ELSEVIER''''S DICTIONARY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES phần 7 ppt

393 processes is due to the intervention of the Deity, who determines that a specific con- scious process shall occur on the occasion of a specific bodily process, and vice versa; and the theory of preestablished harmony - which refers to the relation between mental and physical events that assumes that they occur independently, that is, without either affecting the other causally, but that they harmonize and constitute parallel event series due to a fun- damental or original characteristic of reality; this approach was one phase of a more general theory originated by G. W. Leibnitz (1646- 1716); cf., Leibnitz’s law of sufficient reason, which states that - given sufficient knowledge and time - one might discover why any spe- cific occurrence is such as it is and not other- wise. More recent approaches to the mind- body problem are the double-aspect theory, which assumes that conscious experiences and brain processes are fundamentally identical, the two groups of phenomena being two mani- festations or aspects of a single set of events (a synonym for this theory is the identity hy- pothesis/theory); the theory of parallelism, or psychophysicalism, which is confused often with the double-aspect theory, and states that for every variation in conscious processes or experiences there is a concomitant variation in neural processes [this theory makes no as- sumption of a causal relation between the mind and the body; the theory of parallelism was formulated by B. Spinoza (1632-1677), and the psychophysical aspect was added by G. Fechner (1803-1887)]; the theory of epiphenomenalism, which maintains that con- scious processes are not in any sense causal agents, even with respect to one another, but are merely correlated with certain causally effective physiological processes; the theory of phenomenalism, which holds that human knowledge is limited to phenomena or one’s experience and does not reach the real nature of things [proponents and precursors to this theory were E. Husserl’s (1859-1938) and F. Brentano’s (1838-1917) psychological theory of intentionalism, which defines the distin- guishing feature of psychical phenomena, such as acts of perception or judgment, as their “intention” or reference to an object; this theory is synonymous with act psychology, in which the data are psychic activities, usually of a subject upon an object; cf., F. Brentano’s idiogenetic theory, which holds that the func- tion of judgment is an original or primordial mental fact; and A. E. Jones’ non-common effects principle - states that the disposition of intention begun by an action is most readily seen by acknowledging the “non-common” consequences of alternative actions; the fewer non-common effects of the action and alterna- tive actions, the more readily an attribution of intention of disposition may be made]; and the theory of immaterialism - maintains that the existence of matter cannot be affirmed confi- dently inasmuch as all perceptual experiences are aspects of consciousness. There is general agreement by writers that body refers to the material, physical, or physiological character- istics of the organism and such activities can be studied by the traditional empirical meth- ods of science. However, the mind, psyche, or soul entity of the mind-body problem presents the most difficulty, where questions remain concerning whether such an entity even exists (cf., synergy theory, which holds that mental synthesis consists in a unitary response, whether perceptual or motor, aroused by the aggregate of sensory or other elements that are conceived as stimuli converging upon a single response mechanism; the theory of mind/mind mechanism, which is the use of one’s existing concepts of people’s mental states to explain their behavior; and the law of span, which states that every mind tends to keep its total simultaneous cognitive output constant in quantity, however varying in quality). Ques- tions remain, also, about how best to define the mind and how to apply the empirical methods of science to obtain descriptions and functional laws for such an inferred entity (cf., doctrine of psychologism - posits that every- thing should be viewed from the reference point of the psychology of the individual, and advances the notion that the problem of the validity of human knowledge may be solved by the study of mental processes). See also FECHNER’S LAW; MALEBRANCHE’S THEORIES; MIND/MENTAL STATES, THEORIES OF; RATIONALISM/RATION- ALIST, DOCTRINE OF; WEBER-FECH- NER LAW. 394 REFERENCES Bain, A. (1873). Mind and body: The theories of their relation. New York: Apple- ton. Brentano, F. (1874). Psychologie vom empiri- schen standpunkt. Leipzig: Dun-ker & Humblot. Baldwin, J. M. (1905). Sketch of the history of psychology. Psychological Review, 12, 144-165. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Lon- don: Hutchinson. Husserl, E. (1962). Phenomenological psych- ology. The Hague: Nijhoff. Polten, E. (1973). Critique of the psycho- physical identity theory. The Hague: Mouton. Cheng, D. (1975). Philosophical aspects of the mind-body problem. