enforcement agencies as well as the media and the general public. SPLC staf f members conduct training sessions regarding these groups for law enforcement agencies, schools, and community groups. SPLC also offers online hate-crime training on its Web site in conjunction with the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center and Auburn University Montgomery. In addition to being the subject of continu- ous vitriolic attacks by extremist organizations, whose activity it monitors, the SPLC was the subject of strong criticism by Washington, D.C based writer Ken Silverstein. Writing in the November 2000 issue of Harper’s Magazine, Silverstein accused SPLC of raising millions of dollars from fund-raising and investments but spending only a portion of the mone y raised on its civil rights programs. The SPLC has been the subject of violent threats during the 2000s. In 2006 it brought suit against the Imperia l Klans of America (the second largest KKK group in the United States) after two members of the Klan beat a 16-year- old boy of Panamanian descent. After SPLC filed the suit, Klan members threatened to bomb the SPLC building. SPLC said it would step up its security efforts. In 2008 the center won the case in a Kentucky trial court. The SPLC promotes its “Teach Tolerance” campaign throughout the United States. FURTHER READINGS Jacobs, James, and Kimberly Potter. 2000. Hate Crimes: Criminal Law & Identity Politics. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Johnson, Sandra E. 2002. Standing on Holy Ground: A Triumph over Hate Crime in the Deep South. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Ridgeway, James. 1995. Blood in the Face: The Ku Klux Klan, Aryan Nations, Nazi Skinheads, and the Rise of a New White Culture. 2d ed. New York: Thundermouth. Southern Poverty Law Center. Available online at http:// www.splcenter.org (accessed June 3, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights; Civil Rights Acts; Discrimination; Ku Klux Klan. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY The legal protection that prevents a sovereign state or person from being sued without consent. Sovereign immunity is a judicial doctrine that prevents the government or its political subdivisions, departments, and agencies from being sued without its consent. The doctrine stems from the ancient English principle that the monarch can do no wron g. Suits against the United States In early American history, the courts supported the traditional view that the United States co uld not be sued without congressional authorization (Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. [2 Dall.] 419, 478, 1 L. Ed. 440 [1793]; Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. [6 Wheat.] 264, 412, 5 L. Ed. 257 [1821]). This IMMUNITY applied to suits filed by states as well as individuals (Kansas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331, 27 S. Ct. 388, 51 L. Ed. 510 [1906]). Thus, for many years, those who had contract and tort claims against the government had no legal recourse except through the difficult, inconve- nient, and often tardy means of convincing Congress to pass a special bill awarding compen- sation to the injured party on a case by case basis. The federal government first began to waive its sovereign immunity in areas of law other than torts. In 1855 Congress established the U.S. COURT OF CLAIMS, a special court created to hear cases against the United States involving contracts based upon the Constitution, federal statutes, and federal regulations. In 1887 Con- gress passed the TUCKER ACT (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346 (a) (2), 1491) to authorize federal district courts to hear contractual claims not exceeding $10,000 against the United States. Other SPECIAL COURTS were later created for particular types of nontort claims against the federal government. The U.S. Board of General Appraisers was created in 1890 and was replaced in 1926 by the U.S. Customs Court. The U.S. Court of Customs Appeals was created in 1909 and then replaced in 1926 by the U.S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. These courts handled complaints about duties levied on imports. The Board of Tax Appeals, created in 1924 to handle internal revenue complaints, was replaced in 1942 by the TAX COURT of the United States. Not until 1946 did Congress address the issue of liability for torts committed by the government’s agencies, officers, or employees. Until 1946 civil servants could be individually liable for torts, but they were protected by sovereign immunity from liability for tortious acts committed while carrying out their official duties. However, the courts were not always consistent in making that distinction. In 1946 Congress passed the Tort Claims Act (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1346[b], 2671 – 2678), which GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 278 SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY authorized U.S. district courts to hold the United States liable for torts committed by its agencies, officers, and employees just as the courts would hold individual defendants liable under similar circumstances. This general waiver of immunity had a number of exceptions, including the torts of BATTERY, FALSE IMPRISONMENT, FALSE ARREST, MALICIOUS PROSECUTION, ABUSE OF PROCESS, libel, slander, MISREPRESENTATION, deceit, interference with contractual rights, tort in the fiscal opera- tions of the Treasury, tort in the regulation of the monetary system, and tort in combatant activi- ties of the armed forces in wartime. By 1953 the U.S. SUPREME COURT had drawn distinctions under the Tort Claims Act between tortious acts committed by the government at the planning or policy-making stage and those committed at the operational level. In Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 73 S. Ct. 956, 97 L. Ed. 1427 (1953), the Supreme Court held that the Tort Claims Act did not waive sovereign immunity as to tortious acts committed at the planning stage; immunity applied only to torts committed at the