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keen - debunking economics; the naked emperor dethroned (2011)

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  • About the author

  • Tables, figures and boxes

    • Tables

      • 2.1 Anticipations of the housing crisis and recession

      • 3.1 ‘Utils’ and change in utils from consuming bananas

      • 3.2 Utils arising from the consumption of two commodities

      • 3.3 The commodities in Sippel’s ‘Revealed Preference’ experiment

      • 4.1 Demand schedule for a hypothetical monopoly

      • 4.2 Costs for a hypothetical monopoly

      • 4.3 Sales and costs determine the level of output that maximizes profit

      • 4.4 Cost and revenue for a ‘perfectly competitive’ industry identical in scale to hypothetical monopoly

      • 5.1 Input and output data for a hypothetical firm

      • 5.2 Cost drawings for the survey by Eiteman and Guthrie

      • 5.3 Empirical research on the nature of cost curves

      • 7.1 Sraffa’s hypothetical subsistence economy

      • 7.2 Production with a surplus

      • 7.3 Relationship between maximum and actual rate of profit and the wage share of surplus

      • 7.4 The impact of the rate of profit on the measurement of capital

      • 10.1 Anderson’s ranking of sciences

      • 12.1 The alleged Money Multiplier process

      • 13.1 A hypothetical example of the impact of decelerating debt on aggregate demand

      • 13.2 The actual impact of decelerating debt on aggregate demand

      • 14.1 A pure credit economy with paper money

      • 14.2 The dynamics of a pure credit economy with no growth

      • 14.3 Net incomes

      • 14.4 A growing pure credit economy with electronic money

      • 15.1 Von Neumann’s procedure for working out a numerical value for utility

      • 15.2 The Allais ‘Paradox’

      • 15.3 The Allais ‘Paradox’ Part 2

      • 16.1 The solvability of mathematical models

      • 17.1 Marx’s unadjusted value creation table, with the rate of profit dependent upon the variable-to-constant ratio in each sector

      • 17.2 Marx’s profit distribution table, with the rate of profit now uniform across sectors

      • 17.3 Steedman’s hypothetical economy

      • 17.4 Steedman’s physical table in Marx’s value terms

      • 17.5 Steedman’s prices table in Marx’s terms

      • 17.6 Profit rate and prices calculated directly from output/wage data

      • 17.7 Marx’s example where the use-value of machinery exceeds its depreciation

    • Figures

      • 3.1 A valid market demand curve

      • 4.1 Leijonhufvud’s ‘Totems’ of the Econ tribe

      • 4.2 Stigler’s proof that the horizontal firm demand curve is a fallacy

      • 4.3 Output levels for between 1- and 100-firm industries

      • 5.1 Capacity utilization over time in the USA

      • 5.2 Varian’s drawing of cost curves in his ‘advanced’ microeconomics textbook

      • 7.1 The standard economic ‘circular flow’ diagram

      • 9.1 The time path of one variable in the Lorenz model

      • 9.2 Structure behind the chaos

      • 9.3 Phillips’s functional flow block diagram model of the economy

      • 9.4 The component of Phillips’s Figure 12 including the role of expectations in price setting

      • 9.5 Phillips’s hand drawing of the output–price-change relationship

      • 9.6 A modern flow-chart simulation program generating cycles, not equilibrium

      • 9.7 Phillips’s empirically derived unemployment–money-wage-change relation

      • 10.1 Hicks’s model of Keynes

      • 10.2 Unemployment-inflation data in the USA, 1960–70

      • 10.3 The hog cycle

      • 11.1 How the EMH imagines that investors behave

      • 11.2 How speculators actually behave

      • 12.1 Change in M0 and unemployment, 1920–40

      • 12.2 The volume of base money in Bernanke’s ‘quantitative easing’ in historical perspective

