the absolute immunity enjoyed by judges or legislators. In theory, the defense allows police to do their job without fear of reprisal. In practice, however, it has become increasingly difficult for individuals to sue law enforcement officers for damages for allegedly violating their civil rights. U.S. SUPREME COURT decisions have continually asserted the general rule that officers must be given the benefit of the doubt that they acted lawfully in carrying out their day-to-day duties, a position reasserted in Saucier v. Katz,533U.S. 194, 121 S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001). History Society has grappled with misconduct and corruption issues for as long as it has had police officers. Through the mid-to-late 19th century, private police forces were commonplace, and agents of Pinkerton’s and other for-hire services became notorious as the muscle that employers used to violently end strikes. Heavy-handed law enforcement as well as vigilantism by groups such as the racist KU KLUX KLAN spurred passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, which criminalized acting under state law to deprive a person of constitutional or other rights under federal law. SECTION 1983 of the act remains a critical tool for enforcing constitutional rights, with direct appli- cability to police misconduct cases. The twentieth century saw multiple legal, administrative, and scholarly approaches to the problem. Some developments bore indirectly upon police misconduct, suc h as the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which gave new protections to citizens who had long suffered discriminatory policing. Additionally, a string of landmark Supreme Court decisions during the era gave new force to individual privacy rights and to curbs upon POLICE POWER: highly influential cases resulted in the strengthening of FOURTH AMENDMENT rights against unreason- able SEARCH AND SEIZURE, evidentiary rules forbidding the use at trial of evidence tainted by unconstitutional police actions, and the establishment of the so-called Miranda warning requiring officers to advise detained suspects of their constitutional rights. Whereas these decisions profoundly shaped the legal and social landscape, renewed focus on police misconduct and corruption occurred in the latter part of the century. As the pioneering criminologist Herman Goldstein argued, tradi- tional views were based on the assumption that police abuse reflected the moral failings of individual officers—the so-called bad cop. Public scandals began to shape a new view of the problem. In 1971, New York City organized the Knapp Commission to hold hearings on the extent of corruption in the city’s police depart- ment. Police officer Frank Serpico’s startling testimony against fellow officers not only revealed systemic corruption but highlighted a longstanding obstacle to investigating these abuses: the fraternal understanding among police officers known variously as “the Code of Silence” and “the Blue Curtain” under which officers regard testimony against a fellow officer as betrayal. Broader recognition of the problem brought more ambitious reform efforts in the 1980s and 1990s. Spurred by the work of criminologists such as Goldstein and others, police departments sought to improve organi- zational rules, training, and prevention and control mechanisms. Such efforts are reflected in the publication of a code of police conduct by the International Association of Chiefs of Police, more rigorous training for officers, and experimentation with so-called community policing programs to improve ties between officers and the public. Several cities estab- lished joint police and civilian complaint review boards to give citizens a larger role in what traditionally had been a closed, internal process by police departments. Among the most dramatic examples of system-wide reform is New York City’s response to longstanding brutality, discrimination, and corruption within the New York City Police Department (NYPD). After flirting with civilian review of complaints against police in the 1960s, the city committed to it after public outcry over the videotaping of officers beating citizens who violated curfew in 1988. The city subsequently established its Civilian Complaint Review Board, which became an all-civilian agency in 1993. In 1992, responding to new complaints, Mayor David N. Dinkins appointed the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Police Corruption and the Anti-Corruption Procedures of the Police Department, known as the Mollen Commission. Two years later, the commission concluded that the city had alternated between cycles of corruption and reform. In 1995 Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani established the full-time Commis- sion to Combat Police Corruption (CCPC) as an entity independent from the police department. The CCPC monitors the NYPD anti-corruption GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 8 POLICE CORRUPTION AND MISCONDUCT policies and procedures, conducts audits, and issues public