-examine the contentious claim made by some constructivist scholars that ASEAN is either a nascent security community or is already one. I so by doing a qualitative study of the two core features of a security community: existence of a ‘we-feeling’ regional identity within ASEAN, and a ‘non-war’ community. Chapter Three will conclude with some observations about the progress and significance of efforts to forge an ‘ASEAN Community’ and what it means for the claim that ASEAN is already a regional security community. In Chapter Four, I examine the main determinants in the shaping of regional order in Northeast Asia, especially the strengths and limitations of the ‘ASEAN Way’ in promoting greater habits of consensual and consultative styles of inter-regional cooperation and integration. To what extent is it valid to claim that the ‘ASEAN Way’ has played the critical role in the peaceful evolution of post-Cold War regionalism in Southeast and Northeast Asia? While it is true to argue that ASEAN and the ASEAN Way have played a very important role in helping to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia, to what extent is it valid to claim that the ASEAN Way is the most important factor in promoting Northeast Asian regionalism over the past two decades? I will argue that the ASEAN Way of cooperative security is only one of several factors which are determining the dynamics of Northeast Asian regionalism. 30 Finally, Chapter Five concludes the dissertation by highlighting the main driving forces in Southeast and Northeast Asia. It is then followed by an analysis of the conditions necessary for the rise of an East Asian security community. The significance and contributions of this dissertation will then be highlighted and summarized. The Argument My first theme in this study is that the main driving forces shaping regionalism in Southeast Asia are both material (power interests) and ideational (identity and community). National interests (political stability and security) are pre-requisites for promoting economic growth and prosperity; fear of trade protectionism; and fear of marginalization, especially the potential dangers posed by the rise of China. In terms of foreign policy: the quest for regional autonomy (freedom from external intervention; ideal of ‘One Southeast Asia’ and the philosophy of ‘regional solutions for regional problems’; realization of the importance of enhancing greater regional bargaining strength and clout) are important considerations. Regarding the first specific research question, my argument is that contrary to the claim made by some constructivist scholars, ASEAN has not yet become integrated into a regional security community, from both the Deutschian and constructivist perspectives. They have not developed into a “we-feeling” and “non-war” community. While ASEAN regional economic cooperation has made noteworthy strides since the post-Cold War era, underlying intra-ASEAN tensions persist arising from deep-seated culturalcivilizational and economic-political diversity, economic rivalry and disputes over territory and natural resources. These intra-ASEAN suspicions, rivalries and disputes are unlikely to disappear anytime soon. On balance, the available evidence so far 31 does not give us strong confidence to conclude that ASEAN, alone in the nonWestern world, has finally become integrated into a security community. ASEAN’s goal of establishing an ASEAN Community by 2015 seems overly optimistic. It may take a few generations to achieve Southeast Asian political integration. The second theme of this dissertation is that the ‘ASEAN Way’ of cooperative security is only one factor which has usefully facilitated the expansion of post-Cold War Northeast Asian regionalism. The ‘ASEAN Way’ of dialogue and consultation has played a positive, confidence-building role in the promotion of peace and security in East Asia. But there are more, critical state-centric factors at work (Chapter Four). The rise of China and its priority of promoting good relations with all of its neighbours as Beijing needs a peaceful regional and international environment to concentrate on strengthening China’s economy is an important determinant. Japan’s quest for ‘normal’ international status and Tokyo’s strong support for open and inclusive multilateralism are equally important factors. Another major determinant is the cautious US support for the regional integration movement in East Asia since the late-1990s. Washington’s position is that East Asian multilateralism must be open, inclusive and not jeopardize the US-centric hub-and-spokes alliance system with its regional allies like Japan and South Korea. Methodology This dissertation is mainly a qualitative study. It makes a reassessment of various studies done by scholars on the topic of the evolution of East Asian regionalism. My main challenge is re-interpreting and analysing what is already a vast existing literature, so as to try to offer new insights on the crucial driving forces that are shaping the nature and dynamics of East Asian regionalism. There are two research 32 questions I am interested in: First, what are the main driving forces which have shaped (and continues to shape) the evolution and trends of East Asian regionalism. A specific research question analyses the claim that ASEAN is either a ‘nascent’ security community or is already one. In particular, I analyse how it was possible for Western Europe, after its total devastation in World War Two, to rise from the ashes and move on to forge a security community. My intention is not to a comparative study between the regional security orders in Western Europe and East Asia. Nevertheless, as Western Europe is generally regarded as having achieved the most advanced form of regionalism in the world, it is inevitable that this study have to make references to the European regionalist experience. No single theoretical paradigm or approach enjoys a monopoly of the truth. They all have their strengths and weaknesses as they try to help us gain a better understanding of the complex world around us. So I adopt an eclectic approach to the meaning and study of security community, by combining the useful insights offered by Deutsch and constructivist scholars. 