Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 9 P39 pptx

right of a defaulting mortgagor to reclaim pro- perty by paying all past due mortgage payments anytime prior to foreclosure. Statutory redemp- tion, by contrast, begins at the point of fore- closure and requires that the defaulting mortgagor pay the full fo reclosure sale price. Equitable redemption is a common-law concept, which means it exists as law in the form of judicial opinions. All state courts have recognized a mortgagor’s right to equitable redemption. FURTHER READINGS Bauer, Patrick B. 1985. “Statutory Redemption Reconsidered: The Operation of Iowa’s Redemption Statute in Two Counties between 1881 and 1980.” Iowa Law Review 70 (January). Nelson, Grant S. 2007. “The Foreclosure Purchase by the Equity of Redemption Holder or Other Junior Inter- ests.” Missouri Law Review 72 (fall). Palace, Eric S. 1996. “In Re BFP: Just a Band-Aid?—Looking for a Stable Solution that Balances Creditors’ and Debtors’ Rights under Bankruptcy Code Section 548(A) (2).” Annual Review of Banking Law 15 (annual). Peeler, Ronald L. 1986. “Statutory Redemption—Redemption of Property by the Debtor or Debtor’s Assignee during the Exclusive Statutory Period Extinguishes a Junior Lienor’s Right of Redemption.” Drake Law Review 35 (summer). STAY The act of temporarily stopping a judicial proceed- ing through the order of a court. A stay is a suspension of a case or a suspension of a particular proceeding within a case. A judge may grant a stay on the motion of a party to the case or issue a stay sua sponte, without the request of a party. Courts will grant a stay in a case when it is necessary to secure the rights of a party. There are two main types of stays: a stay of execution and a stay of proceedings. A stay of execution postpones the enforcement of a judgment against a litigant who has lost a case, called the JUDGMENT DEBTOR. In other words, if a civil litigant wins money damages or some other form of relief, he may not collect the damages or receive the relief if the court issues a stay. Under rule 62 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, every civil judgment is stayed for ten days after it is rendered. An additional stay of execution lasts only for a limited period. It usually is granted when the judgment debtor appeals the case, but a court may grant a stay of execution in any case in which the court feels the stay is necessary to secure or protect the rights of the judgment debtor. The term stay of execution may also refer to a halt in the execution of a death penalty. This kind of stay of execution normally is granted when a court decides to allow an additional appeal by a condemned prisoner. Such stays of execution may be granted by executives, such as governors or the president of the United States, or by appeals courts. A stay of proceedings is the stoppage of an entire case or a specific proceeding within a case. This type of stay is issue d to postpone a case until a party complies with a court order or procedure. For example, if a party is required to deposit collateral with the court before a case begins, the court may order the proceed- ings stayed for a certain period of time or until the money or property is delivered to the court. If the party fails to deposit the collateral, the court may cite the party for CONTEMPT of court and impose a fine or order incarceration. A court may stay a proceeding for a number of reasons. One common reason is that another action is under way that may affect the case or the rights of the parties in the case. For instance, assume that a defendant faces lawsuits from the same plaintiffs in two separate cases involving closely related facts. One case is filed in federal court, and the other case is filed in state court. In this situation one of the courts may issue a stay in deference to the other court. The stay enables the defendant to concentrate on one case at a time. The term stay may also be used to describe any number o f legal measures taken by a legislature to provide temporary relief to debtors. For example, under section 362(a) of the Bank- ruptcy Code, a debtor who files for bankruptcy receives an automatic stay immediately upon filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition. Used in this sense, the term stay refers to the right of the debtor to keep creditors at bay during the resolution of the bankruptcy case. FURTHER READING Hazard, Geoffrey C., Jr., Colin C. Tait, and William A. Fletcher. 2009. Cases and Materials on Pleading and Procedure: State and Federal. 10th ed. Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press. CROSS REFERENCE Capital Punishment. STEERING The process whereby builders, brokers, and rental property managers induce purchasers or lessees of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 368 STAY real property to buy land or rent premises in neighborhoods composed of persons of the same race. Steering is an unlawful practice and includes any words or actions by a REAL ESTATE sales representative or BROKER that are intended to influence the choice of a prospective buyer or tenant. Steering violates Section 804 of the federal Fair Housing Act, a provision that proscribes DISCRIMINATION in the sale or rental of housing. The Housing and Civil Enforcement Section of the Department of Justice’s CIVIL RIGHTS Division has a fair housing testing program. Since 1991, it has trained and sent over 1,000 trained personnel to investigate patterns of steering in housing markets. These individuals pose as buyers or renters in order to gather information about possible discrimination in housing. As of 2009, the Department has recovered