diary. Weinberger had given them to the LIBRARY OF CONGRESS , with the requirement that no one could read them without his personal consent. Throughout Iran-Contra investigations, Wein- berger had repeatedly testified to Congress and the Tower Commission that he had argued against the arms-for-hostages scheme when it was discussed by White House officials. Walsh did not make Weinberger’s involvement an issue in the 1992 indictment. Instead, he zeroed in on Weinberger’s testimony under oath that he had not kept notes or a personal diary during the arms sale period. The discovery of the notes in the Library of Congress suggested that Weinberger had presented false testimony. On June 19, 1992, Weinberger pleaded not guilty to all five felony charges. Judge Thomas F. Hogan set a tentative trial date of November 2, 1992, one day before the presidential election. This timing raised the question of whether Weinberger’s trial would cause political embar- rassment for President George H. W. Bush, who was campaigning against BILL CLINTON. Four days before the election, Walsh announced a new indictment against Weinberger. It centered on a note that had been written by Weinberger about a 1986 White House meeting and that seemed to contradict Bush’s claim that as VICE PRESIDENT he had not been involved in the arms-for- hostages decision making. Senate Republicans, angered by the indictment, asked the Justice Department to name an independent counsel to investigate whether the Clinton campaign had been behind the indictment. Attorney General WILLIAM P. BARR denied the request. The case progressed no f urt her. I n a surprise reprieve on Christmas Eve, 1992, President Bush pardoned We inberger and five others i mplicated in the Iran-Contra Affair. The pardon cited Weinberger’s record of public and m ilitary service, his recent ill health, and a desire to put Iran- Contra to rest. Bush a lso pardone d former assistant secretary of st ate Elliot Abrams; former CIA officials Clair George , Duane Cl arridge, and Alan Fiers; and former national security adviser McFarlane. Bush deemed all six men patriots and said their prosecution represented not law en- forcement but the “criminalization of policy differences,” essen tially repeating his l ong-stan ding argument that Iran-Contra w as really a c ase where Democrats h ad pursued a political witch-hunt t o punish Republican offic ials over dis agreements on foreignpolicy(GrantofExec. CLEMENCY,Procla- mation No. 6518, 57 Fed. Reg. 62,145). Reaction to the pardons divided along party lines, with Republicans hailing Bush and Democrats criticizing him. Walsh accused Bush of furthering a cover-up and thwarting judicial process. He had long maintained that top Reagan administrat ion officials had engaged in a cover-up to protect their president. Now, he promised, Bush would become the subject of his remaining investiga tion. Bush’s only testimony had taken place in a January 1988 videotaped deposition. An unset- tled question was why Bush’s personal diaries were withheld from prosecutors for six years; their existence was only disclosed to the independent counsel’s office following the 1992 presidential election. Throughout 1993, Walsh sought to interview the former president but was blocked by Bush’s attorneys. Bush consistently insisted on placing limits on any interview. Walsh refused those limits, com- plained that Bush was stalling the investigation, and ultimately abandoned the attempt to ques- tion Bush. Walsh also chose, in 1993, not to indict another high-ranking Reagan administration official, former attorney general EDWIN MEESE III. In 1986 Meese said that Reagan did not know about the arms sales to Iran. Walsh contended that the statement was false, but admitted that building a criminal case against Meese would have been difficult: too much time had passed and could therefore have bolstered memory loss as a defense. On August 6, 1992, after six-and-a-half years and $35.7 million, Walsh concluded the Iran-Contra investigation and submitted his final report to the special court that had appointed him. By 1993 the Iran-Contra Affair seemed over, in one sense. The STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS on crimes that may have been committed during it had expired, and no further prosecution would be forthcoming. However, additional revelations followed as historians sifted through emerging evidence, notably in the memoirs of key participants. The lessons of the affair continued to be debated. Some said that Iran-Contra exposed a pattern of zealous disregard, by the EXECUTIVE BRANCH, of legislative co nstraint on foreign policy, that dated back to the VIETNAM WAR. Others took the view held by the Reagan and Bush administrations: namely, that nothing terrib le had happened. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 518 IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR FURTHER READINGS Walsh, Lawrence E. 1993. Final Report of the Independent Counsel for Iran/Contra Matters. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Available online at http:// www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/walsh/; website home page: http://www.fas.org (accessed August 2, 2009). ——— . 