Electronic Business: Concepts, Methodologies, Tools, and Applications (4-Volumes) P264 ppt

2564 Pricing Strategy of Online Knowledge Market DQDOWHUQDWLYHWR¿QGLQJDQVZHUVE\WKHPVHOYHV Therefore, the prices set by these consumers do QRWSURSHUO\UHÀHFWWKHYDOXHRIWKHLUTXHVWLRQV Nevertheless, for those consumers who utilize the knowledge market to derive additional utilities, their prices will be set according to Equation 5. The more utility they expect to get, the higher prices they will set. Following this rational, the consumers on the knowledge market can be dif- ferentiated into the following two categories: • Spin-off information consumer: those who are only interested in using the knowledge PDUNHWDVDQDOWHUQDWLYHWR¿QGLQJLQIRUPD- tion without value added to their utilities; and • Mainstream knowledge consumer: those who utilize the knowledge market to acquire knowledge to derive additional utilities. As we have assumed, the additional utility is UHODWHGZLWKWKHGLI¿FXOW\q m of the question, so DPRUHGLI¿FXOWTXHVWLRQZLOOJLYHDFRQVXPHU more additional utility, which, however, is only applicable to mainstream knowledge consumers, but not to spin-off consumers, because there is no additional utility attached to their questions no PDWWHUKRZGLI¿FXOWWKH\DUH,QIDFWWKHKLJKHVW price that a spin-off consumer with the skill level s j is willing to pay for the answer of a question m is just c(s j , q m ), whereas a mainstream consumer with the same skill level will be willing to pay an amount higher than c(s j , q m ) as long as he(she) may derive additional utility from the answer of his(her) question. The existence of the spin-off consumers has some negative effects on the knowledge market EHFDXVHSULFHVGRQRWUHÀHFWWKHLUWUXHYDOXHVDV they just post their questions by offering a very low price. As a former researcher of Google An- swers, West (2002) made the similar observations DVIROORZV³2IWKHTXHVWLRQV,SLFNHGVRPHIHOO in my areas of expertise—technical support is- sues, historical facts, etc.—and some were just plain odd. One person offered a few bucks for someone to tell him a joke he hadn’t heard be- fore. Another wanted psychic advice, or barring that, a humorous reply. People used the service as an impromptu temp agency, offering a few dollars for someone to test drive a Web site or to make business appointments for them. While the service was intended to offer answers to factual questions, people tried to push the envelope any way they could.” Although the group of spin-off consumers seems to cause some problems to the knowledge PDUNHW LW PD\ DOVR EHQH¿W WKH ¿UP WR UHWDLQ some of them for several reasons. First of all, spin-off consumers are usually those who keep abreast of the state-of-art technologies and new SKHQRPHQD7KH³ZRUGRIPRXWK´HIIHFWWKURXJK spin-off consumers can bring more customers to the market. Second, network effects require the ¿UPWRDWWUDFWPRUHTXHVWLRQVWRWKHNQRZOHGJH market so that more consumers may be enticed WR SDUWLFLSDWH LQ WKH ³DVNLQJDQGDQVZHULQJ´ process. Third, maintaining a certain volume of questions on the knowledge market may alleviate the malicious competition among researchers. Therefore, it is also necessary to welcome some spin-off consumers on the knowledge market. Minimal and Maximal Posting Prices In this subsection, we analyze the purpose of the ¿ U P V S HF L I \ LQ J WK H PL Q L PD OD QG P D[ L P DO S R VW LQ J prices on the knowledge market. First of all, designating a minimal posting price has two effects on the knowledge market. The next proposition illustrates the effect of a minimal posting price on the spin-off consumers of the knowledge market. Proposition 3: A spin-off consumer j will not post his(her) question m on the knowledge market if the minimal posting price p VSHFL¿HGE\WKH¿UP is greater than c(s j , q m ). 