reports. Contemporary Problems Despite legal safeguards and well-intentioned reforms, police problems have continued to produce headlines. The exact scope of miscon- duct is unknown. Misconduct complaints can be quantified on a city-by-city basis, but these data are often subjective, and far more com- plaints are filed than ever are evaluated at trial. Corruption is even harder to measure. As the National Institute of Justice acknowledged in its May 2000 report, The Measurement of Police Integrity, most corruption incidents go unre- ported, and data that do exist “are best regarded as measures of a police agency’ s anticorruption activity, not the actual level of corruption.” During the late 1990s, highly publicized cases in New York, New Jersey, Texas, Detroit, and Cleveland exposed an apparently new trend: police drug corruption. In the Cleveland case alone, the FBI arrested 42 officers from five law enforcement agencies in 1998 on charges of CONSPIRACY to distribute cocaine. In a 1998 report to U.S. Congressman Charles B. Rangel, the federal GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE (GAO) found evidence of growing police involvement in drug sales, theft of drugs and money from drug dealers, and perjured testimony about illegal searches. The GAO survey of police commission reports and academic research suggested a troub ling new dimension not previously seen in studies of police corruption. Traditionally, police corrup tion had been un- derstood to involve individuals acting alone, but the new trend revealed officers working in small groups to protect and assist each other. In 1999 this pattern emerged in one of the worst police corruption scandals in U.S. history. The scandal involved the Los Angeles Police Department’s Rampart precinct and particularly its elite anti-gang unit, CRASH (Community Resources Against Street Hoodlums). Following local and federal investigations, CRASH was dismantled, some 70 officers were investigated, and several either pleaded guilty to or were convicted of crimes ranging from drug theft and peddling to assault, fabricating arrests, and filing false reports. The Rampart scandal bore heavy costs, financially as well as in human terms. Several dozen criminal convictions credited to the work of the corrupt officers were overturned. By 2003, the city had already paid $40 million to settle lawsuits. In a settlement with the federal government in 2000, the Los Angeles City Council accepted a CONSENT DECREE that placed the city’s police department under the supervi- sion of a federal judge for five years to implement and monitor reforms. However, reform is no panacea. Even New York City’s extensive reforms were called into doubt by two high-profile police cases in the 1990s. Both highlighted the difficulties inherent in prosecuting even apparently clear-cut mis- conduct. The first, in 1997, involved Haitian immigrant Abner Louima, who was shockingly beaten in a police cruiser and sodomized in a bathroom with a broom handle by four NYPD officers. Louima ultimately settled a civil case against the department for $8.7 million in 2001, one of the highest police brutality settlements ever paid and the highest by New York City since paying a $3 million settlement in the choking death of Anthony Baez in 1994. Yet, despite much public frustration, prose- cution of the officers was less conclusive. Officer Justin Volpe pleaded guilty to leading the SODOMY assault and was sentenced to 30 years in prison. However, in 1999 his fellow three officers were acquitted on charges of assault in the police cruiser; one of them, officer Charles Schwarz, was convicted of violating Louima’s civil rights for holding him down during the bathroom assault. In 2000 all three were convicted of obstructing justice for their actions in covering up evidence of the attack, but these convictions were later overturned in United States v. Schwarz, 283 F.3d 76 (2d Cir. 2002). After a new trial on the civil right s charge was ordered, Schwarz reached a plea bargain in September 2002, agreeing to be sentenced to a five-year prison term. The second New York controversy involved the killing in 1999 of an unarmed man. Four undercover police officers shot Amadou Diallo 41 times after stopping the Guinean immigrant in the vestibule of his apartment building, where, they said, he reached into his back pocket. Large public protests attracted activists such as Susan Sarandon and former New York Mayor David Dinkins, who argued that the department’s so-called Aggressive Street Crimes Unit was, in fact, far too aggressive. In 2000 the four officers were acquitted in a trial that GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION POLICE CORRUPTION AND MISCONDUCT 9 supporters said vindicated them but that critics blamed on lax prosecution. During the late 2000s, a number of cases arose in which video surveillance recordings showed police officers abusing suspects, leading to criminal charges being brought against the officers, or to prosecutors dropping charges against the suspects. In one case, a