Law in Times of Crisis Part 9 ppsx

‘‘terrorism and law” interface 385 2. An emergency that threatens the life and security of the state, in which international human rights law applies subject to any allowable derogations that fully comport with the substantive and procedural requirements of derogation. This is most likely to occur in tandem with modes of domestic legislative accommodation. 3. An armed conflict where both international human rights law and international humanitarian law may apply simultaneously, though the latter will constitute the lex specialis, 59 suggesting another format for an international model of accommodation. 4. An Extra-Legal Measures context where ex post accountability (legal and otherwise) is sought for unlawful acts by state actors. We argue that a useful means to conceptualize the relationships between the first three regimes is to think in terms of the principle of comple- mentarity. What we hope to demonstrate is that the legal regimes that apply to crisis situations (terrorist or otherwise) need not be static in nature and that movement between them is both a practical reality and a legal imperative to ensure the maximum responsiveness of legal sys- tems to exigencies. The emphasis of analysis in this context is on the constitutional models of emergency regimes. The principle of complementarity has come to play a critical role in the advancement of international criminal law, 60 specifically in its reg- ulation of the relationship between international and national jurisdic- tion over specific crimes and individuals. It contains the expression of the idea that national law and international law play mutually reinforc- ing and complementary roles in the context of international crimes. The concept is a useful way to think about how the regulation of terrorism can move between the accommodation and Business as Usual models. Regulation may therefore be dependent on the scale of the terrorist ac- tion or its increased intensity, and most importantly reflects that the regulation of terrorism can move between legal categories and is not necessarily static. The regulation of terrorism by international humanitarian law Chapters 1 and 2 have set out in principle how terrorism is amenable to regulation by ordinary law or through certain models of accommoda- tion. Chapter 6 demonstrated how there can be a clear overlap between 59 We acknowledge the influence of the typologies proposed by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in its ‘‘Report on Terrorism and Human Rights.’’ 60 Bartram S. Brown, ‘‘Primacy or Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals” (1998) 23 Yale Journal of International Law 383. 386 responses to contemporary threats what we term ‘‘high-intensity emergencies” and situations of armed con- flict (conflict that may include acts of terrorism). However, at this junc- ture, and given its importance to contemporary legal regulation, we think it important to address a separate question, namely whether acts of terrorism alone can create the material conditions that activate the application of international humanitarian law. 61 This is an important question in that those who reject the applicability of existing legal struc- tures and rules (national and international) to the actions of groups such as al Qaeda make the clear supposition that the accommodation model of humanitarian law is irrelevant or inapplicable to the contemporary context. We would suggest that some, though not necessarily all, terrorist acts can, in principle, activate the application of international humanitarian law. 62 Applying international humanitarian law to terrorist acts or situa- tions encounters conceptual and political barriers. States have frequently resisted the application of such law on the general grounds that to do so would be to give an undeserving status (symbolic and practical) to orga- nizations and individuals engaged in terrorist violence. 63 States have also been concerned that, because neither Common Article 3 nor Protocol II contains any specific provisions on criminal responsibility, non-state ac- tors will escape legal process. These latter concerns have been addressed by the Statute of the International Criminal Court, by a developing ju- risprudence of universal jurisdiction, and by the jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. 64 At this point we separate out two discrete questions, i.e., whether terrorism can engage international humanitarian law and whether the particular acts of al Qaeda, commencing with the attacks of September 11, 2001, activate the laws of armed conflict. On the first question, there has been a wide variety of academic views expressed by legal scholars on the core question, as well as on related 61 We specifically imply here the application of the law of armed conflict, which, while having overlap with the term international humanitarian law, may be narrower in scope. 62 See Derek Jinks, ‘‘September 11 and the Laws of War’’ (2003) 28 Yale Journal of International Law 1; Christopher Greenwood, ‘‘War, Terrorism and International Law’’ (2003) 56 Current Legal Problems 505. 63 Fionnuala N ´ ıAol ´ ain, The Politics of Force: Conflict Management and State Violence in Northern Ireland (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 2000), pp. 224 30. 