Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 3 P37 pps

CROSS REFERENCE Bank of the United States. v DALLAS, GEORGE MIFFLIN George Mifflin Dallas was born July 10, 1792 to statesman ALEXANDER JAMES DALLAS. He graduated from Princeton University in 1810 and was admitted to the bar three years later. In 1813 statesman Albert Gallatin was dispatched to Russia for the purpose of securing Russian aid in negotiating an end to the WAR OF 1812 between the United States and Great Britain. Dallas performed the duties of secretary to Gallatin and was commissioned in 1814 by the American delegates at the Ghent Peace Conference to relay the terms of peace to the British. Dallas returned to Philadelphia and served as deputy attorney general before becoming mayor in 1829 for a three-year period. He also acted as U.S. district attorney, and in 1831, he entered the federal government. Dallas filled a vacancy in the U.S. Senate and represented Pennsylvania until 1833; in that same year, he also performed the duties of attorney general of Pennsylvania and continued in this capacity until 1835. In 1837 Dallas again acted as a diplomat, serving as emissary to Russia. Eight years later, he was elected as U.S. vice president during the administration of JAMES K. POLK.Histermlasted until 1849, and in 1856, he returned to foreign service, acting as minister to Great Britain until 1861. During his tenure Dallas was instrumental i n the negotiations that resulted in the formation of the Dallas-Clarendon Convention of 1856, for the purpose of arbitrating disputes concerning Central America between the United States and Great Britain. Dallas died December 31, 1864, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. DAMAGES The term damages refers to monetary compensa- tion that is awarded by a court in a civil action to an individual who has been injured through the wrongful conduct of another party. Damages attempt to measure in financial term s the extent of harm a PLAINTIFF has Alexander J. Dallas. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS George Mifflin Dallas 1792–1864 ❖ ❖ ◆ 1792 Born, Philadelphia, Pa. 1813 Served as Gallatin's secretary during mission to obtain Russian mediation to end the war 1833–35 Served as attorney general of Pa. 1837–39 Served as minister to Russia 1845–49 Served as vice president under James K. Polk 1864 Died, Philadelphia, Pa. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 1775–83 American Revolution 1812–14 War of 1812 1829–31 Served as mayor of Philadelphia 1856–61 Served as minister to Great Britain GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 348 DALLAS, GEORGE MIFFLIN suffered because of a defendant’sactions. Damages are distinguishable from costs, which are the expe nses incurred as a result of bringing a lawsuit and which the court may order the losing party to pay. Damages also differ from the VERDI CT, which is the final decision issued by a jury. The purpose of damages is to restore an injured party to the position the party was in before being harmed. As a result, damages are generally regarded as remedial rather than preventive or punitive. However, PUNITIVE DAMAGES may be awarded for particular types of wrongful conduct. Before an individual can recover damages, the injury suffered must be one recognized by law as warranting REDRESS and must have actually be en sustained by the individual. The law recognizes three major categories of damages: COMPENSATORY DAMAGES,whichare intended to restore what a plaintiff has lost as a result of a defendant’s wrongful conduct; NOMINAL DAMAGES, which consist of a small sum awarded to a plaintiff who has suffered no substantial loss or injury but has neverthele ss experienced an invasion of rights; and punitive damages, which are awarded not to compen- sate a plaintiff for injury suffered but to penalize a DEFENDANT for particularly egregious, wrongful conduct. In specific situations, two other forms of damages may be awarded: treble and liquidated. Compensatory Damages With respect to compensatory damages, a defendant is liable to a plaintiff for all the natural and direct consequences of the defendant’s wron gful act. Remote consequences of a defendant’s act or omission cannot form the basis for an award of compen satory damages. CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, a type of compen- satory damages, may be awarded when the loss suffered by a plaintiff is not caused directly or immediately by the wrongful conduct of a defendant, but results from the defendant’s action instead. For example, if a defendant carried a ladder and negligently walked into a plaintiff who was a professional model, injuring the plaintiff’s face, the plaintiff could recover consequential damages for the loss of income resulting from the injury. These consequential damages are based on the resulting harm to the plaintiff’s career. They are not based on the injury itself, which was the direct result of the