2565 Pricing Strategy of Online Knowledge Market Proof:,IWKH¿UPVSHFL¿HVDPLQLPDOSRVWLQJSULFH as p , then a spin-off consumer’s expected payoff by posting a question m is S c = (u – c(s j , q m )) + [c(s j , q m ) – p](1 – ˆ i k ), whose second term is positive and decreasing in p when p < c(s j , q m ) and negative when p > c(s j , q m ). Therefore, the consumer will post a question if the minimal posting price p c(s j , q m ). Otherwise, he(she) is better off by not posting the question RQWKHNQRZOHGJHPDUNHW Ŷ 7KHDERYHSURSRVLWLRQLPSOLHVWKDWWKH¿UP can specify the minimal posting price p on the knowledge market to reduce the proportion of spin-off consumers. Given the minimal posting price p VSHFL¿HGE\WKH¿UPLWFDQEHLQIHUUHG that spin-off consumers with the skill level s j  s j w i l l n o t b e s e r v e d o n t h e k no w le d ge m a r k e t , w h e r e c( s j , q m ) = p , and s j ( p ) is the threshold skill level for the minimal posting price. The minimal post- ing price p determines the proportion of spin-off consumers to be served on the knowledge market. :KHQWKH¿UPLQFUHDVHVWKHPLQLPDOSRVWLQJ price p , the threshold skill level s j ( p ) decreases, so more spin-off consumers will be eliminated from the knowledge market. In addition to its effect on the spin-off con- sumers, the minimal posting price also affects the mainstream consumers, but in a different way. The next proposition summarizes this effect. Proposition 4: All the mainstream consumers will be served by the knowledge market no matter what DPLQLPDOSRVWLQJSULFHLVVSHFL¿HG,QDGGLWLRQ for a minimal posting price p , those mainstream consumers with the skill level s j < I j s ( p )will be mandated to price their questions at p , where the skill level I j s ( p ) of mainstream consumers is determined by ˆ () 1 1 () ( () ) i I jm i p pu k pucspq p k ww c '   '   ˆ Proof:)RUTXHVWLRQVZLWKWKHGLI¿FXOW\W\SHDV q m , mainstream consumers with the skill level s j < I j s ( p ) will price their questions at p , where the threshold skill level I j s ( p ) of consumers is from () 1 1 () ( () ) i I jm i p pu k pucspq p k ww c '   '   ˆ +RZHYHUDVXI¿FLHQWFRQGLWLRQIRUDOOWKHFRQVXP- ers with the skill level s j (0, I j s ( p )] to remain served by the market is P j s ( p  I j s ( p ), where the threshold skill level P j s ( p ) is determined from p = U( p )'u+c( P j s ( p ), q m ). This is to ensure that all the mainstream consum- ers with the skill level s j (0, s j ( p )] have positive surpluses by posting their questions with the minimal price p on the market. By comparing the WZRWKUHVKROGVNLOOOHYHOVLWLVQRWGLI¿FXOWWRVHH that consumers who are mandated to price their questions at the minimal posting price always have positive surpluses. First, it can be seen that at the minimal posting price, a customer whose skill level is I j s ( p ) always has a positive surplus because the maximal price for the skill level I j s ( p ) to have a positive surplus is greater than p . Sec- ond, for a consumer with the skill level s j < I j s ( p ), the maximal price for him(her) to have a positive surplus is greater than that for the skill level I j s ( p ), which is certainly greater than p  Ŷ The above two propositions suggest that less s k i l l f u l c on s u m e r s , e i t he r s pi n - of f o r ma i n s t r e a m consumers, are generally less sensitive to the PLQLPDOSRVWLQJSULFHVSHFL¿HGE\WKH¿UPIRU the knowledge market. For spin-off consumers, the maximal price they are willing to pay to obtain a positive surplus from the market is c(s j , q m ), which decreases in the consumer’s skill level. For mainstream consumers, their maximal price for a positive surplus is determined from p  = U( p  )'u + c(s j , q m ), where p  also decreases in the skill level s j . Therefore, a less skilled consumer for the 2566 Pricing Strategy of Online Knowledge Market knowledge market always has a larger support of price than a more skilled one. Intuitively, this result directly relates to our assumption that a less VNLOOHGFRQVXPHULQFXUVDKLJKHUFRVWIRU¿QGLQJ an answer to the question by himself(herself) than a more skilled one. Therefore, a less skilled consumer is willing to pay more for answers to his(her) question. In summary, by specifying a minimal posting price p IRUWKHNQRZOHGJHPDUNHWWKH¿UPFDQ eliminate some spin-off consumers and mandate some mainstream consumers to increase their posting prices to p . The reduced proportion of spin-off consumers on the knowledge market is thus s j ( p ) J, where J is the original estimated proportion of spin-off consumers. Having described the effects