Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 9 P22 ppt

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Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 9 P22 ppt

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should not be performed or allowed and mandates such party to meet the PRIMA FACIE case set forth in the complaint or AFFIDAVIT of the applicant. A SHOW CAUSE ORDER mandates that an indi- vidual or corporation make a court appearance to explain why the court should not take a proposed action. In the event that such individ- ual or corporation does not appear or provide adequate reasons why the court should take no action, action will be taken by the court. SHOW CAUSE ORDER A court order, made upon the motion of an applicant, that requires a party to appear and provide reasons why the court should not perform or not allow a particular action and mandates this party to meet the PRIMA FACIE case set forth in the complaint or AFFIDAVIT of the applicant. A show cause order, also called an order to show cause, mandates that an individual or corporation make a court appearance to explain why the court should not take a proposed action. A court issues this type of order upon the application of a party requesting specific relief and providing the court with an affidavit or declarati on (a sworn or affirmed statement alleging certain facts). A show cause order is generally used in CONTEMPT actions, cases involving injunctive relief, and situations where time is of the essence. A show cause order can be viewed as an accelerated motion. A motion is an application to the court for an order that seeks answers to questions that are collateral to the main object of the action. For example, in a civil lawsuit the plaintiff generally requests from the defendant documents pertinent to the case. If the defen- dant refuses to provide the documents or does not make a timely response to the request, the plaintiff may file a motion with the court asking that it issue an order to compel the defendant to produce the documents. A show cause order is similar to a motion but it can produce a court order on the requested relief much more quickly than a motion can. For example, after a motion is served on the opposing party, that party has a certain number of days under the jurisdiction’s rules of CIVIL PROCEDURE to prepare a response. A show cause order is submitted to a judge, who reads the applicant’s papers and decides the deadline for the responding party’ssubmissionofpapers.The judge may order an opposing party to appear “forthwith” in urgent cases. The judge may hear arguments on the matter at some place other than the courthouse, if necessary, and may allow papers to be served on opposing parties by a method not ordinarily permitted. A judge may include in the show cause order a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER or stay that maintains the status quo as long as the matter is pending before the court. At the hearing on the show cause order, if the responding party fails to rebut the prima facie case (evidence sufficient to establish a fact if uncontradicted) made by the applicant, the court will grant the relief sought by the applicant. SHOW-UP The live presentation of a criminal suspect to a victim or witness of a crime. A show-up usually occurs immediately or shortly after a crime has occurred. If law en- forcement personnel see a person they suspect is the perpetrator of a very recent crime, the officers may apprehend the suspect and bring him or her back to the scene of the crime and show him or her to witnesses, or they may take the suspect to a police station and bring the witnesses to the station. This method of iden- tification of a criminal suspect is a legitimate tool of law enforcement and is encumbered by few judicial restraints. The U.S. SUPREME COURT has ruled that an unnecessarily suggestive identification proce- dure is a violation of due process (Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 87 S. Ct. 1967, 18 L. Ed. 2d 1199 (1967)). Evidence from such an identification should be excluded from a trial of the suspect. A show-up is inherently sugges- tive because police generally do not present to a witness a person whom they believe is innocent of wrongdoing. Nevertheless, show-ups do not violate due process if they are conducted near the scene of the crime and shortly after the crime was committed . Show-ups are a valuable and practical tool in apprehending criminals. If a witness affirma- tively identifies a suspect as the perpetrator of a crime, police can detain the suspect without delay to serve the interests of public safety. If a witness fails to identify the subject of a show-up as the perpetrator, the show-up will result in the quick release of the innocent suspect and allow GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 198 SHOW CAUSE ORDER APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR REISSUANCE OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER Show Cause Order NAME OF PARTY OR ATTORNEY (and state bar number if attorney): ADDRESS WHERE YOU WANT MAIL SENT: TELEPHONE NO.: FAX NO. (Optional ): E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional ): ATTORNEY FOR (Name): SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF STREET ADDRESS: MAILING ADDRESS: CITY AND ZIP CODE: BRANCH NAME: PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: CASE NUMBER: 1. ٗ Plaintiff ٗ Petitioner (name): requests the court to reissue the Order to Show Cause and Temporary Restraining Order ("Order to Show Cause") originally issued