and made thousands of copies to distribute through local churches the following Sunday. They asked for a show of support for Rosa Parks in a one-day boycott of the city’s buses. On December 5, 1955, 90 percent of Montgomery’s black citizens avoided use of the public buses. Wanting to capitalize on the momentum, church ministers in the area quickly mobilized and organized the M ontgomery Improvement Association as the flagship entity to lead a formal boycott. The ministers elected 27-year-old new- comer, MARTIN LUTHER KING JR., as the spokesper- son for the new organization. Formal demands were made to the city and the bus company. African Americans wanted more courteous service, black bus drivers hired for the black routes, and a first-come, first-served (but still segregated) rider policy. To punctuate the seriousness of the protests, Montgomery citizens (black and white) formed what was locally referred to as a “taxicab army.” They refused to ride the public buses and instead walked to their destinations or hailed taxicabs driven by African Americans. As part of the boycott, the taxi drivers had agreed to charge a red uced rate of ten cents per person, equal to the public bus fare. When riders began sharing taxicab fares and riding together in the same direction, city officials declared it illegal. In response, people began donating their own vehicles to transport riders. Others began volunteering their services as drivers for those who needed to travel farther than they could walk. By the end of the first week, more than 20,000 black citizens of Montgomery were getting rides to work through the Montgomery Improvement Association. In February 1956, city officials obtained an INJUNCTION against the boycott and used a 1921 law prohibiting the hindrance of a bus as grounds to arrest 156 protesters. Martin Luther King Jr. was also arrested, convicted, and ordered to pay fines. Ultimately, Fred Gray, a young black Montgomery attorney, filed an action on behalf of a group of black citizens. He sought a DECLARATORY JUDGMENT finding Alabama’s state statutes and Montgomery city ordinances unenforceable and unconstitutional under the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution. The laws and ordinances required separate accommodations on any commercial vehicle operated by any motor transportation company within the state of Alabama and the city of Montgomery. The bus company, in res- ponse, had alleged that segregation on privately owned buses was valid under the laws. A three-member federal panel struck down the laws, finding the 1954 Supreme Court ruling in BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (repudiating a “separate but equal” principle) applicable to ci ty buses. The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the deci- sion, and the successful boycott ended in major victory. FURTHER READINGS Bermanzohn, Sally Avery. 2000. “Violence, Nonviolence, and the Civil Rights Movement.” New Political Science. 22, no. 1. “Montgomery Bus Boycott.” Excerpted from Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. Papers Project: Encyclopedia. Undated. Available online at http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu/index. php/kingpapers/article/montgomery_bus_boycott_1955_ 1956/; website home page: http://mlk-kpp01.stanford.edu (accessed August 17, 2009.) Swann-Wright, Dianne. 2000. “The Montgomery Bus Boycott.” Footsteps 2. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights Acts; Discrimination. MONUMENT Anything by which the memory of a person, thing, idea, art, sci ence or event is preserved or perpetuated. A tomb where a dead body has been deposited. In REAL-PROPERTY law and surveying, visible marks or indications left on natural or other objects indicating the lines and boundaries of a survey. Any physical object on the ground that helps to establish the location of a boundary line called for; Rosa Parks’s refusal to give up her bus seat to a white man on December 1, 1955, sparked the 11-month long Montgomery Bus Boycott. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 118 MONUMENT it may be either natural (e.g., trees, rivers, and other land features) or artificial (e.g., fences, stones, stakes, or the like placed by human hands). v MOODY, WILLIAM HENRY William Henry Moody, Supreme Court appoin- tee of THEODORE ROOSEVELT, served the Court from 1906 to 1910. The Massachusetts Repub- lican, representative, and two-time cabinet member supported the progressive policies of his era. He was especially respected by his colleagues for his skill in the area of ANTITRUST LAW . Moody’s service on the Court was ended prematurely due to health problems. Moody was born on December 23, 1853, in Newbury, Massachusetts from a long line of New England, Puritan ancestry. He was educa- ted at Phillips Academy and fo und his first real success in life as an athlete on the Harvard baseball team. He graduated from Harvard in 1876 with honors in history, ranking third in his class. After Harvard, he worked in the law office of RICHARD DANA. He was admitted to the bar in 1878. Moody established a private practice in Haverhill, Massachusetts, and served as the city solicitor for two years (1888–1890). In 1890 he was appointed district attorney for the eastern district of Massachusetts. He was one of the state’s two prosecutors in the trial of LIZZIE BORDEN , who was