of the minimal SRVWLQJSULFHZHQH[WWXUQWRDQDO\]HWKHLQÀX- ence of a maximal posting price on the knowledge market. As we have illustrated, the existence of spin-off consumers is due to the fact that some consumers do not derive additional utilities from the market ('u = 0), so that the term U(p)'u is reduced into zero and a consumer’s additional surplus from the market ([c(s j , q m ) – p] – (1 – ˆ i k )) becomes a decreasing function of price p. In ad- dition to the effect of the additional utilities 'u, the probability function U(p) also has the similar effect when U(pĺ:KHQDFRQVXPHUUHDOL]HV that the probability function has such property that when p *  ˆ p , U(p) = 1, and U'(p) = 0, he(she) will price his(her) question at ˆ p instead of p * when p * > ˆ p . Suppose a consumer is not aware of this property of the probability function, he(she) will still set a very high price p * for his(her) question. The consumer’s total surplus in this situation will be U c = (u – c(s j , q m )) + [U(p * )'u + c(s j , q m ) – p](1 – ˆ i k (p * )) §u – c(s j , q m )) + ['u + c(s j , q m ) – p](1 – ˆ i k (p * )). Since we know that U(p§ when p [ ˆ p , p * ), then the consumer will be better off by setting his(her) price at ˆ p , which barely reduces his(her) utility but increases the probability for his(her) question to be answered. Therefore, by announcing a maximal posting SULFHWKH¿UPLPSOLFLWO\LQIRUPVFRQVXPHUVRI the boundary price ˆ p so that they will be better RII,QDGGLWLRQWKH¿UPZLOODOVREHEHWWHURII which is shown in the following proposition. Proposition 5:7KH¿UPLVEHWWHURIIE\VSHFLI\LQJ a maximal posting price ˆ p such that when all p * > ˆ p , ˆ i k (p * ĺ. Proof:7KH¿UP¶VQHWEHQH¿WIRUDSRVWHGTXHV- tion m is S m (p * ) = (1 – D) p * (1 – ˆ i k (p * )). ,QVWHDGLIWKH¿UPVHWVDPD[LPDOSRVWLQJSULFH as ˆ p that is greater than p * WKHQWKH ¿UP¶VQHW EHQH¿WIRUWKLVTXHVWLRQPZLOOEH S m ( ˆ p ) = (1 – D) p (1 – ˆ i k (p)) It can be observed that S m (p * ĺZKHQ ˆ i k (p * ) ĺ  7KHUHIRUH WKH ¿UP ZLOO EH EHWWHU RII E\ specifying a maximal posting price ˆ p such that S m ( ˆ p ) > S m (p * ) Ŷ ,QVXPPDU\WKHVSHFL¿HGPD[LPDOSRVW- ing price not only may increase a mainstream FRQVXPHU¶V VXUSOXV EXW DOVR PDNHV WKH ¿UP better off. Firm’s Optimal Decisions )ROORZLQJRXUSULRUGLVFXVVLRQVWKH¿UPVKRXOG now determine the appropriate allocation to UHVHDUFKHUVEDVHGRQWKHVSHFL¿HGPLQLPDODQG maximal posting prices on the knowledge market, LQRUGHUWRPD[LPL]HLWVWRWDOH[SHFWHGSUR¿W 7KHUHIRUHWKH¿UP¶VGHFLVLRQSUREOHPFDQEH formulated as 2567 Pricing Strategy of Online Knowledge Market 1234 [] m q max E  (7) where () 1 1 0() (1 ) ( ) ( ) j i p s ii jj p k pgkdkfsds ªº «» «» ¬¼   ³³ ˆ () 1 2 0() (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) I j i sp ii jj p k pgkdkfsds ªº «» «» ¬¼    ³³ ˆ () 1 3 () ( ) (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) j I j i p s ii jj sp p k pgkdkfsds  ªº  «» «» ¬¼    ³³ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 11 4 () () (1 ) (1 ) ( ) ( ) j i ii jj pp s k pgkdkfsds ªº «» «» ¬¼    ³³ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ $VVKRZQLQ)LJXUHWKH¿UP¶VWRWDOSUR¿W FR Q VL V W V RI IRX UF RP S RQH QW V7 KH¿ U VWF RPS RQH QW S  LVWKHSUR¿WIURPWKHUHPDLQLQJVSLQRIIFRQ- sumers by specifying the minimal posting price p , in which J is the initial proportion of spin-off consumers on the knowledge market. The second LVWKHSUR¿WIURPPDLQVWUHDPFRQVXPHUVZLWKWKH minimal posting price; the third is from main- stream consumers who set their optimal prices in between the minimal and maximal posting prices; and the fourth is again from mainstream consumers who are forced to have their questions priced at the maximal level ˆ p . According to our previous analysis, when WKH¿UPLQFUHDVHVWKHPLQLPDOSRVWLQJSULFH p and decreases the maximal posting price ˆ p , s j ( p ) decreases, I j s ( p ) increases, and s ˆ j ( ˆ p ) decreases. Therefore, less consumers will be able to price their questions at their optimal ones p * and more mainstream consumers will price their questions at either the minimal or maximal price, while mo re spi n- of f con su me rs wi ll be el im inat ed f rom WKH PDUNHW 7KHUHIRUH WKH ¿UP PD\ UHJXODWH the knowledge market by designating different minimal and maximal posting prices. 