1998. Firewall: The Iran-Contra Conspiracy and Cover-Up. New York: Norton. Wolf, Julie. “The Iran-Contra Affair.” PBS People & Events. Available online at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/ reagan/peopleevents/pande08.html; website home page: http://www.pbs.org (accessed September 5, 2009). IRAQ WAR The Iraq War involved the invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq by U.S. and U.N. forces beginning in March 2003. The Iraq War, also known as Operation Iraqi Freedom, involved the invasion of Iraq by multinational forces along with the subsequent occupation of the country by U.S. and other UNITED NATIONS (UN) forces. In many ways, the conflict was a continua tion of the first Gulf War, which took place in 1990 and 1991. The Iraq War resulted in the overthrow of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein, who was executed in 2006. The hostilities in Iraq followed extensive efforts by the UN to disarm Iraq through dip- lomatic means. Efforts of the UN broke down, though, as U.S. and British military forces crossed into Iraq during March 2003. These military forces represented a coalition of nations seeking to enforce UN resolutions that required Iraq to disarm itself by destroying and accounting for its WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (WMDs). Diplomacy Gives Way to Force as a Means of Disarming Iraq The original Persian Gulf War began when Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990. In response, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 678, authorizing the UN to use force to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait and restore peace to the region. The Resolution gave Iraq until January 15, 1991, to comply. When Saddam Hussein allowed the deadline to pass without removing his forces, the United States led an international coalition of more than 90 nations in a six-week war—dubbed “Operation Desert Storm” by President GEORGE H. W. BUSH—that liberated Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. Fighting ended on March 1, 1991, and two days later, Iraq accepted UN Resolution 687, which set out the conditions of ceas efire. Specifically, Resolution 687 imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its WMDs, which were defined to include all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. Resolution 687 suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under Resolution 678. A material breach of Resolution 687 would revive the authority to use force under Resolution 678. Working with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA ), the UN Security Coun- cil established the UN Special Commission (UNSCOM) in April 1991 to ensure that Iraq eliminated all of its WMDs and undertook no efforts to later develop or acquire such weapons. Iraq cooperated in part with UN inspections efforts until 1996, when Iraq began to block inspections at what it deemed “sensitive military sites,” including certain presidential palaces. A year later, Iraq demanded that UN inspectors leave the country, claiming that some of the inspectors were U.S. and British spies. By 1998, all UNCOMS inspectors had be en withdrawn from Iraq. In 1999, the UN created the United Nations Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC) to replace UNSCOM, but Iraq declined to allow inspections by the new body either. For the next two and a half years, the ongoing problems with the Iraq weapons inspection took a backseat to the impeachment proceedings against President BILL CLINTON and the 2000 presidential election between GEORGE W. BUSH and AL GORE. However, the Iraq situation was revisited after September 11, 2001, when more than 3,000 people died in terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C. Lacking proof that Iraq was connected with either the September 11 attacks or the al Qaeda terrorist network that was allegedly responsible for coordinating the attacks, Bush told Americans in November 2001 that force would be used to disarm Iraq and remove Saddam from power if the Iraqi president did not allow the UN to resume its inspections for WMDs. Anti-U.S. terrorists had proven their willingness to use WMDs to kill Americans, the president argued, and Saddam had proven his capacity to manu- facture WMDs. So while there may have been no conclusive proof establishing a link between al Qaeda and Saddam, Bush said that his duties as president prevented him from waiting to protect Americans from “another September 11.” On January 29, 2002, Bush stepped up the rhetoric in his State of the Union address, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION IRAQ WAR 519 identifying Iraq, Iran, and North Korea as members of the “axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world.” The president told Congress that he “would not wait on events while dangers gather,” suggesting that he was contemplating pre-emptive strikes against those nations armed with WMDs. Secretary of State Colin Powell persuaded the president that if Saddam was to be disarmed, it was best to do so with the backing of the international commu- nity. The UN Security Council, Powell said, was ready to force Iraq to accept weapons inspectors for the first time since 1998. Bush pressed his case for resumed inspections before the UN on September 12, 2002. Two months later, on November 8, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1441, which declared that Iraq was in material noncompliance with Resolution 687, but gave Iraq a final opportunity to abide by its disarma- ment obligations. The resolution warned of “serious consequences” were Iraq again to be found in material breech of its disarmament obligations, but left undefined what that term meant. Iraq accepted the UN resolution and delivered a 12,000-page declaration of its weap- ons programs in December 2002. After reviewing the report, Hans Blix, executive chairman of UNMOVIC, told the Security Council that the declaration “is essentially a reorganized version” of information Iraq provided UNSCOM in 1997 and t hat it “is not enough to create confidence” that Iraq had destroyed its WMDs. On January 27, 2003, Blix again appeared before the Security Council, this time to report that after 60 days of UN inspections Iraq “appears not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today” of demands that it disarm. In particular, Blix said that Iraq had failed to demonstrate it had destroyed 10,000 liters of anthrax, 40,000 liters of botulinum, hundreds of liters of ricin, hundreds of tons of mustard gas, and thousands of tons of the VX nerve agent, all of which