charged with murdering her father and stepmother with an ax in 1892. Although Borden was acq uitted, Moody won respect for his performa nce in the trial. Shortly after the Borden case, the Repub- licans nominated Moody to a seat in Congress. He was elected to the House of Representatives in November 1895 and became one of its most influential members. On April 30, 1902, he resigned from the House to become Theodore Roosevelt’s secretary of the Navy. Two years later he was appointed attorney general. He successfully argued the landmark antitrust case of Swift and Company v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 25 S. Ct. 276, 49 L. Ed. 518 (1905), befo re the Supreme Court. The govern- ment had obtained an INJUNCTION against the trust by arguing that a combination of corpora- tions and individuals, after purchasing livestock and converting it to fresh meat, sold products in interstate commerce in such a manner as to suppress competition both in livestock and fresh meats. The trust appealed the injunction. Moody won a perpetual injunction, but the William H. Moody. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. William Henry Moody 1853–1917 ❖ 1853 Born, Newbury, Mass. 1914–18 World War I 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1904–06 Served as U.S. attorney general ▼▼ ▼▼ 19001900 19251925 18501850 18751875 1917 Died, Haverhill, Mass. 1876 Graduated from Harvard ◆◆ 1908 Wrote opinion in Twining v. New Jersey 1906–10 Served as associate justice of the Supreme Court 1892 Led prosecution team in Lizzie Borden trial ◆ ❖ 1890 Appointed district attorney for the eastern district of Mass. ◆◆ 1878 Admitted to Mass. bar 1888–90 Served as city solicitor in Haverhill, Mass. 1895 Elected to the U.S. House ◆ 1902 Appointed secretary of the Navy under Theodore Roosevelt ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MOODY, WILLIAM HENRY 119 trust ignored it. Moody was infuriated and instigated a GRAND JURY investigation in Chicago, which led to indictment of all the major packers. Through Moody ’s success in prosecut- ing Swift and Company, the Supreme Court first formulated the “stream of commerce” doctrine, which held corporations responsible for all of their interstate commercial activities. After the resignation of Associa te Justice HENRY B. BROWN, Roosevelt appointed Moody to the Supreme Court in 1906. Moody’s most important opinion with the Court was probably that in Twining v. New Jers ey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S. Ct. 14, 53 L. Ed. 97 (1908), which held that the Fourteenth Amendment’s DUE PROCESS CLAUSE did not incorporate the FIFTH AMENDMENT right against SELF-INCRIMINATION and apply it to the states. Twining was overruled in 1964 by Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 84 S. Ct. 1489, 12 L. Ed. 2d 653. Moody continued to serve the Court until 1910, at which time acute rheumatism forced his retirement. He died July 2, 1917 , in Haver- hill, Massachusetts. FURTHER READINGS Congressional Quarterly. 2004. Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quar- terly. Friedman, Leon, and Fred L. Israel, eds. 1995. The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, Volumes I–V. New York: Chelsea House. Watts, James F. Jr. 1969. “William Moody,” in The Justices of the United States Supreme Court 1789–1969, eds. Leon Friedman and Fred L. Israel. New York: Chelsea House. v MOORE, ALFRED As an associate justice, Alfred Moore served on the U.S. Supreme Court for five years. The ardent federalist, whose life and political career involved danger, controversy, and principled stands, left little mark on the Court’s business during his service from 1799 to 1804. Although he fought in the Revolutionary War and later held high office in North Carolina, Moore’s fire had mostly left him by the time President JOHN ADAMS appointed him to the Supreme Court. Even at a time when the Court decided major cases, he either acquiesced to the majority or did not participate in certain decisions because of poor health. He wrote just one opinion, Bas v. Tingy, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37, 1 L. Ed 731 (1800), important only in its historical relevance to the United States ’ undeclared naval war with France in the last years of the eighteenth century. Moore was a youth during the country’s difficult transition from British colony to independent nation. Born on May 21, 1755, in New Hanover County, North Carolina, he was the son of Maurice Moore, a colonial judge. Moore studied in Boston before being educated in law by his father, and he was admitted to the North Carolina bar at the age of 20 in 1775. Soon after, he fought against the British, first as a soldier and then as a saboteur. During the war Moore’s brother, father, and uncle were killed, the family plantation was ransacked, and their home was destroyed. Moore was a member of the North Carolina legislature in 1782 and 1792. From 1782 to 1791 he served as the state’s attorney general, arguing one particularly important case, Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C. (Mart.) 5 (1787), which marked one of the first complete discussions of the doctrine of JUDICIAL REVIEW (the authority of courts to determine the validity of legislation under the Cons titution). Alfred Moore 1755–1810 ▼▼ 1750 1800 1825 1775 ❖ 1755 Born, New Hanover County, N.C. ❖ 1775–83 