$100. This rule is based on the theory that without such knowledge there can be no meeting of the minds, which is essential to the formation of a contract. Knowledge of a statutory remedy is not necessary to entitle the claimant to recover it. When a reward is offered to the public, anyone who performs the required service can claim and accept the reward, except persons who are under a duty to perform such services. A law enforcement officer, therefore, cannot claim a reward if the service performed is within the line and scope of the officer’s duty. This prohibition will apply even if the officer performed the service at a time when he was not on duty or was outside his territorial jurisdiction. When, however, an officer acts beyond the scope and line of duty, there is no prohibition in claiming the reward. A person who aids and abets the commis- sion of a crime has no right to a reward for the arrest of the perpetrator. Similarly a person who purchases stolen property with reasonable grounds for believing it has been stolen cannot receive a reward offered for its return. CROSS REFERENCES Contracts; Finding Lost Goods; Offer; Meeting of Minds; Prize Law. REX [Latin, The king.] The phrase used to designate the king as the party prosecuting an acc used in a criminal action, such as an action entitled Rex v. Doe. REYNOLDS V. SIMS Reynolds v. Sims is a landmark case, 377 U.S. 533, 84 S. Ct. 1362, 12 L. Ed. 2d 506 (1964), in which the U.S. SUPREME COURT established the principle of ONE PERSON, ONE VOTE, based on the EQUAL PROTECTION Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. As a result of the decision, almost every state had to redraw its legislative districts, and power shifted from rural to urban areas. All subsequent CONSTITUTIONAL LAW on apportionment has relied on the principles established in Reynolds v. Sims. Reynolds completed a change in direction by the U.S. Supreme Court concerning the apportionment of voting districts. Until 1962, the Court had refused to hear lawsuits that challenged legislative districting, co ncluding that such issues were political questions that were not justiciable. In 1962 the court, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, reversed course and ruled that state legislative apportionment cases could be reviewed by the federal courts. As a result, Reward: Prominent Villain R B ewards have ended cou ntless crimi nal careers. On occasion, the lure of money has even been enough to entice criminals to turn in their associates. Such was the downfall of the famous nineteenth-century outlaw Jesse James (1847–1882). After the U.S. Civil War, Jame s quickly became one of the most notorious bandits on the U.S. frontier. With his older brother Frank, Jesse led the so-called James Gang through several robberies and murders during the 1860s and 1870s. Their daring holdups of banks, stage coaches, and trains made them figures of romantic myth for readers and prime targets for law enforcement posses, w hich they long managed to evade. A reward brought James to his end. Having barely escaped with his life after a thwarted bank robbery in Northfield , Minnesota, in 1876 that left two of hi s gang dead, James hired new outlaws and lived under an alias in Missouri. In 1881 Thomas T. Crittenden, the state’sgovernor,offeredarewardof $10,000 for James’scapture—dead or alive. One of the new gang members, Robert Ford, contacted the governor, then bided his time. On April 3, 1882, FordsawhischanceinJames’s house. When the gunslinger laid down his pistols and climbed on achairtoadjustapictureframe,Fordshothim in the head and instantly killed him. What the law had been unable to do, one of the lawless accomplished. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 378 REX lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of legislative districts were filed in many states. Reynolds involved the apportionment of the Alabama state legislature. The facts in the case were common to many states also undergoing court challenges. When the Alabama Constitu- tion of 1901 was ratified, it provided that the legislature should periodically reapportion itself. The legislature ignored this mandate, however, and the legislative districts remained unchanged for 60 years. During that period, Alabama, like other states, saw a dramatic population shift from rural to urban areas. Thus, the Alabama legislature in 1960 was dominated by rural legislators, who were unwilling to reapportion and lose power. The disparities between popu- lation and votin g strength were staggeri ng. The 1960 census revealed that only about 25 percent of the total population of the state lived in districts represented by a majority of state senators, and counties with only 27.5 percent of the total population elected a majority of state representatives. Population variance ratios of up to 41 to 1 existed in the Senate, and up to 16 to 1 in the House. For example, Bullock County, with a population of approximat ely 13,500, was allocated two seats in the Alabama House, while Mobile County, with a population of 314,000, was given only three seats. Faced with these disparities and the unwill- ingness of the Alabama legislature to reappor- tion the legislative districts based upon population, a group of citizens filed a lawsuit in federal court. The three-judge panel of federal district judges at first tried to d efer to the legislature for a solution. When that failed, the judges implemented a