Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 7 P48 ppsx

Paul was born on January 11, 1885, in Moorestown, New Jersey. She graduated from Swarthmore College in 1905 and then went to England to do graduate work. While in England, Paul became involved with the British suffra- gettes and received three jail sentences for participating in militant actions. She returned to the United States in 1910 and continued her graduate work at the University of Pennsylvania. She earned a Ph.D. in social work in 1912. In 1913 Paul formed the Congressional Union for Woman Suffrage, which later became the National Woman’s Party (NWP). She advocated a more militant position to publicize the need for an amendment to the U.S. Constitution. Paul organized marches, rallies, and protests outside the White House. As in England, she was jailed three times for organiz- ing and participating in suffrage protests. While in jail she waged hunger strikes, resulting in her hospitalization where she was force-fed. For a federal campaign to succeed, Paul believed, it needed to have the support of the president. Paul selected March 3, 1913, the day before WOODROW WILSON’S inauguration, for a massive suffrage parade on Pennsylvania Avenue, in Washington, D.C. Not only would the suffragists gain important publicity for their cause, they would also inform the president that they were willing to hold the party in power responsible for women’s enfranchisement. More than 8,000 marchers participated; more than a half million people gathered along the parade route. When President Wilson arrived at the train station that afternoon, few were there to greet him; instead they had gone to Pennsylvania Avenue to watch the suffrage parade. Though Paul had done her part to organize an ordered and peaceful march, an unruly crowd assaulted the suffragists while police stood by and did nothing. The near-riot resulted in a special Senate investigation that resulted in the removal of the superintendent of police. A few days after the parade, a Congressional committee sent a delegation to the White House to meet with the president, who politely asked for more time to consider the matter of women’s suffrage. Never- theless, Paul’s first major organizing effort had met with some success. By late 1917 President Wilson was wearied by the tactics of the NWP. He announced his support for the suffrage amendment in January 1918. When the Senate refused to pass the bill, Paul once again resumed her picket campaign. When 48 suffragists were arrested, a public outcry prompted the women’s release. By 1919 the amendment had passed both houses. Paul, however, continued to lobby until it was ratified in 1920. With the RATIFICATION of the NINETEENTH AMENDMENT to the Constitution in 1920, which gave women the vote, Paul shifted her focus to the legal inequality of women. In 1923 she wrote the equal rights amendment, which she called the Lucretia Mott amendment, in honor of the nineteenth-century feminist leader. The proposed amendment stated that “Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex” and that “the Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.” Paul’s proposed amendment was introduced to Con- gress in 1923, but it would not be approved until March 1972. However, the amendment failed to be ratified by the 38 states required under the Constitution. Paul continued to lead the NWP, and in 1938 she organized the World Party for Equal Rights for Women, known as the World Woman’s Party. She played a key role in seeing that the preamble to the UNITED NATIONS Charter included references to sex equality. During the debates over the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Paul and the NWP helped lobby for the inclusion of sex DISCRIMINATION as illegal conduct. Paul died on July 9, 1977, in Moorestown, New Jersey. FURTHER READINGS Butler, Amy E. 2002. Two Paths to Equality: Alice Paul and Ethel M. Smith in the ERA Debate, 1921–1929. Albany: State Univ. of New York Press. Lunardini, Christine A. 1986. From Equal Suffrage to Equal Rights: Alice Paul and the National Woman’s Party, 1910–1928. New York: New York Univ. Press. PAUPER An impoverished person who is supported at public expense; an indigent litigant who is permitted to sue or defend without paying costs; an impoverished criminal defendant who has a right to receive legal services without charge. PAWN To deliver PERSONAL PROPERTY to another as a pledge or as security for a debt. A deposit of goods IF THE WOMEN OF THE WORLD HAD NOT BEEN EXCLUDED FROM WORLD AFFAIRS , THINGS TODAY MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT . —ALICE PAUL GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 458 PAUPER with a creditor as security for a sum of money borrowed. In common usage, pawn signifies a pledge of goods, as distinguished from a pledge of intangible personal property, such as a contract right. In a more limited sense, it denotes a deposit of personal property with a pawnbroker as security for a loan. A pawned article is retained until the loan is repaid within a certain time. If it is not repaid on time, the pawnbroker may sell the item. PAWNBROKER A person who engages in the business of lending money, usually in small sums, in exchange for personal property deposited with him or her that can be kept or sold if the borrower fails or refuses to repay the loan . A pawnbroker