American Revolution 1812–14 War of 1812 ◆ 1775 Admitted to North Carolina bar 1810 Died, Bladen County, N.C. 1782–91 Served as attorney general of N.C. 1803 Did not participate in Marbury v. Madison decision ▼▼ 1788 Spearheaded N. Carolina's ratification of the U.S. Constitution 1799–1804 Served as associate justice on the U.S. Supreme Court ◆ ◆◆ 1800 Wrote opinion in Bas v. Tingy declaring that France and the United States "should be called enemies" GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 120 MOORE, ALFRED A federalist who firmly believed in central government, he spearheaded North Carolina’s ratification of the U.S. Constitution in 1788. In 1791 Moore took the strongest personal stand of his career when he resigned from the office of attorney general; he stepped down over the state legislature’s creation of the office of SOLICITOR GENERAL with powers equivalent to his, an action he saw as unconstitutional. He won reelection to the legislature but failed in a 1795 bid for the U.S. Senate by one vote. In 1799 President John Adams nominated Moore to fill a vacancy on the U.S. Supreme Court created by the death of Associate Justice JAMES IREDELL. The next five years were pivotal ones for the Supreme Court, which expanded its powers of judicial review under the highly influential Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL. How- ever, failing health minimized Moore’s role. He did not participate in the most important decision of his day, MARBURY V. MADISON, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). Moore’s only recorded Supreme Court opinion is a five-paragraph statement on the undeclared naval war between France and the United States. This war reached its height in 1798 and 1799 and was fought chiefly over French claims to seize all cargo of British origin from both British and U.S. ships. Although Congress passed many acts in relation to the conflict, problems arose over the ownership of goods that were recaptured, and in one instance the issue was resolved by determining whether France and the United States were enemy nations. When Bas v. Tingy reached the Supreme Court in 1800, each of the four justices hearing the case agreed that the two nations were indeed foes. Moore’s opinion declared, “It is for the honor and dignity of both nations that they should be called enemies.” In 1804 Moore resigned from the Court. He died on October 15, 1810, in Bladen County, North Carolina, leaving as part of his legacy the establishment of the University of North Carolina. FURTHER READINGS Congressional Quarterly. 2004. Guide to the U.S. Supreme Court. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. Friedman, Leon, and Fred L. Israel, eds. 1995. The Justices of the United States Supreme Court: Their Lives and Major Opinions, Volumes I–V. New York: Chelsea House. Schwartz, Bernard. 1997. “Ten Worst Supreme Court Justices,” in A Book of Legal Lists. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. MOOT An issue presenting no real controversy. Moot refers to a subject for academic argument. It is an abstract question that does not arise from existing facts or rights. MOOT COURT Moot court is a method of teaching law and legal skills that requires students to analyze and argue both sides of a hypothetical legal issue using procedures modeled on those employed in state and federal appellate courts. In the mid-1700s moot courts in the United States had a tradition of debate and oratory revered in undergraduate institutions such as Yale College. Moot court exercises have chan- ged in the United States since that time. Law instructors present hypothetical cases and students argue them before professors and other lawyers (and sometimes fellow students), who serve as judges. Hypothetical cases often address matters of current political and consti- tutional import. Moot court requirements vary from law school to law school, with most schools man- dating that students participate at least once in a Alfred Moore. ETCHING BY ALBERT ROSENTHAL. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. IF WORDS ARE BUT THE REPRESENTATIVE OF IDEAS , BY WHAT OTHER WORD [CAN] THE IDEA OF THE RELATIVE SITUATION OF AMERICA AND FRANCE BE COMMUNICATED , THAN BY THAT OF HOSTILITY OR WAR ? —ALFRED MOORE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MOOT COURT 121 moot court argument before receiving their law degree. Many law schools offer a series of moot court opportunities for students of differing skill levels and legal interests. The activity is competitive by nature, and students vie for honors within their school and in regional and national moot court competitions featuring teams of students from several law schools. Moot court helps students learn to analyze legal issues; its larger purpose is to teach students the practical side of practicing law. Typically, law students are given a detailed hypothetical fact scenario that raises one or more legal issues. Often these fact patte rns are based on real cases on appeal to a state’s highest court or the U.S. SUPREME COURT. Students choose or are assigned the position on the issue to be argued. They then conduct legal research, finding statutes, regulations, and CASE LAW that both support their position and detract from it. An important part of the moot court process is to teach students to overcome legal authority (statutes, regulations, and