temporary redistricting plan based o n popu latio n. Al ab ama ch all enged the redistricting order in the U .S. Supreme C ourt. The court ignored the claims of Alabama and other states that they should be all owed to apportion their legislative districts as they wished under the concept of FEDERALISM. This concept calls for the federal courts to abstain from making decisions that are the proper province of the states. Chief Justice EARL WARREN, in his majority opinion, made clear that the court had no choice but to step in. The Alabama legislature had refused to reapportion itself, leaving the citizens with few viable options to effect the change. Alabama law did not provide for an initiative procedure that would have permitted voters to decide on reapportionment. A CONSTI- TUTIONAL AMENDMENT was also unlikely, as a three-fifths majority in both houses of the legislature would have to approve any propo- sals. With no effective political remedy, the court was obligated to examine the issue to determine whether Alabama had violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The court could conduct this review because in 1962 it had ruled in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663, that federal courts had jurisdiction to review state reapportionment plans. The court recognized that U.S. democracy is based on a representative form of government. The right to vote for a candidate “is the essence of a democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representative government.” The “debasement or dilution” of a person’s vote can be just as effective as prohibiting that person from voting. Warren concluded that minority control over the majority of state legislators could not be sanctioned. He emphasized that “Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests.” To permit the minority to have power over the majority would be a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Diluting the weight of a person’s vote because of the location of that person’s residence was as invidious a form of DISCRIMINATION as if the dilution had been based on that person’s race or financial status. Therefore, the court would require that “each citizen have an equally effective voice in the election of members of his state legislature.” The court also rejected Alabama’s conten- tion that it should be allowed to apportion its Senate based on the equal representation of units of government, in this case counties, rather than of people. Alabama’s argument was based on the so-called federal analogy, a reference to the U.S. Senate, where each state has two seats regardless of population. Warren dismissed this analogy, calling it “irrelevant to state legislative redistricting schemes.” He pointed out that the original constitutions of 36 states provided that representation in both legislative houses would be based completely, or predominantly, on population. In addition, there was no evidence that the Framers of the U.S. Constitution intended to establish this model for the states. The arrangements for GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION REYNOLDS V. SIMS 379 representation in the U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTA- TIVES and Senate were devised at the Constitu- tional Convention as a solution to a particular political dilemma. Having dismissed the federal analogy, War- ren stated that the Equal Protection Clause requires that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned on the basis of population. To aid the states, the Court provided guidelines that recognized that standards of state legislative apportionment cannot be hard and fast but must be fair and made in GOOD FAITH. The primary objective to be reached was “substantial equality of population.” Warren made clear, however, that the court was not mandating perfect proportionality, for “mathematical exactness or precision is hardly a workable constitutional requirement.” A state could con- stitutionally consider many factors other than population in devising an apportionment plan, but history, economics, and group interests were impermissible factors. Population was to be the starting point in all apportionment discussions, and if a plan debased a citizen’s right to vote, it would be unconstitutional. Warren also directed the states to reappor- tion their legislatures, at minimum, every ten years, based on the population figures derived from the federal decennial census. A state need not readjust its legislative districts constantly as the population changes, but the court made clear that inaction such as that of the Alaba ma legislature would no longer be tolerated. If a state did not reapportion every ten years, any new redistricting plan submitted by the state would be “constitutionally suspect.” The Reynolds decision produced sweeping changes in state legislatures. Within two years, at least one house in nearly all state legislatures had been held invalid; in most states, both houses had to be reapportioned. Rural domination declined as urban areas gained a substantial number of legislative seats. The one-person, one- vote requirement soon moved to the municipal level, where city councils and county boards also adjusted voting districts to reflect population. FURTHER READINGS Darling, Marsha J. Tyson. 2001. Race, Voting, Redistricting, and the Constitution: Sources and Explorations on the Fifteenth Amendment. New York: Routledge. Davidson, Chandler, ed. 1989. Minority Vote Dilution. Washington, D.C.: Howard Univ. Press. Grofman, Bernard. 