64 Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the Defense Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, reprinted in (1996) 35 International Legal Materials 32 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for Former Yugoslavia Appeals Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995). ‘‘terrorism and law” interface 387 matters such as the right of self-defense, the status and legitimacy pro- vided (or not) by the Security Council, and the status of non-state ac- tors engaged in terrorist activity. 65 The general threshold question as to whether an act (or acts) of terrorism can engage international human- itarian law involves detailed consideration of a number of legal terms, thresholds, and organizational responses, including the following under the United Nations Charter the meaning of use or the threat of force, armed attack, and an act of aggression. 66 In examining the general ques- tion, there is a danger, as Watkin notes, that: A very low threshold of what constitutes an armed attack has the potential to blur the lines between armed conflict and criminal law enforcement. At the other end of the spectrum, too high a threshold may leave a state at risk, espe- cially if there is a credible threat involving the use of weapons of mass destruc- tion by a non-state actor. 67 This indicates that a general response is inappropriate. Rather each par- ticular situation where the applicability of international humanitarian law is relevant should be assessed on its own merits (we have canvassed some of the relevant factors in the previous chapter), and the appro- priate thresholds must be independently assessed. However, in principle we do not believe the applicability of international humanitarian law to be excluded, and take the view that it may be applicable, and that there may be a hybrid application in which significant parts of counter- terrorism law would continue to operate from a crime control model while in parallel contexts an armed conflict model would apply. 68 Application of an armed conflict model to acts of terror is dependent significantly on reaching particular thresholds of violence and intensity. 65 Kenneth Watkin, ‘‘Controlling the Use of Force: A Role for Human Rights Norms in Contemporary Armed Conflict’’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law 1; Sean D. Murphy, ‘‘Terrorism and the Concept of ‘Armed Attack’ in Article 51 of the UN Charter” (2002) 43 Harvard International Law Journal 41; Richard A. Falk, The Great Terror War (Moreton-in-Marsh, UK: Arris, 2003); Antonio Cassese, ‘‘Terrorism is also Disrupting Some Crucial Legal Categories of International Law” (2001) 12 European Journal of International Law 993. 66 Note also the problems engendered by the ICJ’s decision in the case of Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits (1986) International Court of Justice Reports 14, and its distinction between ‘‘most grave” use of force and ‘‘less grave” use of force. 67 Watkin, ‘‘Controlling the Use of Force,’’ 4. 68 For an interesting exploration of this see David Kretzmer, ‘‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists: Extra-Judicial Executions or Legitimate Means of Defence?” (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 171. 388 responses to contemporary threats As we have explored in chapter 6, this terminology is not straightfor- ward, and may be outdated in terms of the lived experiences of violence on the ground. We have suggested some rethinking that might be useful in terms of examining thresholds of violence sufficient to activate inter- national humanitarian law, and different ways to recalibrate the tests of intensity (horizontal as well as vertical) as well as the interrelationship between time and violence in judging the relevance of international hu- manitarian law. Clearly too, such factors as the nature and ideology of the non-state actors require calibration in this equation, 69 as does their organizational capacity. None of these qualifiers can provide a ‘‘one size fits all” answer to a generic question about whether international hu- manitarian law applies to acts or situations involving terrorist violence. We strongly suggest that the clarity sought on answering the specific question would be augmented significantly if the threshold questions were more fully identified and given greater flexibility and nuance. On the second question, concerning the legal regime which should ap- ply to actions taken against al Qaeda on and since the events of Septem- ber 11, we take the position that the relevant body of norms activated is Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949. We now set out the basis for that assessment. The relevant starting point is identi- fying why the law of internal armed conflict would be applicable over that of international armed conflict. A relevant history of the law of armed conflict tells us that the thrust of its provisions has been aimed at regulating ‘‘armed conflicts” between sovereign states. 70 Thus, article 2 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 sets out that the laws of war apply to armed conflicts taking place between states, regardless of whether either state (or more) has formally declared war. A logical corollary of this activation threshold is that the full protections of the Geneva Con- ventions will only apply to armed conflicts which arise between High Contracting Parties. In the context of legally categorizing the nature of the hostilities between al Qaeda and the coalition of Western states led by the United States, Derek Jinks succinctly points out that, ‘‘Absent proof that al Qaeda acted on behalf of a state or that a state has rec- ognized al Qaeda as a ‘belligerent,’ the only potentially applicable body of law is the law of war governing internal armed conflicts.” 