cases) that cuts against their position. Students then draft APPELLATE briefs, which are formal legal papers combining a recital of the facts of the case with analysis and argument of the leg al issues raised. As with real appellate courts, moot courts generally dictate many specific requirements for a brief, including the size of the paper, the width of the margins, and the maximum number of pages. Citations to legal authority must also be listed in a uniform style. Once the briefs are written, students prepare for the second phase of moot court advocacy: oral argument. Oral argument demands prepa- ration, organization, and the ability to think quickly and respond convincingly when ques- tioned. The student appears before a panel of judges and presents her or his position on the legal issue. Each student has a time limit, normally five to ten minutes, to convince the panel. As with real appellate courts, judges on the panel are free to interrupt frequently and at any time to ask questions about the facts of the case, legal authority for or against the argument, or the student’s thoughts and opinions about the case’s outcome. Students learn to anticipate difficult questions about their legal position and respo nd intelligently and persuasively. Following oral argument, the moot court panel often will review the student’s performance. Moot court is modeled after the appellate procedure employed in state and federal courts. Moot court is sometimes confused with mock trials, a similar learning method by which students conduct a jury trial based on a hypo- thetical fact pattern. Where moot court empha- sizes legal research, analysis, writing, and oral advocacy, mock trials emphasize jury persua- sion techniques and a thorough familiarity with the RULES OF EVIDENCE. Top moot court advocates from law schools throughout the country compete each year at a variety of national moot court competitions, many having a focus on a specific area of the law. The National Moot Court Competition is held annually in New York City and focuses on issues of CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. The Philip C. Jessup INTERNATIONAL LAW Moot Court Compe- tition, held each spring in Washington, D.C., is sponsored by the American Society of Interna- tional Law and the International Law Students Association. The Chief Judge Conrad B. Duber- stein National Bankruptcy Moot Court is an annual competition focusing on BANKRUPTCY issues. FURTHER READINGS Bucholtz, Barbara K., Martin A. Frey, and Melissa L. Tatum. 2002. The Little Black Book: A Do-It-Yourself Guide for Law Student Competitions. Durham, N.C.: Carolina Academic Press. Davis, Tracy Hamrick. 1995. “The Holderness Moot Court Bench.” North Carolina Law Review 73 (January). Mellhorn, Donald F., Jr. 1995. “A Moot Court Exercise: Debating Judicial Review prior to Marbury v. Madison.” Constitutional Comment 12 (winter). Teply, Larry L. 2003. Law School Competitions in a Nutshell. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West. CROSS REFERENCES Appellate; Legal Education. MORAL LAW The rules of behavior an individual or a group may follow out of personal conscience and that are not necessarily part of legislated law in the United States. Moral law is a system of guidelines for behavior. These guidelines may or may not be part of a religion, codified in written form, or legally enforceable. For some people moral law is synonymous with the commands of a divine GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 122 MORAL LAW being. For others, moral law is a set of universal rules that should apply to everyone. Ethical principles held primarily by the followers of Christianity have influenced the development of U.S. secular law. As a result, Christian moral law and secular law overlap in many situations. For example, murder, theft, prostitution, and other behaviors labeled im- moral are also illegal. Moral turpitude is a legal term used to describe a crime that demonstrates depravity in one’s public and private life, contrary to what is accepted and customary. People convicted of this crime can be disqua- lified from government office, lose their license to practice law, or be deported (in the case of immigrants). Passing laws is relatively easy when public policy makers can unanimously identify behav- ior that is socially unacceptable. Policy makers can then attempt to enforce socially correct behavior through legal channels. However, in many other situations, it is far more difficult to determine what behavior the government should promote, if any. When a government seeks to implement a code of conduct that may conflict with the U.S. Constitution, the courts are generally called upon to determine the law’s validity. ABORTION is an area where legal and moral principles converge and often conflict. In 1973 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147, that a woman’s decision to have an abortion is a private choice that is protected by the Constitu- tion, at least until the end of the first trimester of pregnancy. After a fetus is viable (able to survive outside the womb), the state may regulate the woman’s pregnancy and prohibit abortion except if the woman’s life is in danger. Some advocates of legalized abortion as well as some critics believe that the current legal situation is inadequate. To protect either the rights of