more than $12 million in fines and damages resulting from more than 80 suits filed. FURTHER READING U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division. “Housing and Civil Enforcement Division” http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/ housing/housing_testing.php (accessed September 28, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights; Di scrimination; Racial and E thnic Discrimination. v STEINEM, GLORIA GLORIA STEINEM is one of the most importa nt feminist writers and organizers of the late twentieth century. Since the 1960s, Steinem has been a political activ ist and organizer who has urged equal opportunity for women and the breaking down of gender roles. As a writer she has produced influential essays about the need for social and cultural change. Steinem was born on March 25, 1934, in Toledo, Ohio . Her parents divorced when she was 11 years old. Steinem enrolled at Smith College in 1952 and graduated in 1956. After graduation she went to India to study at the universities of Delhi and Calcutta. It was there that she began publishing freelance articles in newspapers. In the 1960s, Steinem continued to pursue a writing career, working first for a political satire magazine in New York. Her breakthrough came in 1963 with the publication of her article “I Was a Playboy Bunny,” which retold her Gloria Steinem. AP IMAGES Gloria Steinem 1934– ▼▼ ▼▼ ❖ 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ 1950–53 Korean War 1939–45 World War II 1934 Born, Toledo, Ohio ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ 1956 Graduated from Smith College 1960 Moved to New York to pursue writing career 1963 “I Was a Playboy Bunny” published 1968–72 Wrote for New York magazine 1972 Founded Ms. magazine 1971 Co-founded the National Women’s Political Caucus with Betty Friedan, Bella Abzug, and Shirley Chisholm 1972–87 Served as editor of Ms. magazine 1986 Marilyn published 1983 Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions published 2000 Addressed 3-day international Feminist Expo 2000 in Baltimore, Md. 1997 Feminist Family Values published 1992 Revolution from Within: A Book of Self-Esteem published 1994 Moving Beyond Words published 2006 Doing Sixty and Seventy published 2002 Celebrated 30th anniversary of founding of Ms. magazine 2000 1975 1950 STEINEM, GLORIA 369 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION experiences working in the Manhattan Playboy Club. For the next few years, her articles appeared in many national women’s magazines. Steinem also wrote comedy scripts for a weekly politi- cal satire television show, That Was the Week That Was. Her attention shifted to politics in 1968 when Steinem began writing a column for New York magazine. During the late 1960s, the “women’s liberation movement” began and Steinem soon became a leading supporter of the movement. In 1971 she, along with BETTY FRIEDAN, BELLA ABZUG, and SHIRLEY CHISHOLM, founded the National Women’s Political Caucus. The mission of the caucus was to identify and encourage women to run for political office. In 1972 Steinem founded and served as editor of Ms. magazine. Ms. addressed feminist issues, including reproductive rights, employ- ment DISCRIMINATION, sexuality, and gender roles. The magazine presented Steinem with a plat- form to air her views about the contemporary social scene. That same year Steinem was one of the cofounders of the Ms. Foundation for Women, a nonprofit organization that pioneered the concept of giving money to programs that addressed the specific concerns of women. At that time less than one percent of foundation grants were given to programs that supported women’sissuessuchas DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, female- friendly legislation, and economic disparities. Since the 1970s, Steinem has been a spokes- person for many feminist causes. She has sought to protect ABORTION rights, establish RAPE crisis centers, and guarantee work environments free from sexual discriminatio n. Steinem has distin- guished between “erotica” and PORNOGRAPHY, believing that nonviolent sexual material is acceptable but pornography should be banned. More radical feminists have criticized Steinem for these and other positions, arguing that she seeks legal changes that falsely promise equal opportunity and fair treatment. Despite these criticisms, Steinem has remained a popular public figure, traveling across the United Stat es and worldwide, and lecturing to packed audiences. She is a prolific writer, regularly contributing articles to maga- zines and newspapers; she also provides politi- cal commentary on television, radio, and the INTERNET. A collection of her articles and essays, Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions, was published in 1983. In 1986 she published Marilyn, a biography of film star Marilyn Monroe retold from a feminist perspective. In Revolution from Within: A Book of Self-Esteem (1992), Steinem looked inward, discussing ways that women could empower themselves. In 1994 she wrote Moving beyond Words, acollectionofessayson the politics of gender, and Doing Sixty and Seventy was published in 2006. In addition to her numerous awards and honorary degrees, in 1993, Steinem was inducted into the National Women’sHallofFamein Seneca Falls, New York. In 2000 she astonished observers by getting married at the age of 66 to an entrepreneur she had met at a Voters for Choice (VFC) fundraiser in 1999. Steinem is president of VFC, which is a bipartisan POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE that supports candidates work- ing for reproductive freedom. In May 2002 Steinem and her supporters celebrated the thirtieth anniversary of the founding of Ms. magazine. Steinem was active and vocal regarding the 2008 presidential election. She was quoted as saying that “Both Senators Clinton and Obama are CIVIL RIGHTS advocates, feminists, environ- mentalists, and critics of the war in Iraq Both have resisted pandering to the right, something that sets them apart from any Republican candidate, including JOHN MCCAIN. Both have Washington and foreign policy experience; GEORGE W . BUSH did not when he first ran for president.” She ended up endorsing Senator Clinton, citing Clinton’s broader experience. Steinem was critical of sexist media treatment of the Clinton campaign. Following McCain’s selection of Sarah Palin as his running mate, Steinem penned an op-ed in which she labeled Palin an “unquali- fied woman.” FURTHER READINGS Davis, Flora. 