2003. Race and Redistricting in the 1990s. New York: Algora. Richie, Robert, and Steven Hill. 1999. Reflecting All of Us: The Case of Proportional Representation. Boston: Beacon. CROSS REFERENCES Census; Equal Protection; Fourteenth Amendment; Voting. v RICHARDSON, ELLIOT LEE Elliot Lee Richardson had a distinguished career in government service, including holding four different cabinet positions—the first person in U.S. history to do so. He was best known, however, for his brief tenure as U.S. attorney general under President RICHARD M. NIXON. Richardson served from May 25, 1973, to October 20, 1973, during the unfolding of the WATERGATE scandal. He resigned the office during the “Saturday Night Massacre” rather than fire the special Watergate prosecutor as Nixon had directed. Richardson was born on July 20, 1920, in Boston, Massachusetts. He graduated from Harvard University in 1941 and then served in the U.S. Army during WORLD WAR II. Following the war, he attended Harvard Law School, where he was the president of the Harvard Law Review. After graduation in 1947, he served as law clerk for Judge LEARNED HAND of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In 1948, he went to Washington, D.C., to clerk for Justice FELIX FRANKFURTER at the U.S. Supreme Court. Richardson returned to Boston in 1949 to practice law, but by 1953 he was back in Washington, serving as an assistant to Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts. He left for Boston and private practice again in 1954 but was summoned by President DWIGHT D. EISEN- HOWER in 1957 to be assistant secretary of health, education, and welfare. In 1958 Richardson served as acting secretary of the department for four months. He was appointed as U.S. attorney for Massachusetts in 1959, serving until 1961, when he became special assistant attorney general. In 1964 Richardson turned to the political arena and was elected lieutenant governor of Massachusetts. In 1966 he was elected attorney general of the state. He left state government in 1969 when President Nixon appointed him under SECRETARY OF STATE. In June 1970 Nixon named Richardson to be secretary of health, education, and welfare, a position he held until the end of Nixon’s first term. Following a cabinet reshuffle, Nixon made Richardson GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 380 RICHARDSON, ELLIOT LEE secretary of defense in January 1973. Less than four months later, however, Nixon named Richardson to be attorney general. Richardson’s appointment came at a time of growing concern about the credibility of Nixon’s assertions that the White House had not been involved in the 1972 BURGLARY of the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters in the Watergate office complex in Washington, D.C. Richardson succeeded RICHARD KLEINDIENST, who left under a cloud of scandal for his involvement with Watergate and other politi- cally charged issues. Richardson’s personal and professional in- tegrity gave the Nixon administration new credibility. He appointed ARCHIBALD COX,a professor at Harvard Law School, as special Watergate prosecutor to investigate whether federal laws had been broken in connection with the break-in and the attempted cover-up. Richardson assured Cox, who was a personal friend, that he would have complete indepen- dence in his work. In July 1973 it was revealed that Nixon had secretly recorded conversations in his White House offices. Cox immediately subpoenaed the tapes of the conversations . When Nixon refused to honor the subpoena, Judge John Sirica ordered that the tapes be turned over. After the federal court of appeals upheld the order, Nixon offered Cox written summaries of the conversa- tions in return for an agreement that no more presidential documents would be sought. Cox refused the proposal. On Saturday, October 20, Nixon ordered Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson and his deputy attorney gene- ral, William D. Ruckelshaus, resigned rather than carry out the order. Cox was fired that night by solicitor general ROBERT H. BORK. The two resignations and the firing of Cox became known as the “Saturday Night Massacre.” Al- though Nixon would not resign until August 9, 1974, the events of the previous October 20 signaled the beginning of the end for his administration. Richardson, on the other hand, was celebrated for his courage and integrity. GERALD R. FORD became president upon Nixon’s resignation. He named Richardson to be U.S. ambassador to Great Britain in 1975. In Elliot Lee Richardson 1920–1999 ▼▼ ▼▼ 1925 2000 1975 1950 ❖ 1961–73 Vietnam War ◆ 1950–53 Korean War 1939–45 World War II 1920 Born, Boston, Mass. ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ 1942–45 Served in the U.S. Army's 1st light infantry division in World War II 1947–48 Clerked for Learned Hand of the U.S. Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit 1948–49 Clerked for U.S. Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter 1957 Appointed assistant secretary of HEW 1959–61 Served as U.S. attorney for Mass. 1999 Died, Boston, Mass. 1980–92 Partner at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy 1996 Reflections of a Radical Moderate published ◆ 1980 Retired to private practice 1977–80 Served as ambassador at large 1975 Appointed secretary of commerce under Ford 1974 Nixon resigned from office 1973 Appointed secretary of defense; named attorney general; resigned during "Saturday Night Massacre" 1970 Appointed secretary of HEW 1969 Appointed undersecretary of state in Nixon administration 1966 Elected attorney general of Mass. 1964 Elected lieutenant governor of Mass. Elliot Lee Richardson. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION RICHARDSON, ELLIOT LEE 381 1976 Ford appointed Richardson to be secre- tary of commerce and in 1977 chose him to serve as ambassador at large, a post he held until 1980. Richardson was a senior partner at a Washington, D.C., law firm from 1980 to 1992. In 1996 Richardson published Reflections of a Radical Moderate, which recorded his obser- vations about politics and government, based on his experiences in public service. Richardson died in Boston, Massachusetts, on December 31, 1999. In 2000 the nonprofit Council for Excellence establi shed the Elliot Richardson Prize for Excellence in Public Service. FURTHER READINGS Coleman, William, et al. 2000. “He Wrote the Definition For ‘Integrity’: In Praise of Elliot Richardson, 1920–1999.” Legal Times (January 10). Greenya, John. 2000. “Elliot Richardson: The Last Inter- view.” Washington Lawyer 14 (January–February). Richardson, Elliot L. 1996. Reflections of a Radical Moderate. New York: Pantheon. Vance, Thomas J. 2006. “The Mentors of Elliot Richardson.” The Massachusetts Historical Review 8. CROSS REFERENCE Special Prosecutor. RICO See RACKETEERING. RIDER A schedule or writing annexed to a document such as a legislative bill or insurance policy. A rider is an attachment, schedule, amend- ment, or other writing that is annexed (added) to a document in order to modify it. The changes may be small or large, but in either case the primary purpose of the rider is to avoid rewriting or redrafting the document entirely. The language of the rider is understood to be incorporated into the document. Riders are commonly used in contracts and records and also have complex uses in legislation and insurance. As part of the lawmaking process in state legislatures and Congress, riders are typically added to bills at a late stage in their evolution. In the insurance industry, riders are added to insurance policies to modify benefits and the conditions of coverage. The use of riders in the legislative process is a time-honored tradition. Lawmakers do not add riders immediately but instead wait for the appropriate stage in the evolution of a bill. Traditionally, legislative bills start out as proposals that are sent to committees for approval or disapproval. Once a bill successfully passes out of committee, lawmakers frequently amend it with a rider. The rider may simply add a new clause to the law that is the main subject of the bill, or it may go further and add an entirely new, unrelated provision. The addition of riders reveals much about the political agendas of lawmakers. Riders make ideal opportunities to introduce controversial or unpopular fiscal changes. Often these are attached to appropriations bills, which must be passed annually to fund the operation of state and federal government. Some lawmakers have traditionally seen such bills as the place to add extra appropriations for projects they and their constituents favor—a kind of funding known pejoratively as pork. In the 2008 presidential election, Senators JOHN MCCAIN and BARACK OBAMA attacked the growing use of “earmarks,” which are congressional riders that fund projects for local constituents. Unlike other riders, earmarks are not reviewed by congressional committees. Conversely, legislators may add riders that cut spending in areas that would attract public protest if the changes were the single subject of a bill and thus more noticeable. Lawmakers’ attempts to add new provisions to bills through riders are sometimes contro- versial. Since a rider need not be related to the subject matter of the bill, legislators sometimes seize the opportunity to further their political agendas. A rider may be attached to a bill in an attempt to sneak through a measure that would not attract majority support if proposed by itself. Sometimes, a bill’s opponents may attempt to defeat it by adding a controversial rider. In insurance, riders change the contract, or policy, between the purchaser and the insurance company. Also known as endorsements, they can either expand or restrict the benefits provided by the policy. Thus, for example, personal automobile insurance policies generally cover only typical use of the vehicle. A rider specifies that commercial use of the car will make the policy null and void. This form of insurance rider is called an exclusion. Riders in health insurance policies have other effects. They increase the cost of the policy, or even exclude coverage altogether, when the purchaser has certain pre-existing health conditions. For example, someone CERTAINTY IS THE STRAIGHTJACKET OF LIBERTY ; TO DRESS A TRUTH IN AUTHORITY IS TO STULTIFY FREEDOM OF THOUGHT . —ELLIOT LEE RICHARDSON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 382 RICO suffering from high blood pressure may pay higher costs for insurance. In certain cases, the insurer may choose to issue a policy with the stipulation that it will cover certain health- related costs but not those costs associated with the pre-existing condition. v RIDGE, THOMAS JOSEPH Tom Ridge, the 43rd governor of Pennsylvania, was thrust into the national spotlight in October 2001 when he was sworn in as the head of