'XHWRWKHFRPSOH[QDWXUHRIWKH¿UP¶VPD[L- mization problem, the closed-form solution of D is not available. However, Table 2 demonstrates KRZWKHSUR¿WVWUXFWXUHRIHDFKFRPSRQHQWZLOO change when the allocation D to researchers in- FUHDVHVZKLFKJLYHVWKHLQWXLWLRQIRUWKH¿UPWR practically assign the allocation D. Essentially, WKH¿UPKDVWREDODQFHWKHWUDGHRIIEHWZHHQWKH gross revenue of each question and the payment to researchers; by increasing the allocation to UHVHDUFKHUVWKH¿UPPD\LQFUHDVHWKHWRWDOJURVV revenue from each question, but may have to al- locate more to researchers. 7KH¿UP¶VSUR¿WDOVRFKDQJHVZLWKWKHLQLWLDO proportion of spin-off customers on the knowledge market. As the example to show the intuition, we investigate the following special case. If we consider that all the questions posted on the knowledge market are homogeneous with respect WRWKHLUGLI¿FXOWLHVEXWKHWHURJHQHRXVLQWHUPVRI their originators, and when JĺRUDOPRVWDOO the consumers belong to the spin-off type, the ¿UP¶VSUR¿WZLOOEHFRPH )LJXUH7KH¿UP¶VSUR¿W)RXUFRPSRQHQWV Mainstream consumers Spin-off consumers eliminated 1 ()p () j sp 2 ()p 3 (*)p 4 ()p ˆ () I j sp () j sp ˆˆ 2568 Pricing Strategy of Online Knowledge Market () 1 0() (1 ) ( ) ( ) j i p s ii jj p k pgkdkfsds ªº «» «» ¬¼  ³³ (1 ) (1 ( )) ( ) j i ppp s k     ZKRVH ¿UVWRUGHU FRQGLWLRQ ZLWK UHVSHFW WR D yields () 1 11() i i p k p k ww    which indicates that there exists an optimal proportion for a given minimal posting price p because the LHS of the above equation increases and the RHS decreases in D. In addition, when WKHVSHFL¿HGPLQLPDOSRVWLQJSULFH p increases, the threshold knowledge level ˆ i k ( p ) increases and  ˆ i k ( p D decreases, resulting in a larger optimal allocation D. This implies that when the majority of consumers are not serious about the knowledge PDUNHWRUEHORQJWRWKHVSLQRIIW\SHWKH¿UP s h o u l d a l lo ca t e m o r e t o r e se a r c h e r s w h e n i t t r i e s t o eliminate more spin-off consumers by increasing the minimal posting price. Intuitively, when there are less spin-off consumers on the knowledge market, researchers deserve more from answer- ing each question. CONCLUSION The development of Web and information tech- nologies provides real-time access for people to seek and acquire information and knowledge from online sources. Viewing knowledge transaction as WKHQHZSUR¿WPDNLQJRSSRUWXQLW\FRPSDQLHVDUH trying to set up online marketplaces for potential knowledge buyers and sellers to meet and thereby make transactions. Based on the best practice from Google Answers, we present an analytical model of an online knowledge market, where knowledge re- searchers and consumers trade knowledge. The ¿UPPDLQWDLQVWKHRQOLQHNQRZOHGJHPDUNHWDQG charges fees for all the questions that have been answered. We analyze the pricing strategies from ERWKFRQVXPHUV¶DQGD¿UP¶VSHUVSHFWLYHV First, a consumer’s optimal strategy to price his(her) question is studied. Based on whether the knowledge market is used to derive additional utilities, two types of consumers on the market can be differentiated. Spin-off consumers utilize the knowledge market just to quickly retrieve information without any additional utilities. Compo- nent Organi- zational proportion Selling price Mar- ket share Probability of questions being answered ʌ 1 decrease same Same increase ʌ 2 decrease same de- crease increase ʌ 3 decrease increase in- crease increase ʌ 4 decrease same in- crease increase 7DEOH&KDQJHVRISUR¿WVWUXFWXUHZLWKUHVSHFWWRDOORFDWLRQD 2569 Pricing Strategy of Online Knowledge Market %HFDXVHSULFHVGRQRWUHÀHFWWUXHYDOXDWLRQVRI their questions, spin-off consumers always price their questions as low as possible. Mainstream consumers use the knowledge market to acquire knowledge to obtain additional utilities. Mostly, the more utilities they expect to get, the higher they will be prepared to pay for an answer of their questions. In addition, a more knowledgeable consumer tends to set a higher price for his(her) question. Second, the purpose of specifying the mini- mal and maximal posting prices on the market is analyzed. Basically, the minimal posting price is used to control the