71 This lack 69 See Jan Klabbers, ‘‘Rebel with a Cause? Terrorists and Humanitarian Law’’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 299. 70 Ingrid Detter, The Law of War (2nd edn, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), pp. 1 61. 71 Jinks, ‘‘September 11 and the Laws of War,’’ 12. ‘‘terrorism and law” interface 389 of state nexus means that the conflict that was activated between al Qaeda and the United States on September 11 should not be defined as an international armed conflict. However, in claiming that an ‘‘armed conflict” was activated by the attacks, we accept that the combined ele- ments of the nature and ferocity of the attacks (and the subsequent scale of destruction) an intensity of violence threshold in tandem with the legal responses by international organizations and other states a recognition threshold (supported by the domestic legal responses of the USA) join to don this stature. 72 We note, however, that separate issues arise as to the categorization of the conflict that was actualized with the bombing and invasion of Afghanistan in October 2001 and the conflict that was activated by the USA and its allies by the bombing and subsequent invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003. Only relatively recently has international humanitarian law focused its regulatory attention on internal conflicts, despite the proliferation and effects of such conflicts since World War II onwards. 73 This lag in regulation tells a deeper narrative about a consistent gap which has ex- isted within the law of armed conflict, between the conflict(s) actually being experienced on the ground and the law’s capacity to keep reg- ulatory pace. Following the grievous harms inflicted and experienced during World War II, the Geneva Conventions of 1949 sought to put in place a system of law that would prevent such violations from occur- ring again in situations of war. However, the conceptualization which dominated the Diplomatic Conference was one of inter-state conflict, and Common Article 3 is the sole article of the conventions which ad- dresses the problems of non-international armed conflicts. The opening paragraph to the article states: ‘‘In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to the conflict shall be bound to apply, as a minimum, the following provisions . ” There are many policy-based and humanitarian reasons why the ap- plication of international humanitarian law may be desirable to the contemporary ‘‘war on terrorism.” 74 However, we think it important to quantify the rationale for formal legal applicability, under specific legal 72 See UN Security Council Resolution 1368, UN SCOR, 56th Sess., 4370 mtg., at 1, UN Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 73 Lindsay Moir, The Law of Internal Armed Conflict (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 74 Jinks, ‘‘September 11 and the Laws of War,’’ 5 7. See also Kretzmer, ‘‘Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists,’’ 186 88. 390 responses to contemporary threats requirements of appropriate thresholds of violence, intensity, organiza- tion, and state acknowledgment of a situation of belligerency. First, while the events of September 11 constituted a one-off series of violent actions against the United States, a number of legal consequences followed. First, immediately following the attacks the United Nations Se- curity Council condemned the acts and recognized the inherent right of the United States to self-defense against unambiguous external ag- gression. 75 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for the first time in its history invoked article 5 of the Washington Treaty, demon- strating ‘‘NATO’s overall approach to security can include the possibility of collective action in response to a terrorist attack from abroad.” 76 Sec- ond, the United States Congress authorized its president to use military force against those responsible for the attacks against the territorial integrity of the state. 77 Following from this, President Bush’s executive order, providing for trial of suspected terrorists by military commissions, characterized the events of September 11 as an attack ‘‘on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United State’s Armed Forces.” 78 The scale and ferocity of the attacks also serve a threshold function, excluding the argument that the scale of violence falls below the Common Article 3 violence threshold. Recent jurispru- dence concerning the contours of the term ‘‘armed conflict’’ from the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia also supports this reading of Common Article 3. 79 Finally, we note that though not required to activate the applicability of Common Article 3, the organi- zational structure of al Qaeda is such as to make them capable (though clearly not willing) to reach the command and control prerequisites of 75 Security Council Resolution 1368. See also Security Council Resolution 1373, UN SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., UN Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). See Thomas M. Franck, ‘‘Terrorism and the Right of Self-Defense” (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 839; Robert K. Goldman, ‘‘Certain Legal Questions and Issues Raised by the September 11th Attacks’’ (2001) 9(1) Human Rights Brief 2. 