operational stage. Congress also waived sovereign immunity in cases seeking injunctive or other nonmone- tary relief again st the United States in a 1976 amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act (5 U.S.C.A. §§ 702–703). Suits Against the States The doctrine of sovereign immunity applies to state govern ments within their own states, but it was not initially clear whether states had immunity to suits involving other states or citizens of other states. In the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia, the U.S. Supreme Court permitted a North Carolina citizen to sue Georgia for property that Georgia had seized during the American Revolution. The states’ strong disap- proval of the court’s decision in Chisholm led to the prompt adoption of the ELEVENTH AMEND- MENT to the U.S. Constitution in 1795. The Eleventh Amendment specifically grants immu- nity to the states as to lawsuits by citizens of other states, foreign countries, or citizens of foreign countries in the federal courts. This limitation was judicially extended to include suits by a state’sowncitizensinHans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10 S. Ct. 504, 33 L. Ed. 842 (1890). The U.S. Supreme Court still has jurisdic- tion to hear suits by one state against another. In addition, the courts have construed the Eleventh Amendment as permitting APPELLATE proceedings in cases originally instituted by a state if the DEFENDANT asserted rights under the U.S. Constitution, statutes, or treaties (Cohens v. Virginia), or in cases against state officials alleged to have violated such rights (Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. [9 Wheat.] 738, 6 L. Ed. 204 [1824]). The latter category has resulted in extensive litigation in federal courts against state and local officers alleged to have violated the CIVIL RIGHTS Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983). Claims brought under the act are not subject to sovereign immunity. The FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT does allow Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity. Section 5 grants Congress the enforcement power to advance the goals of the amendment, which include the guarantees of due process and EQUAL PROTECTION of the laws. Congress has used this power to apply modern civil rights laws as well as patent and trademark laws to state governments. This power was not ques- tioned until the mid-1990s, when the Supreme Court began to issue decisions that strike down the application of federal statutes to the state governments. In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 116 S.Ct. 1114, 134 L.Ed.2d 252 (1996), the court established a two-part test for deter- mining whether Congress abrogated the states’ immunity when enacting a particular statute. It ruled that absent a state’s waiver, states retain their sovereign immunity unless (1) Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to abrogate the immunity, and (2) Congress acted pursuant to a valid exercise of its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that, in order to satisfy the first prong of the test, Congress must make its intent to abrogate the states’ immunity unmis- takably clear. The court proceeded to apply this two-part test in a series of cases. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 119 S.Ct. 2199, 144 L.Ed.2d 575 (1999), the court ruled that the state of Florida could invoke its sovereign immu- nity to block federal lawsuits against it by a bank charging it with patent and trademark law violations. The court found that Congress had clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity but had failed to satisfy the second part of the test. The court stated that “Congress must identify conduct transgressing the Four- teenth Amendment’s substantive provisions, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 279 and must tailor its legislative scheme to reme- dying or preventing such conduct.” Because Congress failed to identify a pattern of patent INFRINGEMENT by the states or a pattern of constitutional violations, the Eleventh Amend- ment barred the laws’ application to the states. The Supreme Court, in Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S 706, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 144 L.Ed.2d 636 (1999), ruled that a group of state employees could not sue their state employer using the provisions of the FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT (29 U.S.C.A. 201 et seq.). In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 120 S.Ct. 631, 145 L. Ed.2d 522 (2000), the court found that the AGE DISCRIMINATION in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), 29 U.S.C.A. §§621-634, did not apply to state governments. The ADEA could not be applied because under the second part of the Seminole Tribe test there must be a “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that en d.” Using this standard, the court found that ADEA was not “appropriate legislation.” The court n oted that ag e i s not a SUSPECT CLASSIFICATION under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Therefore, states may “discriminate on the basis of age without offending the Fourteenth Amendment if the age classification is rationally related to a legitimate state interest.” ADEA prohibited “substantially more state employment decisions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional” under the equal protection, rational basis standard. The Supreme Court also invalidated the application of part of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Pub. L. 101-336 (1990), to state government. In University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 121 S.Ct. 955, 148 L.Ed. 2d 866 (2001), the court struck down ADA applicability to damage lawsuits involving alleged disability employment DISCRIMINATION by state governments. Congress could only be authorized to include the states within ADA reach if it identified a history and pattern of unconstitu- tional employment discrimination against dis- abled persons. However, the court concluded that