defendant’s conduct. The measure of compensatory damages must be real and tangible, although it can be difficult to fix the amount with certainty, especially in cases involving claims such as pain and suffering or emotional distress. In assessing the amount of compensatory damages to be awarded, a trier of fact (the jury or, if no jury exists, the judge) must exercise good judgment and common sense, based on general experi- ence and knowledge of economics and social affairs. Within these broad guidelines, the jury or judge has wide discretion to award damages in whatever amount is deemed appropriate, so long as the amount is supported by the evidence in the case. A plaintiff can recover damages for a number of different injuries suffered as a result of another person’s wrongful conduct. The plaintiff can recover for a physical impairment if it results directly from a harm caused by the defendant. The jury, in determining damages, considers the present as well as long-range effects of the disease or injury on the physical well-being of the plaintiff, who must demon- strate the disability with reasonable certainty. George M. Dallas. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DAMAGES 349 Compensatory damages can be awarded for mental impairment, such as a loss of memory or a reduction in intellectual c apacity suffered as a result of a defendant’s wrongful conduct. A plaintiff may recover compensatory damages for both present and future physical pain and suffering. Compensation for future pain is permitted whe n there is a reasonable likelihood that the plaintiff will experience it; the plaintiff is not permitted to recove r for future pain and suffering that is speculative. The jury has broad d iscretion to award damages for pain and suffering, and its judgment will be overturned only if it appears that the jury abused its discretion in reaching the decision. Mental pain and suffering can be considered in assessing compensatory damages. Mental pain and suffering includes fright, nervousness, grief, emotional trauma, anxiety, humiliation, and indignity. Historically, a plaintiff could not recover damages for mental pain and suffering without an accompanying physical injury. In the early 2000s, most jurisdictions have modi- fied this rule, allowing recovery for MENTAL ANGUISH alone where the act precipitating the anguish was willful or intentional or done with extreme carelessness or recklessness. Ordinarily, mental distress brought on by sympathy for the injury of anothe r will not warrant an award of damages, although some jurisdictions may allow recovery if the injury was caused by the willful or malicious conduct of the defendant. For instance, if an individual wrongfully and intentionally injures a child in the presence of the child’s mother, and the mother suffers psychological trauma as a result, the defendant can be liable for the mother’s mental suffering. In some jurisdictions, a bystander can recover damages for mental distress caused by observing an event in which another person negligently, but not intentionally, causes harm to a family member. In some instances, a plaintiff’s fears can give rise to damages. In Norfolk Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 123 S. Ct. 1210, 155 L. Ed. 2d 261 (2003), the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the types of damages that were available under the Federal Emplo yers ’ Liability Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. In the case, the Court concluded that railroad workers who had been exposed to asbestos could seek damages for fears that they would eventually contract cancer. Compensatory damages of an economic nature may also be recovered by an injured party. A plaintiff may recover for loss of earnings resulting from an injury. The measure of lost earnings is the amount of money that the plaintiff might reasonably have earned by working in her or his profession during the time the plaintiff was incapacitated because of the injury. In the case of a permanent disability, this amount can be determined by calculating the earnings that the injured party actually lost and multiplying that figure out to the age of retirement—with adjustments. If the amount of earnings actually lost cannot be determined with certainty, as in the case of a salesperson paid by commission, the plaintiff’s average earnings or general qualities and qualifications for the occupation in which she or he has been employed are considered. Evidence of past earnings can also be used to determine loss of FUTURE EARNINGS. As a general rule, lost earnings that are speculative are not recoverable, although each case must be exam- ined individually to determine whether damages can be established with reasonable certainty. For example, a plain tiff who bought a restaurant immediately before suffering an injury could not recover damages for the profits he might have made running it, because such profits would be speculative. A