76 See Statement to the Press, NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson, on the North Atlantic Council Decision on Implementation of Article 5 of the Washington Treaty following the 11 September Attacks against the United States, Oct. 4, 2001, available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011004b.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2005); NATO Statement on Combating Terrorism: Adapting the Alliance’s Defence Capabilities, Press release (2001) 173 (Dec. 18, 2001), available online at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-173e.htm (last visited Aug. 8, 2005). 77 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107 40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 78 Executive Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the War against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57, 833 (Nov. 13, 2001), para. 1(A). 79 Prosecutor v. Tadic (Appeal on Jurisdiction). ‘‘terrorism and law” interface 391 international humanitarian law. All of these factors combined with the value system underpinning the international humanitarian law regime justify classifying the hostilities between the United States (and other states) and al Qaeda as an ‘‘armed conflict” within the meaning of the Geneva Conventions. The utilitarian question then arises as to what benefits accrue from such categorization. First, as a technical matter, by its explicit terms Common Article 3 imposes its obligation on all parties to the conflict but its application in no way affects the legal status of parties to the conflict. Affirming this is by no means of small symbolic or practical significance. As a definitional matter, the acts of terror perpetrated on September 11 and since by al Qaeda clearly violate the provisions of Common Article 3. Ensuring that conflicts that fall within article 3’s mandate are formally recognized is important to protect (both for states and non-state actors) the core humanitarian values that Common Article 3 was designed to defend. 80 Applying Common Article 3 vacates the argument that there is a legal gap evident, exposed by recent acts of terrorism, which can only be filled by state domestic dictate. It also confirms the capacity of an armed conflict involving acts of terrorism to be contained within a model of accommodation provided by international law. We would also point out that the application of Common Article 3 does not negate the derogation privilege of states, which specifically affirms armed conflict to be a basis for limiting the full application of the human rights regime. It does not, as we have outlined in detail in chapter 6, wipe out the application of the human rights system. Finally we acknowledge that movement between legal regimes is to be expected, and that the application of the Geneva Conventions does not mean that at some other stage counter-terrorism actions may not slip back fully into a crime control model from an armed conflict model, or that both models may not operate in tandem with one another. In conclusion we highlight a couple of important procedural matters as regards the application of specific legal regimes. First, we acknowledge that a ‘‘formal” legal application issue arises when applying Common Article 3, namely that the provision only applies to armed conflicts oc- curring in the territory of a state party. 81 This raises the obvious question 80 Gerald L. Neuman, ‘‘Humanitarian Law and Counterterrorist Force’’ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 283. 81 Our thanks to David Kretzmer for pointing this out and encouraging clarity on the matter. 392 responses to contemporary threats as to whether it can be applied in transnational contexts. A formalis- tic response would suggest that a conflict must be either an inter-state conflict (international) or an internal conflict (thereby taking place in the territory of a specific state). In response it might be argued that this clear-cut distinction exposes a lacuna in international humanitarian law in urgent need of attention. Our response is more nuanced. We suggest that to start with it would be helpful to probe the term ‘‘transnational” a little more critically. Namely, while the transnational identity of cer- tain non-state groupings is an identifying feature, many such groups still continue to operate and identify locally, with the explicit or tacit consent of states. Furthermore, the terrorist actions post-September 11, 2001 (e.g., the terrorist attacks in London in July 2005) indicate that home-grown terrorists with a clear national and territorial link, though undoubtedly with international associations, might foster, in the long run, circumstances in which the material conditions for the application of international humanitarian law would apply within the traditional definitions, despite their transnational linkages. Third, we stress that it would be helpful to think less in either/or categories when applying in- ternational humanitarian law, namely solely in terms of international armed conflict or internal armed conflict. It is equally possible that a state will be in conflict on both levels and that such conflict may be pri- marily aimed at non-state groupings and their state supporters where relevant. To some extent this duality may soak up some of the per- tinent transnational elements of non-state groupings operating across and within state borders. Second, as regards the application of international humanitarian law, when a situation of conflict is considered to fall within the parameters of