the legislative record “simply fails to show that Congress did in fact identify a pattern of irrational state discrimination in employment against the disabled.” The court asserted that Congress had published only a handful of inci- dents to support this conclusion. Absent a compelling historical pattern of discrimination, such as the racial discrimination against African Americans that justified the VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965, the court saw no merit in stripping states of the ir immunity from citizen lawsuits for money. The court continued its promotion of states’ rights in Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority, 535 U.S. 743, 122 S.Ct. 1864, 152 L.Ed.2d 962 (2002). In this case the court demonstrated its continuing com- mitment to FEDERALISM by extendin g a state ’s sovereign immunity to federal administrative law proceedings. Though the case involved a fairly obscure federal commission, the court’s prece- dent could be extended to the many federal agencies and commissions that oversee the environmental and natural resources. The Supreme Court did restrict Eleventh Amendment immunity, on procedural grounds , in Lapide s v. Board of Regents of the University System of Georgia, 535 U.S. 613, 122 S.Ct. 1640, 152 L.Ed.2d 806 (2002). In this action the court ruled that states could not claim Eleventh Amendment immunity when they voluntarily remove a case to federal court. By doing so, the court concluded that the state had voluntarily waived its immunity, thereby giving a PLAINTIFF the chance to argue the merits of the case. The decision was likely to encourage states to litigate actions in state court if state law waives sovereign immunity. In state court actions, immunity continues to be allowed in the absence of consent to be sued. Depending on the type of case, different levels of immunity may apply. Absolu te immu- nity is generally allowed for judges and QUASI- JUDICIAL officers, such as prosecuting attorneys and PAROLE board members. For executive officers, immunity is a function of the amount of discretion they possess to make decisions and the circumstances in which they act (Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 94 S. Ct. 1683, 40 L. Ed. 2d 90 [1974]). Immunity has been denied to officials acting in excess of statutory authority (Greene v. Louisville and Interurban Railroad Co., 244 U.S. 499, 37 S. Ct. 673, 61 L. Ed. 1280 [1917]) or under an unconstitutional statute (Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S. Ct. 441, 52 L. Ed. 714 [1908]). Immunity has been allowed when state property is involved or the state is an essential party for granting relief (Cunningham v. Macon and Brunswick Railroad Co., 109 U.S. 446, 3 S. Ct. 292, 27 L. Ed. 992 [1883]). Until a Supreme Court decision in 1979, it was generally assumed, and decided by a court GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 280 SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY in at least one case (Paulus v. South Dakota, 52 N.D. 84, 201 N.W. 867 [1924]), that a state’s immunity must be recognized not only in its own courts but also in the courts of other states throughout the country. The U.S. Supreme Court addressed the issue in Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 99 S. Ct. 1182, 59 L. Ed. 2d 416 (1979). That case involved an employee of the University of Nevada who was driving in California on official business and injured a California resident in an automobile accident. The Supreme Court held that the common- law doctrine of sovereign immunity had not passed to the states when the United States was created; therefore, it is up to the states to decide whether to recognize and respect the immunity of other states. The Supreme Court held in Hall that California could properly refuse to respect Nevada’s sovereign immunity in the California courts. Like the federal government, the states often relied on private laws to provide relief to specific individuals who would otherwise be unable to sue due to sovereign immunity doctrines. Reco- gnizing that this arrangement was an inefficient and nonuniform way to provide relief from immunity doctrines, the states began to waive all or parts of their immunity from lawsuits. Many states created administrative bodies with limited capacity to settle claims against the state. Several states authorized suits against municipal cor- porations, counties, and school districts whose officers or employees injured individuals while performing proprietary, but not government, services. The distinction between proprietary and government services proved impossible to apply uniformly. Under modern law government services are widely considered to include police services, fire department services, and public education. Depending on the state involved, streets, sidewalks, bridges, parks, recreational facilities, electricity suppliers, gas suppliers, and airport functions can be considered either gov- ernment or proprietary services. As of 2009 most states had waived their immunity in various degrees at both the state and local government levels. State supreme courts first abolished immunity via judicial decisions; later, legislative measures were enacted at the state and local level to accept liability for torts committed by civil servants in the perfor- mance of government functions. The law varied by state and locality. The limits states place on their liability can be substantial when there is a mass tort action, such as with the collapse of the I35W bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, on August 1, 2007. Limits on how much the state will pay can produce injustice. Minnesota law limited its liability for tort actions to $300,000 per victim and $1 million total for an incident, regardless of the number of victims. With 13 people killed and 145 people suffering injuries, $1 million was clearly not enough to compensate victims. The state had previously enforced this limit on tort actions but the state legislature remedied the situation by creating a $38 million victims compensation fund. Suits