is considered a “bailee” of goods. PAXTON’S CASE See WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE. PAY EQUITY See COMPARABLE WORTH. PAYABLE Justly due; legally enforceable. A sum of money is said to be payable no later than the time when a person is under an obligation to pay it, such as after one aspect of a contract has been performed. The term may therefore signify an obligation to pay at a future time, but when used without qualification, it ordinarily means that the debt is due to be paid immediately. In such situations, the adjective is often used with “on demand” to indicate that one party has the prerogative to collect something at a time of his or her choosing. A payment for residential lease may be payable before the due date, at the discretion of the tenant, and thus the landlord would not be legally prevented from accepting the money early, and prior to the time when the obligation could be enforced against the tenant. PAYEE The person who is to receive the stated amount of money on a check, bill, or note. PAYMENT The fulfillment of a promise; the performance of an agreement. A delivery of money, or its equivalent in either specific property or services, by a debtor to a creditor. P.C. An abbreviation for professional corporation, which is a special corporation established by professionals, such as physicians, accountants, or, in some states, attorneys, who practice together. In most jurisdictions, a professional corpo- ration may be organized by professionals who render a personal service to the public that requires a license and that, before prop er statutory organization, could not be performed by a corporation. One of the main reasons professionals incorporate is to gain certain tax benefits. Incorporation neither changes PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY nor protects those incorporating from liability for MALPRACTICE. PEACE BOND The posting of money in court, as required by a judge or magistrate, by a person who has threatened to commit a breach of an order; the bond will be forfeited if the order is violated. PEACE OFFICERS Officers whose duty it is to enforce and preserve the public order, named to provide specialized services directed primarily at a named purpose or agency. Examples include constables, officers, agents, marshalls, city police officers, and other public officials. v PECKHAM, RUFUS WHEELER Rufus Wheeler Peckham served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1895 to 1909. A prominent New York attorney and judge, Peckham was a conservative judge who believed that state and federal government had limited authority to regulate business activity. He expressed this belief most clearly in LOCHNER V. NEW YORK, 198 U.S. 45, 25 S. Ct. 539, 49 L. Ed. 937 (1905), a case that is best remembered for the DISSENT of Justice OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES JR . Peckham was born in Albany, New York, on November 8, 1838, into a family of prominent GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PECKHAM, RUFUS WHEELER 459 lawyers and judges. He attended private schools and studied abroad as a young man. He read the law in his father’s Albany law office and was admitted to the New York bar in 1859, following the lead of his older brother, Wheeler Hazard Peckham. After almost ten years in private practice, he began his career in New York government in 1868 when he became district attorney of Albany County. He served until 1872. An active participant in New York State DEMOCRATIC PARTY politics, Peckham and his brother Wheeler were aligned with the upstate wing of the party, which was often in conflict with the New York City faction that was dominated by the corrupt TAMMANY HALL regime. Wheeler Peckham was instrumental in the 1873 prosecution of the Tweed Ring, the Tammany machine run by William M. (“Boss”) Tweed. His efforts would later hurt his legal career. From 1880 to 1881, Rufus Peckham served as corporation counsel for the city of Albany. In 1883 he was elected to the New York Supreme Court (the state’s trial court), and in 1886 he was appointed to the New York Court of Appeals (the state’shighestcourt).In 1895 President GROVER CLEVELAND nominated Peckham to the U.S. Supreme Court. This followed Cleveland’s unsuccessful attempt to appoint Wheeler Peckham to the High Court in 1894. The appointment of Wheeler Peckham failed when New York Senators Edward Murphy Jr. and David Bennett Hill, both aligned with the New York City Demo- cratic machine, blocked the nomination. Rufus Peckham had little trouble winning confirmation. He joined a Supreme Court that was generally hostile to attempts by state and federal government to regulate business and the economy. Peckham fit right in. In Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 17 S. Ct. 427, 41 L. Ed. 832 (1897), he wrote the majority opinion that struck down a Louisiana insurance law as being a violation of the federal DUE PROCESS CLAUSE.He enunciated the doctrine of “liberty of contract” as a limit on state regulatio n of business. Government could not limit a person from entering “into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential” to the conduct of a person’s life. Rufus Wheeler Peckham 1838–1909 ❖ 1838 Born, Albany, N.Y. 1859 Admitted to New York bar 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1895–1909 Served on the U.S. Supreme Court 1873 Instrumental in prosecution of corrupt Tammany Hall regime ▼▼ ▼▼ 18751875 19001900 18251825 18501850 ◆ ◆ 1880–81 Served as corporation counsel for city of Albany ❖ 19251925 1905 Wrote majority opinion in Lochner v. New York, which reaffirmed liberty of contract 1868–72 Served as district attorney of Albany 1909 Died, Altamont, N.Y. 1914–18 World War I ◆◆ 1886–95 Served on New York Court of Appeals 1883–86 Served on New York Supreme Court 1897 Wrote majority opinion in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, in which he enunciated the doctrine of "liberty of contract" Rufus Wheeler Peckham. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. THE GENERAL RIGHT TO MAKE A CONTRACT IN RELATION TO HIS BUSINESS IS PART OF THE LIBERTY OF THE INDIVIDUAL PROTECTED BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT T HE RIGHT TO PURCHASE OR TO SELL LABOR IS PART OF THE LIBERTY PROTECTED BY THIS AMENDMENT . —RUFUS WHEELER PECKHAM GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 460 PECKHAM, RUFUS WHEELER Peckham reaffirmed liberty of contract in Lochner. In his majority opinion, Peckham held that a New York State law that limited bakers to no more than ten hours of work per day violated the “liberty of contract” guaranteed by the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, which provided that no state was to “deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law.” The state’s power to regulate was restricted to matters of health, safety, and welfare. In Peckham’s view the restriction of hours did not fit into any of these three areas and therefore the law unconstitutionally inter- fered with the right of bakers and bakery companies to negotiate work hours and work conditions. Justice Holmes, in his dissent, castigated Peckham and the majority for reading into the Constitution their particular economic theory and for not practicing judicial restraint. Despite Peckham’s opposition to govern- ment regulation, he did support ANTITRUST LAWS . This was consiste nt, in his view, with maintaining individual economic liberty. He articulated his support and helped restore some of the authority of federal antitrust efforts in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Associa- tion, 166 U.S. 290, 17 S. Ct. 540, 41 L. Ed. 1007 (1897), United States v. Joint-Traffic Association, 171 U.S. 505, 19 S. Ct. 25, 43 L. Ed. 259 (1898), and Addyston Pipe & Steel Company v. United States, 175 U.S. 211, 20 S. Ct. 96, 44 L. Ed. 136 (1899). Peckham died on October 24, 1909, in Altamont, New York. CROSS REFERENCE Labor Law. PECULATION The unlawful appropriation, by a depositary of public funds, of the government property entrusted to the care of the depository (comparable to embezzlement); the fraudulent diversion to an individual’s personal use of money or goods entrusted to that person’s care. In the drafting of the federal False Claims Act during the 1860s, members of Congress condemned and reacted to reports of “fraud an d peculation” by state officials involved in the procuring of military materials used in the Civil War. The term is not commonly used in the twenty-first century. PECUNIARY Monetary; relating to money; financial; consisting of money or that whi ch can be valued in money. In litigation, the adjective is often used in the context of damages in connection with a type of loss measurable in dollars (e.g., pecuniary losses due to time out of work as a result of an accident caused by another’s negligence). In a securities context, the adjective can refer to an ownership position by which a party stands to gain (or lose) financially. For example, a party could have a pecuniary interest in a corporation, in which case they own part of it and may be entitled to a share of the profits and/or an opportunity to sell shares to a buyer in exchange for money. PEDERASTY The criminal offense of unnatural copulation between men. The term pederasty is usually defined as anal intercourse of a man with a boy. Pederasty is a form of SODOMY. PEDOPHILIA See CHILD MOLESTATION. PEERS Equals; those who are an individual’s equals in rank and station. The traditional phrase trial by a jury of his peers means trial by a jury of citizens. The expectation is that a jury of one’s peers be drawn from a represen tative cross section of the community. PEN REGISTER A pen register is a device that decodes or records electronic impulses, allowing outgoing numb ers from a telephone to be identified. The use of pen registers is governed by a 1986 federal statute, Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices (18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121–3127). The statute also governs the use of trap devices, which are used to identify the originating number from which the wire or electronic com- munications were transmitted. Neither device enables the listening or recording of the actual communication. In Smith v. Maryland (442 U.S. 735, 99 S. Ct. 2577, 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 [1979]), the U.S. Supreme C ourt upheld the constitutionality of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PEN REGISTER 461 the use of pen registers, declaring that the use of a pen register is not an invasion of privacy. In the Smith case, Patricia McDonough, the victim of a ROBBERY, began receiving threaten- ing and obscene telephone calls from a man