proportion of spin-off consumers on the market so that the negative ef- fects of spin-off consumers on the entire market can be alleviated. The maximal posting price is used to improve the welfare of both mainstream FRQVXPHUVDQGWKH¿UP%\VSHFLI\LQJGLIIHUHQW PLQLPDODQGPD[LPDOSRVWLQJSULFHVWKH¿UPFDQ effectively moderate the structure of the online knowledge market. Finally, the firm’s optimal allocation to researchers is investigated. Contingent on the VSHFL¿HGPLQLPDODQGPD[LPDOSRVWLQJSULFHV WKH ¿UP¶V SUR¿W FDQ EH FDWHJRUL]HG LQWR IRXU components. When the allocation to researchers F K DQ J HV  WK H¿ U P¶V S UR ¿ W V W U X F WX UH FK DQ JH VD VZ H O O  Essentially, the increased allocation to researchers improves the gross revenue from each question RQWKHPDUNHW7KHUHIRUHWKH¿UPKDVWREDODQFH the tradeoff between its payment to researchers DQGLWVLQFUHDVHGEHQH¿WLQRUGHUWRFKRRVHWKH best allocation to researchers. This study serves as our initial attempt to fully understand the pricing mechanism on the NQRZOHGJHPDUNHW'XHWRWKHGLI¿FXOWLHVRIRE- taining researchers’ data from Google Answers, the empirical validation of our analytical results is still in preparation. We plan to conduct a de- tailed analysis to not only verify the results in this research, but also make extensions to reveal more hidden facts on knowledge marketplaces. In addition, future study may also include network effect in the model and explore the variations of pricing strategies on the knowledge market. 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Electronic marketplaces of knowledge: Characteristics and sharing of knowledge assets. Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Infrastructure for e-Business, e-Education, e-Science, and e-Medicine on the Internet (SSGRR 2002w). West, J. (2002). Information for sale: My experi- ence with Google Answers. Searcher - The Maga- zine for Database Professionals, 10(9), 14. This work was previously published in the International Journal of E-Business Research, edited by I. Lee, Volume 4, Issue 1, pp. 55-68, copyright 2008 by IGI Publishing (an imprint of IGI Global). 2571 Copyright © 2009, IGI Global, distributing in print or electronic forms without written permission of IGI Global is prohibited. Chapter 8.13 Evolving E-Health System Symbiosis: Theoretical Constructs in International Realpolitik Space Denis H. J. Caro Université d’Ottawa, Canada ABSTRACT The 21 st century continues to witness the trans- formation of organizational systems globally through the deployment of information and com- munication technologies (ICT). The emerging IXWXUHLVZLWQHVVLQJWKHFRQYHUJHQFHRIDUWL¿FLDO intelligence, biotechnology, nomadic informa- tion systems, and nano-technology. This prom- ises to further compel inter-organizational and inter-sectorial interactive transformations. The health care sector is no exception to the inter- organizational dynamic imperatives driven with ICT innovative advances. This article proposes a conceptual model of symbiotic e-health networks in a meta-cultural domain that goes beyond the realm of extant literature on dyadic relation- ships. The model dimensions are posited on a key informant approach and content analysis of the strategic perceptions of international ICT and health care executives interacting through dyadic SDUWQHUVKLSV 7KH ¿QGLQJV DQG LPSOLFDWLRQV RI the study for the model and further information management research are underscored. The un- derlying meta-cultural frame is characterized by public governance values and the article explores its perceived role in sustaining symbiotic e-health networks in Canada and Sweden. INTRODUCTION The 21 st century continues to witness the transfor- mation of organizational systems globally through information and communication technologies (ICT), which drive and evolve systemic goals. The implementation of ICT, such as business in- telligence systems, knowledge management, data mining and warehousing, supply chain manage- ment, systems development and implementation, systems integration, and security systems continue to compel different sectors to engage in chal- 2572 Evolving E-Health System Symbiosis lenging inter-organizational relationships (Senge, Carstedt, & Porter, 2001). With the cogent and ub iquitous developments in nomadic information systems and wireless and wearable technologies, the emerging IXWXUHLVZLWQHVVLQJWKHFRQYHUJHQFHRIDUWL¿FLDO intelligence, biotechnology, and nano-technology (Orlikowski & Iacono, 2001; Pearson, 2001). This promises to further propel inter-organizational and inter-sectorial interactions. Strategic dyadic partnerships, with its characteristics of longev- ity, management control and direction, mutual EHQH¿FHQFH DQG VWDELOLW\ H[HPSOLI\ RQH W\SH inter-organizational relationship. The literature underscores the critical role of strategic inter- VHFWRULDO SDUWQHUVKLSV LQ IRVWHULQJ HI¿FLHQFLHV sectorial growth, and social actualization through innovation and mutual organizational learning (Burgelman & Doz, 2001; Etemad, Wright, & Dana, 2001; Kodama, 2001; Nooteboom, 2000; Oliver, 2001; Robinson, Savage, & Campbell, 2003). These linkages have the potential to liberate thinking beyond closed organizational paradigms and embrace complex changes and uncertainty extra-organizationally and proactively (Dickson, Farris, & Verbeke, 2001). The health care sector is no exception to the inter-organizational change imperatives driven through ICT innovative advances. Regionally integrated e-health networks promise less re- source duplication, lower operational costs, reduced clinical waiting times, and lengths of stay and greater quality care in the face of care provider and clinician shortages. E-health is the t ra nsfor mat ion al wave of t he f ut u re i n healt h ca re systems (Adewale, 2004; Gutierrez, 2001; Sahney, 2003). The upcoming generation of consumers and providers instinctively understand the trans- formational power of ICT to improve delivery HI¿FLHQFLHVDQGTXDOLW\RIKHDOWKFDUHUHJLRQDOO\ through inter-organizational interactions. On the basis of extant literature, this article proposes a conceptual model of symbiotic e-health networks. The model dimensions are posited on a key infor- mant approach and content analysis of the strategic perceptions of international ICT and health care executives interacting through dyadic partner- VKLSV7KH¿QGLQJVDQGLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHVWXG\ underscore directions for future international research in information management. INTER-SECTORIAL DYADIC RELATIONSHIPS: GENERIC AND THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES This article posits that strategic partnerships and alliances are, in essence, symbiotic information networks. These are, in essence, mutually advan- tageous inter-organizational systems between informational cultures differing in values, mis- sions, perceptions, and evolutions. Moreover, these informational cultures incubate and thrive in informational cultural polities, which are ar- ticulated through the governance organizations. Networks are systems of interconnected individu- als and organizations through which informational DQGUHVRXUFHVÀRZ)RUG:HOOV%DLOH\ These networks interact and coalesce through an exchange of informational, relational, and trans- actional capital, and sustained through transac- tional and transformational processes. Moreover, these processes are articulated through skills sets exercised through system participants, called executives. Tight coupling of different sectors occurs when relational capital and transactional capital is leveraged through transactional and transformational skill sets. Where the capital and process resources are inadequate, a supra-level (governance agents) foster and leverage evolving symbiotic information network. Symbiotic infor- mation networks are the result of the interplay of management and technical processes. The extant literature on strategic partnerships and alliances is germane to the evolution of inter- sectorial symbiotic information networks that incubate in meta-cultural information domains. In so doing, the article subsumes a realist approach, 2573 Evolving E-Health System Symbiosis rather a strictly positivistic, or phenomenological, one to the exploration of inter-sectorial networks (Stiles, 2003). It responds to the call for a polity system perspective, where social-political ele- PHQWVLQÀXHQFHLQWHUVHFWRULDOQHWZRUNEHKDYLRU and integrate elements of trust within economic, political, socio-cultural and strategic dimensions. 