      • 12.3 The empirical ‘Money Multiplier’, 1920–40

      • 13.1 The vortex of debt in my 1995 Minsky model

      • 13.2 US private debt to GDP, 1955–2005

      • 13.3 Aggregate demand in the USA, 1965–2015

      • 13.4 The change in debt collapses as the Great Recession begins

      • 13.5 The Dow Jones nosedives

      • 13.6 The housing bubble bursts

      • 13.7 The Credit Impulse and change in employment

      • 13.8 The biggest collapse in the Credit Impulse ever recorded

      • 13.9 The two great debt bubbles

      • 13.10 The collapse of debt-financed demand then and now

      • 14.1 The neoclassical model of exchange as barter

      • 14.2 The nature of exchange in the real world

      • 14.3 Bank accounts

      • 14.4 Unemployment is better with a debtor bailout

      • 14.5 Modeling the Great Moderation and the Great Recession – inflation, unemployment and debt

      • 14.6 The Great Moderation and the Great Recession – actual inflation, unemployment and debt

      • 14.7 Debt and GDP in the model

      • 14.8 Debt and GDP during the Great Depression

      • 17.1 A graphical representation of Marx’s dialectics

    • Boxes

      • 10.1 The Taylor Rule

      • 13.1 Definitions of unemployment

  • Where are the Diagrams?

  • Preface to the Second Edition

    • Looking back

    • Looking forward

  • Preface to the First Edition

  • 1 | Predicting the ‘unpredictable’

    • The destabilizing effect of neoclassical economics

    • Possibility of debt deflation in the USA

    • The likelihood of a Japanese outcome for America after the crash

    • The impact of the Maastricht Treaty on Europe during a crisis

    • The Efficient Markets Hypothesis encouraging debt-financed speculation

    • Deregulation and crisis

    • The history of crises causing – and not causing – paradigm shifts in economics

    • Public reactions to the failure of neoclassical economics

    • Postscript 2011

  • 2 | No more Mr Nice Guy

    • Why economics must undergo a long-overdue intellectual revolution

    • Purge

    • Triumph

    • Crisis

    • ‘No one saw this coming’

      • table 2.1 Anticipations of the housing crisis and recession

    • Revisionism

    • Ignorance

    • Educated into ignorance

    • Does economics matter?

    • Revolt

    • But it seems to make sense …

    • Sincerity is no defense

    • Debunking economics: a user’s guide

  • Part 1 | Foundations: The logical flaws in the key concepts of conventional economics

  • 3 | The calculus of hedonism

    • Why the market demand curve is not downward-sloping

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Pleasure and pain

    • Flaws in the glass

    • ‘The sum of the interests’

      • table 3.1 ‘Utils’ and change in utils from consuming bananas

      • table 3.2 Utils arising from the consumption of two commodities

    • Deriving the individual demand curve

    • The impact of changing prices on consumer demand

    • Income and substitution effects and the ‘Law of Demand’

    • How rising income affects demand

    • Two is a crowd

      • 3.1 A valid market demand curve

    • Cut off at Pythagoras’ pass

    • Drowning the result

    • Don’t tell the children

    • Following the madding crowd

    • So what?

    • Addendum: an anti-empirical theory

      • table 3.3 The commodities in Sippel’s ‘Revealed Preference’ experiment

    • Rational behavior and the curse of dimensionality

    • Conclusion

  • 4 | Size does matter

    • Why there is no supply curve

      • 4.1 Leijonhufvud’s ‘Totems’ of the Econ tribe

    • The kernel

    • Prelude: the War over Perfect Competition

      • 4.2 Stigler’s proof that the horizontal firm demand curve is a fallacy

    • The roadmap

    • Economic perfection

    • Monopoly

      • table 4.1 Demand schedule for a hypothetical monopoly

      • table 4.2 Costs for a hypothetical monopoly

      • table 4.3 Sales and costs determine the level of output that maximizes profit

    • Perfect competition

    • Checking our sums

    • Calculus 101 for economists: infinitesmals ain’t zero

      • table 4.4 Cost and revenue for a ‘perfectly competitive’ industry identical in scale to hypothetical monopoly

    • Returns to scale and the durability of perfect competition

    • Addendum: the war over perfect competition

    • Equating marginal cost and marginal revenue does not maximize profits

    • Calculus schmalculus

      • 4.3 Output levels for between 1- and 100-firm industries

    • Dialogue with the deaf

    • So what?

  • 5 | The price of everything and the value of nothing

    • Why most products cost less to produce as output rises

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Diminishing productivity causes rising price

      • table 5.1 Input and output data for a hypothetical firm

    • Things don’t add up

      • 5.1 Capacity utilization over time in the USA

    • Resource-constrained versus demand-constrained economies

    • Summing up Sraffa

    • If not rising marginal cost, what?