identifying himself as the robber. In one instance, the man asked her to s tep out on her porch, and when she did, she identified the car that she had previously described to the police as belonging to the robber. The police traced the license plate number and learned that Smith was the registered owner. With this information, the police asked the telephone company to install a pen register at its office to record the numbers dialed from Smith’s telephone. The register revealed that a call was placed f rom Smith’s residence to McDonough’s telephone, and with this infor- mation, along with other evidence, the police obtained a warrant to search Smith’s residence. During the search, the police found Smith’s telephone book open to the page where McDonough’s name and address appeared. Smithwasarrested,andMcDonoughidentified himfromasix-manlineupasthemanwho had robbed her. Smith asserted that the installation of the pen register violated his constitutional rights and that “all fruits derived from the pen register” should be suppressed. The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that no constitution- ally protected right of privacy existed in the numbers dialed into a telephone. Therefore, use of the pen register did not violate the FOURTH AMENDMENT , which guarantees the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” TheSupremeCourtheldthatindetermin- ing whether a government-initiated ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, it must determine “whether the person invoking the protection can claim a ‘justifiable,’‘reason- able,’ or a ‘legitimate expectation’ of privacy” (Smith). The Court examined the government activity that was being challenged and stated that Smith “could not claim that his property was invaded or that the police intruded into a constitutionally protected area” because the pen register was installed on the telephone company’s property. The determination as to whether a “search” took place depended on whether Smith had a “legitimate expectation of privacy” regarding the numbers d ialed into his telephone. In its analysis the Court stated that it is doubtful that people expect privacy in the telephone numbers they dial. People realize that the numbers go through the telephone com- pany once they are dialed, and they also realize that the telep hone company keeps records for billing purposes of long-distance numbers dialed. Furthermore, most telephone books inform subscribers that the company has the capacity to “identify to the authorities the origin of unwelcome and troublesome calls.” The Court held that Smith probably did not have an expectation of privacy in the telephone numbers he dialed but that even if he did, the expectation was not “legitimate.” Therefore, the use of the pen register was not a “search” within the Fourth Amendment, and thu s a SEARCH WARRANT was not required for its installation. The DISSENT in Smith, as well as legal commentators, have expressed concern regard- ing the holding that there is no legitimate right of privacy in the numbers dialed into the telephone. They assert that there is a reasonable and legitimate expectation of privacy when the numbers are dialed from a person’s residence. Justice POTTER STEWART, in his dissent, stated that using a telephone within a person ’s home is private conduct and that, without question, this conduct is entitled to Fourth and FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT protection. Although Smith upheld the constitutionality of the installatio n of a pen register without a warrant, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3123 now requires a court order, based on a law enforcement officer’s declaration that the information is relevant to an ongoing investigation, before a pen register may be installed. Many states have enacted legislation similar to the federal statutes regulating the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices. At the state level, Caller ID and its use of Calling Party Identification has been challenged on several different theories with varying outcomes. Caller ID is a service provi ded by telephone companies that records each calling party’s telephone number, enabling the receiving party to view the number before answering the telephone. Proponents of Caller ID, primarily tele- phone companies, believe that it provides additional security to customers because it can detect and prevent obscene and harassing calls GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 462 PEN REGISTER and may facilitate emergency response services. The telephone companies also state that custo- mers are able to screen their calls with the service, thus enhancing their privacy. Opponents of Caller ID argue that the service is an invasion of privacy because some callers may wish to remain anonymous, espe- cially callers with unlisted telephone numbers or users of a confidential crisis hot line. Further- more, opponents argue that Caller ID is a vio- lation of state and federal trap or trace device statutes. In determining the legality of Caller ID, states tend to follow either Barasch v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission (133 Pa. Cmwlth. 