Iraq possessed in 1998 kicked out the UN weapons inspectors. A week later, Powell presented the Council with satellite photos and other so-called evi- dence demonstrating what he claimed w ere secret efforts at developing WMDs. However, any momentum Powell might have gained by his presentation was undercut when Blix reported on February 14 that Iraq had increased its cooperation with the UN. On March 1, Blix told the Security Council that Iraq had begun destroying 100 AI Samoud 2 missiles that violated the UN-established range for surface missiles. Encouraged by what appeared to be height- ened Iraqi cooperation, Russia and France, two permanent members of the Security Council, vowed to veto any new resolution that would expressly authorize the use of force to disarm Iraq. Germany, which in February had assumed the chairmanship of the Security Council in its role as a rotating, non-permanent member, opposed the use of military force. All three countries, along with peace activists around the world, urged the United States to allow the inspections to conti nue for several months before considering military action. The United States, though, was not similarly encouraged. U.S. officials charged that Iraq’s latest efforts were meaningless tokens of coop- eration aimed at deceiving the UN and keeping Saddam in power. On March 17, Bush delivered a prime-time address in which he said that time had run out for Iraq. Bush said he was prepared to go to war with Iraq without a new UN resolution authorizing him to do so, suggesting that he already had UN authorization under Resolutions 1441, 687, and 678. Independent of UN authority, Bush stressed that he was authorized to use force by his constitutional powers and obligations to protect the American people as PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES and commander in chief of the armed forces. Bush gave Saddam and his sons 48 hours to leave Iraq or face “the full force and might” of the U.S. military “at a time of our choosing.” In the pre-dawn hours of March 20, 2003, U.S. and British military forces commenced “Operation Iraqi Freedom,” purporting to disarm Iraq of WMDs, removing Saddam from power, and liberating the people of Iraq. Approximately 40 countries supported the military campaign, according to White House sources. Three weeks later, U.S. troops reached the Iraqi capital of Baghdad. The Demise of Saddam Hussein By April 2003, much of the world watched live coverage via satellite of U.S. and coalition forces assisting Iraqi citizens to pull down a huge statue of Saddam Hussein that had dominated Bagh- dad’s central square for decades. Photographs of the symbolic gesture appeared on the front pages GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 520 IRAQ WAR of newspapers around the globe. By the end of the day, nearly every statue of Iraq’styrannicalleader had been removed, dismembered, defaced, or destroyed by a rowdy group of jubilant Iraqis. Thousands took to the streets cheering, while others burned and looted government buildings associated with Saddam’s regime. The jubilation seemed short-lived, quickly turning to anarc hy. Downtown Baghdad was nearly gutted by looting and burning. Several Iraqis took advantage of the chaos to commit robberies and carry out revenge killings against fellow Iraqis. The MURDER rate in Baghdad jumped to 20 times its average. This took place in the presence of UN coalition troops who had taken over control of the capital. One year later, in April 2004, the jury was still out as to how much life had actually improved for Iraqi citizens. Many polls indicated that the majority was satisfied to see the end of Saddam’s control. But anti-coalition, anti-American senti- ments were on the rise as frustration over on- and-off-again utilities, high unemployment, and warring among internal factions all took their toll. Moreover, violence from Iraqi insurgents had actually escalated as the June 30, 2004, deadline for transfer of governmental control from the United Nations’ Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) to the Iraqi people drew near. In addition to military casualties, there was a palpable increase in the use of suicide bombings and sniper attacks on civilian contractors or others perceived to be assisting the coalition. In May 2004 alone, the car bombing of the leader of the Iraqi Governing Council, as well as the beheading of an American contractor a few days earlier, served as somber reminders of the uncertain road ahead. Almost a year earlier, on July 13, 2003, the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council, which had the power to appoint ministers and approve the budget for 2004, met for the first time to discuss the future of Iraq following the demise of Saddam’s Baath regime. In the interim, the United Nations had designated the CPA as the lawful government of Iraq until such time as Iraq was politically and socially stable enough to accept sovereignty. All involved remained focused on the dual objectives of searching for weapons of mass destruction and rebuilding a strong and stable Iraq. On July 22, 2003, Saddam’s sons, Uday and Qusay, were shot and killed by coalition troops in a gun battle at their Mosul hideout. The hunt for Saddam himself seemed to dominate the news of the war. A $25 million reward and all of the CIA’s finest intelligence failed to find him, but alleged sightings of Saddam were common throughout the country. Finally, in December 2003, an Iraqi official in U.S. custody buckled under interrogation and blurted out Saddam’s whereabouts. Within twenty-four hours, U.S. Special Forces had closed in on a farmhouse south of Tikrit, Saddam’s hometown, and began looking for a hidden bunker or underground facility. U.S. forces arrested Saddam after finding him hiding in a hole stocked with various supplies and $750,000 in U.S. currency. Saddam was removed to a cell in Baghdad