plaintiff who is unable to accept a promotion to another job because of an injury would stand a better chance of recovering damages for loss of earnings, because the amoun t lost could be established with more certainty. Individuals injured by the wrongful con- duct of another may also recover damages for impairment of earning capacity, so long as that impairment is a direct and foreseeable conse- quence of a disabling injury of a permanent or lingering nature. The amount of damages is determined by calculating the difference be- tween the amount of m oney the injured person had the capacity to earn prior to th e injury and the amount he or she is capable of earning after the injury, in view of his or her life expectancy. Loss of profit is another element of compensatory damages, allowing an individual to recover if such a loss can be established with sufficient certainty and is a direct and probable GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 350 DAMAGES result of the defendant’s wrongful actions. Expected profits that are uncertain or contin- gent upon fluctuating conditions would not be recoverable, nor would they be awarded if no evidence existed from which they could be reasonably determined. A plaintiff can recover all reasonable and necessary expenses brought about by an injury caused by the wrongful acts of a defendant. In a contract action, for example, the party who has been injured by another’s breach can recover compensatory damages that include the reason- able expenses that result from reliance on the contract, such as the cost of transporting perish- able goods wrongfully refused by the other contracting party. In other actions, expenses awarded as part of compensatory damages may include medical, nursing, and prescription drug costs; the costs of future medical treatment, if necessary; or the costs of restoring a damaged vehicle and of renting another vehicle while repairs are performed. Interest can be awarded to co mpensate an injured party for money wrongfully withheld from her or him, as when an individual defaults on an obligation to pay money owed under a contract. Interest is ordinarily awarded from the date of default, which is set by the time stated in the contract for payment, the date a demand for payment is made, or the date the lawsuit alleging the breach of the co ntract is initiated. Nominal Damages Nominal damages are generally recov erable by a plaintiff who successfully establishes that he or she has suffered an injury caused by the wrongful conduct of a defendant but cannot offer proof of a loss that can be compensated. For example, an injured plaintiff who proves that a defendant’s actions caused the injury but fails to submit medical records to show the extent of the injury may be awarded only nominal damages. The amount awarded is generally a small, symbolic sum, such as one dollar, although in some jurisdictions it may equal the costs of bringing the lawsuit. Punitive Damages Punitive damages, also known as exemplary damages, may be awarded to a plaintiff in addition to co mpensatory damages when a defendant’s conduct is particularly willful, wanton, malicious, vindictive, or oppressive. Punitive damages are awarded not as compen- sation, but to punish the wrongdoer and to act as a deterrent to others who might engage in similar conduct. The amount of punitive damages to be awarded lies within the discretion of the trier of fact, which must consider the nature of the wrongdoer’s behavior, the extent of the plain- tiff’s loss or injury, and the degree to which the defendant’s conduct is repugnant to a societal sense of justice and decency. An award of punitive damages will usually not be disturbed on the grounds that it is excessive, unless it can be shown that the jury or judge was influenced by prejudice, bias, passion, partiality, or corruption. In the late twentie th c entury, s everal U.S. Supreme Court decisions considered the constitutionality of punitive damages. In 1989 the Court held that large punitive damages awards did not violate the Eighth Amendment prohibition against the imposi- tion of excessive fines (Browning-Ferris Indus- tries of Vermont v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 109 S. Ct. 2909, 106 L. Ed. 2d 219). L ater, in Pacific M utual Life Insuranc e Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 113 L. E d. 2d 1 (1991), the Court held that unlimited jury discretion in awarding punitive damages is not “so inherently unfair” as to be unconstitutional under the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. And in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 113 S. Ct. 2711, 125 L. Ed. 2d 366 (1993), the Court ruled that a punitive damages award that was 526 times the compensatory award did not violate due process. Both Haslip and TXO Production disappointed observers who hoped that the Court would place limits on large and increasingly common punitive damages awards. In a 1994 