Against Foreign Governments Until the twentieth century, mutual respect for the independence, legal equality, and dignity of all nations was thought to entitle each nation to a broad immunity from the judicial process of other states. This immunity was extended to heads of state, in both their personal and official capacities, and to foreign property. In the 1812 case of The Schooner Exchange v. M’Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 116, 3 L. Ed. 287, a ship privately owned by a U.S. citizen was seized in French waters by Napoleon’s government and converted into a French warship. When the ship entered the port of Philadelphia, the original owner sought to regain title, but the Supreme Court respected the confisc ation of the ship because it occurred in accordance with French law in French waters. With the emergence of socialist and Com- munist countries after WORLD WAR I,thetradi- tional rules of sovereignty placed the private companies of free enterprise nations at a com- petitive disadvantage compared to state-owned companies from socialist and Communist countries, which woul d plead immunity from lawsuits. European and U.S . businesses that engaged in transactions with such companies began to insist that all contracts waive the sovereign imm unity of the state companies. This situation led courts to reconsider the broad immunity and instead adopt a doctrine of restrictive immunity that excluded commercial activity and property. Western European co untries began waiving immunity for state commercial enterprises through bilateral or multilateral treaties. In 1952 the U.S. STATE DEPARTMENT decided that, in considering future requests for immunity, it GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 281 would follow the shift from absolute immunity to restrictive immunity. In 1976 Congress passed the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) (28 U.S.C.A. § 1601 et seq.) to provide foreign nations with immunity from the juris- diction of U.S. federal and STATE COURTS in certain circumstances. This act, which strives to con- form to INTERNATIONAL LAW, prohibits sovereign immunity with regard to commercial activities of foreign states or their agencies or with regard to property taken by a foreign sovereign in violation of international law. Customary inter- national law has continued to move toward a restrictive doctrine. The Supreme Court delved into the com- plexities of the FSIA when it addressed a U.S. federal lawsuit brought by HUMAN RIGHTS victims against the Republic of the Philippines for inju- ries suffered under former President Ferdinand Marcos. The plaintiffs recovered a $2 billion judgment and sought to recover funds from Marcos that were held in U.S. financial institu- tions, but the Philippine government laid claim to the monies as well. The plaintiffs sued the Philippines’ government and a commission that was seeking to determine what money belonged to the state and to the Marcos estate. The gov- ernment and commission invoked FSIA and asked that they be dismissed from the lawsuit. The Supreme Court ultimately agreed with the defendants and dismissed the action. Republic of the Philippines v. Pimentel,—U.S.—, 128 S.Ct. 2180, 171 L.Ed.2d 131 (2008). In an earlier case, Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 124 S.Ct. 2240, 159 L. Ed.2d 1 (2004), the court held that FSIA applies to acts committed before 1976 when FSIA was passed. The court based this conclusion on numerous provisions in the act that “unques- tionably” applied to cases arisi ng out of conduct committed before 1976. In addition, applying the law to “all pending cases regardless of when the underlying conduct occurred” fulfilled the intent of Congress to clarify the rules governing sovereign immunity claims and “eliminate[e] political participation in the resolution of such claims.” To hold otherwise would force courts to apply the confusing set of rules that existed prior to FSIA. The court also suggested that the State Department could offer its opinion on particular cases to the courts and these opinions “might well be entitled to deference as the considered judgment of the Executive on a particular question of foreign policy.” FURTHER READINGS Chemerinsky, Erwin. 2007. Federal Jurisdiction, 5th ed. New York: Aspen Publishers. Doernberg, Donald L. 2004. Sovereign Immunity and/or the Rule of Law: The New Federalism. Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. Durchslag, Melvyn R. 2002. State Sovereign Immunity: A Reference Guide to the United States Constitution. Westport, CT: Praeger. Shortell, Christopher. 2009. Rights, Remedies, and the Impact of State Sovereign Immunity. New York: State Univ. Press of New York. CROSS REFERENCES Federal Tort Claims Act; Feres Doctrine; Immunity; Judicial Immunity; Section 1983; Tort Law. SOVEREIGNTY The supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable power by which an independent state is governed and from which all specific political powers are derived; the intentional independence of a state, combined with the right and power of regulating its internal affairs without foreign interference. Sovereignty is the power of a state to do everything necessary to govern itself, such as making, executing, and applying laws; imposing and collecting taxes; making war and peace; and forming treaties or engaging in commerc e with foreign nations. The individual states of the United States do not possess the powers of external sovereignty, such as the right to deport undesirable persons, but each does have certain attributes of internal sovereignty, such as the power to regulate the acquisition and transfer of property within its borders. The sovereignty of a state is deter- mined with reference to the U.S. Constitution, which is the supreme LAW O F THE LAND. Native American tribes possess a unique brand of sovereignty that allows them the rights of U.S. citizens but also allows tribes self-governance, at least where tribal members are concerned. SPANISH-AMERICAN WAR The Spanish-American War of 1898 lasted only a few months. It resulted in a U.S. victory that not only ended Spain’s colonial rule in the Western Hemisphere but also marked the emergence of the United States as a world power, as it acquired Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam. THEODORE ROOSEVELT’s military exploits in Cuba catapulted him onto the national stage and led to the vice presidency and, ultimately, the presidency. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 282 SOVEREIGNTY The conflict had its origins in Spain’sdeter- mined effort in the 1890s to destroy the Cuban independence movement. As the brutality of the Sp anish authorities was graphically reported in U.S. newspapers, especially Joseph Pulitzer’s New York World and William Randolph Hearst’s New York Journal, the U.S. public began to support an independent Cuba. In 1897 Spain proposed to resolve the conflict by granting partial autonomy to the Cubans, but the Cuban leaders continued to call for complete independence. In December 1897, the U.S. battleship Maine was sen t to Havana to protect U.S. citizens and property. On the evening of February 15, 1898, the ship was sunk by a tremendous explosion, the cause of which was never determined. U.S. outrage at the loss of 266 sailors and the sensationalism of the New York press led to cries of “Remember the Maine” and demands that the United States intervene militarily in Cuba. President WILLIAM MCKINLEY, who had origi- nally opposed intervention, approved an April 20 congressional resolution calling for immediate Spanish withdrawal from Cuba. This resolution precipitated a Spanish declaration of war against the United States on April 24. Congress imme- diately reciprocated and declared war on Spain on April 25, stating that the United States sought Cuban independence but not a foreign empire. The war itself was brief due to the inferiority of the Spanish forces. On May 1, 1898, the Spanish fleet in Manila Bay in the Philippines was destroyed by the U.S. Navy under the command of Commodore George Dewey. On July 3, U.S. troops began a battle for the city of Santiago, Cuba. Roosevelt and his First Volun- teer Cavalry, the “Rough Riders,” led the charge up San Juan Hill; he emerged as one of the war’s great heroes. With the sinking of the Spanish fleet off the coast of Cuba on July 3 and the capture of Santiago on July 17, the war was effectively over. An ARMISTICE was signed on August 12, ending hostilities and directing that a peace conference be held in Paris by October. The parties signed the TREATY OF PARIS on December 12, 1898. Cuba was granted independence, and Spain agreed to pay the Cuban debt, which was estimated at $400 million. Spain gave the United States possession of the Philippines and also ceded Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States. Many members of the U.S. Senate opposed the treaty, however. They were con- cerned that the possession of the Philippines had made the United States an imperial power, claiming colonies just like European nations. This status as an imperial power, they argued, was contrary to traditional U.S. foreign policy, which was to refrain from external entangle- ments. The Treaty of Paris was ratified by only one vote on February 6, 1899. FURTHER READINGS Crawford, Michael J., Mark L. Hayes, and Michael D. Sessions. 1998. The Spanish-American War: Historical Overview and Select Bibliography. Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, Dept. of the Navy. Hart, Jonathan. 2008. Comparing Empires: European Colo- nialism from Portuguese Expansion to the Spanish- American War. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Hendrickson, Kenneth E. 2003. The Spanish-American War. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. Rosenfeld, Harvey. 2000. Diary of a Dirty Little War: The Spanish-American War of 1898. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Zimmermann, Warren. 2002. First Great Triumph: How Five Americans Made Their Country a World Power. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. SPECIAL APPEARANCE The act of presenting oneself in a court and thereby submitting to the court’s jurisdiction, but only for a specific purpose and not for all the purposes for which a lawsuit is brought. Teddy Roosevelt emerged as one of the Spanish-American War’s great heroes. He was photographed along with members of the First Volunteer Calvary, the “Rough Riders,” atop San Juan Hill in 1898. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION SPECIAL APPEARANCE 283 A party makes a special appearance before a state court for the sole purpose of objecting to the court’s jurisdiction over that party. If the party makes a general appearance to respond to the lawsuit, instead of a special appearance, then COMMON LAW dictates that the party thereby waives any objection to the court’s jurisdiction over her. A party may object to the court’s jurisdiction for a number of reasons, such as when SERVICE OF PROCESS was insufficient or defective, there is a variance between the com- plaint and the summons, or the lawsuit was brought in the wrong court. When a party wants to make a jurisdictional objection , she has the righ t to appear for the special purpose of making that objection, but according to com- mon law, the party must clearly and specifically state to the court that she is specially appearing. Rule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure has abolished the distinction between general and special appearances for federal courts. Therefore, parties can raise a jurisdic- tional objection along with other defenses in a responsive pleading in federal court. However, if a party wishes to make the jurisdictional objection initially without having to prepare a full responsive PLEADING, the federal courts will permit that party to do so if he specially appears. Some states have followed the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and have eliminated for state court matters the distinction between general and special appearances. Many states still ack- nowledge the distinction, however, and some specifically provide for the distinction