the newly created Office of Homeland Security. President GEORGE W. BUSH had established the office shortly after the SEPTEMBER 11TH TERRORIST ATTACKS on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. In January 2003, Ridge became the first Secretary of the HOMELAND SECURITY DEPART- MENT , which was established after 22 domestic agencies were merged in the most significant reformation of the U.S. government since President HARRY S. TRUMAN’s 1947 merger of disparate branches of the U.S. armed forces into the DEFENSE DEPARTMENT (formerly known as the War Department). Thomas Joseph Ridge was born August 26, 1945, in Munhill, part of Pittsburgh’s Steel Valley. He grew up in Erie, Pennsylvania, where his family lived in a public housing project. Hard-working and ambitious, Ridge attended Harvard University, graduating in 1967 with a B.A. in government studies. He started classes at Dickinson School of Law but received his draft notice that summer. Although he could have been trained as an officer with a three-year commitment, Ridge chose instead to be trained as an infantryman so that he could serve for two years and return to law school. He went to Vietnam, where he quickly rose to the position of staff sergeant and received several awards, including the Bronze Star for Valor. Ridge returned to law school in 1970 and received his JURIS DOCTOR degree in 1972. He worked in private practice and handled cases for the public defender’s office. From 1979 to 1982, he served as an assistant Erie County district attorney. Running as a moderate Republican in a swing district, Ridge was elected to the U.S. House of Representatives in 1982, where he served until 1994. In 1994 Ridge ran as the Republican candi- date for governor. Campaigning on a platform that advocated school choice, reducing taxes, and cracking down on crime, Ridge was elected by a margin of five percent. In 1998 he was re-elected by a margin of 26 percent. The 780,000-vote difference marked the largest vote for a Republi- can governor in Pennsylvania’shistory. During his tenure as governor, Ridge supported a limited form of ABORTION rights, Tom Ridge. ETHAN MILLER/ GETTY IMAGES 1950–53 Korean War Thomas Joseph Ridge 1945– ▼▼ ▼▼ 1925 2000 1975 1950 1945 Born, Munhill, Pa. ❖ 1972 Earned J.D. from Dickinson School of Law ◆ 1979–82 Served as assistant Erie Country (Pa.) district attorney 1982–1994 Served in U.S. House of Representatives ◆ 1994 Elected governor of Pennsylvania ◆ 2001 Sworn in as first director of Homeland Security 2003 Sworn in as first secretary of Homeland Security Department ◆ 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks ◆◆ 2004 Announced resignation from public service GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION RIDGE, THOMAS JOSEPH 383 but also presided over a special session that led to a “three-strikes” law and hastened the state’s death-penalty process. In 2000, Ridge signed the largest tax cut in the history of the state. That same year, Ridge’s name was mentioned as a possible vice presidential choice until George W. Bush selected Dick Cheney. In the days and weeks that followed the SEPTEMBER 11TH ATTACKS, the Bush administra- tion moved quickly to deal with Al-Qaeda, the organization thought to be behind the terrorist attacks. In addition, the administration sought to reassure an American public that was stunned and alarmed by the strategy and subsequent loss of life that had taken place. The administration established the Office of Homeland Security and created the position of director (and White House Security Adviser) who was charged with developing, coordinating, and overseeing a comprehensive national strategy aimed at strengthening the domestic defenses of the country and its citizens. On October 8, 2001, President Bush swore in Ridge as the first director of Homeland Sec urity, praising Ridge’s strength and experience. Heeding calls from many sources to upgrade the newly created office to cabinet level, Congress passed legislation that reformulated the Office of Homeland Security as the HOMELAND SECURITY DEPARTMENT (DHS). On January 24, 2003, Ridge was sworn in as the first secretary of the new department. He oversaw the coordination of 22 agencies and 180,000 employees as they transitioned from other departments and areas of government into a unified department with the responsibility of improving security of the nation’s borders and airports; providing for analysis of threats and intelligence; protecting the nation’s infrastructure, including highways, bridges, ports, and nuclear facilities; and coordi- nating a comprehensive response in time of national emergencies. In the early part of 2003, the DHS and its new secretary faced criticism from members of Congress and state and local governments, the media, and the public. Some poked fun at the department’s color-coded threat-advisory proce- dure, while others complained that the federal government was burdening cities and states with expensive and time-consuming plans for strengthening domestic security without provid- ing the federal funds needed to carry out the plans. On November 30, 2004, Ridge presented President Bush with his resignation, citing a desire to spend more time with his family. Since resigning from public service, Ridge has served on the boards of The Hershey Company and The Home Depot. He is the founder and CEO of Ridge Global, LLC, a consulting firm in Washington, D.C. Ridge has presided as chair of the National Organization on Disability since 2005. In 2008, Ridge assisted with fellow Republican Senator John McCain’s campaign for the Republican presidential nomination, and some believed that Ridge was considered by McCain as a potential running mate. FURTHER READINGS “Biography of Tom Ridge.” Available online at www. whitehouse.gov/h omeland/ridgebio.html (accessed August 20, 2009). “Pennsylvania’s Tom Ridge Appointed to Bush Cabinet.” 