decision, the Court did strike down an amendment to the Oregon Constitution that prohibited judicial review of punitive damages awards, on the ground that it violated due process (Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 114 S. Ct. 2331, 129 L. Ed. 2d 336). In a jury proceeding, the court may review the award, although the amount of damages to be awarded is an issue for the jury. If the court determines that the verdict is excessive in view GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DAMAGES 351 of the particular circumstances of the case, it can order REMITTITUR, which is a procedural process in which the jury verdict is reduced. Theoppositeprocess,knownasadditur, occurs when the court deems the jury’s award of damages to be inadequate and orders the defendant to pay a greater sum. Both remittitur and additur are used at the discretion of the trial judge and are designed to remedy a blatantly inaccurate damages award by the jury without the necessity of a new trial or an appeal. In rare occurrences, a judge may find that a defendant is not liable and grant judgment as a MATTER OF LAW . In such an instance, the judge must find that there were no facts that justified liability. In 2006 the Eleventh CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals reviewed a trial court’s judgment as a matter of law in favor of a plaintiff. The appellate court concluded that the this judg- ment was unwarranted because a jury should have consid ered some of the evidence (Chris- topher v. Florida, 449 F.3d 1360 [11th Cir. 2006]). Treble Damages In some situations, where provided by statute, TREBLE DAMAGES may be awarded. In such situations, a statute will authorize a judge to multiply the amount of monetary damages awarded by a jury by three and to order that a plaintiff receive the tripled amount. The Clayton Act of 1914 (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 12 et seq.), for example, directs that treble damages be awarded for violations of federal antitrust laws. Liquidated Damages LIQUIDATED DAMAGES constitute compensation agreed upon by the parties entering into a contract, to be paid by a party who breaches the contract to a nonbreaching party. Liquidat- ed damages may be used when it would be difficult to prove the actual harm or loss caused by a breach. The amount of liquidated damages must represent a reasonable estimate of the actual damages that a breach woul d cause. A contract term fixing unreasonably large or disproportionate liquidated damages may be void because it constitutes a penalty or punish- ment for default. Furthermore, if it appears that the parties have made no attempt to calculate the amount of actu al damages that might be sustained in the event of a breach, a liquidated damages provision will be deemed unenforceable. In determining whether a par- ticular contract provision constitutes liquida- ted damages or an unenforceable penalty, a court will look to the intention of the parties, even if the terms liquidated damages and penalty are specifically used and defined in the contract. Appellate Review of Damages When reviewing a trial court’s award of damages, an appellate court generally examines all of the evidence from the tria l to determine whether the evidence supports the award. When review- ing awards for compensatory damages, an appellate court determines from the lower court’s record whether the trial judge abused his or her discretion in allowing a jury’s damage award to stand or in making his or her own damage award, called a bench award. A bench award by a judge is typically subject to closer scrutiny than an award by a jury. An appellate court may determine that a damage award is excessive or inadequate. If the court of appeals determines that the damages are excessive or inadequate and can determine the proper amount with reasonable certainty, the court may adjust the award so that it corresponds with the evidence. One common method for altering an award is through the use of remittitur, whereby the judge directs the plaintiff either to accept a lower award or face a new trial. By contrast, if the appellate court cannot determine the proper amount of the award based upon the evidence, the court may order a new trial. A court of appeals will also review a trial court’s decision whether to admit or to exclude evidence that supports the damage award, such as the decision whether to admit or exclude testimony regarding scientific evidence. Appellate courts typically review the trial court’s decision with respect to admission or exclus- ion of evidence under the ABUSE OF DISCRETION standard. Courts review awards of punitive damages differently than other types of damage awards. As of the early 2000s several federal courts of appeals are engaged in an ongoing struggle over what standard of review should be applied to punitive damag es at the appellate court level. In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 121 S. Ct. 