45 Regionalism can be conceptualized as both a process and an end point. This study implicitly assumes that the driving forces shaping the process of East Asian regionalism will inevitably involve the question of whether East Asia can evolve into a regional security community. For the purposes of this dissertation, we will examine, based on the available evidence, the extent to which ASEAN and Northeast Asia satisfy the two critical and stringent conditions of a security community, that is, a ‘we-feeling’ community; and a ‘non-war’ community. These two core criteria are related, but distinct. A ‘we-feeling’ regional identity can be conceptualized as being part of the ‘preventive’ pre-conditions necessary for 45 Vinod Aggarwal et al. “Roundtable: Peter J. Katzenstein’s Contributions to the Study of East Asian Regionalism”, Journal of East Asian Studies Vol. 7, 2007. 33 members of a regional community to have and thus make it less likely that states will resort to the use of force to settle inter-state conflicts. In contrast, a ‘non-war’ community can be conceptualized as part of the ‘pre-emptive’ conditions that increase the incentives for states not to resort to the use of force against their neighbours based on their threat perceptions. A related consideration has to with the identification and measurement of a ‘we-feeling’ regional security community. How we know a security community exists when we see one? This task presents a major problem of operationalization. It has to with finding the empirical evidence about the existence of common “Asian Values” or a communitarian Asian culture. A major component of a ‘we-feeling’ community has to with the existence of what Chris Roberts has termed as ‘affinity and trust’ among members of a potential security community. 46 Andrew Kydd 47 has defined trust “as a belief that the other side is trustworthy, that is willing to reciprocate, and mistrust as a belief that the other side is untrustworthy, or prefers to exploit one’s cooperation”. Kydd observed that trust and mistrust in international relations is important because it can make the difference between peace and war. Not surprisingly, national policy elites have to constantly calculate each other’s motivations, especially about defence expenditures and the arms build-up of their immediate neighbours. One way to investigate ‘trust’ is to conduct an opinion poll or survey of respondents, on the assumption that they will be as truthful as possible about their real feelings towards neighbouring states. But respondents may choose to hide their real feelings and give ‘politically correct’ answers, which may then not give 46 Christopher Roberts, “Affinity and Trust in Southeast Asia: A Regional Survey”. In Hiro Katsumata and Tan See Seng eds. People’s ASEAN and Government’s ASEAN, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2007. 47 Andrew H. Kydd, Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005, p. 30. 34 us an accurate reading. Hence, a real constraint facing this qualitative study is the human/subjective element, and this is a point worth remembering when it comes to interpretation and analysis of the data and evidence. Here, we are interested in finding out whether East Asia has become integrated to the extent of having developed a common ‘regional identity’ or common regional values (like democracy). A common regional identity or values would include the question of whether the leaders and peoples have positive views and sentiments toward their neighbouring states. Nevertheless, the publication of various reputable public opinion polls and surveys about intra-regional attitudes and perceptions is useful insofar as they give an idea of the general sentiments that East Asian peoples have of one another. Do the peoples within ASEAN view themselves as ‘ASEAN Citizens’? How much they really know of other ASEAN states, their cultures, civilization, economy and politics? Do the general publics really have ‘neighbourly’ attitudes towards other ASEAN states? What are the policies of East Asian governments and the perceptions of their peoples towards democracy, respect for human rights, the rule of law, and political accountability? Do East Asian governments share a common strategic vision of East Asia, that is, they share common views about possible external threats, like the regional role of the US or ‘rising China’ in the region? Do they share common perceptions regarding, for example, the US’s War against Terror? In essence, are the ASEAN states truly able to transcend their Westphalian (national) mindsets into a regional-level mindset? In this dissertation, I will re-examine the implications of the findings of a number of major regional surveys conducted by scholars. First, Jean Blondel conducted a nine-nation survey of citizens’ views about the existence of shared “Asian Values” at end-2000. These nine nations were Singapore, (West) Malaysia, 35 Indonesia (Java), Thailand, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and China. The results of Blondel’s study were published in 2006. The second was a 2007 regional survey by Australian scholar Christopher Roberts. Roberts conducted interviews with national elites (senior government officials in the Home, Defence and Foreign Affairs Ministries) and citizens in the ASEAN states regarding the ASEAN proposal to create an ASEAN Community by 2015. Roberts’ study was part of his doctoral dissertation at the Australian Defence Force Academy at the University of New South Wales. His focus was on the levels of affinity and trust in the ASEAN region. Third, the 2008 joint Thompson-Chulanee regional survey of university students’ perceptions about ASEAN. It surveyed the views of 2170 undergraduates from leading universities for all the ten ASEAN states. 