    • So what?

    • The neoclassical rejoinder

    • Time and the short run

      • table 5.2 Cost drawings for the survey by Eiteman and Guthrie

    • Wrong in fact as well as theory

      • 5.2 Varian’s drawing of cost curves in his ‘advanced’ microeconomics textbook

      • table 5.3 Empirical research on the nature of cost curves

    • A totem in tatters

  • 6 | To each according to his contribution

    • Why productivity doesn’t determine wages

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Labor demand and supply: an inverted commodity

    • Marginal workers

    • Aggregate demand

    • Indifferent workers

    • Problems

    • Backward-bending supply curves

    • Monopoly and monopsony

    • Sraffa’s observations on aggregation

    • Freedom and labor

    • A three-horse race

    • ‘A benevolent central authority’

    • So what?

  • Part 2 | Complexities: Issues omitted from standard courses that should be part of an education in economics

  • 7 | The holy war over capital

    • Why the productivity of capital doesn’t determine profits

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Measuring capital

      • 7.1 The standard economic‘circular flow’ diagram

    • The whole box and dice

      • table 7.1 Sraffa’s hypothetical subsistence economy

      • table 7.2 Production with a surplus

      • table 7.3 Relationship between maximum and actual rate of profit and the wage share of surplus

    • The punchline: capital behaving badly

      • table 7.4 The impact of the rate of profit on the measurement of capital

    • So what?

    • Ignorance is bliss

  • 8 | There is madness in their method

    • Why assumptions do matter, and why economics is so different from the true sciences

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • A paradoxical proposition

  • 9 | Let’s do the Time Warp again

    • Why economics must finally treat time seriously

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Cobwebs of the mind

    • General equilibrium

    • ‘The formal identity of uncertainty with certainty’

    • A transitional methodology?

    • In the long run, we are all in the short run

      • 9.1 The time path of one variable in the Lorenz model

      • 9.2 Structure behind the chaos

    • From meteorology to economics

    • Addendum: Misunderstanding Bill Phillips, wages and ‘the Phillips Curve’

      • 9.3 Phillips’s functional flow block diagram model of the economy

      • 9.4 The component of Phillips’s Figure 12 including the role of expectations in price setting

      • 9.5 Phillips’s hand drawing of the output–price-change relationship

      • 9.6 A modern flow-chart simulation program generating cycles, not equilibrium

      • 9.7 Phillips’s empirically derived unemployment–money-wage-change relation

  • 10 | Why they didn’t see it coming

    • Why the world’s leading macroeconomists were the last ones capable of realizing that a major economic crisis was imminent

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Macroeconomics and the reductionist fallacy

      • table 10.1 Anderson’s ranking of sciences

    • Say, Walras, and the self-equilibrating economy …

    • Credit and the fallacy of Walras’s Law

    • Walrasian rejoinders?

    • So what?

    • Hamlet without the prince

      • 10.1 Hicks’s model of Keynes

    • The age of large-scale econometric models

    • From IS-LM to the representative agent

      • 10.2 Unemployment inflation data in the USA, 1960–70

      • 10.3 The hog cycle

    • Conclusion

      • Box 10.1 The Taylor Rule

    • Postscript: intellectual miasma or corporate corruption?

  • 11 | The price is not right

    • Why finance markets can get the price of assets so badly wrong

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Fisher on finance: from reassuring oracle to ignored Cassandra

    • Fisher during the Crash: ‘don’t panic’

    • The efficient markets hypothesis

      • 11.1 How the EMH imagines that investors behave

      • 11.2 How speculators actually behave

    • Addendum: Fama overboard

    • So wrong it’s almost right

  • 12 | Misunderstanding the Great Depression and the Great Recession

    • 12.1 Change in M0 and unemployment,1920–40

    • After the Great Recession: Bernanke to the rescue?