by statute. SPECIAL ASSESSMENT A real property tax proportionately levied on homeowners and landowners to cover the costs of improvements that will be for the benefit of all upon whom it is imposed. For example, a special assessment might be made to pay for sidewalks or sewer connections. SPECIAL COURTS Bodies within the judicial branch of government that generally address only one area of law or have specifically defined powers. The best-known courts are courts of general jurisdiction, which have unlimited trial juris- diction, both civil and criminal, within their jurisdictional area. At the federal level, these are called district courts. At the state level, these courts have many different titles, including district court, trial court, county court, circuit court, municipal court, and superior court. Appellate courts of general jurisdiction review the decisions of inferior courts and are typically called either courts of appeal or supreme courts. The bulk of U.S. courts, however, are special courts, which include all courts of limited and specialized jurisdiction that are not courts of general jurisdiction or appellate courts. A special court generally addresses only one or a few areas of law or has only specifically defined powers. Special courts in the United States devel- oped out of the English custom of handling different kinds of cases by establishing many different special courts. Many of the special courts established in the United States during colonial times and shortly after the Constitution was adopted have been abolished, but new special courts continue to be created, especially at the state and local level. Special courts now handle the vast majority of all cases brought in the United States. The majority of all cases brought in any particular state jurisdiction go to special courts. Special courts exist for both civil and crimi- nal disputes. Cases tried in special, limited- jurisdiction criminal courts, such as traffic court or misdemeanor court, may be reheard in a general-jurisdiction trial court without an appeal upon the request of the parties. Special courts do not include the many ADMINISTRATIVE LAW courts that exist at both the federal and state government level; administra- tive courts are considered part of the EXECUTIVE BRANCH , rather than the judicial branch. How- ever, a general-jurisdiction court that hears only specific kinds of cases, such as a landlord-tenant branch of a general-jurisdiction trial court, is usually considered a special court. Special courts differ from general-jurisdiction courts in several other respects besides having a more limited jurisdiction. Cases are more likely to be disposed of without trial in special courts, and if there is a trial or hearing, it is usually heard more rapidly than in a court of general jurisdiction. Special courts usually do not follow the same procedural rules that general-jurisdiction courts follow; often special courts proceed without the benefit or expense of attorneys or even law-trained judges. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 284 SPECIAL ASSESSMENT The judges who serve in special courts are as varied as the special courts themselves. Most special court judges obtain their positions through election, rather than through the merit selection system common in general-jurisdiction courts. In addition, the majority of special court judges are not lawyers. In North v. Russell, 427 U.S. 328, 96 S. Ct. 2709, 49 L. Ed. 2d 534 (1976), the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the use of nonlawyer judges in special courts as consti- tutional as long as a trial de novo (a new trial) in a court of general jurisdiction with a lawyer- judge is given upon the request of the parties. State and Local Special Courts The states and localities have created many special courts. Juvenile courts are special courts that have jurisdiction over delinquent, depen- dent, and neglected children. Juvenile courts have special rules to protect the privacy of the juveniles before them, such as requiring that only the initials and not the full names of juveniles be used in court paperwork so that their identities are not revealed to the public. Juvenile court proceedings are closed to the public, and generally the records are sealed. Probate courts are special courts of limited jurisdiction that generally have powers over the probate of wills and the administration of estates. In some states probate courts are empowered to appoint guardians or approve the ADOPTION of minors. Small-claims courts, called conciliation courts in some states, provide expeditious, informal, and inexpensive adjudication of small claims. The jurisdiction of small-claims courts is usually limited to the collection of small debts and accounts. In most states parties are allowed to represent themselves in small-claims court, and some states prohibit lawyers from representing the parties. Many states have also established family courts that typically have jurisdiction over several types of cases, including CHILD ABUSE and neglect proceedings, child and spousal support pro- ceedings, PATERNITY determinations, CHILD CUSTODY proceedings, juvenile delinquency proceedings, and marital dissolutions. Several states have established tax courts that have jurisdiction to hear appeals in all tax cases and have the power to modify or change any valuation, assessment, classification, tax, or final order. Massachusetts is unique in that it has a land court with exclusive jurisdiction over all applications for registration of title to land within the commonwealth, writs of entry and various petitions for clearing title to real estate, petitions for determining the validity and extent of municipal ZONING ordinances and regulations, and all proceedings for foreclosure. Some states still have justice’s courts, inferior tribunals of limited jurisdiction presided over by justices of the peace. These courts are the primary legacy of the special courts of colonial times. Most states, however, have abolished justice’s courts and transferred their powers and duties