the pregnant woman or the rights of the fetus is a moral question that individuals decide for themselves. Yet the extent to which people should be allowed to act on their beliefs and exercise their rights is debated in the arena of legislative and judiciary decision making. Medical science is a field where evolving technology can create moral crises that have legal consequences. The AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSO- CIATION sponsors a Council on Ethical and Judi- cial Affairs, which debates such problems as assisted suicide, harvesting organs over the objections of family, and whether to include HIV status on autopsy reports. Many public policy issues form a crossroad of legal and moral law, including EUTHANASIA, assisted suicide, same-sex marriages, and CAPITAL PUNISHMENT . FURTHER READINGS Kant, Immanuel.2005. The Moral Law. NewYork: Routledge. McWilliams, Peter. 1996. Ain’t Nobody’s Business If You Do. Los Angeles: Prelude. Tivnan, Edward. 1995. The Moral Imagination: Confronting the Ethical Issues of Our Day. New York: Simon & Schuster. CROSS REFERENCES Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrom e; Animal Rights; Death and Dying; Ethics, Legal; Fetal Rights; Fetal Tissue Research; Gay and Lesbian Rights; Genetic Engineering; Genetic Screening; Health Care Law; Health Insurance; Juris- prudence; Natural Law; Organ Donation Law; Organ Trans- plantation; Patients’ Rights; Slavery; Surrogate Mot herhood. MORAL RELATIVISM The philosophized notion that right and wrong are not absolute values, but are personalized according to the individual and his or her circumstances or cultural orientation. It can be used positively to effect change in the law (e.g., promoting tolerance for other customs or lifestyles) or negatively as a means to attempt justification for wrongdoing or lawbreaking. The opposite of moral relativism is moral absolutism, which espouses a fundamental, NATURAL LAW of constant values and rules, and which judges all persons equally, irrespective of individual circumstances or cultural differences. Within the U.S. justice system, constant values or rules (represented by constitutional, statutory, or case law) are intended to be structurally tem pered to accommodate moral relativity. For example, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, who served on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1902 to 1932, is credited with being the first Supreme Court justice to state that the U.S. Constitution was an organic document—a living constitution subject to changing interpretation. Many times since, Supreme Court justices, in their opinions, have referred to the no tion of “evolving” law when modifying, refining, or, in rare circumstances, overruling earlier precedent. Likewise, statutory laws are enacted or repealed by Congress or state legislators in an effort to GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MORAL RELATIVISM 123 best reflect the principles and mores of their constituency. Notwithstanding this flexible approach to law, moral relativism often plays a significant role in the shaping of law and the punishment of criminals. In 2002 U.S. News & World Report cited a Zogby International poll of 401 randomly selected college seniors, which was commissioned by the National Association of Scholars. According to the results, 73 percent of the students interviewed indicated that they were taught by professors that uniform stan- dards of right and wrong do not exist, but were instead dependent upon individual values and cultural diversity. Such attitudes and percep- tions affect not only the thinking of subsequent generations of politicians and lawmakers, but also the courtroom adjudication of existing laws. In many jury trials, defense attorneys attempt to persuade jurors that the law should be applied differently to a particular defendant. Examples of persuasive arguments may include such operative language as requesting that jurors be “more fair” or “more just” to a particular defendant, or that in order for “justice to be served,” jurors must excuse the defendant’s conduct as justifiable under the circumstances. FURTHER READINGS Cauthen, Kenneth. 2001. The Ethics of Belief: A Bio-Historical Approach. Lima, OH: CSS. Harman, Gilbert, and Jarvis Thomson. 1996. Moral Relativ- ism and Moral Objectivity. New York: Blackwell. Lukes, Steven. 2008. Moral Relativism. New York: Picador. CROSS REFERENCES Jury Nullification; Moral Law. MORAL TURPITUDE A phrase used in criminal law to describe conduct that is considered contrary to community stan- dards of justice, honesty, or good morals. Crimes involving moral turpitude, known simply as “turpitude” in some jurisdictions, include conduct that is contrary to justice, honesty, or morality. Moral turpitude has been defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private and social duties that one person owes to another, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between people. Examples of crimes involving moral turpitude include TREASON, ESPIONAGE, MURDER, RAPE, BURGLARY, LARCENY, ROBBERY, ARSON, KIDNAPPING, BRIBERY, PERJURY, and solicitation of prostitutes. In the area of legal ethics, offenses involving moral turpitude–such as FRAUD or breach of trust–traditionally make a person unfit to practice law. Thus, a CONSPIRACY to bribe state court judge with a $40,000 payment