police detective was indicted on three PERJURY charges after surveillance video conflicted with the detective’s testimony. In another case, a video showed a police officer knocking a man from a bicycle during a cycling event. The cyclist was originally charged with attempted assault, resist- ing arrests, and DISORDERLY CONDUCT,butthe PROSECUTOR dropped the charges due to the tape. Outside the courts, mounting resentment over discriminatory misconduct by police officers has occasionally led to rioting. In contemporary experience, the Los Angeles riots in 1992 followed the acquittal of white police officers charged w ith the videotaped beating of black motorist RODNEY KING. In April 2001, three days of rioting in Cincinnati followed the acquittal of a white police officer on charges of shooting Timothy Thomas, a 19-year-old unarmed black man. Cities, courts, police departments, and criminologists all continue to examine ways to bring meaningful reform to police depart- ments. Some critics have argued that mis con- duct and corruption are age-old problems that resist all efforts at eradication; the best that society can do, in this view, is to monitor and correct. Others trace recent problems to PUBLIC POLICY that emphasizes aggressive polic ing of drug, gang, and street crimes. Whateve r the cause and the solution, until more efficacious remedies are found, some citizens will still require protection from the very people appointed to protect and serve them. FURTHER READINGS Corporation for Public Broadcasting. “The Rampart Scan- dal.” Frontline. Available online at www.pbs.org/wgbh/ pages/frontline/shows/lapd/scandal (accessed Septem- ber 5, 2003). Drug Policy Alliance. “Police Corruption.” Available online at www.drugpolicy.org/law/police/ (accessed August 23, 2003). Hauser, Christine. 2009. “When Evidence from Surveillance Cameras Leads to Charges against Officers.” New York Times (March 25). Howell, Ron. 2002. “Mother Hopes for Settlement.” News- day (February 5). Hurtado, Patricia. 2002. “Case Now Closed: Unusual Plea Deal Yields No Clear Win for Louima, Schwarz.” Newsday (September 23). Kennedy, Rozella Floranz, ed. “Fighting Police Abuse: A Community Action Manual.” ACLU Department of Public Education. Available online at archive.aclu.org/ library/fighting_police_abuse.html (accessed August 23, 2003). Klockars, Carl B., et al. 2000. “The Measurement of Police Integrity.” Research in Brief. Washington, D.C.: National Institute of Justice. “Law Enforcement—Information on Drug-Related Police Corruption.” 1998. Government Accounting Office Report. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office (June 29). Manalili, Joseph, ed. “Chapter 5: Remedies and Legal Developments.” Revisiting Who Is Guarding the Guar- dians? Washington, D.C.: U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Available online at www.usccr.gov/pubs/guard/ main.htm (accessed August 23, 2003). New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board. “History of the CCRB.” Available online at www.ci.nyc.ny.us/ html/ccrb/html/history.html (accessed August 23, 2003). U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division, Coordina- tion, and Review Section. “Addressing Police Miscon- duct: Laws Enforced by the United States Department of Justice” Available online at www.usdoj.gov/crt/cor/ Pubs/polmis.htm (accessed August 23, 2003). CROSS R EFERENCES Civil Rights; Conspiracy; Constitutional Law; Discrimina- tion; Due Process; Fourth Amendment; Immunity; Ku Klux Klan; Pinkerton Agents; Privacy POLICE POWER The authority conferred upon the states by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and which the states delegate to their political subdivisions to enact measures to preserve and protect the health, safety, welfare, and morals of the community. Police power describes the basic right of governments to make laws and regulations for the benefit of their communities. Under the system of government in the United States, only states have the right to make laws based on their police power. The lawmaking power of the federal government is limited to the specific grants of power found in the Constitution. The right of states to make laws governing safety, health, welfare, and morals is derived from the TENTH AMENDMENT, which states, “The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the states, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” State legislatures exercise their police power by enacting statutes, and they also GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 10 POLICE POWER delegate much of their police power to counties, cities, towns, villages, and large boroughs within the state. Police power does not specifically refer to the right of state and local government to create police forces, although the police power does include that right. Police power is also used as the basis for enacting a variety of substantive laws in such areas as zoning, land use, fire and BUILDING CODES, gambling, DISCRIMINATION, park- ing, crime, licensing of professionals, liquor, motor