for interro- gation by the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY. New Iraqi Government but Continued Hostilities The official end of the occupation occurred on June 28, 2004, with the handover of govern- mental authority from the occupying forces to the new Iraqi interim government, headed by interim prime minister Iyad Allawi. The hand- over was conducted two days ahead of schedule and in a secret location, in order to deter insurgent attacks. Insurgency continued to be a major prob- lem for coalition forces. These insurgents were responsible for guerilla actions in the form of constant roadside and car bombings, assassina- tions of government officials, and SABOTAGE of infrastructure. They were also responsible for conventional military attacks and managed to seize police stations and entire towns. When coalition forces counterattacked, the insurgents were often able to melt into the population. On September 15, 2004, U.N. secretary general Kofi Annan declared the war in Iraq illegal and in violation of the U.N. Charter. The United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia issued strong rebuttals to Annan’s declaration, but much of the world’s opinion was aligned with the U.N. By December 1, though, the Bush administration announced that it would increase troop levels to 150,000 by the middle of January 2005. The troop increase coincided with a rise in resistance from insurgents. Saddam Tried and Executed Saddam’s trial for crimes against humanity began i n October 2005. He had previous ly been formally charged by the Iraqi Special Tribunal. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION IRAQ WAR 521 More specific charges related to crimes against the residents of Dujayl in 1982. In that incident, he allegedly ordered the murder of 148 people, the torture of women and children, and the illegal arrest of several hundred others. He was also accused of mass murders in Kurdistan-Iraq in 1987 and 1988 and in the Shi’I south in 1991. However, he was convicted of the Dujayl crimes before being tried for the latter crimes. Saddam was found guilty on November 5, 2006, and was sentenced to be hanged. He appealed both convictions, but the convictions were affirmed, and he was executed on Decem- ber 30, 2006. Democrats Demand Policy Change Democrats took control of Congress through the November 2006 elections, and immediately leaders in the DEMOCRATIC PARTY demanded Should Bush Administration Officials Be Prosecuted for War Crimes? F ew will ever forget the images of the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, which in many ways defined the first decade of the 2000s. One of the results of the attack was a major change in U.S. policy. The United States adopted a tough style that called for a significant increase in foreign engagement. As the decade closed and President GEORGE W. BUSH left office, many remem- bered other appalling images and stories of atrocities committed by those ostensi- bly charged with protecting U.S. interests abroad. Some of these events involved random acts of violence, such as the RAPE and MURDER of 14-year-old Abeer Qassim al-Janabi in 2004 by five U.S. soldiers. Other incidents appeared to be less random. Within a year of the invasion of Iraq, stories emerged about prisoner abuse occurring at the Abu Ghraib prison in Baghdad. Hundreds of images released to the public showed soldiers posing next to and mocking naked Iraqi detainees. Other pictures were more atrocious, showing what appeared to be gang rapes of Iraqi women held at the prison. U.S. soldiers were also accused of beating detainees to death. The atrocities at Abu Ghraib were not without consequence. A total of eleven members of the military were charged for their roles in the incidents, though none was charged with murder. The highest ranking official charged with a crime was Lieutenant Colonel Steven L. Jordan, who was accused of abusing detainees “by subjecting them to forced nudity and intimidation by military working dogs. ” He was also accused of lying about his knowledge of this abuse. In August 2007, though, Jordan was acquitted of most charges, though he was convicted of disobeying an order not to discuss an investigation into the allega- tions. Jordan later received a reprimand for this incident. With Jordan’s ACQUITTAL,nohigh- ranking officer faced any significant pun- ishment for the atrocities at Abu Ghraig. Colonel Thomas M. Pappas, a military intelligence officer who ran the facility, received an administrative punishment and a fine for authorizing the use of dogs during interrogations. Former brigadier general Janis Karpinski, commander of the military police, also received administra- tive punishment and a demotion. Democrats and even some Repub- licans were critical of the Bush adminis- tration’s handling of the Abu Ghraib incident, with several officials calling for the resignation of then secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld (who eventu- ally resigned in December 2006). Rums- feld took responsibility for what he referred to as acts of abuse and offered an apology to the people of Iraq. However, he refused to refer to the incidents as acts of torture. The public became further outraged with news about the alleged torture of detainees at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba. Officials with the CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY used a technique known as waterboarding to interrogate suspected terrorists at the facility. Waterboarding involves strapping a suspect down, plac- ing a cloth over the suspect’s face, and pouring water over the suspect’s face. The technique, which dates back as far at the Spanish Inquisition, creates the sensation of drowning. Beginning in 2007, Congress held hearings regarding use of waterboarding, and several experts testified that the method is nothing short of torture. Members of the Bush