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Levin, M. (1979). Metaphysics and the mind- body problem. Oxford, UK: Claren- don Press. MIND-DUST THEORY. See MIND-BODY THEORIES. MIND/MENTAL SET, LAW OF. = set, law of. The term set is defined in the present con- text as a temporary condition of the organism that facilitates a certain specific type of activ- ity; cf., the set-theoretical model, which refers to any model that treats the entities under consideration as elements arranged in a series or aggregate and formally represents the rela- tions between the elements in terms of set theory that may be applied, among other things, to mathematical characterization, se- mantic features, word meaning, or human long-term memory (cf., resonance theory of learning, proposed by the American psy- chologist Harry F. Harlow (1905-1981), which holds that items belonging to a certain set are more likely to be recalled/responded to during the time that set is being dealt with). The related terms mental/determining set and perceptual set refer, respectively, to any con- dition, disposition, or tendency on the organ- ism’s part to respond in a particular manner, and to a kind of cognitive readiness for a par- ticular stimulus or class of stimuli (called Einstellung in German). When set is associ- ated with a problem-solving or task-oriented situation, the German word Aufgabe (“task”) is used to capture the idea that each particular task or set of instructions for performing a particular task carries with it a cluster of con- straints indicating the use of particular proc- esses (cf., N. Ach’s determining tendency; R. Wheeler refers to the law of Aufgabe). Thus, the law of set/mental set, in a psychological context, refers to a temporary condition of responding that can arise from the task re- quirements (via overt or covert instructions), context, prior experiences, or expectations (cf., rational principle - refers to a mind set concerning how one intends to solve a prob- lem or determine a fact, such as deciding to use deductive versus inductive reasoning in problem-solving). At higher cognitive levels, set can alter the pattern of information pickup, the nature of what is perceived, and the prob- ability that a particular problem may be solved; (cf., fuzzy set theory, which is the mathematical theory of sets that does not have sharp boundaries and, because most concepts are fuzzy in this sense - for example, “bald,” “bad” - some believe the mathematical theory could throw light on cognition). Other ways in which set interacts with cognitive processes are called attentional set, which refers to a condition whereby the observer is prepared to receive information of a particular type (or from a particular channel), and the functional fixedness phenomenon [or functional fixity - first described by the German-born American psychologist Karl Duncker (1903-1940)], which is a conceptual set whereby objects that have been used for one function tend to be viewed as serving only that function, even though the situation may call for the use of the object in a different manner. See also ACH’S LAWS/PRINCIPLES/THEORY; FUZZY SET THEORY; MIND/MENTAL STATES, THEORIES OF; WUNDT’S THEORIES/ DOCTRINES. REFERENCES Ach, N. (1905). Uber die willenstatigkeit und das denken. Gottingen: Vardenboek. Wheeler, R. (1929). The science of psychol- ogy: An introductory study. New York: Crowell. 395 Duncker, K. (1935/1945). Zur psychologie des produktiven denkens . Psychologi- cal Monographs, 58 , No. 5. Gibson, J. (1941). A critical review of the concept of set in contemporary ex- perimental psychology. Psychologi- cal Bulletin, 38, 781-817. Luchins, A. (1942). Mechanization in problem solving - The effect of Einstellung. Psychological Monographs, 54, No. 248. Bruner, J. (1957). On perceptual readiness. Psychological Review, 64, 123-152. MIND/MENTAL STATES, THEORIES OF. In its generalized form, mind theory re- fers to people’s beliefs, cognitions, and intui- tive understanding of their own, and other people’s, mind/mental states that develop over a period of time beginning at a very early age (cf., solipsistic doctrine - a philosophical speculation that there can be no proof that phenomena exist outside of the mind inas- much as everything is assumed to be depend- ent on personal perception; also, it is the ex- treme view that only the self exists, where everything and everyone else is a product of one’s imagination). Although children typi- cally have a well-developed theory of mind by about the age of three years, they do not yet possess the understanding that people’s beliefs may be false (cf., Piaget, 1929). In some atypical and intrapersonal cases, such as chil- dren diagnosed with autism, there is an inabil- ity to understand the notion of mental states and the way in which such states modify or control behavior (cf., theory of impoverished mind - attempts to account for the condition of autism in children, suggesting that autistic individuals have an “impoverished mind” in which they have difficulty imagining others as holding beliefs, ideas, and expectations; how- ever, such persons can identify emotional states via cues such as facial expression and other observable behaviors in other people). In other interpersonal cases, the inability of one person to appreciate the mental states of other people is called the mind-blindness theory. In general, however, people possess the ability to attribute mental states (beliefs, desires) to themselves and others; D. Premack and G. Woodruff called this ability as having a theory of mind and, thus, possessing a theory of mind enables an individual to explain and predict others’ behavior in terms of their mental states. This orientation suggests that when persons in a