as follows: a. Order to Show Cause was issued on (date): b. Order to Show Cause was last set for hearing on (date): c. Order to Show Cause has been reissued previously (number of times): 2. ٗ Plaintiff ٗ Petitioner requests reissuance of the Order to Show Cause because a. ٗ defendant ٗ respondent was unable to be served as required before the hearing date. b. ٗ other (specify): I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct. Date: (TYPE OR PRINT NAME) (SIGNATURE OF DECLARANT) ORDER 3. THE COURT ORDERS that the Order to Show Cause issued as shown in item 1 above is reissued and reset for hearing in this court as follows: a. Date: Time: Dept.: Room: at the street address of the court shown above. b. ٗ By the close of business on the date of this order, a copy of this order and any proof of service must be given to the law enforcement agencies named in the Order to Show Cause as follows: (1) ٗ Plaintiff ٗ Petitioner must deliver. (2) ٗ Plaintiff's ٗ Petitioner's attorney must deliver. (3) ٗ The clerk of the court must deliver. c. A copy of this order must be attached to documents to be served on defendant, as directed in the Order to Show Cause, and must be served on defendant with the Order to Show Cause. d. ALL OTHER ORDERS CONTAINED IN THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE REMAIN IN FULL FORCE AND EFFECT UNLESS MODIFIED BY THIS ORDER. The Order to Show Cause and this Order expire on the date and time of the hearing shown in the box above unless extended by the court. Date: JUDICIAL OFFICER Form Approved for Optional Use Judicial Council of California CIV-025 [Rev. January 1, 2007] APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR REISSUANCE OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER Code Civ. Proc., § 527(d)(5) CIV-025 FOR COURT USE ONLY A sample show cause order. ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION SHOW CAUSE ORDER 199 police to redirect their efforts. A show-up should be conducted shortly after a crime has been committed. If police do not apprehend a suspect until the next day, or several days or weeks afterward, they will have time to conduct a traditional, in-perso n line-up. A police line-up is a procedure in which the crime victim or witness identifies the suspect through confirmation that can be counted as evidence at the trial. During a line-up, the suspect and other individuals of similar com- plexion, build, age, height, hair color, and other similar physical qualities stand facing and profiling the identifier. The person who is making the identific ation views everyone from behind a one-way mirror for protection and confirms or denies the identification of the suspect in the line-up. One exception is when a traditional line-up is impractical. For example, if the sole witness to a crime is bedridden and approaching death, police may bring the suspect to the victim even if the crime occurred several days before the show-up (Stovall). Another type of line-up is a photo line-up. During a traditional photo line-up, photographs of the suspect and other individuals are shown to the victim or witness. If they successfully identify the suspect, the identification is consid- ered valid. Generally, a police officer shows a set of photographs to the identifier and asks whether they recognize one of the persons in the photographs as the perpetrator. A positive identification of a suspect can be used to place the suspect under arrest, and the act of identification may be used later as evidence in the prosecution of the DEFENDANT. Photo line- ups are only admissible in court if they are conducted fairly. Law enforcement officials may not persuade the witness in any way when they are identif ying the suspect. Additionally, the line-up should always include persons with very similar physical attributes. A show-up should not be performed for a witness unless the witness has displayed an ability to make a clear identification of the perpetrator of the crime. A show-up for a witness who cannot cite any identifying char- acteristics of the perpetra tor may be unneces- sarily suggestive and may be excluded from a subsequent trial of the suspect. Because a show-up generally involves de- tention of a criminal suspect, police must have a reasonable suspicion that the suspect committed a crime before subjecting the suspect to a show-up. This is a low level of certainty and need only be supported by enough articulable facts to lead a reasonable officer to believe that the suspect may have committed a crime. CROSS REFEREN CES Criminal Law; Criminal Procedure; Line-up; Photo Line-up. SIC Latin, In such manner; so; thus. A misspelled or incorrect word in a quotation followed by “[sic]” in square brackets indicates that the error appeared in the original source. It is often used as an editorial disclaimer to show the reader that the writer recognizes the error (and thus does not want the error attributed to him or her) and also to allow a precise and verbatim quotation, down to the last detail. SICK CHICKEN CASE See SCHECHTER POULTRY COR P. V. UNITED STATES. SIERRA CLUB The Sierra Club is a nonprofit, member- supported PUBLIC INTEREST organization that promotes conservation of the natural environ- ment by influencing PUBLIC POLICY decisions. It consists of the national organization, located in San Francisco, California, 65 chapters, and approximately 365 local grou ps. In addition, the Sierra Club organizes participation in wilderness activities for its members, including mountain climbing, backpacking, and camping. It is the oldest and largest nonprofit, grassroots environmental organization in the world, with more than 1.3 million members as of 2009. The organization was founded on June 4, 1892, by a group of 162 California residents. The Sierra Club’s first president was John Mu ir, a pioneer in the promotion of national parks and the protection of the environment. Muir involved the club in political action, leading a successful fight to preserve Yosemite as a national park. Muir and the club also lobbied for the creation of national parks at the Grand Canyon and Mount Rainier in the late nine- teenth century. The Sierra Club drew national attention during the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt, when Muir got the presi- dent interested in creating more national parks. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 200 SIC The Sierra Club did not seek members outside of California until 1950, when mem- bership stood at 10,000. Membership has increased dramatically since that time, due in large part to the club’s intense interest in protecting the environment. Since 1970 the club has played a major role in gaining legislative support for many federal environ- mental protection measures, including the establishment of the ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY and the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the passage of the ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT, the CLEAN AIR ACT, the CLEAN WATER ACT, the National Forest Management Act, and the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act. The Sierra Club has also campaigned for similar state legislation. During the 1990s the Sierra Club filed lawsuits seeking to require the federal govern- ment to enforce provisions of the Endangered Species Act and the Clean Air Act. The organization also protested global trade that did not include adequate environmental pro- tection controls. In the early 2000s the Sierra Club also advocated for the cleanup of toxic wastes, resolution of the problems of solid waste disposal, promotion of sustainable population and family planning, and reversal of ozone depletion and global warming. In 2003, the Sierra Club highlighted the evasion of state and local pollution controls by many of the nation’s “animal factories,” sprawling establishments where thousands of animals are produced and housed in strict confinement before being transported to slaughterhouses. The Sierra Club was active in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections, airing televi- sion advertisements about the major party candidates’ positions on environmental issues. Through the Environmental Voter Education Campaign (EVEC), the Sierra Club sought to mobilize volunteers for phone banking, door- to-door canvassing, and postcard writing to emphasize these issues in the campaign. The Sierra Club is currently governed by a 15-member volunteer board of directors. Each year, five directors are elected to three-year terms, and all club members are eligible to vote. A president is elected annually by the board from among its members and receives a small stipend. The executive director runs the day-to-day operations of the group and is a paid staff member. FURTHER READINGS Burton, Lloyd. 2002. Worship and Wilderness: Culture, Religion, and Law in Public Lands Management. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press. Clifton, Carr. 1990. Wild by Law: The Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund and the Places It Has Saved. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books. Ehrlich, Gretel. 2000. John Muir: Nature’s Visionary. Washington, D.C.: National Geographic. Sierra Club. Available online at www.sierraclub.org (accessed November 21, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Environmental Law; Environmental Protection Agency. SIGHT DRAFT A COMMERCIAL PAPER that is payable upon present- ment. When a draft or bill of exchange is payable at sight, money may be immediately collected upon presentment to the drawee named in the instrument. SIGNATURE A mark or sign made by an individual on an ins- trument or document to signify knowledge, ap- proval, acceptance, or obligation. The term signature is generally understood to mean the signing of a written document with one’s own hand. However, it is not critical that a signature actually be written by hand for it to be legally valid. It may, for example, be typewritten, engraved, or stamped. The purpose of a signature is to authenticate a writing, or provide notice of its source, and to bind the individual signing the writing by the provisions contained in the document. Because a signature can obligate a party to terms of a contract or verify that the person intended to make a last will and testament, the law has developed rules that govern what constitutes a legally valid signature. The INTER- NET and other forms of telecommunication have created the need to transact legally binding agreements electronically. Almost all states have passed laws that recognize the validity of “digital signatures.” Requisites and Validity When an instrument must be signed, it is ordinarily adequate if the signature is made in any commonly used manner. Variations be- tween the signature and the name appearing in GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SIGNATURE 201 the body of the instrument do not automatically invalidate the instrument. In the absence of a statutory prohibition, an individual can use any char acter, symbol, figure, or designation he wishes to adopt as a signature, and if he uses it as a substitute for his name, he is