      • 12.2 The volume of base money in Bernanke’s ‘quantitative easing’ in historical perspective

    • The mythical Money Multiplier

      • Table 12.1 The alleged Money Multiplier process

      • 12.3 The empirical ‘Money Multiplier’, 1920–40

    • Don’t mention the data

    • After the Great Recession II: neoclassical responses

    • It’s just a jolt to the left …

    • ‘Like a dog walking on its hind legs’: Krugman’s Minsky model

    • Conclusion: neat, plausible, and wrong

  • Part 3 | Alternatives: different ways to think about economics

  • 13 | Why I did see ‘It’ coming

    • The Financial Instability Hypothesis

    • Modeling Minsky

      • 13.1 The vortex of debt in my 1995 Minsky model

    • Reality check, December 2005

      • 13.2 US private debt to GDP, 1955–2005

    • The empirical dynamics of debt

      • Table 13.1 A hypothetical example of the impact of decelerating debt on aggregate demand

      • 13.3 Aggregate demand in the USA, 1965–2015

      • Table 13.2 The actual impact of decelerating debt on aggregate demand

      • 13.4 The change in debt collapses as the Great Recession begins

      • 13.5 The Dow Jones nosedives

      • 13.6 The housing bubble bursts

      • 13.7 The Credit Impulse and change in employment

      • Box 13.1 Definitions of unemployment

      • 13.8 The biggest collapse in the Credit Impulse ever recorded

      • 13.9 The two great debt bubbles

    • Debt deflation then and now

      • 13.10 The collapse of debt-financed demand then and now

    • Fighting the Great Recession

    • Conclusion

  • 14 | A Monetary Model of Capitalism

    • Methodological precepts

    • Endogenous money

      • 14.1 The neoclassical model of exchange as barter

      • 14.2 The nature of exchange in the real world

    • A ‘pure credit’ economy

      • Table 14.1 A pure credit economy with paper money

      • Table 14.2 The dynamics of a pure credit economy with no growth

      • Table 14.3 Net incomes

      • 14.3 Bank accounts

    • A credit crunch

    • Whose bailout works best?

    • A modern credit crunch

      • Table 14.4 A growing pure credit economy with electronic money

      • 14.4 Unemployment is better with a debtor bailout

    • From tranquility to breakdown

      • 14.5 Modeling the Great Moderation and the Great Recession – inflation, unemployment and debt

      • 14.6 The Great Moderation and the Great Recession – actual inflation, unemployment and debt

      • 14.7 Debt and GDP in the model

      • 14.8 Debt and GDP during the Great Depression

    • Making monetary modeling accessible: QED

    • Conclusion

  • 15 | Why stock markets crash

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Behavioral finance

      • Table 15.1 Von Neumann’s procedure for working out a numerical value for utility Consumer: Joan Cheng

      • Table 15.2 The Allais ‘Paradox’: Experiment 1

      • Table 15.3 The Allais ‘Paradox’ Part 2: Experiment 2

    • The inherent instability of stock markets

    • The Fractal Markets Hypothesis

    • The Inefficient Markets Hypothesis

    • Econophysics

    • Conclusion: progress versus ossification

    • Reforming finance?

    • Conclusion

  • 16 | Don’t shoot me, I’m only the piano

    • Why mathematics is not the problem

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Bad mathematics

    • Omitted variables

    • False equalities

    • Unexplored conditions

    • The limits to mathematics

      • Table 16.1 The solvability of mathematical models

    • The recurring nightmare of straight lines

    • The future of mathematics in economics

  • 17 | Nothing to lose but their minds

    • Why most Marxists are irrelevant, but most of Marx is not

    • The kernel

    • The roadmap

    • Marxian economics and the economics of Marx

    • Value – a prelude

    • Physiocrats

    • Smith (and Ricardo)

    • Marx’s labor theory of value

    • The origin of surplus value (I)

      • Table 17.1 Marx’s unadjusted value creation table, with the rate of profit dependent upon the variable-to-constant ratio in each sector

      • Table 17.2 Marx’s profit distribution table, with the rate of profit now uniform across sectors

    • Marxist economics after Sraffa

      • Table 17.3 Steedman’s hypothetical economy

      • Table 17.4 Steedman’s physical table in Marx’s value terms

      • Table 17.5 Steedman’s prices table in Marx’s terms

      • Table 17.6 Profit rate and prices calculated directly from output/wage data

    • Arun Bose: Marx’s ‘capital axioms’

    • The origin of surplus value (II)

      • 17.1 A graphical representation of Marx’s dialectics

    • The origin of surplus value (II)

      • Table 17.7 Marx’s example where the use-value of machinery exceeds its depreciation

    • Marx without the labor theory of value

    • The misinterpretation of Marx

    • Whither Marxism?