admin- istration, including former VICE PRESIDENT Dick Cheney, defended the use of the method, claiming that its use had led to a great deal of valuable information. Although Bush attempted to distance himself with the atrocities committed at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, members of his administration had provided the legal justification for the torture techniques. In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, Bush ad- ministration officials wanted greater powers to investigate, capture, and inter- rogate suspected terrorists. Within two weeks of the attacks, attorneys with the Office of Legal Counsel began writing memoranda expressing opinions about certain courses of action. The first of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 522 IRAQ WAR changes in U.S. policy in Iraq. U.S. secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld had long downplayed the magnitude of problems in Iraq, and critics charged the U.S. forces in Iraq were too small to accomplish the military’s mission. Democrats and other critics began to demand for a timetable to withdraw forces. Earlier in 2006, Congress had appointed a ten-member Iraq Study Group, which was charged with assessing the situation in Iraq and with making policy recommendations. The group was co-chaired by former secretary of state James Baker (a Republican) and former representative Lee H. Hamilton (a Democrat). The Iraq Study Group released its reports on December 6, 2006. Its conclusion, in part, was: “The Iraqi government shou ld accelerate as- suming responsibility for Iraqi security by increasing the number and quality of Iraqi Army brigades. While this process is under way, these memos concluded that a proposed amendment to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1801 et seq.) would not violate the FOURTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution. One month later, another memo con- cluded that the president had authority under the Constitution and federal statutes to deploy the military to attack terrorists operating within the borders of the United States. In 2002 and 2003, the Office of Legal Counsel wrote more memos focusing on the legality of detaining suspected terror- ists. On February 7, 2002, Bush signed a memo declaring that the third Geneva Convention, which prescribes treatment of prisoners of war, did not apply to suspected members of the Taliban or the terrorist organization al-Qaeda. Another memo written in June 2002 concluded that the military could legally detain U.S. citizens, even though a federal statute specifically prohibits such DETENTION unless the detention is done pursuant to an act of Congress. This memo concluded that the president’s authority as com- mander in chief was enough to provide legal justification for these detentions. On March 14, 2003, a memo entitled “Military Interrogation of Alien Unlaw- ful Combatants Held Outside the United States” concluded that neither the FIFTH AMENDMENT nor the EIGHTH AMENDMENT to the Constitution extended rights to ALIEN ENEMY combatants held outside the United States. The conclusions reached in this memo allegedly justified the use of waterboarding as an interrogation tech- nique by the CIA. Several of these memos were written by a staff member named John Yoo, who later became a law professor at the University of California at Berkeley. Another significant official involved with these memos was Jay Bybee, who later became a judge with the Ninth CIRCUIT COURT of Appeals. Bybee drafted what came to be known as the Bybee Memo, which described “enhanced interrogation techniques” that are widely considered to be methods of torture. Former attorney general and White House counsel Alberto Gonzalez drafted a memo that argued, in part, that the Geneva Conven- tion was largely outdated. As these memos became public knowledge in 2008 and 2009, some critics demanded punishment to those who authorized the torture techniques and other WAR CRIMES. Joe Klein of Time Magazine wrote that Bush’s authorization of the February 2002 torture memo “was his single most callous and despica- ble act. It stands at the heart of the national embarrassment that was his presidency.” In April 2008 the JUSTICE DEPARTMENT began a probe into the background behind Yoo’s memo of March 14, 2003. According to Senator Sheldon White- house (D-RI), an outspoken critic of the interrogations, “The abject failure of legal scholarship in the Office of Legal Coun- sel’s analysis of torture suggests that what mattered was not that the reasoning was sound, or that the research was compre- hensive, but that it delivered what the Bush administration wanted.” Calls for prosecutions of Bush admin- istration officials heated up in 2009, especially once President BARACK OBAMA decided to declassify the memos. In late April 2009, Obama said he was open to prosecuting those who provided the authority for the interrogation methods, saying that the U.S. lost “our moral bearings” in using the tactics. Although some legal scholars sug- gested that the lawyers who drafted the opinions could be subject to prosecution, few believed that this would be a likely result. Prosecutors would have to show that these Justice Department officials had intentionally misstated the law against torture, which would be difficult to prove. Moreover, as Tom Malinowski, Washington director of HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH , told the Los Angeles Times, “Once you begin a serious discussion of crimi- nal prosecution, the question quickly becomes: Why PROSECUTE those in the middle of the chain of command but not those who made the ultimate decisions at the top?” Despite the likelihood that no official will be charged with a war crime, some officials may still pay the price for providing the reasoning that justified the torture. For instance, the Justice Department’s Office of PROFESSIONAL RE- SPONSIBILITY has investigated Yoo, Bybee, and other lawyers involved in the memos. Moreover, members of Con- gress, including House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, have not ruled out the possibility that Bybee could be impeached from his position on the Ninth Circuit. FURTHER READINGS Klein, Joe. 2009. “The Bush Administration’s Most Despicable Act.” Time. January 8. Savage, David G., and Josh Meyer. 