bound by it. For example, if a contract refers to “William Jones” but Jones signs his name “Bill Jones,” the contract is still enforceable against him. An individual can also use a fic- titious name or the name of a business firm. A signature might also be adequate to validate an instrument even if it is virtually illegible. The entire name does not have to be written, and the inclusion of a middle name is not significant. An individual satisfies the sign ing require- ment when someone who has been duly authorized to sign for him does so. In the event a statute mandates an instrument be signed in person, the signature must be made in the signer’s own hand or at his request and in his presence by another in dividual. In a situation where an individual intends to sign as a witness but instead inadvertently signs the instrument in the place where the principal is to sign, the fact that he should have signed as a witness can be shown. Conversely when a signer intends to sign as a principal but instead signs in the place for a w itness, that fact can also be shown. Abbreviations, Initials, or Mark In situations that do not require a more com- plete signature, an instrument can be properly signed when the initial letter or letters of the given name or names are used together with the surname (J. Doe), when only the full surname is used (Doe), when only the given name is used (John), or even when only the initials are used (J. D.). A mark is ordinarily a cross or X made in substitution for the signature of an individual who is unable to write. In the absence of contrary statutory provision, a mark can be used by an individual who knows how to write but is unable to do so because of a physical illness or disability. A mark has the same binding effect upon the individual making it as does a signature. In some statutes a signature is defined as including a mark made by an individual who is infirm or illiterate. Generally the name of the person who makes his mark can be written by anyone, and the mark is not necessarily in validated because the individual writing the name accompany- ing the mark misspells the name. In the absence of a statute that requires a name to accompany the mark, the validity of the mark as a signature is not affected by the fact that a name does not accompany it. When a mark is used as a signature, it can be put wherever the signature can appear. When there is a requirement that the name must accompany the mark, the fact that the mark and the name are not in immediate proximity does not invalidate the mark. Certain statutes mandate that a witness must attest to a signature made by a mark. Under such statutes, if the mark is not properly witnessed, the instrument is not signed and is legally ineffective. These laws were enacted to prevent FRAUD, because it is difficult, if not impossible, to later determine if the alleged signer actually made the mark. Hand of Party or Another A signature can be written by the hand of the purported signer, either through the signer’s unaided efforts or with the aid of another individual who guides the signer’s pen or pencil. In cases when the maker’s hand is guided or steadied, the signature is the maker’s act, not the act of the assisting individual. A signature can generally be made by one individual for another in his presence and at his direction, or with his assent, unless prohibited by statute. A signature that is made in this manner is valid, and the individual writing the name is regarded merely as an instrument through which the party whose signature is written exercises personal discretion and acts for himself. Method Ordinarily a signature can be affixed in a number of different ways. It can be hand written, printed, stamped, typewritten, engraved, or photographed. This allows, for example, a business to issue its payroll checks with the signature of its financial officer stamped rather than handwritten. Digital Signatures The computer and TELECOMMUNICATIONS have changed how work is done and how it is exchanged. Both business and the legal system GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 202 SIGNATURE have begun to explore ways of using the Internet and other forms of electronic communication to transact work. Court systems cannot permit the electronic filing of legal documents, however, unless the documents have been authenticated as coming from the sender. Similarly, businesses will not enter into contracts using the Internet or E-MAIL unless they can authenticate that the other contracting party actually made the agreement. Computers and digital scanners can reproduce handwritten signatures, but they are susceptible to forgery. A solution has been the legal recognition of “digital signatures.” The majority of states have enacted statutes that allow digital signatures in intrastate transactions. In 2000 President BILL CLINTON signed into law the Electronic Signa- tures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub. L. No. 106-229, 114 Stat. 464, also called the E-Sign Act, which essentially valid ates electronic contracts in interstate and foreign commerce. The act does not apply to certain types of documents, includin g wills, DIVORCE notices, and documents that are associated with court proceedings. A digital signature is based on cryptography, which uses mathematical formulas, or algo- rithms, to scramble message s. Using encryption and decryption software, the sender can scram- ble the message and the recipient can unscram- ble it. To affix a digital signature to an electronic document, a signer must obtain electronic “keys.” The keys are assigned in pairs: a private key and a public key. A person creates his keys using a software program. The digi tal signature is affixed to the electronic document using the private key. The “signer” types in a password, similar to a personal identification number for an auto- matic teller machine. The private key then generates a long string of numbers and letters that represent the digital signature, or public key. The recipient of the message runs a software program using this public key to authenticate that the document was signed by the private key and that the document has not been altered during transmission. It is mathematically infeasible for a person to derive another person’s private key. The only way to compromise a digital signature is to give another person access to the signature software and the password to the private key. FURTHER READINGS Hurewitz, Barry J., and Bipassa Nadon. 2002. “Electronic Signature Standards Create Contracting Options.” Jour- nal of Internet Law 6 (September). Mason, Stephen. 2007. Electronic Signatures in Law. 2d ed. United Kingdom: Tottel Publishing. Saunders, Margot. 2003. “A Case Study of the Challenge of Designing Effective Electronic Consumer Credit Dis- closures: The Interim Rule for the Truth in Lending Act.” North Carolina Banking Institute 7 (April). Whitaker, R. David. 2003. “An Overview of Some Rules and Principles for Delivering Consumer Disclosures Elec- tronically.” North Carolina Banking Institute 7 (April). White House. Office of the Press Secretary. 2000. “Elimi- nating Barriers to Electronic Commerce While Protect- ing Consumers: The Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act.” June 30. Wims, Michael D. 1995. “Law and the Electronic Highway: Are Computer Signatures Legal?” Criminal Justice 10 (spring). CROSS REFERENCE Authentication. SIMPLE Unmixed; not aggravated or compounded. A simple assault, for examp le, is one that is not accompanied by any circumstances of aggravation, such as assault with a deadly weapon. Simple inter est is a fixed amount paid in exchange for a sum of money lent. The interest generated on the amount borrowed does not itself earn interest, unlike interest earned where parties agree to compound interest. SIMPSON, O. J. The criminal and civil trials of Orenthal James (“O. J.”) Simpson, a former football star, actor, and television personality, regarding the mur- ders of his former wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and Ronald Goldman, a local restaurant waiter, were two of the most contro versial and highly publicized proceedings in U.S. LEGAL HISTORY. The lengthy criminal trial, which ended in Simpson’s ACQUITTAL for the two murders in October 1995, was nationally televised. In the civil trial, in which the estates of the two MURDER victims sued Simpson for damages for the victims’ WRONGFUL DEATHS, a jury in February 1997 awarded the heirs of the victims a total of $33.5 million. In both proceedings, but especially in the criminal trial, the issue of race played a dominant role. Simpson, an African American, was portrayed by his attor- neys as another victim of the racist beliefs GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SIMPSON, O. J. 203 and behavior of members of the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD). In the early hours of June 13, 1994, the bodies of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman were found lying in a pool of blood outside Nicole Simpson’s Brentwood, Califor- nia, condominium. Both victims had been brutally stabbed to death on the evening of June 12, but there were no eyewitnesses. After the slayings, Nicole Simpson’s dog was found wandering around the upscale neighborhood with bloody paws. Simpson voluntarily gave an interview to LAPD detectives the day after the murder. Five days after the murders, LAPD charged Simpson with the deaths, citing a trail of evidence they said linked the celebrity to the crime scene, including a bloody glove found outside the condominium that allegedly matched one found at Simpson’s estate. On the day Simpson was to surrender to police, he and a friend, Al C. Cowlings, disappeared. Simpson left behind a note professing his love for Nicole, claiming his innocence, and implying that he would commit suicide. Police traced calls from Simp- son’s cellular phone, locating him in a vehicle traveling on a Los Angeles freeway. The ensuing slow-speed chase, which was nationally televised from helicopter cameras, ended back at Simp- son’s Brentwood home, where he was arrested. Simpson’s criminal trial began on January 25, 1995. He had assembled a team of law yers that included ROBERT L. SHAPIRO; JOHNNIE L. COCHRAN JR., a leading Los Angeles defense attorney; F. LEE BAILEY, a nationally known criminal defense attorney; ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, a Harvard law professor; Gerald F. Uelman, the dean of Stanford University Law School; and Barry Scheck and Peter J. Neufeld, New York attorneys skilled in handling DNA EVIDENCE. The group of prosecutors from the Los Angeles county attorney’s office was led by MARCIA R. CLARK and Christopher A. Darden. Presiding at the trial was Superior Court Judge Lance A. Ito. In its opening statements the prosecution argued that Simpson’s history of DOMESTIC VIOLENCE against Nicole Brown Simpson showed a link to her murder. His pattern of abuse and his need to control his former wife culminated, according to Clark, in her murder, “the final and ultimate act of control.” Goldman was murdered, continued Clark, because he got in the way, arriving