48 The fourth is a study by Stephen Levine on “Asian values and the Asia Pacific community: Shared interests and common concerns”. 49 Levine’s study focussed on: discussions concerning the role, if any, of ‘Asian Values’ in the political, economic, and security relationships of nation-states in the Asia-Pacific region. More specifically .to identify shared features of these relationships, the extent to which these can be characterised as sufficiently significant as to constitute a form of ‘community’, and the extent to which these relationships, and such a community, are influenced in any way by values distinctly ‘Asian’ in character. 50 48 Jean Blondel, “Citizen’s values in East and Southeast Asia”, in Ian Marsh ed. Democratization, Governance and Regionalism in East and Southeast Asia: A Comparative Study, London and New York: Routledge, 2006. Christopher B. Roberts, ASEAN’s Security Community Project: Challenges and Opportunities in the Pursuit of Comprehensive Integration. Doctoral Thesis, Australian Defence Force Academy, University of New South Wales, 2008. Eric Thompson and Chulanee Thianthai, Attitudes and Awareness towards ASEAN: Findings of a Ten-Nation Survey. Singapore: ISEAS, 2008. 49 Stephen Levine, “Asian Values and the Asia Pacific Community: Shared Interests and Common Concerns”, Politics and Policy, 35 (1) 2007: 102-135. 50 Levine, ibid.: 102. 36 Second, is East Asia really a “non-war” community, or only a lesser ‘security regime’? Here, we will examine the patterns and trends in military expenditures by East Asian states. A related issue has to with the motivations behind such patterns in regional military expenditures. One motivation has to with legitimate national self-defence. However, a possible second motivation arises if there is a consistent pattern of focus on enhancing offensive-oriented, power-projection capabilities, then we need to ask whether it conceals an underlying mistrust and ill-intent, of states in the surrounding region. A related question is the nature and extent of the breadth and depth of regional security cooperation among East Asian states. For example, Thailand and the Philippines are formal treaty allies of the US. Over the past thirty years, Singapore has developed very extensive military-security linkages with the US. A study of the rationale behind the extensive military linkages between the US and some of the ASEAN states may be able to reveal interesting patterns and underlying motivations. For the Northeast Asian region, Japan and South Korea are formal treaty allies of the US. With the recent rise of China, Japan under Prime Minister Koizumi (2001-2006) reacted by moving to further intensify its security linkages with the US. However, since September 2009, Prime Minister Hatoyama is seeking to improve political ties with Beijing, especially his proposal for an East Asian community. The new South Korean government of President Lee Myung-Bak, in contrast to his two predecessors, has moved back to a re-strengthening of political and security ties with the US, while taking a more cautious approach towards relations with the Kim Jong-Il regime. So a pertinent issue to address is: Do many East Asian states have more extensive defence-security linkages with the US than among themselves? If so, this could indicate they are relatively much more comfortable forging external links with the US than among themselves. 37 To answer these research questions, I will be referring to a number of public opinion polls and surveys conducted by internationally reputable organizations, like the US-based World Public Opinion, the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, and the Financial Times/Harris Poll, and the ASEAN Foundation. These opinion polls are of course not foolproof. But by cross-checking they are useful in providing us with a fairly good and sound idea of the overall perceptions of how the publics in East Asian societies view each other, as well as how Western societies view the implications for global peace and security of the rise of China, and its implications for the evolution of the East Asian security architecture. I will also refer to the military-security studies carried out by the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), and the Stockholm-based Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), RSIS (Nanyang Technological University), CSIS, and ASEAN-ISIS. References will also be made to studies of global and Asian defence expenditures carried out by scholars, like Hartfiel and Job, Desmond Ball, Tim Huxley and others. The aim is to highlight whether there are consistent trends and patterns in East Asian states’ military expenditures and to specify the possible motivations so as to answer the research questions in a more robust manner. Conclusion There is a clear conceptual linkage between the ideas of ‘security community’, ‘integration’, and ‘regionalism’. Regionalism can be conceptualized in terms of two broad levels or stages of development. First, regionalism involves the development of greater levels of regional economic, trade, and financial cooperation. Second, it involves intensifying levels of regional political integration. This stage would include the forging of a common regional identity, the rise of a common foreign-security 38 policy, growing elements of supranationalism, and the establishment of a regional security community. In this study, the major ‘driving forces’ behind ASEAN and East Asian regionalism refer to the critical ‘agents-processes’ involved. First, the ‘agents’ would refer to the