1999. Moving the Mountain: The Women’s Movement in America since 1960. Champaign: Univ. of Illinois Press. Heilbrun, Carolyn G. 1995. The Education of a Woman: The Life of Gloria Steinem. New York: Dial Press. Marcello, Patricia Cronin. 2004. Gloria Steinem: A Biogra- phy. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press Stern, Sydney Ladensohn. 1997. Gloria Steinem: Her Passions, Politics, and Mystique. Secaucus, N.J.: Carol Pub. Group. CROSS REFERENCES Dworkin, Andrea; Feminist Jurisprudence; Ireland, Patricia; MacKinnon, Catharine Alice; Millett, Katherine Murray; Sex Discrimination; Women’s Rights. 370 STEINEM, GLORIA ECONOMIC SYSTEMS ARE NOT VALUE -FREE COLUMNS OF NUMBERS BASED ON RULES OF REASON , BUT WAYS OF EXPRESSING WHAT VARYING SOCIETIES BELIEVE IS IMPORTANT . —GLORIA STEINEM GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STEM CELL RESEARCH See FETAL TISSUE RESEARCH. STENOGRAPHER An individual who records court proceedings either in shorthand or through the use of a paper-punching device. A court stenographer is an officer of the court and is generally considered to be a state or public official. Appointment of a court steno- grapher is largely governed by statute. A stenogra- pher is ordinarily appointed by the court as an official act, which is a matter of public record. He or she is an official under the control of the court and is, therefore, generally subject to its direction. A stenographer is not under the dominion and control of the attorneys in a case. The term of office of a court stenographer is also regulated by statute in most cases. The stenographer has the duty to attend court and to be present, or on call, throughout the entire trial, so that the court and the litigants can be protected by a complete record ofthe proceedings. The stenographer must take notes of what occurs before the court and transcribe and file the notes within the time permitted. The notes must comply with provisions requiring the stenographer to prepare and sign a certificate stating that the proceedings, evidence, and charges levied against the defendant were fully and accurately taken at the trial and that the transcript represents an accurate translation of the notes. Some statutes provide that a judge who appoints the stenographer also has the power to remove him or her. Other statutes fix the term of office; in w hich case a stenographer cannot be removed at a judge’s pleasure, even though the judge has the power to appoint him or her. The compensation of a court stenographer may be in the form of an annual salary, a per diem allowance, or an allowance for work actually performed. In the absence of a statute fixing the fees, a duly appointed stenographer is entitled to be reasonably compensated. Some statutes require that a stenographer’s fees must be paid by the parties. CROSS REFERENCE Court Reporter. STERILIZATION A medical procedure where the reproductive organs are removed or rendered ineffective. Legally mandated sterilization of criminals, or other members of society deemed “socially undesirable,” has been considered a stain on the history of U.S. law for some time. The practice originated early in the twentieth century. In 1914 a Model Eugenical Sterilization Law was published by Harry Laughlin at the Eugenics Records Office. Laughlin proposed the steriliza- tion of “so cially inadequate” persons, which translated as anyone “maintained wholly or in part by public expense.” This would include the “feebleminded, insane, blind, deaf, orphans, and the homeless.” At the time the model law was published, 12 states had enacted steriliza- tion laws. Such laws were seen to benefit society because they presumably reduced the burden on taxpayers of maintaining state-run facilities. Eventually, these laws were challenged in court. In BUCK V. BELL, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. wrote the infamous opinion that upheld the constitutionality of a Virginia sterilization law, fueling subsequent legislative efforts to enact additional sterilization laws. By 1930, 30 states and Puerto Rico had passed laws mandating sterilization for many criminal or moral offenses. Nearly all of the states with such laws imposed mandatory sterilization of mentally challenged citizens. Nineteen states required sterilization for parents of children likely to experience various disorders. Six states encour- aged sterilization for individuals whose children might be “socially inadequate.” Finally, the SUPREME COURT struck down an Oklahoma law mandating involuntary steriliza- tion for repeat criminals in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 62 S. Ct. 1110, 86 L. Ed. 1655 (1942). Justice William O. Douglas’s opinion broadly defined the right to privacy to include the right to procreate, and concluded that the government’s power to sterilize interfered