285, 576 A.2d 79 [1990]), affirmed 529 Pa. 523, 605 A.2d 1198 (1992), or Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Hamm (306 S.C. 70, 409 S.E.2d 775 [1991]). In Barasch, the court held that the use of Caller ID was a violation of Pennsylvania’s constitutional right of privacy. The court rea- soned that people do have a reasonable expecta- tion that the numbers dialed into the telephone are as private as the content of the conversation. In addition, the court held that the Caller ID service violated the state’s WIRETAPPING and Electronic Surveillance Control Act (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 5701–5781 [1978])governingthe use of trap and trace devices. The statute provides that pen registers and trap and trace devices may not be installed without a court order unless one of the statutory exceptions exists. One of the exceptions provided in section 5771(b)(2) of the act is that if the user of the service consents to the installation of the pen register or trap and trace device, then a court order is not necessary. The Commonwealth Court’s decision in Barasch held that because both the calling party and the recipient are users of the service, both must give their consent. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court upheld this part of the Commonwealth Court’sholding. Conversely, in Hamm, the court held that Caller ID was not an invasion of privacy because an individual does not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed into the telephone. Furthermore, although South Carolina has a similar exception to the general prohibition of trap and trace devices, the court held that “user of the service” meant only the subscriber and that, therefore, consent by the calling party is not necessary. The courts that follow the rationale of Hamm agree that unless indicated otherwise in the statutes, the purpose of trap or trace device statutes is to protect telephone users from unauthorized third-party or government intrusions and not merely to protect users from one another. Many states had passed legislation authoriz- ing the use of Caller ID. The FEDERAL COMMUNICA- TIONS COMMISSION (FCC) issued national regula- tions that went into effect in 2004 that work with Caller ID to block unwanted calls.The new rules restrict unsolicited telemarketing calls to homes and unsolicited commercial faxes coming to homes or businesses. The FEDERAL TRADE COMMIS- SION (FTC) also established a national Do-Not- Call list, banning telemarketers from calling unless they have an established business relation- ship with the caller, the caller has given the telemarketer prior express permission, or the caller is exempt under the rules. In addition, telephone companies offering Caller ID also offer per-call and per-line blocking to those individuals who wish to remain anonymous. In per-call blocking, a caller may block the transmission of his or her telephone number by dialing a specified code number before dialing. In per-line blocking, the number is blocked on every call unless the caller dials a specified code number to disable the block for a particular call. In 2001 the Patriot Act expanded the existing definition of pen register to include devices that record E-MAIL and Internet activity. Thus, e-mail and Internet addresses are now given the same treatment as telephone numbers that can be ascertained through use of a pen register. In 2007 the Ninth Circuit examined the issue of whether the laws applicable to pen registers prior to 2001 could likewise authorize the monitoring of e-mail and Internet activity in U.S. v. Forrester (2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 17626, 2007 WL 2120271 [9th Cir. July 25, 2007]). The Ninth Circuit ruled that Internet subscribers could not reasonably expec t their incoming and outgoing e-mail addresses and the addresses of Websites they visit to be private under the Fourth Amendment. In reaching this decision, the court found that the surveillanc e techniques at issue were constitutionally equivalent to those examined in the Smith case. FURTHER READINGS Diffie, Whitfield, and Susan Landau. 2007. Privacy on the Line: The Politics of Wiretapping and Encryption. 2d ed. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PEN REGISTER 463 Haglund, Rich. 2003. “Applying Pen Register and Trap and Trace Devices to Internet Communications: As Tech- nology Changes, Is Congress or the Supreme Court Best-Suited to Protect Fourth Amendment Expecta- tions of Privacy?” Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment Law and Practice 5. Lee, Laurie Thomas. 1993. “U.S. Telecommunications Privacy Policy and Caller ID.” California Western Law Review 30. Mason, Geoffrey C. 1996. “Electronic Surveillance.” George- town Law Journal 84. Regan, Priscilla M. 1995. Legislating Privacy Technology, Social Values, and Public Policy. Chapel Hill: Univ. of North Carolina Press. Schachter, Madeleine, and Kurtzberg, Joel. 2008. Law of Internet Speech, 3d ed. Durham: Carolina Academic Press. Schultz, Christian David Hammel. 