2001. MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour. PBS. Available online at www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/september01/rid- ge_bio.html (accessed August 20, 2009). “In Profile: Tom Ridge, Director, White House Office of Homeland Security.” 2002. Journal of the National District Attorneys Association 36 (January-February). LaFleur, Jennifer. 2003. “Ridge Record on Open Government Called ‘Mixed B ag’.” News Media & the Law 27 (winter). RIGHT In an abstract sense, justice, ethical correctness, or harmony with the RULES OF LAW or the principles of morals. In a concrete legal sense, a power, privilege, demand, or claim possessed by a particular person by virtue of law. Each legal right that an individual possesses relates to a corresponding legal duty imposed on another. For example, when a person owns a home and property, he has the right to possess and enjoy it free from the interference of others, who are under a corresponding duty not to interfere with the owner’s rights by trespassing on the property or breaking into the home. In CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, rights are class ified as natural, civil, and political. Natural rights are those that are believed to grow out of the natur e of the individual human being and depend on her personality, such as the rights to life, liberty, privacy, and the pursuit of happiness. CIVIL RIGHTS are those that belong to every citizen of the state, and are not connected with the organization or administration of govern- ment. They include the rights of property, marriage, protection by law, freedom to con- tract, trial by jury, and the like. These rights are capable of being enforced or redressed in a civil action in a court. WE CAN NEVER GUARANTEE THAT WE ARE FREE FROM THE POSSIBILITY OF TERRORIST ATTACK , BUT WE CAN SAY THIS :WE ARE MORE SECURE AND BETTER PREPARED THAN WE WERE [IN 2001]. E ACH AND EVERY SINGLE DAY WE RISE TO A NEW LEVEL OF READINESS AND RESPONSE . —TOM RIDGE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 384 RIGHT Political rights entail the power to partici- pate directly or indirectly in the establishment or administration of government, such as the right of citizenship, the right to vote, and the right to hold public office. RIGHT OF ACTION The privilege of instituting a lawsuit arising from a particular transaction or state of facts, such as a suit that is based on a contract or a TORT, a civil wrong. RIGHT OF ELECTION The prerogative of a surviving spouse to accept the provision the deceased spouse made in the will or to disregard the will and claim the share specified by statute. At death, spouses commonly leave money and property to their surviving husband or wife. This estate is granted in a formal legal document known as a will, established by the deceased person (the decedent). But a will is not the final word on what happens to the decedent’s estate. The surviving spouse may either accept the provisions of the will or choose an alternative called the RIGHT OF ELECTION. In most states, statutes specify a portion of the estate that the surviving spouse can elect to take instead of receiving the amount specified in the will. The right of election ensures that the spouse receives a fair share of the estate. The option sometimes provides a more favor- able outcome for the spouse than accepting the property distribution in the will. Historically, a surviving spouse has enjoyed protection under the law of wills. This protec- tion is an exception to the freedo m a person generally has to decide the disposition of his or her estate after death. By custom, the maker of a will, or the testator, decides how his or her estate is to be divided. This freedom includes the right to disinherit even close relatives. Traditionally, however, the law has prevented a testator from disinheriting a spouse. The reasons for this intervention lie in the law’s philosophical view of marriage as an economic union that entitles both parties to share in each other’s material wealth, even after one spouse’s death. At COMMON LAW, the surviving spouse was granted specific rights in the estate of the deceased spouse through the legal doctrines of DOWER and CURTESY. These doctrines protected the spouse against total disinheritance. Dower entitled a widow to claim a share of her husband’s lands upon his death in order to support herself and her children. Curtesy func- tioned similarly for men. Most states have abolished these doctrines. In the few jurisdic- tions where they remain in effect, they are used primarily to solve problems arising when a spouse has died “intestate,” that is, without a will. The right of election is available under most contemporary state laws. The surviving spouse may choose between accepting the terms of the will or receiving a share of the estate as defined by statute. This share is called a minimum or “elective” share. It varies in amount from state to state; generally, however, it is one-third of the estate if