with an individual’s basic liberties. Skinner v. Oklahoma is often understood to have ended all compulsory sterilization in the United States. In reality, however, the only types of sterilization that the ruling immediately ended were punitive sterilization, and it did not directly comment on compulsory sterilization of the mentally disabled or mentally ill. Skinner did not OVERRULE Buck v. Bell. Currently, 18 states have statutes that authorize court-ordered steril- ization of mentally disabled individuals. Each law varies as to the grounds that justify compulsory sterilization. For example, some apply only to GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STERILIZATION 371 those who are unable to give consent, while some apply only to those who are “mentally retarded,”“mentally ill,”“brain damaged,” “developmentally disabled,” or “residents of state facilities for the mentally ill.” The reason- ing underlying these laws also varies from state to state. Whereas some states still employ a eugenics rationale, most focus on a mentally disabled woman’s i nability to care adequately for a child or on the potential physical and psychologi- cal effects that procreation may have o n her. FURTHER READINGS Carlson, Elof Axel. 2001. The Unfit: A History of a Bad Idea. Cold Spring Harbor, N.Y.: Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press. Kevles, Daniel J. 1985. In the Name of Eugenics. New York: Knopf. Smith, J. David, and K. Ray Nelson. 1999. The Sterilization of Carrie Buck. Far Hills, N.J.: New Horizon Press. v STEVENS, JOHN PAUL A member of the U.S. Supreme Court since 1975, John Paul Stevens has developed a reputation as a judicial centrist on the High Court, although many of his more well-known opinions are marked by a liberal bent. Born on April 20, 1920, Stevens descended from Nicholas Stevens, who emigrated to America in 1659 after serving as a brigadier general in Oliver Cromwell’s army. Stevens’s father was a businessman and lawyer; he designed Chicago’s Stevens Hotel and was its original managing director. A political moderate during his college days at the University of Chicago, Stevens graduated Phi Beta Kappa in 1941. During WORLD WAR II he served with the U.S. Navy and was awarded the Bronze Star. After the war he studied law at Northwestern University School of Law in Chicago, graduating first in his class in 1947. Stevens began his legal career as a law clerk for U.S. Supreme Court Justice WILEY B. RUTLEDGE. In 1948 he joined the Chicago firm of Poppen- hausen, Johnston, Thompson, and Raymond, specializing in LITIGATION and ANTITRUST LAW.In 1951 he served as associate counsel on a study of MONOPOLY power for a subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee of the House of Repre- sentatives. Upon returning to Chicago in 1952, Stevens founded the firm of Rot hschild, Ste- vens, Barry, and Meyers. Along with his private practice, he taught antitrust law at the North- western University and the University of Chicago law schools throughout much of the 1950s. He also served for a time as a member of the U.S. attorney general’s National Committee to Study Antitrust Laws. In 1970 President RICHARD M. NIXON appointed Stevens as a judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. He became known for his scholarly abilities and his carefully written, clear, and succinct opinions. His first opinion on the court of appeals was a DISSENT in a challenge to the summary INCARCERATION of an antiwar activist who had disrupted a legislative session (Groppi v. Leslie, 436 F.2d 331 [1971]). Stevens viewed the incarceration as unconstitu- tional, and the following year his minority view was vindicated by a unanimous Supreme Court (404 U.S. 496, 92 S. Ct. 582, 30 L. Ed. 2d 632). The liberal Supreme Court justice WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS retired in 1975, providing President GERALD R. FORD his only opportunity to make a Supreme Court appointment. Stevens received high praise and active support from Ford’s attorney general, EDWARD LEVI, and unqualified support from the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION. During the Senate confirmation hearing, Stevens remarked that he believed that litigants should know how judges viewed the arguments and that it was important to make a record to note diverse views for reference in later cases. Stevens was unanimously confirmed on December 17, 1975, and took his oath of office two days later. Until Stevens became a justice, new justices were typically seen but not heard. Instead, they usually joined dissents or concurrences without offering their own opinions. Stevens did not fit that pattern. During the 1976–77 term, Stevens had 17 separate majority concurrences and 27 separate dissents, far more than any other justice. From the start, Stevens evinced a concern that the legal system give particular care to ensure the rights of the underprivileged, includ- ing ALIENS, illegitimate children, and prisoners. However, Stevens cannot easily be classified as either a judicial liberal or a conservative. In a judicial context, a conservative judge generally will not decide issues that he or she believes are within the province of legislatures. Moreover, a conservative typically votes to enhance govern- ment power in a conflict between government interests and individual rights. A judicial liberal, by contrast, tends to favor individual interests and will look beyond the bounds of a statute 372 STEVENS, JOHN PAUL GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION and past interpretations of the Constitution to decide social policy questions. For example, although Stevens is generally perceived