0RUHRYHUWKHXQGHUO\LQJPRGHOUHÀHFWVDSOXUDO- ist epistemology, where the emphasis is on an XQGHUVWDQGLQJ ³RIWKHEHFRPLQJ´ GH 5RQG  Bouchikhi, 2004). Moreover, it views the orga- nizational and national cultures as heterogeneous elements that interact dialectically and dynami- cally in the evolution of information networks (Townsend, 2003). The literature points to management control factors that implicitly form the basis for effec- tive inter-sectorial strategic dyadic partnerships (Dyer, Prashant, & Singh, 2001; Judge & Ry- man, 2001; Weech-Maldonado & Merrill, 2000). Such elements include leadership with executive vision, solid strategic and operational planning constructs, rigorous feasibility studies and cost- EH QH¿WD QDO\ VH V V W D EOH¿ QDQFL QJW K URX J KDU D QJH RILQQRYDWLYHDQGÀH[LEOH¿QDQFLDOLQVWUXPHQWV DQG VSHFL¿F SHUIRUPDQFH PHWULFV DQG WDUJHWV Other extant elements to effective inter-sectorial dyadic links, or strategic partnerships, include the mutual understanding of business models, motivations, priorities, resource strengths, and OLPLWDWLRQVWKHFOHDUDQGH[SOLFLWGH¿QLWLRQRI PXWXDOEHQH¿WVH[SHFWDWLRQVDQGSULRULWLHV DQGWKHPXWXDOVKDULQJRI¿QDQFLDODQGSROLWLFDO risks (Das & Teng, 2001). Structural bonding (economic and functional factors that involve H[SOLFLWEHQH¿WVDQGVRFLDOERQGLQJHPRWLRQDO and affective resources) are the prerequisites to relationship cohesion (Rodriquez, 2002). Mutual t r u s t , o r r e l a t i o n a l c a p i t a l , f o s t e r s a c l i m a t e o f g o o d faith and open collaboration in forging congruent goals and objectives. Perception, mutuality, trust, and understanding are the drivers of organizational system behaviour. This points to the critical need to understand the inter-sectorial cultural and organizational cli- mates. Zhu’s Wu-Shi-Ren (WSR) Li-stage model underscores the perspectives, sensing and the psycho-cognitive elements (Shi-Li) which interact synergistically with socio-political elements or power structures (Ren-Li) to release technical ICT UHVRXUFHV:X/LIRUFHV=KX³6HQVLQJ DQGFDULQJ´WUDQVIRUPWKH³NQRZLQJ´=KX This study explores inter-sectorial informational networks transcending national cultural contexts. It extends Zhu’s WSR-Li framework into the Realpolitik of e-health systems transnationally. In particular, the proposed model in this study FHQWHUV RQ ¿YH V\PELRWLFLQIRUPDWLRQ QHWZRUN dimensions, which are not explicitly reported in the extant literature. 1. Relational capital (Shi-Li) dimension: The extent to which inter-sectorial executives harmonize perceptions, values and motiva- WLRQVLQDQDWPRVSKHUHRIWUXVWDQGEHQH¿W to effect symbiotic information networks; 2. Transactional capital (Wu-Li) dimension: The extent to which inter-sectorial execu- tives effectively avail and access strategic resources to effect symbiotic information networks; 3. Transactional skills (Ren-Li) dimension: The extent to which inter-sectorial execu- tives mobilize internal power resources to effect symbiotic information networks; 4. Transformational skills (Ren-Li) dimen- sion: The extent to which inter-sectorial executives exercise vision and strategic leadership to effect external symbiotic in- formation networks; and 5. Supra-network transgenic (Supra-Ren- Li) dimension: The extent to which external third parties engage, enable, and sustain symbiotic information networks through transactional capital and fostering transfor- mational skills externally. . e r s a c l i m a t e o f g o o d faith and open collaboration in forging congruent goals and objectives. Perception, mutuality, trust, and understanding are the drivers of organizational. relationships (Senge, Carstedt, & Porter, 2001). With the cogent and ub iquitous developments in nomadic information systems and wireless and wearable technologies, the emerging IXWXUHLVZLWQHVVLQJWKHFRQYHUJHQFHRIDUWL¿FLDO intelligence,. to liberate thinking beyond closed organizational paradigms and embrace complex changes and uncertainty extra-organizationally and proactively (Dickson, Farris, & Verbeke, 2001). The