1678, 149 L. Ed. 2d 674 (2001), the U.S. Supreme Court GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 352 DAMAGES ruled that appellate courts must conduct DE NOVO review rather than apply an abuse of discretion standards. This ruling means that federal appel- late courts have great freedom to review and reduce punitive damages based on previous U.S. Supreme Court standards. The decision is one more example of the Court expressing its desire to control excessive punitive damage awards. Cooper Industries, Inc. involved a suit for trademark infringement, where Cooper Indus- tries was accused of using photographs of a knife manufactured by Leatherman Tool Group. A jury awarded Leatherman $50,000 in general damages and $4.5 million in punitive damages. On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the trial court, basing its analysis on the abuse of discretion standard. This standard is highly deferential to the trial court’s actions, allowing the appeals courts to overturn a decision only if the trial judge clearly abused his or her authority. By comparison, de novo review empowers the appeals court to review all of the evidence on punitive damages without regard to the trial court’s decision. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear Cooper’s appeal to resolve the division among the federal circuits over the appropriate stan- dard of review for punitive damages. The Court, in an 8–1 decision, determined that the federal courts should apply de novo review. Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the majority, concluded that the nature of punitive damages demanded that appeals courts conduct a fresh inquiry. He noted the similarities of punitive damages to criminal fines and cited various criminal cases that addressed the proportionality of sentences that relied on de novo review. Moreover, Stevens rejected the idea that when a jury awards punitive damages, it makes a finding of fact that could not be disturbed by an appeals court unless it was clearly erroneous. FURTHER READINGS Abraham, Kenneth S. 2007. The Forms and Functions of Tort Law. 3d ed. St. Paul, Minn.: Thomson/West. Gibeaut, John. 2003. “Pruning Punitives: High Court Stresses Guidelines for Deciding Damages.” ABA Journal 89 (June). Kagehiro, Dorothy K., and Robert D. Minick. 2002. “How Juries Determine Damages Awards.” For the Defense 44 (July). Reis, John W. 2002. “Measure of Damages in Property Loss Cases.” Florida Bar Journal 76 (October). Shaw, Robert Ward. 2003. “Punitive Damages in Medical Malpractice: an Economic Evaluation.” North Carolina Law Review 81 (September). CROSS REFERENCES Personal Injury; Tort Law. DAMNUM [Latin, Damage .] The loss or reduction in the value of property, life, or health of an individual as a consequence of fraud, carelessness, or accident. The phrase ad damnum, “to the damage,” is the name of a clause in a complaint that states the damages for which the individual seeks judicial relief. v DANA, RICHARD HENRY Richard Henry Dana achieved prominence as a lawyer and author, and for his knowledge of the sea. Dana was born August 1, 1815, in Cambridge, Massachusetts. A student at Harvard University, he interrupted his studies in 1834 and spent two years as a sailor. In 1836 he returned to Harvard, Richard Henry Dana 1815–1882 ❖ ❖ ◆ 1815 Born, Cambridge, Mass. ◆ 1837 Graduated from Harvard University 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1834–36 Interrupted studies at Harvard to work as a sailor ◆ 1882 Died, Rome, Italy 1861–66 Served as U.S. attorney for Mass. 1840 Two Years Before the Mast published ◆ ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 1848 Helped organize the Free Soil Party 1877 Represented U.S. as senior counsel at the fisheries commission meeting in Halifax, Nova Scotia 1867–68 Served as attorney for U.S. in Jefferson Davis's treason trial GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DANA, RICHARD HENRY 353 graduating in 1837. He subsequently received an honorary doctor of laws degree in 1866. Before entering a legal career Dana taught elocution at Harvard from 1839 to 1840. He was admitted to the bar in 1840 and established a successful legal practice, demonstrating his expertise in admiralty cases. Dana entered politics in 1848 as an organizer of the Free-Soil party, which opposed the principles of SLAVERY. He attended the party’s convention of that same year, held in Buffalo, New York. In 1861 Dana performed the duties of U.S. attorney for the district of Massachusetts, serving in this capacity until 1866. From 1867 to 1868 he participated in the treason trial against confederate President Jefferson Davis, acting as attorney for the United States. During 1866 and 1868 he also returned to Harvard as a lecturer at the law school. In 1877 Dana was selected to represent the United States as senior counsel at the fisheries commission held at Halifax, Nova Scotia. Dana is regarded as an eminent writer, as is