as being sympathetic to the rights of prisoners, his sympathy has not necessarily translated into leniency for criminal defendants. Stevens wrote the opinion in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 102 S. Ct. 2157, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572 (1982), wherein the Court held that police may search compartments and containers within a vehicle even though the co ntents are not in plain view, as long as the sear ch is based on PROBABLE CAUSE. Probable cause, the same stand- ard needed to obtain a SEARCH WARRANT, is typically determined by a magistrate, but this case effec- tively gave that power to the police in searches of vehicle containers. Stevens’s nomination was opposed by some women’s groups that claimed that he was unresponsive in several sexual DISCRIMINATION cases while on the court of appeals. In 1981 he voted to uphold the all-male draft ( ROSTKER V. GOLDBERG, 453 U.S. 57, 101 S. Ct. 2646, 69 L. Ed. 2d 478), and in another case he declined to consider the theory of COMPARABLE WORTH.On the other hand, he has typically voted to uphold ROE V. WADE, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S. Ct. 705, 35 L. Ed. 2d 147 (1973), and limit restrictions to a woman’s right to ABORTION (Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 510 U.S. 1309, 114 S. Ct. 909, 127 L. Ed. 2d 352 [1994] and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 114 L. Ed. 2d 233 [1991]). In Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 , 117 S. Ct. 1636, 137 L. Ed. 2d 945 (1997), Stevens spoke for a unanimous Court in allowing a SEXUAL HARASSMENT lawsuit against President BILL CLIN- TON to go forward. Stevens ruled that the Constitution does not afford a president temporary immunity—except in the most ▼▼ ▼▼ 1925 2000 1975 1950 1952 Founded firm of Rothschild, Stevens, Barry, and Meyers ◆ 2000 Wrote majority opinion banning student-led and-initiated prayer at football games, Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe; dissented in Bush v. Gore, warning decision would fuel cynicism about partiality of the U.S. judiciary; Justices Ginsburg and Breyer joined the dissent ◆ 1996 Wrote majority opinion in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore 1951 Served as associate counsel to the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power John Paul Stevens 1920– ❖ 1961–73 Vietnam War 1950–53 Korean War 1939–45 World War II 1920 Born, Chicago, Ill. ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ 1942–45 Served in the U.S. Navy 1947–48 Clerked for Justice Wiley B. Rutledge 1970–75 Sat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 1975– Served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 1990 Wrote dissent in Eichman v. United States 2003 Wrote 5–4 majority opinion upholding state use of lawyers’ trust account interest to fund legal services for the poor, Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington 1992 Wrote majority opinion in Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc. 1997 Wrote unanimous opinion for Clinton v. Jones 1999 Dissented in decision limiting the Americans with Disabilities Act, Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., calling majority view miserly ◆◆ 2002 Dissented in landmark school vouchers decision Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, warning about potential for national religious strife 2000 Presidential election result uncertain due to disputed Florida vote count; recount halted by U.S. Supreme Court with 5–4 vote in Bush v. Gore 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks 2006 Wrote majority opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld ◆ ◆ John Paul Stevens. STEVE PETTEWAY, COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES STEVENS, JOHN PAUL 373 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION exceptional circumstances—for civil litigation arising from events that occurred before the president took office. The Court also held that Clinton was not entitled to a stay of proceedings during his term in office. One of Stevens’s earliest opinions was Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S. Ct. 2440, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310, (1976). He wrote for a plurality of the Court, upholding Detroit ZONING ordinances that prevented the concen- tration of “adult” establishments. The case was significant because the ordinance in question did not require a finding that the establishment dealt in legally obscene materials as a prerequi- site to legal action. Before the ruling in Young, sexually-oriented material that was not legally obscene appeared to be entitled to complete FIRST AMENDMENT protection. Stevens wrote that the material in question was so sexually explicit as to be entitled to less protection than other speech, stating that “few of us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our choice.” He reasoned that the zoning restriction did not totally prohibit the availability of the material and was a reasonable action by the city to further its interest in preserving the quality of urban life. This ruling has been the basis for other restrictions that fall short of an outright prohibition of communication that is sexually explicit but not obscene. Justice Stevens, along with Justices POTTER STEWART and LEWIS F. POWELL JR., acted as a swing vote in a series of death penalty cases in the mid- 1970s. The Court upheld death penalty statutes providing for discretion in imposition but over- turned those calling for mandatory death sen- tences. Stevens voted against the death penalty in cases of RAPE and dissented from a 1989 deci- sion permitting an