to obtain a favorable ruling was deemed a “crime of moral turpitude” within the meaning of statute requiring mandatory disbarment for attorneys engaged in the conspiracy; bribery inherently involves moral turpitude, the court concluded, and conspiracy to co mmit a crime of moral turpitude is itself crime of moral turpitude. D.C. Official Code, 2001 Ed. § 11-2503(a). In re Balducci —A.2d ——, 2009 WL 2252296 (D.C COURT OF APPEAL 2009). In defamation law, it is deemed slander per se to wrongfully accuse another person of a behavior involving moral turpitude, which this area of TORT LAW describes as a shameful wickedness that is so extreme a departure from ordinary standards of honest, good morals, justice, or ethics as to be shocking to the moral sense of the community. Examples include accusing a married man of having a mistress, accusing a married woman of unchaste beha- vior, or accusing a business man of fraud or embezzlement. Resident ALIENS who have been convicted for crimes of moral turpitude may be excluded from the United States, while non-resident aliens who commit such crimes may be lawfully denied entry into the country. The remedies of DEPORTATION and exclusion also apply to aliens who admit having committed a crime of moral turpitude, or to committing acts that constitute the essential elements of such a crime, even if they have not been convicted of the crime. Under § 203 of the IMMIGRATION and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994, an alien who merely attempts to commit a crime of moral turpitude is deportable. Pub. L. No. 103-416. Many courts have found implied in every contract of employment a requirement that the employee will conduct himself with such decency and propriety as not to injure the employer in his business. In some lines of work, any public immor al conduct, although having no direct relation to the employment and though not impairing the physical or intellectual capa- city of the employee, will destroy the employee’s usefulness to his or her employer. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 124 MORAL TURPITUDE One group of employees who may be terminated for immoral conduct or acts of moral turpitude is school teachers. Some state statutes provide that a teacher who commits an act that constitutes a crime of moral turpitude may be dismissed. The teacher’s act must constitute a crime involving moral turpitude, although a criminal conviction is not necessary, nor need there be a separate showing of a nexus between the act or acts of moral turpitude and the teacher’s fitness or capacity to perform his or her duties, the reason being that if a teacher cannot abide by these standards his or her fitness as a teacher is necessarily called into question. CROSS REFERENCES Arson; Bribery; Burglary; Defamation; Espionage; Kidnap- ping; Larceny; Murder; Perjury; Rape; Robbery; Treason. MORATORIUM A suspension of activity or an authorized period of delay or waiting. A moratorium is sometimes agreed upon by the interested parties, or it may be authorized or imposed by operation of law. The term also is used to denote a period of time during which the law authorizes a delay in payment of debts or performance of some other legal obliga- tion. This type of moratorium is most often invoked during times of distress, such as war or natural disaster. Government bodies may declare moratoria for a broad range of reasons. For example, a local government may attempt to regulate property development by imposing a moratorium on the issuance of building permits. The legality of such a moratorium is generally determined by mea- suring its impact on the affected parties. In 1987 the U.S. Supreme Court held that certain moratoria on property development may be unconstitutional takings, thus making it more difficult for local governments to slow develop- ment in their communities (First English Evan- gelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 482 U.S. 304, 107 S. Ct. 2378, 96 L. Ed. 2d 250). On the other hand, in 1995 the Court upheld a 30- day moratorium on lawyer advertising that was challenged as an infringement of FIRST AMENDMENT rights (Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 115 S. Ct. 2371, 132 L. Ed. 2d 541). Many state legislatures have passed morato- rium legislation in response to popular demand for debt relief during emergencies. The consti- tutionality of these statutes is determined using a two-pronged analysis. First, the courts con- sider the effect of the moratorium on the rights of the parties to the impaired contrac t. If the moratorium changes only the remedy for breach and not the terms of the contract, it is generally upheld (see Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. [4 Wheat.] 