evidenced by the enduring popularity of Two Years Before the Mast, published in 1840. In this book, Dana describ ed his experiences as a sailor, recounting his voyage from Boston around Cape Horn to California from 1834 to 1836. He also authored The Seaman’s Friend (1841) and To Cuba and Back (1859), and he edited Wheaton’s Elements of International Law (1866). He died January 6, 1882, in Rome, Italy. DANELAGE A system of law introduced into England as a result of its inva sion and conquest by the Danes during the eighth and ninth centuries, which occurred primarily in some of the midland counties and on the eastern coast. Danelage provided basic values and customs to which the later Norman conquerors of England added their customs to provide the foundation of ENGLISH LAW. DANGEROUS INSTRUMENTALITY Any article that is inherently hazardous or has the potential for harming people through its careless use. Examples of a dangerous instrumentality include explosives and electrically charged wires. Statutes and CASE LAW must be consulted to determine what items are regarded as danger- ous instrumentalities. When dealing with dangerous instrumen- talities, some jurisdictions require that due care be exercised to prevent harm to those w ho are reasonably expected to be in proximity with them. Others impose STRICT LIABILITY for injuries and losses caused by them. v DANIEL, PETER VIVIAN Peter Vivian Daniel served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1841 to 1860. A prominent lawyer and Democratic politician from Virginia, Daniel adhered to a Jeffersonian political philosophy that favored states ’ rights and disfavored large economic institutions. A minor figure in the history of the Supreme Court, Daniel joined the majority in DRED SCOTT V . SANDFORD, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857), which held that freed black slaves could not be citizens under the Constitution because they had originally been property, not citizens. Daniel was born in Stafford County, Virginia, on April 24, 1784. He came from a wealthy family and was educated at Princeton Richard H. Dana. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. IN ORDER THAT JUSTICE MAY BE DONE TO THE WEAKEST , AND THAT IN ANY HOUR OF FRENZY OR MISTAKE , WE MAY NOT TOUCH THE HAIR OF [HIS] HEAD, WE WILL GIVE HIM A TRIBUNAL WHICH SHALL BE INDEPENDENT OF THE FLUCTUATIONS OF OUR OPINIONS OR PASSIONS . —RICHARD DANA GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 354 DANELAGE University, graduating in 1805. He read the law in the Richmond offices of EDMUND RANDOLPH, who helped draft the Constitution. He was admitted to the Virginia bar in 1808. Although Daniel maintained a law practice, his focus was on politics and government. He was elected to the Virginia House of Delegates in 1809. In 1812 he was appointed by the house to serve on the PRIVY COUNCIL, which acted as an advisory board for the state governor. Daniel remained on the council for twenty-three years, serving as lieutenant governor for much of his term. Daniel was active in the DEMOCRATIC PARTY and was a strong supporter of President ANDREW JACKSON . In 1836 Jackson appointed Daniel as a judge to the U.S. district court for Eastern Virginia. Five years later President MARTIN VAN BUREN appointed Daniel to the U.S. Supreme Court. This move sparked controversy because it occurred at the end of Van Buren’s term of office. The Whig party’s presidential cand idate, WILLIAM HENRY HARR ISON, was elected president. Whigs in Congress tried to block the appoint- ment of Daniel so Harrison could choose a justice. Daniel was confirmed by the Senate on March 3, 1841, in the last moments of the Van Buren administration. Throughout his years on the Supreme Court, Daniel maintained his commitment to Jefferso- nian government. Thomas Jefferson’sviewof republican government valued an agricultural economy and a limited role for government. Daniel also adopted the Jacksonian variation, which included hostility to banks, corporations, and the federal government. A southerner and a believer in states’ rights, he supported the right of states to maintain the institution of SLAVERY. Daniel was known more for his dissents than for crafting majority opinions. He did, however, join the majority in the Dred Scott case. Dred Scott was a slave owned by an army surgeon, John Emerson, who resided in Missouri. In 1836 Emerson took Scott to Fort Snelling, in what is now Minne sota but was then a territory where slavery had been expressly forbidden by the Missouri Compromise legislation of 1820. In 1846 Scott sued for his freedom in Missouri state court, arguing that his residence in a free territory released him from slavery. The Mis- souri Supreme Court rejected his argument, and Scott appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Court heard arguments on Dred Scott in 1855 and 1856. A key issue was whether African Americans could be citizens of the United States, even if they were not slaves. Daniel was a Peter V. Daniel. EARL CLARKE DANIEL, COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES Peter Vivian Daniel 1784–1860 ❖ ◆ 1784 Born, Stafford County, Va. 1808 Admitted to Virginia bar 1837 Led by President Jackson, number of seats on U.S. Supreme Court increased from seven to nine 1836–40 Served on U.S. District Court of Virginia 1860 Died, Richmond, Va. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 1775–83 American Revolution 1812–35 Served on Virginia privy council 1841–60 Served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court ◆ 1809 Elected to Virginia legislature 1847 Wrote the majority opinion in the License Cases 1857 Joined majority in Dred Scott v. Sandford decision ◆ ❖ ◆ ◆ THE MERE GRANT OF POWER TO THE [FEDERAL] GOVERNMENT CANNOT … BE CONSTRUED TO BE AN ABSOLUTE PROHIBITION TO THE EXERCISE OF ANY POWER OVER THE SAME SUBJECT BY THE STATES . —PETER DANIEL GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DANIEL, PETER VIVIAN 355 loyal southerner, holding in his concurring opinion that African Americans who had been freed since the enactment of the Constitution could never be citizens. The Framers had not contemplated the prospect of granting citizen- ship to persons who were legally recognized as property when the Constitution was drafted. During his term on the Supreme Court, Daniel’s adherence to his principles led him to drift further from the mainstream. As the national economy expanded, and with it both big business and the federal government, Daniel’s Jeffersonian beliefs lost relevance. Daniel died May 31, 1860, in Richmond, Virginia. v DARROW, CLARENCE SEWARD Lawyer and social reformer CLARENCE SEWARD DARROW was the most famous and controversial defense attorney of the early twentieth century. He won unprecedented fame in momentous courtroom battles in which he championed the causes of labor, liberal social thought, and the use of scientific CRIMINOLOGY. His aggressive legal tactics, as well as his outspoken denunciations of industrial capitalism, political corruption, and popular RELIGION, aroused animosities throughout his life. But in the end, his com- passion for oppressed persons, as well as his winsome personality, compelled friends and foes alike to honor his unparalleled legal career as attorney for the damned. Darrow was the master of the courtroom drama. One striking and effective aspect of his legal style was his physical appearance in the courtroom. He wore rumpled suits—often bared to shirtsleeves and suspenders—and let his tousled hair hang into his face. He had a halting walk and slouching stance, and his habits of smoking long cigars slowly during the proceed- ings and even reading and writing during the prosecution’s presentation were endlessly ar- resting for juries and distracting for opponents. Darrow was born poor, on April 18, 1857, near Kinsman, Ohio. His mother died when he was 14, and his father, an embittered seminary student–turned–undertaker, bore the stigma of the village atheist in an intensely religious rural community. As a child, Darrow hated formal schooling, but with his father’s encouragement, Clarence Darrow. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Clarence Seward Darrow 1857–1938 ❖ ◆ 1857 Born, near Kinsman, Ohio ◆ ◆ ◆ 1888 Appointed special assessment attorney for Chicago 1894 Defended Debs during Pullman strike; Prendergast case was Darrow's only capital case loss 1911 Defended his last major labor case: the L.A. Times Building bombers trial; accused and acquitted of jury tampering 1924 Defended millionaire murder suspects Loeb and Leopold 1914–18 World War I 1938 Died, Chicago, Ill. 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1907 Won acquittal for William Haywood and others in Steunenberg bomb murder case ◆ 1934 Headed commission to adjust inequities in the law for the National Industrial Recovery Act 1939–45 World War II ▼▼ ▼▼ 19001900 19251925 1950 1950 18501850 18751875 ❖ ◆ 1892–94 Worked as chief counsel for Chicago and Northwestern R.R. 1925 Defended John T. Scopes in "Monkey Trial"; prosecutor William J. Bryan won in court ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 356 DARROW, CLARENCE SEWARD he read widely from the extensive family library to educate himself. As his father’s intellectual companion, Darrow grew to love reading, to hate being poor, and to willingly embrace unpopular causes. Once, Darrow’s father went to observe a public hanging to see what it was like, but left before the moment of execution and reported to Darrow how he felt a terrible shame and guilt for being any part of such a “barbaric practice.” This report was not lost on Darrow, who would become a fierce public opponent of the popular practice ofcapital punishment, defending 50 murderers in his legal career, with only one being sentenced to death and executed. Darrow’s entrance into the practice of law was straine d by poverty. He left his studies at Allegheny