to courts of general jurisdiction. Some cities have established mayor’s courts in which the mayor sits with the powers of a police judge or magistrate with respect to offenses committed within the city, such as traffic or ordinance violations. In other states these courts are called police courts and are not presided over by the mayor. Federal Special Courts Congress has established several special courts to adjudicate federal matters. ADMIRALTY courts are federal district courts that have jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime actions pursuant to federal statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1333). BANK- RUPTCY courts are federal courts that are con- cerned exclusively with the administration of bankruptcy proceedings; they were also created pursuant to federal statute (28 U.S.C.A. § 1334). The U.S. TAX COURT triesandadjudicatescontro- versies involving deficiencies or overpayments in income, estate, and gift taxes. U.S. magistrates try misdemeanor cases and conduct preliminary proceedings in civil and criminal proceedings. The U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR VETERANS CLAIMS was created in 1988 to review decisions of the Board of Veterans’ Appeals, which hears cases involving benefit programs for veterans and their dependents. Cases appealed from the Court of Veterans Appeals are heard by the U.S. court of appeals for the applicable federal circuit. The U.S. Court of Federal Claims was created in 1982 to replace the former Court of Claims. Its powers are mandated by federal statute (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1491 et seq.). The Claims Court has jurisdiction to render money judgments upon any claim against the United States based on the Constitution, a federal statute, or a federal regulation; any claim based on an express or implied contract with the United States; or any GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SPECIAL COURTS 285 claim for liqu idated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in TORT (not in volving torts). The Court of International Trade has jurisdiction over any civil action against the United States arising from federal laws govern- ing import transactions. It also has jurisdiction to review determinations as to the eligibility of workers, firms, and communities for adjust- ment assistance under the Trade Act of 1974 (19 U.S.C.A. §§ 2101 et seq.). Insular courts are special courts created by Congress with juris- diction over insular possessions (island territo- ries) of the United States, such as Puerto Rico. Military courts include courts-martial, courts of military review, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces, and the Military Court of Inquiry, These courts are designed to deal exclusively with issues arising under MILITARY LAW, which governs the armed forces. Courts-martial are ad hoc military courts, convened under authority of the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE (10 U.S.C.A. §§ 801 et seq.) to try and punish violations of military law committed by persons subject to that law. The courts of military review are intermediate appellate criminal courts, estab- lished by the Military Justice Act of 1968 (10 U.S.C.A. § 866) to review COURT-MARTIAL convic- tions of members of their respective ARMED SERVICES in which the punishment imposed extends to death, dismissal or punitive discharge, or confinement for one year or more. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (USCAAF), formerly known as the Court of Military Appeals, which was created by Congress in 1950 (10 U.S.C.A. § 867), functions as the primary civilian appellate tribunal responsible for reviewing court-martial convictions of all the services. Cases heard by the Courts of Military Review may be appealed to the USCAAF; any appeals from that court are heard by the U.S. Supreme Court. The Military Court of Inquiry is a court of special and limited jurisdiction, convened to investigate specific matters and advise whether further proceedings should be pursued. A Court for the Trial of Impeachments is a tribunal empowered to try any officer of govern- ment or other person brought to its bar by the process of IMPEACHMENT. At the national level, the Senate is the Court for the Trial of Impeach- ments of federal officers, and in most states the upper house of the legislature is the Court for the Trial of Impeachments of state officers. RESOURCES Bamberger, Phylis Skloot. 2003. “Specialized Courts: Not a Cure-All.” Fordham Urban Law Journal 30 (March). Davis, Wendy N. 2003. “Special Problems for Specialty Courts.” ABA Journal 89 (February). Kozlowski, Mark, and Anthony Lewis. 2003. The Myth of the Imperial Judiciary: Why the Right Is Wrong about the Courts. New York: New York Univ. Press. U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces Website. Available online at http://www.armfor.uscourts.gov (accessed August 26, 2009). Wheeler, Russell R. 1987. “Courts of Limited and Special- ized Jurisdiction.” In Encyclopedia of the American Judicial System. Vol. 2. Edited by Robert J. Janosik. New York: Scribner’s. CROSS REFERENCES Federal Courts; Jurisdiction; Judiciary; Juvenile Law; Military Law; State Courts. SPECIAL DAMAGES Pecuniary compensation for injuries that follow the initial injury for which compensation is sought. The terminology and classification of types of damages is varied, at times contradictory, and often confusing. The term “special damages” is one such term that can produce uncertainty, depending on the jurisdiction and context in which it is invoked. Special damages are sought in law suits based on contract and TORT. They are asked for in addition to “general damages.” These two types are classified as COMPENSATORY DAMAGES and are both designed to return persons to the position they were in prior to the alleged injury. For example, if a person was injured in an auto- mobile accident, the victim could seek damages that would cover medical expenses, damage to the motor vehicle, and the loss of earnings now and in the future. Each of these would be classified