122, 4 L. Ed. 529 [1819]). Second, if the moratorium is a response to a bona fide emergency, it is upheld (see Johnson v. Duncan, 3 Mart. 530 [La. 1815], upholding a moratorium passed when the British invaded Louisiana in 1814). As a function of its POLICE POWER, a state may suspend contractual rights when public welfare, health, or safety are threatened. However, this police power is limited by standards of reasonableness. During the WORLD WAR I housing shortage, some New York landlords raised rents to exorbitant levels and evicted tenants who failed to pay. In response to what it perceived as a public health and safety emergency, the state legislature passed a law that limited rentals to reasonable amounts, gave courts authority to determine reasonableness, and prohibited land- lords from evicting tenants willing to pay reasonable rents. The law was sustained by the U.S. Supreme Court in Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465, 65 L. Ed. 877 (1921). An example of a contemporary debt morato- rium is the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Act (1933 Minn. Laws 514), passed by the Minnesota legislature in response to a sharp rise in foreclosures on mortgaged farm property. The constitutionality of the act was challenged in Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231, 78 L. Ed. 413 (1934), in which the Supreme Court upheld the legisla- tion based on five criteria: a bona fide emergency existed; the statute addressed a legitimate societal interest; debt relief was granted only under limited conditions; contractual rights were rea- sonably protected; and the legislation was of limited duration. This act was extended until 1942. Fifty years later the Minnesota legislature responded again to pu blic pressure to relieve farm debts by passing another Mortgage Mora- torium Act (Minn. Stat. § 583.03 [Supp . 1983]). FURTHER READINGS Amundson, Roland C., and Lewis J. Rotman. 1984. “Depression Jurisprudence Revisited: Minnesota’s Mor- atorium on Mortgage Foreclosure.” William Mitchell Law Review 10. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MORATORIUM 125 Chemerinsky, Erwin. 2006. Constitutional Law: Principles and Policies. Frederick, MD: Aspen. Hoffman, P. 1970. Moratorium: an American Protest. New York: Tower. MORMON CHURCH The Mormon Church is a religious body founded in 1830 in Fayette, New York, by Joseph Smith. It is also known as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, or the LDS Church. There are more than 13 million Mormons worldwide. Approximately 46 per- cent reside in the United States, with the highest concentration in the western states, especially Utah. The church, which is headquartered in Salt Lake City, Utah, encountered leg al difficul- ties during its early years because of its practice of POLYGAMY and its opposition to the use of COMMON LAW as legal precedent. The church’s differences with the U.S. government led to armed conflict in the late 1800s. Joseph Smith based his teachings on his translation of hieroglyphic messages revealed to him on several golden plates. Smith’s transla- tion of these divine messages is known as the Book of Mormon. The Book of Mormon and the Bible form the basis of Mormon belief. During the early 1800s, Smith and his followers settled in Kirtland, Ohio, and Jackson County, Missouri, where they were persecuted because of their beliefs. They moved to Illinois and helped establi sh the town of Nauvoo, where the church prospered. However, local residents became inflamed over rumors that Smith and his followers were practicing polygamy, or plural marriage. Smith and his brother Hyrum were arrested and taken to Carthage, the county seat. On June 27, 1844, they were both shot and killed by a group of townspeople. Smith was succeeded by Brigham Young, the head of the church’s Council of the Twelve Apostles. In 1846 Young organ ized and directed church members to follow him from Nauvoo to the Great Salt Basin in the Utah Territory. They settled there and established the headquarter s of the church in Salt Lake City. In Utah the Mormon Church prospered and grew. In addition to leading the church, Young became provisional governor of the Utah Territory in 1849. In that capacity, he and the other members of the government, most of whom were Mormons, defied the U.S. govern- ment by rejecting common law as valid legal precedent in Utah. Common law, as distinct from statutory law, is English precedent adop- ted by U.S. courts. Over time common law became part of U.S. JURISPRUDENCE except where it was expressly abrogated. Although Young patterned the struc ture of Utah’s territorial government after the other state governments, with executive, legislative, and judicial branches, he believed that the United States should abandon all vestiges of English tradition. According to Young, the application of com- mon law allowed judges too much latitude to impose standards that did not comport with public will. Young’s opposition to the application of common law reached its nadir over the issue of polygamy. By the mid-1800s the Mormon Church had acknowledged polygamy as one of its tenets. Mormon teach ing of the time held that men were obligated to have multiple wives. Common law provides that marriage to more than one living husband or wife is a felony and that any marriages other than the first are void. When President MILLARD FILLMORE assigned three federal judges to the Utah Territory in the 1850s, Young became concerned that the new judges would impose common law precedent. He attempted to blunt their impact by urging the legislature to prohibit judges from using common law precedent in Utah. On January 14, 1854, the legislature passed a bill that prohibited any law from being read, cited, or adopted in Utah unless it had been enacted by the legislature or the governor. This bill directly contravened the Organic Act of Utah of 1850 (9 Stat. 453), by which the U.S. Cong ress created the Utah Territory. The act gave the U.S. Supreme Court