at the Brentwood condomin- ium to return a pair of misplaced eyeglasses at the same time that Simpson was attacking Nicole Brown Simpson. The defense team, which Cochran domi- nated, asserted that the LAPD fabricated the physical evidence and that Simpson had been on his way to a golf outing in Chicago when the crimes were committed. The prosecution pre sented the testimony of neighbors in the vicinity of the murder scene and of a limousine driver who arrived early at Simpson’s home that night to establish that Simpson had time to commit the murders and return home shortly after the driver arrived. It also introduced the “bloody glove” found behind Simpson’s guest house, a glove that matched one found at the crime scene. The prosecution called DNA experts to testify that blood found at the crime scene matched Simpson’s blood and that blood from both of the victims was found in Simpson’s vehicle and on socks found in his bedroom. In addition, a bloody shoe print found at the crime scene appeared to match an expensive brand of shoes that Simps on had owned, but which could not be found. The defense team aggressively challenged almost every prosecution witness but leveled its harshest attacks on the credibility of the LAPD. Scheck attacked the way the blood and fiber evidence was collected and suggested that the police had used blood from a sample given by the defendant to concoct false evidenc e. Scheck and Neuf eld also challenged the credibility of The murder trial of former football great O.J. Simpson was among the most highly publicized trials in U.S. history. Simpson was acquitted of murder but was later sentenced to at least nine years in prison after his involvement in an armed robbery. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 204 SIMPSON, O. J. the prosecution’s DNA experts, subjecting the jury to weeks of highly technical discussion of DNA analysis. The defense also argued that the police had rushed to judgment that Simpson was the prime suspect. Cochran and Bailey cross-examined the police officers who had gone to Simpson’s home early on the morning after the murders. These officers had not sought a SEARCH WARRANT but went into the residence based on the belief that Simpson himself might have been the target of the murderer. The defense challenged this justification and attempted to show that one of the officers, Mark Fuhrman, was a racist who planted the bloody glove that morning. Events in the trial confirmed that Fuhrman had lied under oath when he said he had not said the word “nigger ” in the past ten years. As the prosecution case proceeded, the defense used every opportunity to demonstrate to the predominantly African American jury that the police had engaged in a CONSPIRACY to frame Simpson. The dramatic point of the trial was the prosecution’s request that Simpson try on the bloody gloves. Simpson, wearing thin plastic gloves, strained to pull on the leather gloves and announced that they were too small and did not fit. This proved to be a damaging incident for the prosecution. In his CLOSING ARGUMENT, Cochran repeatedly stated, “If the gloves don’t fit, you must acquit.” In October 1995, after 266 days of trial, the jury found Simpson not guilty of the murders. Cochran, in his closing argument, had implored the jury to acquit Simpson and send a message to the LAPD and white America that African Americans should not be the victims of a racist police and justice system. According to opinion polls, his argument sounded a strong chord in African America ns, because a majority of them believed that Simpson was in nocent. Polls also showed that, in contrast, most whites believed that Simpson was guilty. Despite the acquittal, Simpson had to defend himself in a civil lawsuit filed by the parents of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Goldman. In contrast to the criminal trial, the civil case was not televised, thereby reducing the intensity of the press coverage. In addition, the plaintiffs had the opportunity to depose many witnesses before trial, including Simpson, who did not testify at the criminal trial. The plaintiffs’ lead attorney, Daniel M. Petrocelli, fiercely examined Simpson at the DEPOSITION and again at the trial, pointing out the inconsistencies in his various accounts. Petrocelli mocked Simpson’s contention that he had never beaten Nicole Brown Simpson, despite police reports, photographs, and testi- mony of other witnesses. The most crucial piece of evidence became the bloody shoe print at the crime scene. At his deposition Simpson said he had never owned a pair of the “ugly-assed shoes” that had made the shoe print. Simpson repeated this claim at trial, but Petrocelli produced thirty-on e photographs of Simpson at public events showing that he had indeed worn the exact model of shoes prior to the murders. Finally Petrocelli argued that Simpson committed the murders because he could not control his temper: When Nicole Brown Simpson rejected him for good in the spring of 1994, he erupted in the same uncontrollable rage that had caused him to lash out at her in the past, only this time he used a knife. In February 1997 the jury awarded the plaintiffs $8.5 million in COMPENSATORY DAMAGES and $25 million in PUNITIVE DAMAGES. The jury awarded the punitive damages based on an expert’s testimony that Simpson could earn $25 million over the rest of his life by trading on his notoriety with book deals, movi e contracts, speaking tours, and memorabilia sales. The jury did not want Simpson to profit from the crimes. Superior Court Judge Hiroshi Fujisaki, who