actors and their motivations/ambitions in pushing for greater regionalism. States are the major actors involved in pushing for greater political regionalism in East Asia. Second, the specific processes would include, for example, the ASEAN Way of cooperative security in the quest to promote greater Northeast Asian regionalism. Ultimately, the ‘agents-processes’ would greatly determine the scope and limitations of the nature and dynamics of East Asian regionalism. Finally, Southeast and Northeast Asian regionalism are inextricably linked in a number of ways. They are not only geographically proximate but are also strategically interdependent. Northeast Asian states have historically sought to expand their influence into the Southeast Asian region. Over the past four decades, Southeast Asian states have remained divided over the critical issue of how to respond to the role and rivalries among the Great Powers, especially the US, China, and Japan, in their region. At the same time, Southeast Asian elites are seeking to forge greater ASEAN unity to ensure the region’s autonomy in being the leading manager of the evolving East Asian regional order. 39 [...]... Press, 19 99 Mely Caballero-Anthony, Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond the ASEAN Way Singapore: ISEAS, 2005 21 Chapters Three and Four of this study are linked in a number of ways It is meaningless to talk about peace and security in Southeast Asia without analysing the impact that Northeast Asia has on it Historically, the Northeast Asian states of China and Japan have cast a long shadow over the. .. decades Some scholars have argued that the ASEAN Way’ is the most important factor to forge greater Northeast Asian regionalism, and hence ultimately an East Asian security community For example, writing in 19 97, Acharya noted that Southeast Asian leaders and intellectuals saw the ASEAN Way “as the organizing principle of multilateralism at the wider Asia-Pacific regional level.” 37 36 Rizal Sukma,... engagement of the Great Powers, especially the US and China The security and well-being of the Southeast Asian states are deeply affected by their more powerful neighbours in Northeast Asia, especially China and Japan A study of the major driving forces behind peace, security, and regionalism in Southeast Asia makes sense only in the larger context of the evolving security order in Northeast Asia and. .. Northeast Asia, especially the strengths and limitations of the ASEAN Way’ in promoting greater habits of consensual and consultative styles of inter -regional cooperation and integration To what extent is it valid to claim that the ASEAN Way’ has played the critical role in the peaceful evolution of post-Cold War regionalism in Southeast and Northeast Asia? While it is true to argue that ASEAN and the. .. the ASEAN Way have played a very important role in helping to maintain peace and security in Southeast Asia, to what extent is it valid to claim that the ASEAN Way is the most important factor in promoting Northeast Asian regionalism over the past two decades? I will argue that the ASEAN Way of cooperative security is only one of several factors which are determining the dynamics of Northeast Asian regionalism. .. analysis of the generally adverse ASEAN reaction to this Indonesian proposal is at Chapter Three Extending the ASEAN Way’ to Northeast Asia (NEA) The extension of the ASEAN Way’ of cooperative security to Northeast Asian regionalism is the second question I will be examining in the dissertation The issue is the extent to which the ASEAN Way’ has played in promoting East Asian regionalism over the past two... have in effect argued that the ASEAN Way is all a myth, that ASEAN is an ‘imitation community and a delusion 38 They have argued that the ASEAN states are still beset with serious intraregional conflicts, and have failed to achieve regional identity and solidarity as shown by their failure to respond quickly and adequately to regional threats like the Asian Financial Crisis of 19 97-98, the regional. .. organizations including the ASEAN Secretariat Next, I will examine data and studies carried out on the progress and extent of promoting an ASEAN Economic Community: what is the extent of intra -ASEAN regional trade and investment over the past decade as compared to the EU and NAFTA? Do the ASEAN elites expect a continuing rise in the pace of ASEAN regional economic cooperation? What are the constraints... theory to Southeast and Northeast Asia In the Methodology section, I explain my approach in research design, and obtaining the sources to assess whether Southeast Asia is evolving into a regional security community and the determinants of Northeast Asian regionalism There is a voluminous literature by scholars writing about the evolution of regionalism in East Asia With the Internet and Google-Search, it... Asia and East Asia 40 41 JK Fairbank, “Tributary Trade and China’s Relations with the West”, The Far Eastern Quarterly 1 (1) February 19 42: 12 9 -14 9 Heita Kawakatsu and John Latham eds Japanese Industrialization and the Asian Economy London: Routledge, 19 94 Giovanni Andornino, The nature and linkages of China’s tributary system under the Ming and Qing dynasties” Working Papers of the Global Economic . ‘Asia- Pacific Way’ or the East Asian Way’, has played the major role in shaping post-cold war regional integration in Northeast Asia: “…Southeast Asian leaders and intellectuals speak of an ASEAN. cooperation, as seen in the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF 19 94), the ASEAN Plus Three (APT 19 97) and the East Asian Summit (EAS 2005), and the ratification of the European Union-style ASEAN. important factor to forge greater Northeast Asian regionalism, and hence ultimately an East Asian security community. For example, writing in 19 97, Acharya noted that Southeast Asian leaders and