society or culture lack a theory of mind/mental states, social behavior is affected adversely and where, in particular, coopera- tion among members in the group is disrupted (cf., Vygotsky, 1978). In a larger philosophi- cal context, the notion of category mistake - described by the English philosopher Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) - refers to a statement about something that belongs to one category but is intelligible only of something belonging to another category (e.g., as in the case where the mind is referred to as if it were a physical entity). Philosophers also use the notion of inverted qualia (a hypothetical situation in which an individual experiences “qualia,” or sensory data/events, such as the experience of the “redness” of roses, in the opposite way to another person) - with the apparent impossi- bility of knowing if, indeed, inverted qualia exist - as an argument that mental experiences are not reducible to physical entities/states. The versatile German physician, painter, natu- ralist, and psychologist Carl Gustav Carus (1789-1869) developed a topographic hy- pothesis/model of the mind in which one’s awareness of mental contents and functions is divided into four aspects: conscious, precon- scious, general absolute, and partial absolute where the elements possess interactional char- acteristics; Sigmund Freud initially adopted Carus’ model but replaced it, subsequently, with his own structural hypothe- sis/model/theory consisting of the three as- pects/components of unconscious, precon- scious, and conscious (cf., doctrine of uni- versalism - philosophical speculation that some aspects of the human mind are univer- sal; for example, the notion that humans rec- ognize some behaviors as being intrinsically bad or evil such as killing other humans against their will). In the obsolete school of psychology called faculty psychology - devel- oped and popularized by the German philoso- pher and mathematician Christian Wolff (1679-1754) in the 1730s - it was suggested that the mind is divided into arbitrarily posited powers or capacities (called “faculties”), such as reason, will, and instinct, through which all 396 mental functions and phenomena supposedly occur and interact. In the early act psychology [i.e., an anti-elementalism, anti-content ap- proach that emphasized the unity of interac- tions with the environment (and which argued that “psychological acts,” such as emotions, judgments, and ideations, are intentional, and all analytical attempts to study the individual destroy the acts being studied) of the German psychologist Franz Brentano (1838-1917)], the idiogenetic theory posits that the function of judgment/ideation is a primordial, and original, mental capacity of humans. Faculty psychology served as the basis for the founda- tion of the later theoretical, and discredited, approach called phrenology - founded by the German physiologist Franz Joseph Gall (1758-1828) who called it “craniology” and the Austrian physician Johann K. Spurzheim (1776-1832) who called it “phrenology” - that was a doctrine of mental faculties allegedly located in specific areas of the brain and de- tectable via bumps at corresponding points on the outside of the skull. Another basis for phrenology is found in the doctrine of the modularity of mind, traceable back to the Greek philosopher Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) who indicated that cognitive processes are controlled by subsystems that operate as dis- tinct units and with a large degree of inde- pendence from one another (cf., Fodor, 1983). Today, in educational theory, modularity theories assume that the human mind is com- posed of various independent units/modules that may be made to operate in several ways where, over time, the modules relate to each other to establish a type of integrative synthe- sis [cf., regional-localization theory - states that the brain has special areas that control particular functions, such as the occipital lobes in the back area of the brain as being instrumental in vision; Broca’s area - named after the French physician/physiologist Paul Broca (1824-1880) - located in the left cere- bral cortex, is essential to the produc- tion/motor aspects of spoken language; and Wernicke’s area - named after the German neurologist Carl Wernicke (1848-1905) - lo- cated in the left cerebral cortex, is essential to the comprehension of meaning in language; cf., Wernicke-Geschwind theory - named after Carl Wernicke and the American neurologist Norman Geschwind (1926-1984), attempts to explain how the brain processes information related to speech and other verbal behaviors]. In the modern computational theory of mind (e.g., Pinker, 1988; cf., Horst, 1996) - which is a central strategy/dogma at the heart of cogni- tive science, and is analogous to the doctrine of atomism in physics, the germ theory of disease in medicine, and plate tectonics theory in geology - it is posited that mental processes are formal manipulations of sym- bols/programs consisting of sequences of ele- mentary processes made accessible by the information-processing capabilities of neural tissue; accordingly, images may be viewed as patterns of activation in a three-dimensional array of cells accessed by two overlaid coor- dinate systems (i.e., a fixed viewer-centered spherical coordinate system, and a movable object-centered or world-centered coordinate system); such a theoretical framework allows the researcher