2001. “Unrestricted Federal Agent: ‘Carnivore’ and the Need to Revise the Pen Register Statute.” Notre Dame Law Review 76. Zitter, Jay M. 1993. “Caller ID System, Allowing Telephone Call Recipient to Ascertain Number of Telephone from Which Call Originated, as Violation of Right to Privacy, Wiretapping Statute, or Similar Protections.” American Law Reports 9. CROSS REFERENCES Electronic Surveillance; Patriot Act; Search and Seizure; Wiretapping. PENAL Punishable; inflicting a punishment. PENALTY A punitive measure that the law imposes for the performance of an act that is proscribed, or for the failure to perform a required act. Penalty is a comprehensive term with many different meanings. A penalty u sually refers to a monetary punishment, but can also apply to imprisonment for wrongdoing. It entails the concept of punishment—either corporal or pecuniary, civil or criminal—although its mean- ing is usually confined to pecuniary punishment. The law can impose a penalty, and a private contract can provide for its assessment. Pecuni- ary penalties are frequently negotiated in con- struction contracts, in the event that the project is not completed by the specified date. Another example would be the Enviromental Protection Agency levying a civil penalty to a company for pollution violations. PENDENT JURISDICTION The discretionary power of a federal court to permit the assertion of a related state law claim, along with a federal claim between the same parties, properly before the court, provided that the federal claim and the state law claim derive from the same set of facts. Generally, in the CIVIL LAW, claims based on federal law are heard in federa l court, and claims based on state law are heard in state court. The principle of pendent jurisdiction creates an exception to this general rule by allowing a plaintiff who has filed a claim based on federal law in federal court to add a state law claim to the case. This may be done only if the state law claim arose out of the same transaction or occurrence, or nucleus of facts, that gave rise to the federal claim. For example, assu me that a plaintiff has filed suit in federal court alleging that the respondent has violated her CIVIL RIGHTS under the CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a et seq.). Assume further that the claim arises from an incident in which the plaintif f was denied service at a public restaurant based on her perceived national origin. If the plaintiff was also physically harmed by the respondent in the incident, she may want to file claims for ASSAULT AND BATTERY . Assault and battery of a private party are state law claims; no federal laws exist under which the plaintiff could bring such claims. Pendent jurisdiction would give the federal court the authority to hear the assault and battery claims because they arose out of the same incident that gave rise to the federal civil rights claims. Pendent jurisdiction is a rule of judicial convenience and efficiency. If federal courts could not hear state law claims, many plaintiffs would be forced to present two cases in two courts involving essentially the same matter. Such a rule woul d be unduly expensive for plaintiffs, would increase the number of cases in the court system, and could lead to seemingly inconsistent results from different courts con- cerning related matters. CROSS REFERENCE Jurisdiction. PENDENTE LITE [Latin, while the action is pending.] During the actual progress of a lawsuit. Example: “Alimony pendente lite” means an order for temporary support granted to a spouse during the pendency of a divorce or annulment proceeding. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 464 PENAL PENDING Begun, but not yet completed; during; before the conclusion of; prior to the completion of; unsettled; in the process of adjustment. A lawsuit is said to be pending from its inception until the issuance of a final judgment by a court. The phrase pending appeal refers to the time before an appeal is taken, as well as to the period during which an appeal is in progress. v PENDLETON, GEORGE HUNT George Hunt Pendleton, nicknamed “Gentle- man George,” was a prominent nineteenth- century lawyer, congressman, senator, and ambassador who played the central role in passing the CIVIL SERVICE Act, also known as the Pendleton Act of 1883 (5 U.S.C.A. § 1101 et seq.). The Pendleton Act established a federal civil service system that was based on merit rather than on political patronage. Pendleton was born on July 29, 1825, in Cincinnati, Ohio. After his admission to the Ohio bar in 1847, he established a law practice in Cincinnati. He soon turned his attention toward politics. A lifelong member of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY, Pendleton was electe d to the Ohio Senate in 1853, where he served for two years. In 1856 he was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives, where he served until 1865. In 1862 the House of Representatives appointed Pendleton a manager in conducting the IMPEACHMENT proceedings against West H. Humphreys, United States judge for several districts of Tennessee. During the Civil War, Pendleton gained national prominence for his opposition to President Abraham Lincoln’s suspension of HABEAS CORPUS and other wartime measures that restricted civil liber ties. In 1864 he was the Democratic vice-presidential candi- date, campaigning for peace between the North and the South on a ticket headed by Union General George B. McClellan. Lincoln and Vice President ANDREW JOHNSON won reelection. After the war Pendleton became the leader of the greenbacker movement, which sought to redeem Civil War bonds in paper currency (greenbacks) instead of gold. His advocacy of this cause cost him the 1868 Democratic presidential nomination, because East Coast Democrats disagreed with the scheme. Pendleton did not reenter national politics until 1879, when he served