the decedent has children and one- half of the estate otherwise. Statutes may also specify minimum dollar amounts. Under a 1992 New York state law, for instance, the ELECTIVE SHARE is the greater of $50,000 or one-third of the net estate. For some spouses, exercising the right of election is more advantageous than accepting the terms of the will. Besides protecting a spouse against total disinheritance, the right of election can be useful when the testator has left little to the spouse, when the testator has left the spouse’s share in trust, or when other parties assert competing claims to the estate. Statutes establish different conditions and qualifications under which a spouse may claim the right to elect against the will; these range from estate and gift tax issues to marital status at the time of the other spouse’s death. Advocates of same-sex marriage have ar- gued that gay and lesbian couples in long-term relationships cannot employ the right of election because state laws do not recognize same-sex partners as “surviving spouses.” With the legalization of same-sex marriage in Con- necticut, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Maine, this legal impediment has been removed in these states. FURTHER READINGS Derrick, John H. 1986. “Annotation: Construction, Appli- cation, and Effect of Statutes Which Deny or Qualify Surviving Spouse’s Right to Elect against Deceased Spouse’s Will.” American Law Reports 48. Practising Law Institute (PLI). 1994. Recent Changes to the Right of Election Laws and Ethical Considerations, by Arlene Harris. Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook series, PLI Order no. d4-5252. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION RIGHT OF ELECTION 385 CROSS REFERENCES Descent and Distribution; Elective Share; Husband and Wife. RIGHT OF PUBLICITY See TRADEMARKS. RIGHT OF REENTRY A right, retained by the grantor at the time land is conveyed, to reenter and take possession of the land if a certain condition occurs or fails to occur. The right of reentry, also known as the power of termination, applies to a type of interest in land known as a fee simple subject to condition subsequent. The right of reentry means that the grantee must abide by the specified condition or the grantor, or the grantor’s heirs, may reenter and take back the property. For example, a grantor conveys land “to Hennepin County, but if the land is not used for a fire station, then the grantor has the right to reenter and repossess the property.” Once a grantor has exercised the right of reentry, the grantee has no further right to the property. Sometimes a right of reentry is discussed with respect to a grant in the form, “to Hennepin County as long as the land is used for a fire station.” However, this grant is known as a fee simple determinable, which means that upon the county’s failure to use the land for a fire station, the property reverts back to the grantor by operation of law. Technically, then, this grant requires no right of reentry because a failure to abide by its terms automatically reinstates possession in the grantor. With a true right of reentry, the transfer is not automatic, and the grantor must affirmatively reenter the land or, if that is not feasible, bring a court action to recover the property. Leases also frequently include a right of reentry allowing the lessor to reclaim the property if the lessee fails to abide by the terms of the lease. When the lessor exercises the right of reentry and reclaims the property, the lessee has no further right to the premises. However, the lessor may have to take reasonable care to prevent damage to any PERSONAL PROPERTY left on the premises by the lessee. RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP The power of the successor or successors of a deceased individual to acquire the property of that individual upon his or her death; a distinguishing feature of joint tenancy. The right of survivorship determines what happens to a certain type of co-owned property after one of its owners dies. Under law, there are many kinds of co-ownership, but the right of survivorship is found only in JOINT TENANCY,a contract between two or more parties specifying their simultaneous ownership of some form of real or personal property such as a house, land, or money. In all joint tenancies, at the death of one of the joint tenants, ownership of the rema ining property passes to the surviving tenants, or successors, who assert the right of survivorship. This is a powerful LEGAL RIGHT because, upon one spouse’s death, the right of survivorship takes priority over claims on the property by the deceased person’s heirs, beneficiaries, and creditors. Originally a right, at COMMON LAW,it is recognized by statute in all states. In order for co-owners of property to realize the right of survivorship, the property must be owned in joint tenancy. Joint tenancy describes an ownership interest in property held by two or more people called tenants. The tenants acquire their ownership interest in the property in the same way and at the same time, and each holds an equal share. Joint tenancies are created by deed, will, or other transfer of property. Property that is held under a different form of co-ownership can be converted into a joint tenancy by amending the title to the property. When one of the joint tenants dies, the right of survivorship takes effect, passing the deceased tenant’s interest in the property to