as special damages. If the victim sought a money award for pain and suffering, mental anguish, and loss of consortium, these would be classified as general damages. Thus, special damages are based on measurable dollar amounts of actual loss, while general damages are for intangible losses that can be inferred from special damages as well as other facts surround- ing the case. In this description special damages are damages that are reduced to a “sum certain” before trial. This description is typically used in tort actions. However, the definitions of special and general damages are reversed in contractual disputes. Thus, general damages in contract GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 286 SPECIAL DAMAGES would include the difference between contract and market prices, the difference between the value of the goods as delivered and as warranted, and interest on money that has been wrongfully withheld. In contrast, special damages would include all other damages. In contract special damages and “consequential” damages are virtu- ally interchangeable. In this context the losses flowing out of the breached contract could be compensated for as special damages. For exam- ple, the lost profits that resulted from the failure of the seller to deliver the goods could be claimed as special damages. However, it is commonplace for sellers to require buyers to sign a contract excluding the recovery of special or consequential damages. In addition, special damages are sometimes described in statutes when the legislature seeks to identify specific types of awards that are available when the state or a private person violates a person’s rights. For example, a statute may list the special damages plaintiffs are entitled to if their real property is improperly taken through EMINENT DOMAIN. FURTHER READINGS Ball, David. 2001. David Ball on Damages. Denver, Colo.: National Institute for Trial Advocacy. Brown, Mark A. and Christopher W. Smart. 2007. “Are Consequential Damages Recoverable from Title Insurers or Has There Been a Change in Policy?” The Florida Bar Journal 81 (October). Dunn, Robert L. 1998. Recovery of Damages for Lost Profits. Westport, Conn.: Lawpress Corp. Greene, Edie, and Brian H. Bornstein. 2002. Determining Damages: The Psychology of Jury Awards. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association. CROSS REFERENCES Lawsuit; Restitution. SPECIAL MASTER A special master is a representative of the court appointed to hear a case involving difficult or specialized issues. Special masters are OFFICERS OF THE COURT who serve in a QUASI-JUDICIAL role at the pleasure of the appointing court. Special masters are employed in complex civil actions where their expertise would assist the court in developing the record. In addition, special masters may be established by Congress to assist in the admin- istration of claims against the government. Rule 53 of the Feder al Rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE (FRCP) provides the authority for the appointment of special masters by U.S. District Courts. Because state civil procedure rules are modeled on the FRCP, similar authority is granted to state trial courts. Rule 53 defines the word master to include referees, auditors, examiners, and assessors. Special masters are compensated for their work. The court sets the rate of compensation, and the parties must pay these costs. However, when a federal magistrate judge serves as a master, no additional compen- sation is paid. Rule 53 was revised in 2003. The revised rule featured several changes to the previous version, including the following: (1) allowing the limited use of special masters in trials; (2) authorizing use of special masters whenever the parties consent; (3) authorizing use of masters to assist with matters during pre-trial and post- trial; (4) adopting procedures and standards for the appointment of special masters; and (5) imposing standards for reviewing a special master’s actions. When a matter is to be tried before a jury, a referral to a special master is appropriate only if the issues are complicated. If a case is not to be tried before a jury, a special master is appro- priate only when “some exceptional condition requires it.” The SUPREME COURT,inLa Buy v. Howes Leather Company (352 U.S. 249, 77 S. Ct. 309, 1 L. Ed. 2d 290 [1957]), ruled that court congestion that delayed cases for long periods did not, by itself, become an exceptional condi- tion that justified the appointment of a special master. In addition, the complexity of the case must be extreme, as many fields of CIVIL LAW are complex. To rule otherwise would deprive parties of their right to a jury trial. Though the Court made the appointment of special masters more difficult, lower courts have used masters when they could justify the complexity and exceptional nature of the case. The appointing court may speci fy or limit the powers of the master and may also limit the issues the master considers. However, once given this appointing order the special master has the authority to regulate all proceedings and to compel the production of docu ments and other evidence. In addition, the master may put witnesses and parties under oath and may examine them. Once the evidence has been taken, the special master files a report with the appointing court. This report may contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. Once GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SPECIAL MASTER 287 . Railroad Co., 1 09 U.S. 446, 3 S. Ct. 292 , 27 L. Ed. 99 2 [1883]). Until a Supreme Court decision in 197 9, it was generally assumed, and decided by a court GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 280. that general-jurisdiction courts follow; often special courts proceed without the benefit or expense of attorneys or even law- trained judges. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 284 SPECIAL ASSESSMENT The. with the appointing court. This report may contain findings of fact and conclusions of law. Once GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SPECIAL MASTER 287