in the U.S. Senate. By 1883 the federal government was plagued by inefficiency and corruption, most of which was attributed to the way federal employees were hired. Under the patronage system (also known as the “spoils system”), federal emplo yees were George Hunt Pendleton 1825–1889 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18251825 19001900 18751875 1850 1850 ❖ ◆◆ 1864 Campaigned for vice president on ticket headed by Gen. George McClellan 1825 Born, Cincinnati, Ohio 1847 Admitted to Ohio bar 1853–55 Served in Ohio Senate 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1879–85 Served in U.S. Senate ◆ 1883 Pendleton Act (the Civil Service Act) passed, creating the federal Civil Service Commission 1885 Appointed minister to Germany 1889 Died, Brussels, Belgium ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1868 Ran for Democratic nomination for president 1857–65 Served in U.S. House 1881 President Garfield assassinated by Charles Guiteau George Pendleton. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PENDLETON, GEORGE HUNT 465 hired and fired for political reasons. It was understood that presidents were entitled to reward political allies with cabinet posts, judge- ships, and diplomatic posts, but the spoils system extended to routine and low-level government workers. This created employee turnover when a president left office and the opposition party came into power. The 1881 ASSASSINATION of President JAMES GARFIELD by a disappointed office seeker led to the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883. The act, which created a federal Civil Service Commission that administered a merit-based, open selection process for hiring government employees, began the process of professionaliz- ing the federal government. Politics and factors such as religion and nationality were to have no bearing on the hiring of civil servants. Although the act initially covered only about 10 percent of the jobs, subsequent legislation increased the percentage and it grew steadily. In 1869 he became president of the Kentucky Central Railroad. Pendleton’s efforts at patron age reform cost him his Senate seat. Democratic leaders who preferred political patronage prevented his return to the Senate for a second term in 1885. President GROVER CLEVELAND appointed Pendleton minister to Germany in that year. He served in this position until his death on November 24, 1889, in Brussels, Belgium. FURTHER READINGS Case, H. Manley. 1986. “Federal Employee Job Rights: The Pendleton Act of 1883 to the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.” Howard Law Journal 29 (spring). PENITENTIARY A prison or place of confinement where persons convicted of felonies serve their term of imprison- ment. CROSS REFERENCE Jail. PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776 In 1776, Pennsylvania enacted its first state constitution in direct response to the DECLARA- TION OF INDEPENDENCE and the instructions of the Second CONTINENTAL CONGRESS to the colonies to reject British rule. Dedicated to the idea of placing authority in the hands of the people, and specifying a broad range of rights, the constitution proved to be controversial. Over the next 14 years, criticism of the document came both from within Pennsylvania and from across the new nation, and the state replaced the constitution in 1790. With the signing of the Dec laration of Independence, the American Revolution had begun. Congress issued two resolutions in May 1776 calling for the colonies to reject British rule and establish governments based on the authority of the people. Pennsylvania had refused to join the rebellion, and Congress hoped to win its support. Instead, revolution- aries in Pennsylvania quickly he ld public meetings and devoted themselves to electing representatives to a constitutional convention. The noted American statesman and philoso- pher Benjamin Franklin was instrumental in organizing and leading the endeavor. He was also the most well-known author of the document. Other authors included Timothy Matlack,Dr.ThomasYoung,GeorgeBryan, and James Cannon. The Constitution was debated and revised for four months and was approved on September 28, 1776. Although five other states also adopted constitutions during this time, the Pennsylva- nia document was unique. In outlook, the constitution bore the mark of the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau, a critic of representative government who viewed it as a necessary evil. Thus, un der the Pennsylvania Constitution, g overnment would aspire to the democratic ideal of maximum participa- tion by citizens while simultaneously ensur- ing fair, just, and LEGAL REPRESENTATION by politicians. The constitution pur sued this goal in several ways. It created a unicameral legisla- ture—having only one bod y—afeatureunique among American states at the time. Legislators were to be “persons most noted for wisdom and virtue” and were required to swear that they would do nothing “injurious to the people.” In an effort to rotate the l argest number of people in and out of office, the rules mandated annual elections and limited terms to four out of every seven years. The framers had two goals: to make representatives more responsive to the people, and to allow bad politicians to be removed from office swiftly. To ensure participation by citizens, lawmaking itself was