execution for someone who committed a MURDER at age 16 or 17. In Eichman v. United States, 496 U.S. 310, 110 S. Ct. 2404, 110 L. Ed. 2d 287 (1990), the Supreme Court ruled that flag burning was a form of expression protected by the First Amendment and overturned a federal statute that attempted to protect flags. The majority ruled that the statute had to withstand the most exacting scrutiny and could not be upheld under the First Amendment. Stevens wrote a dissent joined by conservative Chief Justice WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST and two other justices, maintaining that the statute was consistent with the First Amendment. Stevens wrote the opinion in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 116 S. Ct. 1589, 134 L. Ed. 2d 809 (1996), the first case in which the High Court overturned a jury’s PUNITIVE DAMAGES award. A jury awarded an automobile owner $4 million (later reduced to $2 million) when the manufacturer failed to disclose a refinished paint job on a new BMW. Stevens called the award “grossly excessive” and set out criteria to determine the propriety of punitive damage awards. The four dissenting justices in the case argued that the ruling improperly intruded into states’ prerogatives. In 1992 Stevens wrote the opi nion for CIPOLLONE V. LIGGETT GROUP, INC., 505 U.S. 504, 112 S. Ct. 2608, 120 L. Ed. 2d 407 (1992), possibly exposing the tobacco industry to huge adverse verdicts for money damages by opening the door to increased litigation for smoking- related deaths. In a 7–2 decision, the Court ruled that cigarette manufacturers that lie about the dangers of smoking or otherwise misrepre- sent their products can be sued under state laws. Because cigarette labeling is governed by federal law, at issue was whether federal law preempts state common-law liability lawsuits. The Court ruled that federal suits are the only avenue for pursuing failure-to-warn cases or claims of omissions in the manufacturer’s advertising or promotions. Litigants may sue in state court, however, for claims of breaches of express warranties, claims that cigarette advertisements are fraudulent, and claims that a company hid the dangers of smoking from state authorities or conspired to mislead smokers. Stevens also authored WALLACE V. JAFFREE, 472 U.S. 38, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 86 L. Ed. 2d 29 (1985), holding that a state cannot provide a moment of silence at the beginning of the school day for the express purpose of facilitating meditation or prayer. The Court held that the Alabama statute in question did not pass constitutional scrutiny. Recent Decisions In the first decade of the 2000s, Stevens’s opinions have continued to cross the political spectrum, despite the tendency for observers to cast him as one of the “liberal” justices. In Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 153 L. Ed. 2d 666 (2002), Stevens wrote a 6–3 majority opinion ruling that a prison inmate had been 374 STEVENS, JOHN PAUL IT IS NOT OUR JOB TO APPLY LAWS THAT HAVE NOT YET BEEN WRITTEN . —JOHN PAUL STEVENS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION subjected to CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT in violation of the EIGHTH AMENDMENT when prison guards handcuffed him to a hitching post as punishment for disruptive behavior, even though the inmate had already been subdued. Stevens said that the prison guards knowingly subjected the inmate to a substantial risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs, to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun, to prolonged thirst and taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular discom- fort and humiliation. That same year Stevens also wrote a 6–3 majority opinion ruling that the execution of mentally retarded criminals violates the Eighth Amendment’s guarantee against cruel and unusual punishment. ATKINS V. VIRGINIA, 536 U.S. 304, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 153 L. Ed. 2d 335 (2002). Citing “evolving standards of decency,” Stevens said that his decision was informed by the consensus reflected in deliberations of the American public, legislators, scholars, and judges that have taken place over the thirteen years since Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 106 L. Ed. 2d 256 (1989). In Penry, the Supreme Court held that two state statutes prohibiting the execution of the mentally retarded, even when added to the fourteen states that had rejected CAPITAL PUNISHMENT completely, did not provide sufficient evidence of a national consensus. In Atkins, though, Stevens empha- sized that sixteen additional states had passed laws barring execution of the mentally retarded since the Penry decision was handed down. Stevens surprised many observers with his dissenting opinion in Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94 (2001), where five justices found that the use of a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative amounts of heat within the home constituted a “search” withi n the meaning of the FOURTH AMENDMENT , and thus the use of that device was presumptively unreasonable without a warrant. Justice Stevens argued that thermal imaging did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search because it detected only heat radiating from the external surface of the house. Stevens surprised no one with his dissenting opinion in BUSH V. GORE, 531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525, 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 (2000), however, where seven justices concluded that the process devised by the Florida Supreme Court to recount the popular vote in the 2000 presidential election violated the EQUAL PROTEC- TION CLAUSE of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. Only five justices agreed that there was insuffi- cient time to fashion a remedy that would fairly and lawfully allow the votes of Florida residents to be accurately counted for either presidential candidate. As a result, the nation’s high court effectively ordered the Florida recount to stop, which meant that GEORGE W. BUSH would become the forty-third president of the United States. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens argued that the Equal Protection Clause does not limit the states’ power to design their electoral processes—including substantive stan- dards for determining whether a vote had been legally cast. Consequently, Stevens believed that the U.S. Supreme Court should have deferred to the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of those standards and allowed the recount to continue. Under the majority’s own reasoning, Stevens wrote, the appropriate course of action would have been to remand the case so the Florida high court could establish more specific procedures for implementing the legislature’s uniform general standard of “voter intent.” But in “the interest of finality,” Stevens continued, “the majority effectively orders the disenfran- chisement of an unknown number of voters whose ballots reveal their intent—and are therefore legal votes under state law—but were for some reason rejected by ballot-counting machines.” In one of his most significant decisions, Hamdan. v. Rumsfeld (2006), Stevens held that military commissions set up by the Bush administration to try detainees at Guantanamo Bay lacked “the power to proceed because [their] structures and procedures violate both the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE and the four Geneva Conventions signed in 1949.” He concluded his 72-page majority opinion with the statement that “the Executive is bound to comply with the RULE OF LAW that prevails in this jurisdiction. ” Justice Stevens, age 90, announced in April 2010 that he would retire at the end of the Supreme Court’s term in June 2010. FURTHER READINGS Jost, Kenneth. 1996. The Supreme Court Yearbook 1995–96. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly. STEVENS, JOHN PAUL 375 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION Manaster, Kenneth A. 2001. Illinois Justice: The Scandal of 1969 and the Rise of John Paul Stevens. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Sickels, Robert J. 1988. John Paul Stevens and the Constitu- tion: The Search for Balance. University Park: Pennsyl- vania State Univ. Press. v STEVENSON, ADLAI EWING Adlai Ewing Stevenson was a lawyer, statesman, and unsuccessful DEMOCRATIC PARTY candidate for the presidency in 1952 and 1956. An eloquent and witty speaker, Stevenson served as chief U.S. delegate to the UNITED NATIONS during the Kennedy administration. Stevenson was born on February 5, 1900, in Los Angeles, California, and moved with his family to Bloomington, Illinois, in 1906. After high school, he attended The Choate School, a prepatory school where he acted as editor-in- chief of the school’s paper, The News. In 1918 Stevenson joined the U.S. Navy, although he did not take part in WORLD WAR I. Stevenson attended Princeton University, where he was a member of the Phi Delta Theta fraternity and the managing editor of The Daily Princetonian. After receiving his degree in 1922, he briefly attended Harvard Law School but withdrew after failing multiple classes. Stevenson became interested in law again after talking t o Supr eme Court Justice Ol iver W endell Holmes Jr. Returning home to Bloomington, Stevenson decided to go back to school and obtain his law degree. Stevenson received his LL.B. from Northwestern University School of Law in 1926 and was admitted to the Illinois bar. He joined the firm of Cutting, Moore, and Sidley, a conservative firm in Chicago. In 1928, Stevenson married Ellen Borden, and the couple soon became familiar faces within Chicago’s soci al scene. By the early 1930s Stevenson had set his sights on public service, following the course of his grandfather, Adlai E. Stevenson, who was vice president of the United States during the administration of President GROVER CLEVELAND (1893–1897). Stevenson joined the NEW DEAL administration of President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT in 1933, serving as special legal adviser to the Agricultural Adjustment Administration. In 1934, he became general counsel for the Federal Alcohol Bureau. Though Stevenson returned to his Chicago law practice in 1934, he remained an active civic leader. He headed the Chicago Bar Association’s CIVIL RIGHTS Committee and became the chair of the Chicago chapter of the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. This committee, composed of prominent business and civic leaders, worked to overcome U.S. isolationist foreign policy and provide aid to Great Britain and France at the beginning of WORLD WAR II. Stevenson rejoined the Roosevelt adminis- tration in 1941 as special assistant to the secretary of the Navy, and in 1943 he led a mission to Italy to establish a U.S. relief program. In 1945 Stevenson moved to the STATE DEPARTMENT, where he became a key participant in the establishment of the United Nations (U.N.). He was senior adviser to the U.S. delegation at the first meeting of the U.N. General Assembly in London in 1946 and was a U.S. delegate at meetings of the assembly in New York in 1946 and 1947. ▼▼ ▼▼ Adlai Ewing Stevenson 1900–1965 18751875 19251925 19501950 19751975 19001900 ❖ 1900 Born, Los Angeles, Calif. 