and the federal district courts of the territory both co mmon law and equity jurisdiction and established that the laws of the United States applied in the territory. In 1856, the Territorial Supreme Court held that the Organic Act extended common law over the Territory of Utah and that the legislature violated the Organic Act when it forbade the use of common law in Utah (People v. Moroni Green, 1 Utah 11 [1856]). Tensions continued to mount between Mormons and the federal government. In May 1857 President JAMES BUCHANAN dispatched 2,500 U.S. Army troops to Utah to remove Young from office and enforce federal authority. Anticipating the federal troops’ arrival, a group GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 126 MORMON CHURCH of angry Mormons joined forces with a group of Paiute Indians who attacked and killed 120 settlers traveling through the territory in September 1857. Mormon leaders feared that the attack, known as the Mountain Meadows Massacre, would lead to further reprisals by the federal government. They sent sympathetic church members to destroy the Army’s supplies, thereby delaying the troops’ arrival. The Mor- mons’ resistance came to be known as the Utah War. By the time the troops arrived in the summer of 1858, tensions had eased consider- ably, and under a negotiated settlement, troops were stationed outside Salt Lake City without incident. The Mormon Church’s resistance to the application of common law continued through the late 1800s. A number of cases reached the Territorial Supreme Court, which repeatedly affirmed that common law was valid in the territory. (See Murphy v. Carter, 1 Utah 17 [1868], and Godebe v. Salt Lake City, 1 Utah 68 [1870].) In First National Bank of Utah v. Kinner, 1 Utah 100 (1873), the court held that the people of the Utah territory had tacitly agreed to the application of common law. In 1878 the U.S. Supreme Court settled the question of whether the common law prohibi- tion of polygamy applied in the territory. In Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145, 25 L. Ed. 244, the plaintiff argued that the common law prohibition of polygamy was unconstitutional because it violated the FIRST AMENDMENT guarantee of freedom of religion. The court disagreed and held that religious freedom does not encompass the practice of polygamy and that laws prohibiting the practice are constitutional. The court stated that to allow Mormons to practice plural marriage “would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the LAW OF THE LAND and, in effect, permit every citizen to become a law unto himself. Government could exist only in name under such circumstances.” By the 1890s the Mormon Church had officially abandoned the practice of plural marriage. In 1896 Utah became a state, and in 1898 the legislature passed a measure that declared that the common law “shall be the rule of decision in all courts of this state” (The REVISED STATUTES of the State of Utah, § 2488). The common law continues to carry the force of precedent in Utah, except for the common law of crimes, which the legislature abolished in 1973 (Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-105; repealed, Utah Code Ann. § 68-2-3; replaced by Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-1). A derivative of the Mormon Church, known as the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints (FLDS Church), has been the subject of considerable controversy since the mid-2000s. The FLDS Church was created by former members of the LDS Church who left the LDS after it denounced the practice of plural marriage. The leader of the FLDS Church, Warren Jeffs, garnered intern ational attention in 2006 when he was placed on the FBI’s Ten Most Wanted list. Jeffs w as sought for alleged sexual contact with a minor and being an ACCOMPLICE to RAPE. The charges related to an ALLEGATION that Jeffs had forced a teenage girl to marry and have sex with an adult man. Once captured, Jeffs faced trial for additional charges and was ultimately convicted of two counts of being an accomplice to rape. He was sentenced to a term of 10 years to life in prison. On the date he was sentenced, Jeff resigned from his position as head of the FLDS Church. Another controversy involving the FLDS Church took place in 2008 at a ranch owned by the Church in Texas. Based on an apparent tip from a teenager living at the ranch, police raided the property and took custody of more than 450 children living there. The children Brigham Young was the second president of the Mormon Church and colonizer of Utah. The church’s resistance to the application of common law resulted in conflict with the federal government during the 1800s. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MORMON CHURCH 127 . 175 5–1810 ▼▼ 175 0 1800 1825 177 5 ❖ 175 5 Born, New Hanover County, N.C. ❖ 177 5–83 American Revolution 1812–14 War of 1812 ◆ 177 5 Admitted to North Carolina bar 1810 Died, Bladen County, N.C. 178 2–91 Served. THAT OF HOSTILITY OR WAR ? —ALFRED MOORE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION MOOT COURT 121 moot court argument before receiving their law degree. Many law schools offer a series of. For some people moral law is synonymous with the commands of a divine GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 122 MORAL LAW being. For others, moral law is a set of universal rules that