an international armed conflict, such that the armed forces satisfy the prisoner of war conditions set out in article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention or articles 43 45 of Protocol I, then the fact that individual combatants may have engaged in acts of terrorism does not alter the continued application of international humanitarian law to the conflict. It also means that those combatants are still entitled to the protections of the Third Geneva Convention but, significantly, can be prosecuted for terrorist acts which constitute war crimes or other serious violations of international humanitarian law. 82 Third, while we accept that there is no international consensus on a comprehensive definition of terrorism, and that as a result there is a 82 Specifically they may be responsible for grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols. See Gross, ‘‘The Grave Breaches System.’’ ‘‘terrorism and law” interface 393 tendency to use loose labels (e.g., war on terrorism) to describe a partic- ular sequence of actions by a state against terrorist actors or groups, this does not per se serve as a basis for defining the international legal obli- gations of states. We acknowledge that there are new elements to the terrorist phenomenon, specifically the reality of transnational groups unaffiliated substantially with states and prepared to make self-sacrifice for their cause on a scale hitherto unseen, 83 but this trend does not of itself vacate the applicability of international legal norms. We accept that an assessment of contemporary crisis experiences may require spe- cific negotiation of some new legal norms that fall logically into the realm of international humanitarian law. Such norms might regulate the permissible range of responses by states to the actions of non-state groupings, which are entirely unaffiliated with a sovereign territory and whose political aims are not territorially premised. Such an instrument could address the new forms of ‘‘terrorist war” being waged against non-state actors. 84 We contend that some of the efforts currently being expended by states in augmenting suppression conventions would in fact be better spent pursuing this specific lacuna. This might alleviate the need to expand the suppression conventions, a process that does not necessarily address the current regulatory gap in international law and may endanger the protection of liberties more generally in democratic societies. In the current context, with an eye to procedure as well as to the out- comes generated by faulty legal process, we think it is particularly impor- tant to stress the significance of the form of language used to describe and proscribe terrorist acts. Given both the stigma and the generally augmented punishments that follow at the domestic level from prose- cution and punishment of terrorist crimes, it is critical that precise and unambiguous language be used to define the unlawful acts in question. International law has a direct relationship with clarity at the national level in this context, given that states have on a significant scale either adopted international treaty obligations directly into national law, or used the legal terms as set out in the international standards to frame the prohibition in question at the domestic level. The legal purpose of 83 There is a substantial debate as to whether the view that contemporary terrorists show greater willingness to sacrifice their lives than those of previous generations is empirically correct. See Walter Laqueur, No End to War: Terrorism in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Continuum, 2003), pp. 71 97. 84 In parallel vein Michael Reisman has urged that a flexible approach be taken to the regulation of terrorism. See W. Michael Reisman, ‘‘International Legal Responses to Terrorism’’ (1999) 22 Houston Journal of International Law 3 at 12 13. 394 responses to contemporary threats strict definitional boundaries is to preserve the principle of legality at both the domestic and international level. International legal responses post-September 11 Suppression conventions Failing agreement on a singular definition of terrorism, states have suc- cessfully managed to plough ahead with legal agreements to suppress particular kinds of acts by terrorist actors. In addition they have sought to adapt and to synchronize the integration of national and regional measures to combat terrorism. 85 Specifically, states have enhanced ex- tradition cooperation and streamlined associated procedures. 86 Notably here many states have concluded in a number of international anti- terrorism instruments that terrorist crimes are not to be regarded as political or related common offenses for the purposes of extradition or mutual legal cooperation. 