vehicles, bicycles, nuisances, schooling, and sanitation. If a law enacted pursuant to the police power does not promote the health, safety, or welfare of the community, it is likely to be an unconstitutional deprivation of life, liberty, or property. The most common challenge to a statute enacted pursuant to the police power is that it constitutes a taking. A taking occurs when the government deprives a person of property or directly interferes with, or substan- tially disturbs, a person’s use and enjoyment of his or her property. The case of Mahony v. Township of Hamp- ton, 651 A.2d 525 (Pa. 1994) illustrates how a state or local jurisdiction can exceed its police power. Mahony involved a zoning ordinance enacted by the township of Hampton in Pennsylvania. The ordinance prohibited a private party from operating a gas well in a residential district but allowed the operation of such wells by the government. Jack D. Mahony, a landowner who operated a gas well, objected to the ordinance, arguing that the disparate treatment of public and private operation of gas wells was arbitrary and not justified by any concerns related to the police power. Mahony noted that the STATE DEPARTMENT of Environ- mental Regulation (DER) already regulated all gas wells in the state and that there was no factual basis for distinguishing between public and private wells. The SUPREME COURT of Pennsylvania agreed with Mahony that the regulation by the DER was sufficient to secure the safety of the community. The court opined that if the township wished to further ensure gas well safety, it could require the posting of a bond with the township before granting a license to operate the well. Such a measure would ensure that the gas well was being operated by a financially secure person who would have the resources to keep the well in good repair. The court held that the total ban on private operation of gas wells in residential districts was unreasonable and that it bore no real and substantial relation to the health, safety, and welfare of the community. Therefore, the ordinance was an invalid exercise of the police power. FURTHER READINGS Bodenhamer, David J. and James W. Ely, Jr., eds. 2008. The Bill of Rights in Modern America. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press. McAffee, Thomas B., Jay S. Bybee, and A. Christopher Bryant. 2006. Powers Reserved for the People and the States: A History of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments. Westport, Conn.: Praeger Publishers. CROSS REFERENCES Buck v. Bell; Eminent Domain; Land-Use Control; Lochner v. New York;States’ Rights. POLICY The general principles by which a government is guided in its management of public affairs, or the legislature in its measures. A general term used to describe all contracts of insurance. As applied to a law, ordinance, or RULE OF LAW, the general purpose or tendency considered as directed to the welfare or prosperity of the state or community. POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE A group not endorsed by a candidate or political party but organized to engage in political election activities, especially the raising and spending of money for “campaigning.” Some political action committees (PACs) are organized solely to help defeat a candidate the group deems undesirable. PACs are most often organized around a particular trade, union, or business. They are also organized to promulgate particular social, economic, or political beliefs or agendas. For example, there are PACs formed to represent the interests of the pharmaceutical and auto- motive industries. Likewise, from an ideological perspective on ABORTION, there are both pro-life PACs and pro-choice PACs. Some PACs are sponsored by a corporation, business, or LABOR UNION. Corporations, busi- ness interests, and labor unions that sponsor PACs are prohibited from contributing their organizations’ funds to the PACs they sponsor, but employees or members of the sponsoring organizations may contribute. Many types of special -interest groups have established PACs, including the following examples: coal operators, hospitals, labor GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 11 unions, banks, doctors, feminist groups, lawyers, insurance agents, pharmaceutical companies, and manufacturers. These groups commonly form PACs to promote their legislative goals. Some of these, such as the coal industry and labor PACs, generally give most of their dona- tions to candidates they expect to favor their legislative agendas. Other PACs, such as those created by chiropractors or publishers, may dole out small contributions to dozens of candidates with widely varying political views. Nearly all PACs have specific legislative agendas. Special-interest PACs are a major force in the financing of congressional campaigns. Their contributions heavily favor incumbents. These PACs’ numbers and influence are grow- ing. For example, in 1976 there were only 608 PACs; just 20 years later, in 1996, there were more than 4,000 PACs. Since 1996, the number of PACs has