to generate, inspect, and trans- form images, as well as attend to locations and recognize shapes. The term mental model - introduced in 1943 by the Scottish psycholo- gist Kenneth J. W. Craik (1914-1945) - refers to an internal representation having the same structure (in an abstract sense) as the aspect or portion of external reality that it represents; for example, the English psychologist David C. Marr’s (1945-1980) 3-D model of visual perception; the British psychologist Philip N. Johnson-Laird’s (1936- ) proposition that mental models are constructed by people to carry out inductive and deductive reasoning on the basis of propositions that are not them- selves mental models by typically lead to mental models; and other psychologists’ sug- gestions that mental models are needed to comprehend discourse, to experience con- sciousness, and the have a body image. The terms metacognition and meta-memory [which, again, may be traced back to Aristotle, and popularized more recently in the 1970s by the American psychologists John H. Flavell (1928- ), Richard E. Nisbett (1941- ), and Timothy D. Wilson (1951- )] - refer to beliefs and knowledge about one’s own cogni- tive/mnemonic processes, and may be applied to regulation of one’s cognitive functions, including planning, checking, and monitoring processes - such as planning for a cognitive 397 strategy when memorizing material, checking accuracy in performing mental arithmetic, or monitoring one’s comprehension during read- ing. Research in this area indicates, generally, that people often are unaware of the variables that influence their own choices, behavior, and evaluations, and typically - when questioned - produce verbal re-ports that may be mislead- ing and filled with errors. The theory of men- tal self-government, developed by the Ameri- can psychologist Robert J. Sternberg (1949- ), is a model that attempts to reconcile intelli- gence and personality, and proposes a set of intellectual styles that are stated in terms of the various functions, forms, levels, and as- pects of government, such as the legisla- tive/executive, mon-archic/anarchic, and global/local dimensions. See also COOP- ERATIVE PRINCIPLE; EMPATHY THE- ORY; FREUD’S THEORY OF PERSONAL- ITY; GESCHWIND’S THEORY; IM- AGERY/MENTAL IMAGERY, THEORIES OF; INTELLIGENCE, THEORIES/LAWS OF; LEARNING THEORIES/ LAWS; MIND-BODY THEORIES; MIND/ MEN- TAL SET, LAW OF; PIAGET’S THEORY OF DEVELOPMENTAL STAGES. REFERENCES Piaget, J. (1929). The child’s conception of the world. New York: Littlefield, Ad- ams. Aristotle. (1941). De anima (On the soul). In R. McKeon (Ed.), The basic works of Aristotle. New York: Random House. Craik, K. J. W. (1943). The nature of explana- tion. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Morris, C. W. (1946). Six theories of mind. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Ryle, G. (1949). The concept of mind. Lon- don: Hutchinson. Scher, J. M. (Ed.) (1966). Theories of mind. New York: Free Press. Nisbett, R. E., & Wilson, T. D. (1977). Telling more than we can know: Verbal re- ports on mental processes. Psycho- logical Review, 84, 231-259. Premack, D., & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 4, 515-526. Vygotsky, L. S. (1978). Mind in society: The development of higher psychologi- cal processes. New York: Cam- bridge University Press. Flavell, J. H. (1979). Metacognition and cog- nitive monitoring. American Psych- ologist, 34, 906-911. Hebb, D. O. (1980). Essay on mind. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Sternberg, R. J. (1980). Sketch of a compo- nential theory of human intelli- gence. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3, 573-584. Fodor, J. A. (1983). The modularity of mind. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press. Johnson-Laird, P. N. (1983). Mental models: Towards a cognitive science of lan- guage, inference, and conscious- ness. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni- versity Press. Leslie, A. M. (1987). Pretense and representa- tion: The origins of “Theory of Mind.” Psychological Review, 94, 412-426. Richards, R. J. (1987). Darwin and the emer- gence of evolutionary theories of mind and behavior. Chicago: Uni- versity of Chicago Press. Astington, J., & Harris, P. L. (1988). Develop- ing theories of mind. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Pinker, S. (1988). A computational theory of the mental imagery medium. In M. Denis, J. Engelkamp, & J. T. E. Richardson (Eds.), Cognitive and neuropsychological approaches to mental imagery. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: M. Nijhoff. Wellman, H. M. (1990). The child’s theory of mind. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press. Newell, A. (1991). Metaphors for mind, theo- ries of mind: Should the humanities mind? In J. J. Sheehan & M. Sosna (Eds.), Boundaries of humanity: Humans, animals, machines. Berke- ley, CA: University of California Press. Whiten, A. (1991). Natural theories of mind. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. 398 Fodor, J. A. (1992). A theory of the child’s theory of mind. Cognition, 44, 283- 296. Carruthers, P., & Smith, P. K. (1996). Theo- ries of theories of mind. New York: Cambridge University Press. Horst, S. (1996). Symbols, computation, and intentionality: A critique of the computational theory of mind. Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press. Lillard, A. (1998). Ethnopsychologies: Cul- tural variations in theories of mind. Psychological Bulletin, 123, 3-32. Sigel, I. E. (1999). Development of mental representation theories and appli- cations. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Velde, van der, C. D. (2004). The mind: Its nature and origin. New York: Pro- metheus Books. MIND/MIND MECHANISM, THEORY OF. See MIND-BODY THEORIES. MIND’S EYE THEORY. See VISION/ SIGHT, THEORIES OF. MIND-STUFF THEORY. See MIND- BODY THEORIES. MIND-TWIST HYPOTHESIS. See SCHI- ZOPHRENIA, THEORIES OF. MINIMAL GROUP PARADIGM/SITUA- TION. See CONSTRUCTIVISM, THEO- RIES OF. MINIMAL SOCIAL SITUATION EF- FECT. See CONSTRUCTIVISM, THEO- RIES OF. MINIMAX THEOREM/PRINCIPLE. See DECISION-MAKING THEORIES. MINIMUM-RESOURCE/POWER THEO- RY. See INGROUP BIAS THEORIES. MINITHEORIES OF EMOTION. See EMOTIONS, THEORIES/LAWS OF. MIRROR NEURONS THEORY. Recent physiological research indicates that mirror neurons, first located in the rostral part of monkeys’ ventral premotor cortex (called “area F5”), discharge under conditions both when the animal performs a goal-directed hand action and when it observes another individual performing the same, or a similar, action (i.e., “imitation gestures” and “affor- dances”). Also, in the same cortical area, mir- ror neurons have been found that respond to the observation of mouth actions. In humans, it has been shown that the observations of actions performed with the hand, the mouth, and the foot leads to activation of different sectors of Broca’s area [a cortical region in- volved in the production of language - named after the French surgeon and anthropologist Paul Broca (1824-1880) who discovered its function in 1861] and premotor cortex, ac- cording to the effector involved in the ob- served action, and follows a somatotopic pat- tern resembling the classical motor cortex “homunculus.” Such observations and results support the mirror neuron theory regarding the hypothesized existence of an execution- observation matching system (mirror neuron system). According to the mirror neuron the- ory, the mirror-neuron substrates promote language abilities in humans, where the neu- rons appear to represent a system that matches observed events to similar, internally gener- ated actions and, in this way, forms a link between the observer and the actor. In one case (Weigand, 2002), a theory of human dia- logic interaction is proposed that contains a methodology focusing on how the constitutive features of language are confirmed by the discharging of mirror neurons. Mirror neurons theory also hypothesizes that there is a very general, evolutionarily ancient mechanism, called the “resonance mechanism,” through which pictorial descriptions of motor behav- iors are matched directly on the observer’s motor “representations” of the same behav- iors. The “resonance mechanism” is posited to be a fundamental mechanism at the basis of inter-individual relations, including some behaviors commonly described as “imitative.” Thus, mirror neurons theory has implications for several classes of behavior and related issues, including imitation, autism, language origins and production, motor activity, im- plicit-procedural memory, and learning. Inas- 399 much as the mirror neurons show activity in relation both to specific actions performed by self and matching actions performed by oth- ers, the theory provides a potential neuro- physiological and neuropsychological “bridge between minds.” See also AFFORDANCE THEORY; EMPATHY THEORY; HOMUN- CULUS/SENSORY HOMUNCULUS HYPO- THESES; LANGUAGE ORIGINS, THEO- RIES OF; MIND/MENTAL STATES, THE- ORIES OF; NEURON/NEURAL/NERVE THEORY; RIGHT-SHIFT THEORY; SPEECH THEORIES. REFERENCES Miklosi, A. (1999). From grasping to speech: Imitation might provide a missing link. Trends in Neurosciences, 22, 151-152. Wolf, S., Gales, M., Shane, E., & Shane, M. (2000). Mirror neurons, procedural learning, and the positive new ex- perience: A developmental systems self psychology approach. Journal of the American Academy of Psy- chophysics and Dynamic Psychia- try, 28, 409-430. Rizzolatti, G., Craighero, L., & Fadiga, L. (2002). The mirror system in hu- mans. In M. Stamenov & V. Gallese (Eds.), Mirror neurons and the evo- lution of brain and language. Am- sterdam, Netherlands: J. Benjamins. Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., & Gallese, V. (2002). From mirror neurons to imitation: Facts and speculations. In A. N. Meltzoff & W. Prinz (Eds.), Imitative mind: De- velopment, evolution, and brain bases. New York: Cambridge Uni- versity Press. Vihman, M. M. (2002). The role of mirror neurons in the ontogeny of speech. In M. Stamenov & V. Gallese (Eds.), Mirror neurons and the evo- lution of brain and language. Am- sterdam, Netherlands: J. Benjamins. Weigand, E. (2002). Constitutive features f human dialogic interaction: Mirror neurons and what they tell us about human abilities. In M. Stamenov & V. Gallese (Eds.), Mirror neurons and the evolution of brain and lan- guage. Amsterdam, Netherlands: J. Benjamins. Buccino, G., & Binkofski, F. (2004). The mirror neuron system and action recognition. Brain & Language, 89, 370-376. MIRROR-REVERSAL PHENOMENON/ EFFECT. The issue of why a mirror - when we look into it - appears to reverse right and left, but not up and down, has been debated ever since the Greek philosopher Plato (c. 427-347 B.C.) answered it incorrectly in the 4 th century B.C. More recently, explanations for the mirror-reversal effect have been pro- posed by the