2009. “Prosecuting ‘Torture Memo’ Authors Called a ‘Real Stretch.’” Los Angeles Times. April 23. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION IRAQ WAR 523 and to facilitate it, the United States should significantly increase the number of U.S. military personnel, including combat troops, imbedded in and supporting Iraqi Army units. As these actions proceed, U.S. combat forces could begin to move out of Iraq.” Conservatives who supported the war effort were critical of the report upon its release. Rumsfeld resigne d at the end of 2006. Early in 2007 Bush announced that he was sending more than 21,000 additional troops to battle an increase in insurgency that had begun late in 2006. By the spring 2007, violence in Iraq had decreased significantly. In May 2007 Congress approved legislation that funded the war in Iraq but established deadlines for troop withdrawal. Bush vetoed this legislation. By 2008 Bush announced that Iraq was returning to a normal, thanks in part to the U.S. military’s efforts to increase security. In N o- vember 2008, following the election of President BARACK OBAMA, the Iraqi government approved a resolution calling for the United States to end its military presence in Iraq by 2011. In February 2009, Obama announced that the United States would withdraw combat forces within an 18-month window. Failed Search for Weapons of Mass Destruction On January 12, 2005, the Bush administration announced that the search for weapons of mass destruction in Iraq had ended, without any such weapons having been found. The announce- ment coincided with several reports calling into question the data on which Bush had based his allegations in 2002 about Iraq’s attempts to obtain materials to create WMDs. As Bush prepared to leave office in Decem- ber 2008, he acknowledged that one of his biggest disappointments was the “intelligence failure in Iraq,” referring specifically to the data used as the basis for the decision to go to war with Saddam. FURTHER READINGS Falk, Richard A. 2008. The Costs of War: International Law, the U.N., and World Order after Iraq. New York: Routledge. Iraq Study Group. 2006. Iraq Study Group Report. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace. Jaques, Richard B., ed. 2006. Issues in International Law Newport, R.I.: Naval War College. CROSS REFERENCE War on Terrorism. v IREDELL, JAMES James Iredell was one of the original U.S. Supreme Court justices appointed by GEORGE WASHINGTON . Iredell was born October 5, 1751, in Lewes, England. At age 17 he began working in his family’s MERCANTILE business in North Carolina and also undertook the study of law. He was licensed to practice law in 1771. In the next few years, he became active in the Revolutionary cause, arguing that the colonies not separate from England and advocating in his writings that the conflict be resolved through RECONCILIA- TION rather than war. In 1776 he was appointed to a commission to draft and revise the laws for the governance of North Carolina. A year later he served as a judge on the state superior court, and from 1779 to 1781 he was state attorney general. In 1787 he codified and revised the statutes of North Carolina, a process that resulted in the publication of Iredell’sRevisal four years later. A staunch supporter of the Constitutional Convention, Iredell led North Carolina in the movement for ratification through a series of James Iredell 1751–1799 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17501750 18001800 17751775 ❖ ◆◆◆ 1751 Born, Lewes, England ❖ 1775–83 American Revolution 1768 Began working in his family's mercantile business in North Carolina 1776 Helped revise North Carolina's laws of governance; Declaration of Independence signed in Philadelphia 1787–91 Codified and revised North Carolina statutes, which resulted in Iredell's Revisal 1790 Appointed as one of the original justices to serve on the U.S. Supreme Court 1799 Died, Edenton, North Carolina 1771 Licensed to practice law ◆ 1798 Authored opinion in Calder v. Bull ◆◆◆ 1777 Served on North Carolina Superior Court 1779–81 Served as attorney general of North Carolina 1793 Wrote dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 524 IREDELL, JAMES acclaimed and well-publicized floor debates and speeches. In 1790 he drew the attention of President Washington, who appointed him to the newly formed U.S. Supreme Court. At age 38, Iredell was the youngest of the original justices. In addition to hearing cases before the entire Supreme Court, the justices at that time presided over CIRCUIT COURT sessions throughout the United States, which required them to travel extensively to hear arguments. Iredell was assigned to the Southern Circuit and quickly developed a reputation as an exceptional jurist with respect to CONSTITUTIONAL LAW matters. He wrote a number of notable opinions, including a dissent in CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA, 2 U.S. (Dall.) 419, 1 L. Ed. 440 (1793), in which he argued that only a constitutional provision could SUPERSEDE the common-law principle that a state cannot be sued by a citizen from another state. Iredell maintained that the states were sovereign and did not owe their origins to the federal government. Iredell ’s view of states’ rights would prevail in Congress’s subsequent adop- tion of the ELEVENTH AMENDMENT. Iredell also authored Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (1798), in which he argued that a legislative act unauthorized by or in violation