controlled. NO BILL could be enacted GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 466 PENITENTIARY until it had been printed for general reading and, except in rare instances, until a year after its printing. Strikingly, no provision was made for a state governor. Instead, the executive function fell to an elected twelve-member executive council. These members served staggered three-year terms, making them ineligible for re-election until four years after their terms ended. The Framers believed that this approach not only served to train more citizens for political leadership, but that it also helped to thwart what they most detested: “an inconvenient aristocracy” of politicians. The council and the legislature elected a president and vice presi- dent. The president could not exercise any power—whether appointing judges or com- manding the state’s militia—without the con- sent of a majority of the council. Just as the constitution placed restraints on lawmakers, so did it look skeptically at the judiciary. Pennsylvania judges were not given independence. The legislature could revoke judgeships, which lasted seven years, for “mis- behavior” at any time. As an additional limita- tion on the judiciary, the constitution created a special body called the Council of Censors, which met every seven years to review the constitutionality of laws. The rights granted by the Pennsylvania Constitution were among the most liberal in the United States at that time. The right to vote was based on a minimal property interest; it belonged to free men above the age of twenty-one who had resided in the state for one year and had paid public taxes, as well as to the sons of fre eholders. The constitution defended the free exercise of religion, stating that no “man who acknowledges the being of a God, [may] be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen” regardless of his “religious sentiments or peculiar mode of religious worship.” Other significant liberties included the right to buy one’s release from military service, not to be taxed without the consent of lawmakers, and to receive liberal due process in court. Of all the suggested constitutional innova- tions in Pennsylvania, possibly the most sobering was rejected by the constitutional convention: “That an enormous Proportion of Property vested in a few individuals is dangerous to the Rights, and destructive of the Common Happiness of Mankind; and therefore every free State hath a Right by its Laws to discourage the Possession of such Property.” This was an unusual provision, even in radical circles, because rarely did even the most radical question the right of the wealthy to enjoy their property and personal possessions undisturbed. Despite being rejected by the constitutional convention, this provision’s hostile attitude about the evils of accumulating private property caused grave concern in neighboring states, where agrarian residents feared that their farm holdings would be broken up by politicians and redistributed as part of an overall policy of “leveling” the rich and the poor. Partly because of the radical nature of many of its provisions, both the provisions that were adopted and those that were rejected, the Pennsylvania Constitution was not a success at home or outside the state. Critics complained about its heavy reliance on a revolving, and extremely powerful, legislature. Influential forces in the state, particularly those in business, attacked the uncertain conditions that it created for commerce. The Federalists, who believed in a strong federal government, detested its parochial flavor. Lawyers and judges decried the weakened judiciary. By 1790, the experiment had ended: The state replaced the constitution with one modeled on the U.S. Constitution’s SEPARATION OF POWERS and its adherence to the idea of a republic. FURTHER READINGS Williams, Robert F. 1989. “The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylvania’s Radical Constitution and Its Influences on American Constitutionalism.” Temple Law Review 62 (summer). Witte, Harry L. 1995. “Judicial Selection in the People’s Democratic Republic of Pennsylvania: Here the People Rule?” Temple Law Review 68 (fall). PENNY STOCKS Inexpensive issues of stock, typically selling at less than $1 per share, in companies that often are newly formed or involved in highly speculative ventures. Penny stocks are usually available for sale over-the-counter; that is, among brokers and customers themselves, as opposed to being listed on the American Stock Exchange or the New York Stock Exchange. The Penny Stock Reform Act of 1990 (“Remedies Act”), Pub.L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931, increased the SEC’s GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PENNY STOCKS 467 . recording of the actual communication. In Smith v. Maryland (442 U.S. 73 5, 99 S. Ct. 2 577 , 61 L. Ed. 2d 220 [1 979 ]), the U.S. Supreme C ourt upheld the constitutionality of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION PECKHAM, RUFUS WHEELER 459 lawyers and judges. He attended private schools and studied abroad as a young man. He read the law in his father’s Albany law office. debt. A deposit of goods IF THE WOMEN OF THE WORLD HAD NOT BEEN EXCLUDED FROM WORLD AFFAIRS , THINGS TODAY MIGHT HAVE BEEN DIFFERENT . —ALICE PAUL GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 458