American science-writer Martin Gardner (1914- ) and the English psycholo- gist Richard L. Gregory (1923- ). In the for- mer case, Gardner suggests that because the image appears behind the mirror, the viewer performs a mental rotation of it, using the vertical axis of rotation; however, this expla- nation is lacking because the operation of mental rotation under these conditions takes too much time to account for the experienced phenomenon. In the latter case, Gregory offers a seemingly more satisfying and correct solu- tion to the issue: a mirror doesn’t reverse left and right or top and bottom, but in order to see the reflection of an object/person, the viewer has to rotate it physically about the horizontal axis to face the mirror; when this is done, the image appears left-right reversed because the object/person is left-right reversed relative to the orientation of the reflected image. Looking into a mirror, a mirror image of one’s own face appears left-right reversed for the same reason; in order to look into a mirror, one perceptually turns horizontally through 180- de-grees relative to the reflected image that is about to be produced. In terms of unconscious inference, one cannot face the same way as the reflected image, because then the person would be facing away from the mirror (cf., Holmes, Roeckelein, & Olmstead, 1968). See also PERCEPTION (I. GENERAL), THEO- RIES OF; PERCEPTION (II. COMPARA- TIVE APPRAISAL), THEORIES OF; UN- CONSCIOUS INFERENCE, DOCTRINE OF; VISION/SIGHT, THEORIES OF. 400 REFERENCES Plato. (1953). Timaeus. The dialogues of Plato. 4 vols. Oxford, UK: Claren- don Press. Gardner, M. (1964). The ambidextrous uni- verse. New York: Basic Books. Holmes, D. S., Roeckelein, J. E., & Olmstead, J. A. (1968). Determinants of tactual perception of finger-drawn symbols: Reappraisal. Perceptual and Motor Skills, 27, 659-672. Gregory, R. L. (1997). Mirrors in mind. New York: W. H. Freeman. MISAPPLIED CONSTANCY, THEORY OF. See CONSTANCY HYPOTHESIS. MISATTRIBUTION THEORY. See IM- PRESSION FORMATION, THEORIES OF. MISINFORMATION EFFECT. See EYE- WITNESS MISINFORMATION EFFECT. MISORIENTATION EFFECT. See PER- CEPTION (I. GENERAL), THEORIES OF. MISSING FUNDAMENTAL ILLUSION. See APPENDIX A. MIXED CEREBRAL DOMINANCE THE- ORY. See NEURON/NEURAL/NERVE THEORY. MNEMIC THEORY. See JUNG’S THE- ORY OF PERSONALITY. MNEMON. See SHORT-TERM AND LONG-TERM MEMORY, THEORIES OF. MODALITY EFFECTS. See FORGET- TING/MEMORY, THEORIES OF; SHORT- TERM AND LONG-TERM MEMORY, THEORIES OF. MODEL OF TIME AND BRAIN CON- SCIOUSNESS. This theoretical model of time and brain consciousness describes how, where, and when the human brain receives and analyzes different perceptual stimuli. In particular, the model advances the notion that when stimuli occur very fast the brain per- ceives and remembers the more useful stimuli, and not necessarily in the sequence in which they occur. See also CONSCIOUSNESS, PHENOMENON OF; TIME, THEORIES OF. REFERENCE Dennett, D., & Kinsbourne, M. (1992). Time and the observer. The where and when of consciousness in the brain. The Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 15, 183-201. MODEL OF TIME IN ADOLESCENTS. This model for qualitative logic analysis in adolescents is based on the Newtonian con- cept of ”absolute” or “physical” time. In this approach, within a psychological context, children’s cognitive development is viewed as alternating between structurally stable and unstable cognitive systems where consistency or inconsistency of general and referred knowledge provides the foundation for the model of time in adolescents. See also DE- VELOPMENTAL THEORY; TIME, THEO- RIES OF. REFERENCE Crepault, J. (1983). Models, reasoning, and notion of time in adolescents. Ca- hiers de Psychologie Cognitive, 3, 387-392. MODERN/CONTEMPORARY THEOR- IES OF INTELLIGENCE. See INTELLI- GENCE, THEORIES/LAWS OF. MODERN SYNTHETIC THEORY OF EVOLUTION. See DARWIN’S EVOLU- TION THEORY/EVOLUTION, THEORY/ LAWS OF. MODIFICATION BY EXERCISE, LAW OF. See USE, LAW OF. MODULARITY HYPOTHESIS/THEORY. See TRANSFER OF TRAINING, THORN- DIKE’S THEORY OF. MODULARITY OF MIND, DOCTRINE OF. See MIND/MENTAL STATES, THEO- RIES OF. MODULARITY THEORIES. See MIND/ MENTAL STATES, THEORIES OF. 401 MOLECULAR/CONTIGUITY THEORY. See LEARNING THEORIES/LAWS. MOLECULAR MODEL OF MEMORY. See FORGETTING/MEMORY, THEORIES OF. MOLYNEUX’S QUESTION. See NATURE VERSUS NURTURE THEORIES. MOMENTARY INTEREST, LAW OF. See CONDUCT, LAWS OF. MONAD THEORY. See HERBART’S DOCTRINE OF APPERCEPTION. MONIST/MONISM THEORY. See MIND- BODY THEORIES. MONOAMINE HYPOTHESIS. See DE- PRESSION, THEORIES OF. MONOTONICITY. See SET THEORY. MONOTYPIC EVOLUTION THEORY. See RECAPITULATION THEORY/LAW. MONTAGUE’S THEORY OF TIME PERCEPTION. The American psychologist W. Montague (1904) formulated a theory of time perception that - although dependent on a rather artificial view of consciousness - marked a new stage at the turn of the 20 th century in the analysis of time by its concep- tion of time as change, by a revised account of the “specious present” (of William James) as the relation of old content to new content, and of the elaboration of “recognition” as the re- sultant of a “two-fold specious present” (cf., Dunlap, 1904). See also FRAISSE’S THE- ORY OF TIME; JAMES’ TIME THEORY; TIME, THEORIES OF. REFERENCES Dunlap, K. (1904). Time. Psychological Bul- letin, 1, 363-365. Montague, W. (1904). A theory of time- perception. American Journal of Psychology, 