had conducted the trial, upheld the damages award. Simpson announced that he planned to appeal the case. The plaintiffs obtained a court order permitting the seizure of many of Simpson’s assets to pay the multimillion-dollar judgment. Simpson, who had regained custody of his two children that he had with Nicole Brown Simpson, claimed he was near financial insol- vency. Nevertheless, the plaintiffs’ attorneys returned to court numerou s times in 1997 seeking disclosure of Simpson’s assets, contend- ing that he was attempting to hide them. More than 14 years after the initial trial, Simpson re-entered the news when he was convicted on a variety of charges stemming from his role in breaking into a hotel room in an effort to retrieve memorabilia. The Nevada judge who presided over the case showed no mercy for Simpson, sentencing the celebrity to GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SIMPSON, O. J. 205 33 years in prison. Simpson would not be eligible for parole for nine years. Many of Simpson’s items of value, including his He isman Trophy, were sold at auction to satisfy the Goldman judgment. A market existed for Simpson items, due in large part to the novelty of having items that once belonged to the disgraced star. During the first decade of the 2000s, Simpson attempted to write a book, entitled If I Did It, which Simpson said was a hypothetical account of how he might have committed the murders. In June 2007 a federal bankruptcy judge in Miami awarded the rights to the book to the Goldman family. The Goldman family retitled the book as If I Did It: Confessions of the Killer and published the book on September 13, 2007. As the Goldmans aggressively pursued the items, Simpson continued his efforts to hide personal possessions. At one point, Simpson’s former manager, Mike Gilbert, allegedly removed several valuables from Simpson’shomesothat the Goldmans could not recover the items. On the same day that the Goldmans published If I Did It: Confessions of the Killer, Simpson and five others convened at the Palace Station hotel- casino in Las Vegas. Simpson forcibly entered the room of two memorabilia dealers named Alfred Beardsley and Bruce Fromong, who allegedly purchased the items from Gilbert. Another memorability dealer named Thomas Riccio secretly recorded the break-in, during at least one of the men brandished a gun. Fromong later said that Simpson never brandished a gun. However, Riccio maintained that Simpson w a s the one who organized the break-in, which lasted about five or six minutes. Within days, Simpson and his accomplices were arrested and charged with several crimes, including kidnapping and armed robbery. On September 19, Simpson was freed on $125,000 bail, after which he returned to his home in Florida. Within a month, three of Simpson’s accomplices agreed to plea deals that would require them to testify against Simpson. On November 14, 2007, Simpson and two accom- plices were charged with 12 crimes, to which the defendants pleaded not guilty. One, Charles Ehrlich, eventually agreed to testify against Simpson in a plea bargain. Simpson had been ordered not to contact his co-defendants, but he violated this order by leaving a message for one with a bail bondsman. On January 16, 2008, Judge Jackie Glass repri- manded Simpson and doubled Simpson’s bail. Up to this time, it appeared to be questionable whether the prosecution would move forward. The witnesses had given conflicting accounts of the incident, and most involved were perceived to be shady characters. Nevertheless, on September 15, 2008, the trial began. Simpson ’s lawyers attempted to discredit the witnesses and tri ed to convince the jury that Simpson’s motive was simply to retrieve items that belonged to him. Simpson did not testify during the trial, which some experts said was a mistake. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury deliberated for 13 hours before rendering its verdict. Simpson and Stewart were both found guilty on all 12 counts, including kidnapping, armed robbery, conspir- acy, coercion, BURGLARY, and assault with a deadly weapon. At his sentencing hearing, Simpson gave a rambling speech during which he said, “I didn’t want to steal anything from anyone. I’m sorry, sorry.” Despite Simpson’s plea, Judge Glass showed no leniency. On December 5, Glass sentenced Simpson to a maximum of 33 years in prison. He is currently serving time at Lovelock Correctional Center in Lovelock, Nevada. In a twist of fate, the items that Simpson sought to retrieve from the memora- bilia dealers ended up in the hands of Goldman. When Simpson was sentenced, Goldman told reporters, “We are thrilled, and it’s a bittersweet moment. It was satisfying seeing him in shackles like he belongs.” FURTHER READINGS Alschuler, Albert W. 1998. “How to Win the Trial of the Century: The Ethics of Lord Brougham and the O.J. Simpson Defense Team. McGeorge Law Review 29 (spring). Cotterill, Janet. 2003. Language and Power in Court: A Linguistic Analysis of the O.J. Simpson Trial. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Dershowitz, Alan M. 1997. Reasonable Doubts: The Criminal Justice System and the O.J. Simpson Case. New York: Simon & Schuster. Schuetz, Janice, and Lin S. Lilley, ed. 1999. The O.J. Simpson Trials: Rhetoric, Media, and the Law. Carbondale: Southern Illinois Univ. Press. Stuntz, William J. 2001. “O.J. Simpson, Bill Clinton, and the Transsubstantive Fourth Amendment.” Harvard Law Review 114 (January). CROSS REFEREN CES Cameras in Court; DNA Evidence. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 206 SIMPSON, O. J. SIMULTANEOUS DEATH Loss of life by two or more individuals concur- rently or pursuant to circumstances that render it impossible to ascertain who predeceased whom. The issue of who died first frequently arises in cases determining the inheritance of property from spouses who die simultaneously. Generally the answer must be derived from all the surrounding circu mstances. At COMMON LAW, the law would not intervene and make the assumption that one individual or another had died first but would await proof, no matter how slight that might be. Since this created a problem when no satisfactory proof existed, various states enacted statutes allowing judges to presume that one individual survived another under certain circumstances. Because those state statutes that created presumptions proved inadequate, a majority of the states enacted the Uniform Simultaneous Death Act. Although some slight variations exist from on e state to another, the law essentially provides that property will be inherited or distributed as if each person had outlived the other. This prevents the property from passing into the estate of a second person who is already deceased only to be distributed immediately from that estate, a wasteful procedure that precipitates additional LEGAL PROCEEDINGS, costs, and estate taxes. The Simultaneous Death Act cannot be applied if evidence exists that one individual outlived the other. The act only applies when it cannot be determined who died first. Ordinarily the persons involved need not have died in a COMMON DISASTER but might have died in different places and under different circumstances, and it still might be impossible to prove that one survived the other. A 1985 Illinois case provides an example of where Simultaneous Death Act was held inapplicable because the court found it possible to ascertain who died first. Janus v. Tarasewicz, 135 Ill.App.3d 936, 482 N.E.2d 418, 90 Ill.Dec. 599 (Ill. App. 1 Dist. 1985) arose out of a freakish series of events that began in the Chicago area in 1982. Adam Janus unluckily purchased a bottle of Tylenol capsules that had been laced with cyanide by an unknown perpetrator prior to its sale at retail. On the evening of September 29, 1982, the day of Adam’s death, his brother, Stanley Janus, and Stanley’s wife, Theresa Janus, having just returned from their honeymoon, gathered in mourning at Adam’s home with other family members. Not yet knowing how Adam died, Stanley and Theresa innocently compounded the tragedy by taking some of the contaminated capsules themselves. Upon their arrival at the intensive care unit of a hospital emergency room, neither showed visible vital signs. Hospi- tal personnel never succeeded in establishing any spontaneous blood pressure, pulse, or signs of respiration in Stanley and pronounced him dead. Hospital personnel did succeed in estab- lishing a measurable, though unsatisfactory, blood pressure in Theresa. Although she had very unstable vital signs, remained in a coma, and had fixed and dilated pupils, she was placed on a mechanical respirator and remained on the respirator for two days before she was pro- nounced dead on October 1, 1982. Stanley had a $100,000 life-insurance policy that named Theresa as primary BENEFICIARY and his mother, Alojza Janus, as contingent benefi- ciary. The 1953 version of the Uniform Simulta- neous Death Act, in force in Illinois, provides that if there is no sufficient evidence that the insured and beneficiary have died otherwise than simultaneously, the proceeds of the policy shall be distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary. The Illinois Court of Appeals held the act to be inapplicable because a PREPONDER- ANCE OF THE EVIDENCE established that Theresa survived Stanley, albeit by only a couple of days. The result: The proceeds of Stanley’s $100,000 policy did not go to his mother, Alojza, as contingent beneficiary, but to Theresa’sfather, Jan Tarasewicz, as administrator of her estate. The BURDEN OF PROOF is on the person alleging survivorship of a decedent, and the degree of proof is the preponderance of the evidence. In re Estate of Miller 840 So.2d 703 (Miss. 2003). Survivorship may be proven by direct or CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE, and the issue is one of fact for the trial co urt’s determination. In re Estates of Perry 40 P.3d 492 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 3 2001). The minimum evidence required to sustain the burden of proof is sufficient evidence to demonstrate a positive sign of life in one body and the absence of any such sign in the other after an examination of both bodies has been made. It is necessary to prove only that one party survived the other by at least one second. There is no pre sumption that one victim survived another, based on age, sex, and physical condition, although such facts, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SIMULTANEOUS DEATH 207 . GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION SHOW CAUSE ORDER 199 police to redirect their efforts. A show-up should. result in the quick release of the innocent suspect and allow GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 198 SHOW CAUSE ORDER APPLICATION AND ORDER FOR REISSUANCE OF ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE AND. the issue of race played a dominant role. Simpson, an African American, was portrayed by his attor- neys as another victim of the racist beliefs GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION SIMPSON,

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