87 They have given one another mutual legal assistance and shared intelligence and law enforcement sources of in- formation across national boundaries. They have augmented inter-state cooperation on ordinary criminal matters, which often operates to ham- per indirectly the financial and other resources which facilitate terrorist actors and networks. This inter-state cooperation is not without its crit- ics. Many civil libertarians voice concerns about the lack of civil and human rights protections in these joint actions, and the danger that states with lower levels of privacy and due process protections may in- advertently affect the quality of rights protection experienced by indi- viduals in states with higher protective standards. Other mutually reinforcing action includes rigorous and sometimes controversial enforcement of measures to exclude, remove, or extradite 85 An important means to achieve this is by implementing international norms against terrorism in municipal law. For example, the United Kingdom has domestic statutes relating to hijacking aircraft, ships, and other installations (the Aviation Security Act 1982, the Aviation and Maritime Security Act 1990), diplomats (the Internationally Protected Persons Act 1978), hostages (the Taking of Hostages Act 1982), nuclear installations and materials (the Nuclear Material [Offences] Act 1983), and other specific treaties dealing with such matters as extradition (the Suppression of Terrorism Act 1978). 86 See, e.g., Framework Decision on the European Arrest Warrant; OAS Permanent Council Resolution 1293 (2001); see also notes 134 36 below. 87 See the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism (1979) 1137 UNTS 93, 90 European Treaty Series 3, concluded on Jan. 27, 1977, article 1; Inter-American Convention against Terrorism, OAS AG Res. 1840, 32nd Sess., OAS Doc. XXXII-O/02 (June 3, 2002), entered into force July 10, 2003, article 11. [...]... A/52/164 ( 199 8), reprinted in ( 199 8) 37 International Legal Materials 2 49 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec 9, 199 9, entered into force Apr 10, 2002, UN GAOR, 54th Sess., 76th mtg at art 6, UN Doc A/RES/54/1 09 ( 199 9), reprinted in (2000) 39 International Legal Materials 270 See http://www.coe.int/T/E/Legal affairs/Legal co-operation/Fight against terrorism/... ( 197 9) (signed Dec 17, 197 9; entered into force June 3, 198 3), reprinted in ( 197 9) 18 International Legal Materials 1456 Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 UST 565, TIAS No 7570, 97 4 UNTS 178 (signed Sept 23, 197 1; entered into force Jan 26, 197 3) Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including... Material, adopted Oct 26, 197 9, 1456 UNTS 198 7, reprinted in ( 198 0) 18 International Legal Materials 14 19; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar 1, 199 1, 2122 UNTS 3 59, reprinted in ( 199 1) 30 International Legal Materials 721 For discussion of the conventions see M Cherif Bassiouni, International Terrorism: Multilateral Conventions, 193 7 2001 (Ardsley, NY: Transnational... emergence of new forms of ‘‘super-laws” at the United Nations and regional political level since September 11 illustrates where states have moved to gain maximum international legitimacy for actions against terrorist individuals and organizations, as 96 97 98 99 International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, Jan 9, 199 8, GA Res 164, UN GAOR, 52nd Sess., Supp No 49, at 3 89, UN Doc... Persons, including Diplomatic Agents, 28 UST 197 5, TIAS No 8532, 1035 UNTS 167 (signed Dec 14, 197 3; entered into force Feb 20, 197 7) Others include the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, Mar 10, 198 8, 1678 UNTS 221, reprinted in ( 198 8) 27 International Legal Materials 668; Protocol Concerning the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed... Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept 14, 196 3, entered into force Dec 4, 196 9, 20 UST 294 1, 704 UNTS 2 19  396 responses to contemporary threats Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hague Convention) ,91 the International Convention on the Taking of Hostages (Hostages Convention) ,92 the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil... of views (and real differences of opinion) on what in fact states understand the term terrorism to mean More recent treaties include the United Nations Convention for 91 92 93 94 95 Hague Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec 16, 197 0, entered into force Oct 14, 197 1, 22 UST 1641, 860 UNTS 105 International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, GA Res 34/146, UN GAOR,... Located on the Continental Shelf, Mar 10, 198 8, reprinted in ( 198 8) 27 International Legal Materials 685; Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Senate Treaty Doc No 101 1 ( 198 9); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,... of terrorism which raises the possibility of a lack of clear legal basis for specific indictments, as well as the application of specific procedural rules.1 49 The Framework Decision also sets out offenses relating to terrorist groups in article 2, including the requirement that states punish the crime of ‘‘directing a terrorist group.” Article 4 requires that states criminalize inchoate offenses of incitement,... coordination effort by the Directorates General JAI and RELEX on a range of issues including terrorism; creating a European Programme for the Protection of Witnesses; exchanging personal information including DNA and fingerprints but in spheres only linked to terrorism; creating a Europe-wide database on forensic material; enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the EU’s mechanisms for freezing . Doc. A/52/164 ( 199 8), reprinted in ( 199 8) 37 International Legal Materials 2 49. 97 International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Dec. 9, 199 9, entered into force Apr reprinted in ( 198 0) 18 International Legal Materials 14 19; Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, Mar. 1, 199 1, 2122 UNTS 3 59, reprinted in ( 199 1) 30 International. The opening paragraph to the article states: ‘ In the case of armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, each Party to