115, 1-14. MONTE CARLO FALLACY. See PROB- ABILITY THEORY/LAWS. MONTESSORI METHOD/THEORY. The Italian physician (Italy’s first woman physi- cian) and educator Maria Montessori (1870- 1952) established an educational system in Italy in the early 1900s that emphasized the self-education of preschool children via the development of initiative by means of free- dom of action. The Montessori method theory involves training in sense perception using objects of different colors, shapes, and sizes, and the development of eye-hand coordination in exercises and games. Montessori’s educa- tional model offers a “prepared environment” emphasizing the values of care for oneself and one’s property, and includes materials to pro- mote sensory, motor, and language skills edu- cation, proceeding in strict sequence accord- ing to the teacher’s demonstration and facilita- tive leadership, and which combines work and play for the children (cf., synectics model - an educational strategy that focuses on creative problem-solving and the development and implementation of teaching methods that in- crease students’ creativity, such as stressing students’ metaphorical thinking abilities). Additionally, in the Montessori approach, children have the freedom to select any mate- rials to which they are attracted spontane- ously; each learner’s choices reveal the indi- vidual’s unique potentialities, and children may work independently or in groups. The Montessori class typically carries no grades, and rules are intended to encourage mutual cooperation, rather than competition; pupils are responsible for maintaining cleanliness and order, and normally acquire self-discipline rapidly. Typically, by age four or five years old, Montessori children spontaneously burst into writing activities; they learn spelling via a movable alphabet. The Montessori curriculum consists of science, history, geography, ge- ometry, and arithmetic, and is based on the finding that preschool children can solve prob- lems and accomplish a great deal of intellec- tual work before actually entering formal schooling (i.e., children from birth to six years of age demonstrate that they possess an “ab- sorbent mind”). In the Montessori nursery schools, children are encouraged to establish good student-teacher relationships that are expected to generalize to subsequent relation- ships between the child and other adults in 402 society. See also INSTRUCTIONAL THE- ORY; LEARNING THEORIES/LAWS. REFERENCES Montessori, M. (1949). The absorbent mind. Madras, India: Theosophical Publi- cations. Montessori, M. (1964). The Montessori method. New York: Schocken Books. Montessori, M. (1976). Education for human development: Understanding Mon- tessori. New York: Schocken Books. MONTY HALL PROBLEM/DILEMMA. See THREE-DOOR GAME SHOW PROB- LEM/EFFECT. MOON ILLUSION THEORY. Although any normal, healthy, sensory-intact individual may readily experience the moon illusion (i.e., the full moon on the horizon appears to be larger than the same moon when viewed di- rectly overhead at its apex), there have been various speculations - ever since the ancient Greeks - as to how the illusion occurs. Fore- most among such “best guesses” is the moon illusion theory that states that perceptual fac- tors such as apparent size, afterimage, and distance act in the person’s unconscious per- ceptual constructions by placing the horizon sky (which acts as a “background” surface for the “figure” of the moon) at a further distance than it really is (due to “familiar” cues on the horizon such as trees, the skyline, and build- ings that serve as bases for distance estima- tions). Also, the moon on the horizon is per- ceived as being behind the various depth cues that are present, so the depth perception cue of “overlap” adds to the “erroneous” perception that the moon on the horizon is farther away. The moon illusion involves, also, the misap- plication of the principle of size constancy; that is, much like the afterimage of the stimu- lus of a glowing light bulb that “appears” to be larger on a distant wall as compared to the afterimage on a near wall, the moon “appears” to be larger when the perception of its distance increases. In actuality, the perceiver’s retinal size/image of the full moon is the same in all locations whether near or far. Thus, even though one’s retinal image of the moon re- mains constant in size, the viewer makes a “perceptual error” and perceives the moon as being larger because it seems to be farther away on the erroneously-estimated distant horizon. Theoretical notions about illusions, such as the moon illusion, emphasize the fact that what humans “see” is not merely a simple objective (“veridical”) reflection of the world, but involves one’s subjective perceptual inter- pretation - often including “perceptual errors” - of stimuli in the environment. In a sense, illusions - such as the moon illusion - are “ir- resistible;” that is, in spite of the fact that we know - in a rational or intellectual way - about certain facts or features of our environment, we nevertheless make “perceptual errors” about our surroundings that are beyond our resistance or control and seem to be unavoid- able. See also AFTERIMAGE LAW; CON- STANCY HYPOTHESIS; EM-MERT’S LAW; FIGURE-GROUND RELATION- SHIPS, PRINCIPLE OF. REFERENCES Boring, E. G. (1962). On the moon illusion. Science, 137, 902-906. Kaufman, L., & Rock, I. (1962). The moon illusion. Scientific American, 207, 120-130. Kaufman, L., & Kaurman, J. H. (2000). Ex- plaining the moon illusion. Proceed- ings of the National Academy of Sciences, USA, 97, 500-505. MORAL DETERMINISM, DOCTRINE OF. See DETERMINISM, DOCTRINE/THE- ORY OF. MORAL DEVELOPMENT, PRINCI- PLES/THEORY OF. See KOHLBERG’S THEORY OF MORALITY. MORAL NIHILISM, DOCTRINE OF. See DETERMINISM, DOCTRINE/THEORY OF. MORENO’S SOCIAL GROUP TECH- NIQUES/THEORY. The Romanian-born American psychiatrist Jacob Levy Moreno (1889-1974) developed a number of tech- niques for studying and assessing the dynam- ics of social group processes and interper- sonal relationships, among which are the fol- lowing: sociodrama - a group-training and [...]