generally remained steady. Some PACs are not sponsored by an organization. For example, some members of Congress have formed their own PACs. These PACs are separate from their candidate commit- tees. This separation allows them to accept contributions and distribute larger sums than they otherwise could through their own candidate committees. A newly formed PAC must register with the FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC) within ten days of its formation. The PAC must provide the name and address for the PAC, its treasurer, and any affiliated organizations. Many politicians also form leadership PAC s. These PACs are not technically affiliated with the candidate. Rather, they are a way of raising money to help fund other candidates’ cam- paigns. Leadership PACs are often indicative of a politician’s aspirations for leadership positions in Congress or for higher office. Although PACs are used mostly by mem- bers of the House and SENATE, they also can be used in presidential campaigns. For example, in Bob Dole’s 1996 presidential bid, Dole formed a leadership PAC called “Campaign America.” This PAC helped contribute $62,000 to state and loca l candidates in Iowa. This type of money helped Dole to build a very strong base of support for his presidential bid during the Iowa primaries, although he eventually went on to lose that election bid. The laws regarding public funding for presidential candidates are technically separate from the Federal Election Campaign Act, Pub. L. 92–225, 86 Stat. 19, 2 U.S.C. § 451, and are found in the Presidential Campaign Fund Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9012, and the Presidential Primary Matching Payment Account Act, 26 U.S.C. §§ 9031–9042. PACs first came into existence in 1944 . The Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) formed the first PAC to raise money for the re-election of President FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT. The PAC received voluntary donations from union members rather than from union trea- suries; this system did not violate the Smith Connally Act of 1943, which forbade unions from contributing to federal candidates. Although commonly called PACs, federal elec- tion law refers to these accounts as “separate segregated funds” because money contributed to a PAC is kept in a bank account separate from the general corporate or union treasury. In 1936 labor unions began spending union dues to support federal candidates who were sympathetic to the workers’ issues. This practice was prohibited by the Smith-Connally Act of 1943, Pub. L. No. 78-89, 57 Stat. 163 (1943). Thus, labor unions, corporations, and interstate banks were effectively barred from contributing directly to candidates for federal office. In 1944 the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 1979–80 1983–84 1987–88 1991–92 1995–96 1999–00 2003–04 2007–08 Contributions (in millions) $60 $113 $159 $189 $217 $260 $310 $413 0 25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250 275 300 325 350 375 400 425 SOURCE: Federal Election Commission. PAC Campaign Contributions, 1979 to 2008 ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 12 POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE one of the largest labor interest groups in the nation, found a way to go around the constraints of the Smith-Connally Act by forming the first political action committee, or PAC. The CIO’s poli tical goal was to support the re-election of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Because the CIO was a union and prohibited from using union money to support a federal candidate by the Smith Connally-Act, the PAC circumvented the prohibitions of the act by soliciting volunteer contributions from individ- ual union members. In the wake of the WATERGATE political scandal in the early 1970s, Congress passed new campaign financing legislation known as the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA). FECA was intended to do the following: n achieve full disclosure of the sources of campaign contributions; n limit the size of campaign contributions by wealthy individuals and organized interest groups; n provide public funding—with spending limits—for presidential candidates; and n enforce campaign finance rules through a new administrative agency, the Federal Election Commission (FEC). This legislation also continued older prohibi- tions on the use of corporate and union treasury funds in federal elections. These provisions of FECA were sustained by the SUPREME COURT in the leading case of Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 96 S. Ct. 612, L. Ed. 659 (1976). Following the 2002 midterm elections, a new set of campaign finance laws went into effect. The Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81, is considered the most sweeping change of the U.S. campaign finance system since FECA. The legislation was sponsored by Senators JOHN MCCAIN (R-AZ) and Russ Feingold (D-WI) and Representatives Chris Shays (R-CT) and Marty Meehan (D-MA). The BCRA is an attempt to curb the use of “soft money” in campaigns. Basically, soft money is money donated to political parties in a way that leaves the contribution unregulated. Conversely, “hard money” consists of political donations that are regulated by law through the Federal Election Commission. The soft money loophole was created not by Congress but by the Federal Election Commission in an administrative ruling in 1978. The law also increases the contribution limits for individuals giving to federal cand idates and political parties. PACs can donate up to $5,000 to a candidate’s campaign committee for each indi- vidual election bid, and they can give $5,000 per year to any other PAC. PACs may receive up to $5,000 from any one individual, PAC, or party committee during any given calendar year. They may also donate up to $15,000 annually to any national party committee. PACs that affiliate with other like-minded PACs are treated as one donor for the purpose of contribution limits. The Supreme Court has rule d that spending that supports or oppos es a candidate, but is not coordinated with any candidate, cannot be limited. Such “independent expenditures” can be made by either individuals or PACs. Independent expenditures are those made on behalf of (or against) a candidate that are not coordinated with a candidate. For example, an exporters’ PAC might spend $50,000 on televi- sion ads that are critical of a candidate ’s stand on import restrictions and urge a vote against that candidate. Political ads that urge the viewer to “vote for” or “vote against” a candidate are examples of express advocacy and must be paid for from contributions that come under the restrictions of federal campaign finance laws, including prohibitions on contributions by corporations or labor unions. Advertising campaigns discuss- ing issues—and not directly advocating the defeat or election of a candidate—are not subject to federal campaign finance laws. Thus, these “issue advocacy” campaigns are not subject to limits on spending or contributions and are not required to disclose their contribu- tions or expenditures. As a candidate for president in 2008, JOHN MCCAIN criticized Democratic candidate BARACK OBAMA ’S links to the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN). ACORN’s PAC endorsed Obama, and Oba- man’s campaign paid $800,000 to a consultant that used ACORN in an effort to encourage low- and middle-income citizens to vote. FURTHER READINGS Anschutz, Auguste V., ed. 2002. Campaign Financing in the United States: Issues and Laws. Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science. Baran, Jan Witold. 2008. The Election Law Primer for Corporations. 5th ed. Chicago: American Bar Association. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE 13 Bauer, Robert F. 2002. Soft Money Hard Law: A Guide to the New Campaign Finance Law. Washington, D.C.: Perkins Coie. Biersack, Robert, Paul S. Herrnson, and Clyde Wilcox, eds. 1999. After the Revolution: PACs, Lobbies, and the Republican Congress. Boston: Allyn and Bacon. ———. 1994. Risky Business? PAC Decisionmaking in Congressional Elections. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe. Corrado, Anthony. 2000. Campaign Finance Reform. New York: Century Foundation. Herrnson, Paul S. 2004. Congressional Elections: Campaign- ing at Home and in Washington. 4th ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. Ryden, David K., ed. 2002. The U.S. Supreme Court and the Electoral Process. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown Univ. Press. CROSS REFERENCES Campaign Finance Reform; Elections. POLITICAL CAMPAIGN LAW Statutes and court rulings that govern candidates running for public office. Political campaign laws have been enacted to ensure fair elections and to preve nt mislead- ing or false information from being given to voters. Though federal and state laws that govern campaign financing dominate the head- lines, there are a host of state laws that a candidate must follow during a campaign. A candidate who violates campaig n laws risks criminal prosecution or the FORFEITURE of the public office. Political campaigns are protected by the FIRST AMENDMENT, but FREEDOM OF SPEECH is not unlimited. For example, state laws prohibit candidates from using the term “reelect” in campaign signs and literature if the person is not the INCUMBENT of that office. Candidates are also barred from making “false claims of support” that falsely state or imply the endorse- ment of a political party or an organization. Moreover, a candidate cannot state in printed campaign literature that specific individuals endorse the candidate, without first obtaining written permission from those in dividuals. All of these laws speak to fraudulent MISREPRESENTA- TION by a candidate. More difficult situations arise when one candidate alleges that another candidate has intentionally misrepresented the position of the other. Open political debate is expected in a campaign, but candidates can be prosecuted if the claims are judged to be objectively false. Candidates who retract or withdraw challenged