1893–97 Stevenson's grandfather, Adlai E. Stevenson, served as vice president under President Grover Cleveland 1914–18 World War I ◆ 1926 Admitted to Illinois bar 1933–34 Served as legal counsel for the Agricultural Adjustment Administration and Federal Alcohol Bureau 1939–45 World War II 1941–45 Served as special assistant to the secretary of the Navy ◆ 1945 Helped establish United Nations 1946–47 Served as U.S delegate to U.N. assembly 1950–53 Korean War 1948–52 Served as governor of Ill. ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆◆ ❖ 1961–73 Vietnam War 1965 Died, London, England 1960 Appointed ambassador to the U.N. 1959 Friends and Enemies published 1952 & 1956 Ran unsuccessfully for president 1954 A Call to Greatness published THE ESSENCE OF A REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT COMMAND .ITIS CONSENT . —ADLAI STEVENSON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 376 STEVENSON, ADLAI EWING In 1948 Stevenson returned to Illinois and ran as the Democratic candidate for governor. He was elected by the largest majority ever recorded in the state. He proved an effective chief executive, revitalizing the CIVIL SERVICE, establishing a MERIT SYSTEM for the hiring of state police, improving the care of patients in state mental hospitals, and increasing state aid to public education. When President HARRY S. TRUMAN announced that he would not seek reelection in 1952, Democratic leaders urged Stevenson to seek the nomination. Although Stevenson declined to campaign for the nomination, the 1952 Demo- cratic National Convention in Chicago drafted him as their presidential candidate. Stevenson ran a vigorous campaign but proved no match for the Republican candidate and popular war hero, General DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. Eisenhower easily defeated Stevenson in 1952 and again in 1956. Stevenson spent the 1950s practicing law in Chicago and serving as a spokesperson for the Democratic Party. At the 1960 Democratic National Convention in Los Angeles, a small group of liberals again sought to draft Stevenson for president. The effort failed and Senator JOHN F. KENNEDY of Massachusetts was nominated. Kennedy appointed Stevenson U.S. amba s- sador to the United Nations and gave him cabinet rank. Stevenson was deeply disap- pointed, however, believing he was the best- qualified person to serve as SECRETARY OF STATE. Despite his disappointment, Stevenson carried out his role at the United Nations with distinction. In April 1961, Stevenson suffered what some say was the lowest point of his career. After the invasion of Fidel Castro’s forces at the Bay of Pigs, Stevenson denied claims that the attack was led by the CIA, believing that the anti-Communist forces were financed by Cuban émigrés. Once Stevenson learned that he had been deceived, as the CIA did in fact fund the attack, he contemplated resigning his ambassa- dorship but was deterred from doing so. During the CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS of October 1962, Stevenson had a dramatic confrontation with the Soviet Union’s delegate, Valer ian Zorin, regarding the installment of Soviet missiles in Cuba. Stevenson had asked Zorin if there were missiles in Cuba, and when Zorin refused to reply, Stevenson rebutted that he was prepared to wait “until Hell freezes over” for an answer to his question. Stevenson then dis- played photographs that revealed the presence of such missiles, just after the Soviet ambassa- dor implied that they did not exist. Stevenson died on July 14, 1965, in London, England. FURTHER READINGS Broadwater, Jeff. 1994. Adlai Stevenson and American Politics: The Odyssey of a Cold War Liberal. New York: Twayne. Martin, John Bartlow. 1977. Adlai Stevenson and the World. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. ———. 1976. Adlai Stevenson of Illinois: The Life of Adlai Stevenson. Adlai Stevenson and the World. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday. Stevenson, Adlai E. 1972–79. The Papers of Adlai E. Stevenson. Ed. by Walter Johnson. Boston: Little, Brown. v STEWART, POTTER As an associate justice from 1958 to 1981, Potter Stewart charted a middle course during a vigorous era on the U.S. Supreme Court. Before his appointment to the Court by President DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, Stewart practiced law, served in local government in his native Cincinnati, Ohio, and sat on the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals from 1954 to 1958. He joined the Supreme Court during a period when the Court was changing the social and political landscape by extending CIVIL RIGHTS and liberties under Chief Justice EARL WARREN, yet Stewart remained a moderate during his 23-year tenure. Pragmatism, unpredictability, and plainspoken opinions were his hallmarks. His penchant Adlai Stevenson. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS SWIFT JUSTICE DEMANDS MORE THAN JUST SWIFTNESS . —POTTER STEWART GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION STEWART, POTTER 377 . the assembly in New York in 194 6 and 194 7. ▼▼ ▼▼ Adlai Ewing Stevenson 190 0– 196 5 18751875 192 5 192 5 195 0 195 0 197 5 197 5 190 0 190 0 ❖ 190 0 Born, Los Angeles, Calif. 1 893 97 Stevenson's grandfather,. JOHN PAUL 375 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION Manaster, Kenneth A. 2001. Illinois Justice: The Scandal of 196 9 and the Rise of John Paul Stevens. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press. Sickels,. lessees of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 368 STAY real property to buy land or rent premises in neighborhoods composed of persons of the same race. Steering is an unlawful practice