the other joint tenant or tenants. Husbands and wives often create joint tenancies for co-ownership of their real prop erty; under the common law, this form of joint tenancy is called a tenancy by the entirety. It is an attractive legal option because of the right of survivorship. The right passes outside probate—the procedure by which a deceased person’s will is approved—so legal professionals sometimes call joint tenancy a probate-avoidance device. The DISSOLUTION of a marriage usually ends any subsequent claim of right of survivorship. A joint tenancy continues as long as more than one joint tenant survives. Upon the death of one tenant, the shares of the other tenants increase equally; in a sense, they absorb the ownership interest of the deceased person. This automatic process continue s until only one GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 386 RIGHT OF PUBLICITY surviving joint tenant is left; this survivor becomes the sole owner of the property. When one joint tenant does not survive the other one by 120 hours, the UNIFORM PROBATE CODE states that he or she is deemed to have predeceased that individual. Courts frequently hear claims based on the right of survivorship. The survivin g joint tenant furnishes proof of the death of the other joint tenant as well as valid legal titles indicating that the relevant real property was held in a joint tenancy. DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE establishing the existence of a joint tenancy is generally neces- sary to overcome a challenge to the right of survivorship. FURTHER READINGS Averill, Lawrence. 2000.Probate Law in a Nutshell. 5th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West. Ratner, James R. 1999. “Community Property, Right of Survivorship, and Separate Property Contributions to Marital Assets: an Interplay.” Arizona Law Review 41 (winter). RIGHT OF WAY An EASEMENT, a privilege to pass over the land of another, whereby the holder of the easement acquires only a reasonable and usual enjoyment of the property, and the owner of the land retains the benefits and privileges of ownership consistent with the easement. Right of way is also used to describe that strip of land upon which railroad companies construct their roadbed; in this context, the term refers to the land itself, not the right of passage over it. The term right of way also refers to a preference of one of two vehicles or vessels, or between a motor vehicle and a pedestrian, asserting the right of passage at the same place and time. It is not an absolute right, however, since the possessor of the right of way is not relieved from the duty of exercising due care for her own safety and that of others. RIGHT TO COUNSEL The legal responsibility for the government to provide every defendant in a criminal action with LEGAL REPRESENTATION that also must be deemed effective. The SIXTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitu- tion holds, in part, “In all criminal prosecu- tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to have the Assistance OF COUNSEL for his defence.” This clause grants to all defendants the right to an attorney from the moment they are taken into police custody. The decisions of the U.S. SUPREME COURT have also construed this Right to Counsel Clause to mean that an impoverished, or indigent, DEFENDANT has the constitutional right to the presence of a court-appointed attorney at critical stages in the criminal proceedings. These critical stages include CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION, post-indictment lineups, preliminary hearings, ARRAIGNMENT, trial, sentencing, and the first appeal of conviction. The Right to Counsel Clause was a reaction against the English practice of denying the assistance of an attorney in serious criminal cases and requiring defendants to appear before the court and defend themselves in their own words. The 1586 trial of Mary Stuart, Queen of Scots, illustrates the harshness of denying the assistance of counsel in a criminal case. Queen Mary was charged with TREASON for allegedly conspiring to assassinate Queen Elizabeth I. Mary asked for the assistance of counsel, PLEADING that “the laws and statutes of England are to me most unknown; I am destitute of counsellors and no man dareth step forth to be my advocate” (Winick 1989, 787). Her requests were denied, and Mary was summarily convicted and executed by decapitation. The Fra mers of the U.S. Constitution considered the deprivation of counsel repug- nant to basic principles of criminal justice. According to the Framers, the assistance of counsel was a critical element in maintaining an Railroads generally own the strip of land that their tracks cover, called a right of way. DAVID BUTOW/ CORBIS SABA. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION RIGHT TO COUNSEL 387 . What the law had been unable to do, one of the lawless accomplished. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 3 78 REX lawsuits challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of legislative. the Right of Election Laws and Ethical Considerations, by Arlene Harris. Commercial Law and Practice Course Handbook series, PLI Order no. d4-5252. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION RIGHT. TO DRESS A TRUTH IN AUTHORITY IS TO STULTIFY FREEDOM OF THOUGHT . —ELLIOT LEE RICHARDSON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 382 RICO suffering from high blood pressure may pay higher