campaign literature may escape any penalties for these actions if they do so in a timely manner. However, false claims made in the closing days or hours of a campaign will be scrutinized more closely. Up until the early twentieth century, politi- cal campaigns were marred by corruption. Citizens traded their vote for money or the promise of a government job or benefit. Progressive Era reformers sought to diminish the power of political machines that used BRIBERY, as well as coercion, to ensure the election of their candidates. States have enacted criminal laws that prohibit bribing persons to vote or not vote in an election. For example, a person may transport voters to the polls on election day but may not solicit votes. Persons who directly or indirectly threaten the use of force, coercion, economic reprisal, loss of employment, or other harm to compel indivi- duals to vote or not vote for a candidate are also subject to prosecution. Political advertising on television and radio is also subject to regulation. For example, news- paper print ads, along with radio and television broadcasts, must convey to the public that a message is a paid advertisement. Such laws seek to prevent voters from believing that the message is actually news. In addition, the name of the candidate, party, or organization that paid for the advertisement must be disclosed at the beginning or end of the advertisement. This requirement has been evaded at times when a shell organization is created to disguise the true identity of the sponsor. Candidates who violate these types of campaigns laws can be prosecuted. A losing candidate ty pically lodges a complaint with the local district or county attorney, alleging certain violations. If the district attorney finds merit in the allegations, a prosecution will follow. This type of prosecution is rare, but a candidate who is convicted of a campaign law violation may forfeit the nomination or office in question. However, forfeitures will occur only if it is proven that the candidate committed the act or knew that another person committed the act. Courts will reject forfeiture if the act was trivial or accidental and if it would be unjust to declare forfeiture. Even if a court declines to declare forfeiture, legislatures have the right to deter- mine their membership. Occasionally, a legisla- tive body will refuse to seat a person who has committed campaign violations. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 14 POLITICAL CAMPAIGN LAW Candidates must follow campaign financing rules. State and federal laws authorize public financing of many campaigns. Candidates who accept public financing must abide by the strings that are attached to this funding. In addition, political cam paigns must maintain financial records of contributions and expendi- tures, which are filed at designated times before, during, and after a campaign. Campaign com- mittees may be fined for failing to file reports on time or for substantive violatio ns. The FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION (FEC) oversees campaign financing for federal elections. At the state level, a campaign finance board or the SECRETARY OF STATE may oversee this task. Congress enacted the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), 116 Stat. 81, which has come to be known as the McCain-Feingold law. Senator JOHN MCCAIN (R-Arizona) and Senator Russell Feingold (D-Wisconsin) were the SENATE sponsors. The law prohibited “soft money” contributions to political candidates and restricted corporations, labor unions, and advocacy groups from spending their funds to finance “electioneering communications” that seek to influence a federal election. In contrast, “hard money” is the amount that an individual may contribute to a political candidate; federal law places strict limits on these contributions, with individuals allowed to contribute only $2000 to a federal candidate. The U.S. SUPREME COURT ,inMcConnell v. Federal Election Commis- sion, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003), upheld most of the law’s provisions. However, it struck down as unconstitutional a provision that prohibited corporations, unions, and other organizations from broadcasting “issue” advertising specifically mentioning a candidate for office within 60 days of a federal election or 30 days before a primary or caucus. FURTHER READINGS Currinder, Marian. 2008. Moneyin the House: Campaign Funds and Congressional Party Politics.Boulder:WestviewPress. LaRaja, Raymond J. 2008. Small Change: Money, Political Parties, and Campaign Finance Reform. Lansing: University of Michigan Press. Pinaire, Brian. 2008. The Constitution of Electoral Speech. Palo Alto: Stanford Law Books. CROSS REFERENCE Election Campaign Financing. POLITICAL CAMPAIGNS See DEMOCRATIC PARTY; ELECTION CAMPAIGN FINANC- ING ; ELECTIONS; REPUBLICAN PARTY. POLITICAL CRIME A violation of law (either an act or omission to discharge a duty) that threatens, or is construed to threaten, the security or existence of a sitting government, such as ESPIONAGE or CONSPIRACY or TREASON or SEDITION. It might be a violent or non- violent offense, and its motivation might be ideo- logical and/or religious. The nature and range of such offenses, as well as punishment for them, will vary widely and according to each government that criminalizes such acts or omissions. FURTHER READINGS Passas, Nikos. 