of the Constitution was void and that the co urts were responsible for determining an act’s status in that regard. This principle of JUDICIAL REVIEW would be amplified five years later in the landmark decision MARBURY V. MADISON, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), which held that the courts were indeed ultimately responsible for deciding the validity of laws passed by the legislative branch of government. The strain of the travel required to cover his circuit, in addi tion to the heavy caseload of the Supreme Court, eventually took its toll on Iredell’s health. He died at his home in North Carolina in 1799, less than ten years after ascending to the High Court. v IRELAND, PATRICIA Patricia Ireland is an attorney and social activist who became the ninth president of the NATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR WOMEN (NOW) on December 15, 1991; she served as president for ten years, leaving in 2001 due to term limits. Ireland took over the presidency just as NOW was beginning to feel a shift in its ranks and the United States was experiencing a renewed interest in the feminist movement. Ireland was born October 19, 1945, in Oak Park, Illinois. She grew up on a farm in Valparaiso, Indiana, where her family raised honeybees. She is the younger of two daughters of James Ireland and Joan Filipek (older sister Kathy was killed in a horseback riding accident when Ireland was five years old). Ireland’s father, a metallurgical engineer, taught her to be passionate about her profession. Her mother was a volunteer counselor with Planned Parent- hood who became the first director of the local chapter. She was Ireland’s social activist role model. Ireland entered DePauw University when she was 16, but became pregnant and was forced to travel to Japan to obtain a legal ABORTION. She then married and transferred to the University of Tennessee, where she obtained a degree in German in 1966. Her first marriage lasted only a short time. She later began work as a graduate student and German teach er, but she quickly became bored with teaching. She and her second husband, artist James Humble, moved to Miami, where she became a flight attendant for Pan American World Airways. Working as a flight attendant was a pivotal experience for Ireland. She discovered that her employee HEALTH INSURANCE plan would not cover her husband’s dental expenses, even though it did pay such expenses for the wives of male employees. Ireland consulted Dade James Iredell. ENGRAVING BY ALBERT ROSENTHAL. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES A WRITTEN OPINION MUST FOR EVER AFTERWARDS SPEAK FOR ITSELF , AND COMMIT THE CHARACTER OF THE WRITER , IN LASTING COLORS , EITHER OF FAME OR INFAMY , OR NEUTRAL INSIGNIFICANCE , TO FUTURE AGES , AS WELL AS TO THE PRESENT . —JAMES IREDELL GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION IRELAND, PATRICIA 525 County NOW for advice. It referred her to the LABOR DEPARTMENT,theEQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION (EEOC), and the flight attendants’ union. As a result of Ireland ’s challenge, the insurance policy was amended. Her characterist ic good humor is evident in her comments on the experience: “The vice- president of the labor task force at Dade County NOW is now the dean of women lawmakers in the Florida legislature. I am the president of NOW. And Pan am is bankrupt.” Taking on Pan Am’s discriminatory insur- ance plan whet Ireland’s appetite for more knowledge of the law. She enrolled in the law school at Florida State University while con- tinuing to work as a flight attendant. Ireland began to notice that if she introduced herself as a flight attendant, people had little to say to her, but if she introduced herself as a law student, they were eager to discuss complex legal issues and current events. The denigration of work traditionally done by women offended her growing feminist sensibilities. “My brain was the same, my ideas were just as worthy or unworthy, but there was a tremendous difference in the way that people perceived and treated me,” she said. “I think traditional women’sworkis undervalued—teaching, health care, social work. That was part of the experience that made me want to be an activist.” Ireland earned her law degree from the University of Miami, where she had transferred from Florida State, in 1975. She both served on the school’s LAW REVIEW and t he Lawyer of the Americas (now the University of Miami Inter- American Law Review)anddid PRO BONO work for Dade County NOW. After graduation, she practiced corporate law for 12 years, continued working for Dade County NOW, and helped corporate clients formulate AFFIRMATIVE ACTION programs. Ireland’s work in the women’srightsmove- ment expanded during her years as an attorney. In 1983, she became the chair of Florida NOW’s lesbian rights task force. In 1985 she managed Eleanor C . Smeal’s successful campaign for the presidency of NOW, and in 1987 she was elected NOW’sexecutive VICE PRESIDENT, a post she held until May 1991, when she became acting president following the illness of Molly Yard. On December 15, 1991, Ireland was officially named NOW’s ninth president. As NOW’s top officer, Ireland was charged with pursuing the group’sfourpriorityissues: Patricia Ireland. AP IMAGES Patricia Ireland 1945– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1950 2000 1975 ❖ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆◆ ◆ 1991–2001 Served as president of NOW 1996 What Women Want, an autobiography of Ireland and NOW, published 1991 Elected president of NOW 1987 Elected executive vice president of NOW 1983 Became chair of Florida NOW’s lesbian rights task force 1985 Managed Eleanor Smeal’s successful campaign for NOW presidency ◆ 2003 Appointed CEO of YWCA; fired six months later 1975 Earned J.D. from University of Miami Law School; entered private practice 1967–75 Worked as flight