College after one year for lack of money. After three years teaching in a rural one- room schoolhouse and one year at the Michigan University Law School, where he again withdrew for lack of tuition, Darrow gained an apprentice- ship with a law firm in Youngstown, Ohio. There he read the law and passed the bar exam in 1878 at the age of 21. Returning home, he married his childhood sweetheart, Jessie Ohl, began his own practice in the rural Ohio towns of Andover and Ashtabula, and fathered his only child, a son. In search of a better income for his family and eager for opportunity, Darrow accepted an invitation from his brother Everett Darrow to move to Chicago—then the commercial and cultural center of the Midwest—in 1887. Darrow’s path from the country to the city was well-worn by millions of others at the end of the nineteenth century. The lure of jobs and opportunities following the Civil War combined with mass migrations from Europe added 31 million residents to U.S. cities between 1860 and 1930. Chicago, which had barely existed in 1830, had grown by 1900 to 3 million inhabitants. Along with other large U.S. cities such as New York and Boston, Chicago was unprepared for this overwhelming influx of urban immigrants. The results were poverty, crime, and corruption spawning human misery on a grand scale. When Darrow moved his hopes and his family to Chicago, the city was in the midst of both a population and an industrial boom. With its being the railroad center of the nation, the meatpacking, lumber, steel, and agricultural industries were rapidly expanding. A devastat- ing fire in 1871 had leveled much of the city and helped to inspire new building programs and fresh commercial initiatives. The city had also become a magnet for social reformers, artists, and intellectuals, including JANE ADDAMS, Lincoln Steffens, Sinclair Lewis, Edgar Lee Masters, and Theodore Dreiser, who viewed the human suffering of the great city with outrage. Darrow found Chicago both fascinating and troubling. While he saw opportunity for himself to advance, he was moved by the evident suffer- ing of laboring families, poor people, and those who were imprisoned. His passion for the lower class only increased as he witnessed the economic contrasts of industry and labor. Throughout the city, industrial tycoons were striking it rich off the backs of laborers—often uneducated and poor—who earned poverty wages under hazardous conditions. Similarly, the prisons were filled with poor and broken people who had little means of defending themselves. Having read the prison reform writings of Judge John P. Altgeld of Illinois, Darrow shortly introduced himself to this social reformer who would one day become governor. He began a mentorship in the law and politics of reform under Altgeld that would last until Altgeld’s death. When Darrow became outraged by the heavy sentences laid upon four anarchist defen- dants in the Haymarket Square bombing of 1887, Altgeld urged him to join the alliance for their AMNESTY. In turn, Darrow later successfully implored Altgeld as governor to commute their sentences. In 1888, after being impressed by Darrow’s public speaking ability, Mayor DeWitt Cregier, of Chicago, offered him an appointment as a SPECIAL ASSESSMENT attorney. Within a year, Darrow rose to chief corporation counsel— becoming the head of the legal department for the entire city of Chicago at age 33. From this vantage point, he observed firsthand the plight of the city’s working class in industries where labor had little power to organize, and government had little power to regulate. After four years, with his city appointment about to be termin ated, Darrow accepted an offer to become chief counsel for the Chicago and Northwestern Railway (CNR), which he had recently defeated in court. He imposed one condition: that he be allowed to continue his outside legal assistance work as long as it did not conflict with his loyalty to the company. Within two years, a decisive conflict was staring I DO NOT CONSIDER IT AN INSULT , BUT RATHER A COMPLIMENT TO BE CALLED AN AGNOSTIC .IDO NOT PRETEND TO KNOW WHERE MANY IGNORANT MEN ARE SURE —THAT IS ALL AGNOSTICISM MEANS . —CLARENCE DARROW GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DARROW, CLARENCE SEWARD 357 . War ▼▼ ▼▼ 17751775 18251825 18501850 18751875 18001800 1775– 83 American Revolution 1812–14 War of 1812 1829 31 Served as mayor of Philadelphia 1856–61 Served as minister to Great Britain GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 34 8 DALLAS,. Davis's treason trial GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION DANA, RICHARD HENRY 35 3 graduating in 1 837 . He subsequently received an honorary doctor of laws degree in 1866. Before. BE INDEPENDENT OF THE FLUCTUATIONS OF OUR OPINIONS OR PASSIONS . —RICHARD DANA GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 35 4 DANELAGE University, graduating in 1805. He read the law in the Richmond offices