... MOTIVATION, THEORY OF NEED-DRIVE-INCENTIVE PATTERN THEORY See MOTIVATION, THEORIES OF NEED-HIERARCHY THEORY See MASLOW’S THEORY OF PERSONALITY NEED, LAW OF See CONDUCT, LAWS OF NEED-PRESS THEORY See MURRAY’S THEORY OF PERSONALITY NEED-REDUCTION THEORIES MOTIVATION, THEORIES OF See NEED THEORIES See MOTIVATION, THEORIES OF NEGATIVE ADAPTATION, PRINCIPLE OF See HABITUATION, PRINCIPLE/LAW OF NEGATIVE AFTERIMAGES... (1842) Elements of physiology London: Taylor & Walton Roeckelein, J E (1996) Citation of laws and theories in textbooks across 112 years of psychology Psychological Reports, 79 , 979 -998 MULLER’S ZONE THEORY See COLOR VISION, THEORIES/ LAWS OF MULTIATTRIBUTE DECISION-MAKING, THEORY OF See ELIMINATION BY ASPECTS THEORY MULTIFACTOR THEORY OF THIRST See THIRST, THEORIES OF MULTIMODAL THEORY OF INTELLIGENCE... State University of New York Press Morreall, J (Ed.) (19 87) The philosophy of laugher and humor Albany: State University of New York Press MOSAIC THEORY OF PERCEPTION See PERCEPTION (I GENERAL), THEORIES OF MOST LIKELY LAW See EFFECT, LAW OF MOTIVATED FORGETTING, THEORY OF See FORGETTING/MEMORY, THEORIES OF MOTIVATIONAL HEDONIC THEORY See HEDONISM, THEORY/LAW OF MOTIVATIONAL THEORIES OF HUMOR According... Appleton-Century-Crofts Boring, E G (1963) History, psychology, and science: Selected papers New York: Wiley Curti, M (1 973 ) Psychological theories in American thought Vol 4 In P Wiener (Ed.), Dictionary of the history of ideas New York: Scribners Roeckelein, J E (1995) Naming in psychology: Analyses of citation counts and eponyms Psychological Reports, 77 , 163- 174 NATURAL RESPONSE THEORY See LANGUAGE ORIGINS, THEORIES. .. vision American Journal of Psychology, 66, 3 97- 408 Corso, J (1956) The neural quantum theory of sensory discrimination Psychological Bulletin, 53, 371 -393 Neisser, U (19 57) Response-sequences and the hypothesis of the neural quantum American Journal of Psychology, 70 , 512-5 27 Corso, J (1961) The quantal hypothesis and the threshold of audibility American Journal of Psychology, 74 , 191204 Corso, J (1963)... HEDONISM, THEORY/ LAW OF; HULL’S LEARNING THEORY; HUNGER, THEORIES OF; JUNG’S THEORY OF PERSONALITY; KELLY’S PERSONAL CONSTRUCT THEORY; LEARNING THEORIES/ LAWS; LEWIN’S FIELD THEORY; MASLOW’S THEORY OF PERSONALITY; McDOUGALL’S HORMIC/ INSTINCT THEORY/DOCTRINE; PERSONALITY THEORIES; REINFORCEMENT THEORY; ROGERS’ THEORY OF PERSONALITY; THIRST, THEORIES OF; WORK/CAREER/OCCUPATION, THEORIES OF REFERENCES Woodworth,... EMPIRICAL/EMPIRICISM, DOCTRINE OF; EMPIRICIST VERSUS NATIVIST THEORIES; GALTON’S LAWS; INTELLIGENCE, THEORIES/ LAWS OF; LOCKE’S PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY; PERCEPTION (I GENERAL), THEORIES OF; SPEECH THEORIES REFERENCES Locke, J (1690/1965) Essay concerning human understanding London: Dent Davis, J W (1960) The Molyneux problem Journal of the History of Ideas, 21, 392-408 Morgan, M J (1 977 ) Molyneux’s question:... inadequate See also CONTIGUITY, LAW OF; EMOTIONS, THEORIES/ LAWS OF; GUTHRIE’S THEORY OF BEHAVIOR; HELSON’S ADAPTATION-LEVEL THEORY; HULL’S LEARNING THEORY; INSTRUMENTAL CONDITIONING, PRINCIPLES OF; KAMIN EFFECT; MOTIVATION, THEORIES OF; PRE-MACK’S PRINCIPLE/LAW; PUNISHMENT, THEORIES OF REFERENCES Mowrer, O H (19 47) On the dual nature of learning - A re-interpretation of “conditioning” and “problem-solving.”... humor-eliciting aspects of the interpretation, and the cognitive elaboration of the event’s implications See also APTER’S REVERSAL THEORY OF HUMOR; AROUSAL THEORY; BEHAVIORAL THEORIES OF HUMOR/LAUGHTER; COGNITIVE-PERCEPTUAL THEORIES OF HUMOR; FREUD’S THEORY OF WIT/HUMOR; HUMOR, THEORIES OF; SUPERIORITY THEORIES OF HUMOR; WYER AND COLLINS’ THEORY OF HUMOR ELICITATION REFERENCES Freud, S (1905/1960) Jokes and their... however, the history of psychology should probably be considered in terms of both personalistic and naturalistic theories of history, with a major role being assigned to the influence of the Zeitgeist See also HISTORICAL MODELS OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY; PAVLOVIAN CONDITIONING PRINCIPLES/LAWS /THEORIES; PERSONALITY THEORIES; STIGLER’S LAW OF EPONYMY REFERENCES Boring, E G (19 57) A history of experimental . loss of control. Morreall (19 87) provides accounts of other contempo- rary theories of laughter and humor, viz, theo- ries by Michael Clark (theories of humor are distinguished from theories of. THEORY OF HUMOR; AROUSAL THEORY; BEHAVIORAL THE- ORIES OF HUMOR/LAUGHTER; COGNI- TIVE-PERCEPTUAL THEORIES OF HU- MOR; FREUD’S THEORY OF WIT/HU- MOR; HUMOR, THEORIES OF; SUPERI- ORITY THEORIES OF. THEORY OF PERSONAL- ITY; GESCHWIND’S THEORY; IM- AGERY/MENTAL IMAGERY, THEORIES OF; INTELLIGENCE, THEORIES/ LAWS OF; LEARNING THEORIES/ LAWS; MIND-BODY THEORIES; MIND/ MEN- TAL SET, LAW OF; PIAGET’S