attendant 1973 Roe v. Wade legalized abortion in U.S. 1961–73 Vietnam War 1963 Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique published 1966 Earned B.A. from University of Tenn.; NOW founded by Friedan and others 1950–53 Korean War 1945 Born, Oak Park, Ill. 2003–04 Served as campaign manager for Carol Moseley Braun GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 526 IRELAND, PATRICIA protecting abortion rights; electing women to political leadership positions; forming coalitions with other CIVIL RIGHTS organizations; and advo- cating for international women’s rights. She vowed to stir things up, and she did. During her years as president, Ireland developed and implemented a number of programs, including Project Stand Up for Women, an international program designed to protect women who seek abortion services and to combat anti-abortion clinic blockades; Elect Women for a Change, which provides experienced campaign support for feminist candidates; and the Global Feminist Program, which provides a forum for women around the world to discuss relevant women’s issues. Ireland also served as legal counsel on several NOW landmark cases, and was a major organizer of such events as the 1993 March on Washington for Gay, Lesbian, and Bi Civil Rights. Ireland’s tenure, however, was not without detractors. Specifically, questions arose as to whether NOW, with Ireland at the helm, represented the majority of U.S. women, or whether its focus had become too narrow. Such questions were prompted when NOW an- nounced that lesbian rights would be one of its top priorities. At about the same time, the Advocate, a gay and lesbian newspaper, revealed that Ireland, while maintaining her long- standing marriage to Humble, who lives in Florida, also had a female companion with whom she lived in Washington, D.C. Even NOW’s allies became concerned that the organization would be perceived as a fringe group that did not address the concerns of the majority, and that support for NOW causes would be eroded. BETTY N. FRIEDAN, the group’s founding president, accused NOW of failing to address women’s current concerns, such as juggling families and jobs. Ireland, however, maintained that NOW was on the right track for carrying on the fight for women’s rights. “Someone has to raise the issues that make people uncomfortable, the issues that other people don’t want to talk about. [I]t’s healthy to be angry at the situation women face. So, yes, we may be militant and angry but we’re also thoughtful and intelligent.” In 2001, after ten years, Ireland stepped down as president of NOW. In 2003 she became the CEO of the YWCA of the USA. Some conservative critics raised eyebrows over the appointment. She spent six controversial months as president of the YWCA. Traditional Christian groups objected to her using a nominally Christian organization as a platform to advance feminist causes (the group’s initials stand for “Young Women’s Christian Associa- tion”), and the YWCA proved not to be as supportive of Ireland’s controversial stands as she might have liked. “We have the deepest admira- tion for Ms. Ireland’sdedicationtowomen’s issues and social justice, but the YWCA has proved to be the wrong platform for her to advocate for these issues,” the YWCA’sboardsaid when they fired Ireland that October. Ireland served as campaign manager for former Democratic senator Carol Moseley Braun’s short-lived 2004 presidential campaign, from November of 2003 until Moseley Braun withdrew from the race two months later. Ireland’s next stop was DontAmend.com, a web site and organization founded to lobby against a proposed CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT to ban same-sex marriage. She joined that group in March of 2004 and was immediately sent to Capitol Hill t o address the SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE about the issue. “Equal marriage rights willbeoneofthemostexplosiveissuesofthe2004 elections,” said Ireland when she joined forces with DontAmend.com. “This is also an incredible opportunity to make a qua ntum leap forward, and for me, it’s an opportunity not to be missed.” In addition to her professional duties, Ireland is a frequent contributor to periodicals, newspapers, and journals, and, in 1996, she released her autobiography, What Women Want. Ireland is also a frequent guest speaker at universities and with HUMAN RIGHTS groups. FURTHER READINGS Ireland, Patricia. 1996. What Women Want. New York: Dutton. Resnik, Judith. 2003. “Patricia Ireland: Women, Meeting (Again), in and beyond the United States.” In The Difference “Difference” Makes: Women and Leadership, edited by Deborah L. Rhode. Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Gay and Lesbian Rights; Sex Discrimination; Steinem, Gloria. IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES The existence of significant differences between a married couple that are so great and beyond resolution as to make the marriage unworkable, and for which the law permits a divorce. FOR MOST WOMEN, EQUALITY IS A BREAD- AND-BUTTER ISSUE. W OMEN ARE STILL PAID LESS ON THE JOB AND CHARGED MORE FOR EVERYTHING FROM DRY CLEANING TO INSURANCE . —PATRICIA IRELAND GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION IRRECONCILABLE DIFFERENCES 527 . two weeks of the attacks, attorneys with the Office of Legal Counsel began writing memoranda expressing opinions about certain courses of action. The first of GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD. University of Tenn.; NOW founded by Friedan and others 1 950 53 Korean War 19 45 Born, Oak Park, Ill. 2003–04 Served as campaign manager for Carol Moseley Braun GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD. destroyed 10,000 liters of anthrax, 40,000 liters of botulinum, hundreds of liters of ricin, hundreds of tons of mustard gas, and thousands of tons of the VX nerve agent, all of which Iraq possessed