  • 18 | There are alternatives

    • Why there is still hope for a better economics

    • Austrian economics

    • Post-Keynesian economics

    • Sraffian economics

    • Complexity theory and Econophysics

    • Evolutionary economics

    • W(h)ither economics?

  • Bibliography

  • Index

Nội dung

[...]... historians These new chapters ‘break the mold’ for the rest of the book, in that they are not critiques of the neoclassical theory of financial instability and economic crises – because there simply is no such theory Instead they set out, in an introductory way, the non-neoclassical xii   |  preface theories of debt deflation and endogenous money that I have played a role in developing (Keen 2008,... simple but glaring flaw in the application of conventional theory The economic theory of markets argues that combinations of any sort, whether by workers into unions or manufacturers into monopolies, reduce social welfare The theory therefore leads to the conclusion that the world would be better off without monopolies and unions If we were rid of both, then the economic theory of income distribution... were they ill intentioned – most of them sincerely believed that, if only people followed the principles of economic theory, the world would be a better place For a group of people who espoused a philosophy of indi­ vidualistic hedonism, they were remarkably altruistic in their commitment to what they saw as the common good Yet the policies they promoted often seem to non-economists to damage the fabric... resemblance to either Keynes or the Classical School of economic thought But their battle – publicized in the press as a battle between ‘Keynesians’ and the rest – has confused many members of the public into believing that the dominant school of thought in economics at the time of the crisis was ‘Keynesian economics.’ Nothing could be farther from the truth – if Krugman, Woodford and other self-described... exclude the dissidents from the journals they edited Up until the early 1970s, non-neoclassical authors were regularly published in the prestigious journals of the profession – for example, a major debate over the theories of production and distribution between neoclassical and non-neoclassical economists, known as the ‘Cambridge Controversies,’ largely occurred in the American Economic Review (AER), the. .. matters economic because you have in the past deferred to the authority of the economist There is no reason to remain quiet I commented at the beginning of this book that economics was too important to leave to the economists I end on the same note (ibid.: 312–13) Postscript 2011 As these excerpts emphasize, the never-ending crisis in which the USA and much of the OECD is now ensnared was no ‘Black... attention to the level of debt-financed speculation taking place, and considered what would happen to the economy when the debt-driven party came to an end The fact that the vast majority of economists pay no attention at all to these issues is why they were taken by surprise It may astonish non-economists to learn that conventionally trained economists ignore the role of credit and private debt in the economy... leading economists christened The Great Moderation.’ It seemed that, after the turmoil of the period from the late 1960s till the recession of the early 1990s, economists had finally worked out how to deliver economic nirvana To do so, they rejected many of the concepts that had been introduced into economics by the ‘Keynesian Revolution’ in the 1930s The resulting theory of economics was called Neoclassical... without mathematics, but which in fact I found quite easy to explain in the addendum to ‘Size does matter.’ However, for a detailed treatment mathematics is still necessary, so for those who can cope with the odd – or rather frequent! – equation, the most accessible papers are in the journals (Keen 2003, 2004; Keen and Standish 2006, 2010) and book chapters (Keen 2005, 2009a) The paper in the free online... were edited out of this edition, because the crisis has occurred – after the Subprime Bubble, which was in the background during the DotCom Bubble, finally burst as well.1 But these pre-crisis statements remain important, because they indicate that, without the blinkers that neoclassical economic theory puts over the eyes of economists, the crisis now known as the Great Recession was not an unpredictable . REVISED AND EXPANDED EDITION THE NAKED EMPEROR DETHRONED? Steve Keen Zed Books  |   Debunking Economics – Revised and Expanded Edition: The Naked Emperor Dethroned? was first published. on why the theory of demand is false in The calculus of hedon- ism’ and The price of everything and the value of nothing,’ and a record of the recanting of the Ecient Markets Hypothesis by. historians. These new chapters ‘break the mold’ for the rest of the book, in that they are not critiques of the neoclassical theory of financial instability and economic crises – because there simply

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