1986. “Political Crime and Political Offender: Theory and Practice.” Liverpool Law Review Vol. 8, No. 1. (March) Ross, Jeffrey Ian. 2003. The Dynamics of Political Crime. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage. Tunnell, K.D. 1993. Political Crime in Contemporary America: A Critical Approach. New York: Garland Publishing. POLITICAL QUESTION A political question is an issue that the federal courts refuse to decide because it properly belongs to the decision-making authority of elected officials. Political questions include such areas as the conduct of foreign policy, the RATIFICATION of constitutional amendments, and the organiza- tion of each state’s government as defined in its own constitution. The rule preventing federal courts from deciding such cases is called the political question doctrine. Its purpose is to distinguish the role of the federal judiciary from those of the legislature and the executive, preventing the former from encroaching on either of the latter. Under the rule, courts may choose to dismiss cases even if they have juris- diction over them. However, the rule has no precise formulation, and its development since the 1960s has sometimes been unpredictable. The SUPREME COURT originated the idea of political questions in the early 1800s during its formative era. As with other judicial doctrines created by the Court, the rule is interpretive and self-imposed. It is neither a result of legislation nor a part of the U.S. Constitution, although it appears to emanate from the Constitution’s SEPARATION OF POWERS. The Court created the political question doctrine as part of the broader concept of justiciability—the issue of whether a matter is appropriate for court review. Appro- priate matters are called JUSTICIABLE controver- sies and may proceed to court. Political GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION POLITICAL QUESTION 15 questions are not regarded as appropriate matters; they are not justiciable and, generally, will be dismissed. The political question doc- trine will not be applied to every matter that arouses fierce public debate, as seen in the Court’s rulings on ABORTION and AFFIRMATIVE ACTION . As the history of the Supreme Court shows, the determination of whether an issue is justiciable is at its own discretion. Chief Justice JOHN MARSHALL first used the term political question in 1803 at a time when the Court sought to tread delicately between warring factions of politicians in Washington. Not until 1849 was the idea elaborated, in response to a crisis in the state of Rhode Island known as the Dorr Rebellion: A political uprising had resulted in the passage of two separate state constitutions, the declaration of MARTIAL LAW, and the promise of military intervention by President JOHN TYLER. The Supreme Court was asked to settle critical cons- titutional questions about the nature of repub- lican government but refused (Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. [7 How.] 1, 12 L. Ed. 581 [1849]). Chief Justice ROGER TANEY instead delivered the first articulation of the doctrine: Federal courts should leave certain constitutional questions to the legislative and executive branches in any matter that is “a political question to be settled by the political power.” From the mid-nineteenth century until the 1960s, the political ques tion doctrine changed very little. Then the Supreme Court began to narrow it: Where previously a broad rule applied, now matters that would have been rejected as political questions became justiciable Richard Nixon’s counsel argued that the president’s refusal to comply with the subpoenas of White House tapes was a political question because it was a dispute among members of the executive branch, namely the president and special prosecutor. The Supreme Court compelled Nixon to produce the tapes, prompting him to resign on August 8, 1974. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 16 POLITICAL QUESTION controversies. In a landmark case in 1962, the Court intervened to allow a challenge to the way in which the Tennessee legislature apportioned its voting districts ( BAKER V. CARR, 369 U.S. 186, 82 S. Ct. 691, 7 L. Ed. 2d 663). Again in 1969, the Court took up a matter that previously would have been dismissed. This was its decision that the HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES could not exclude a duly elected member who met all constitutional qualifications, despite the provi- sion in Article I of the Constitution that gives both houses of Congress the power to judge qualifications (Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 89 S. Ct. 1944, 23 L. Ed. 2d 491). These cases cast doubt on the future of the doctrine. In 1974 the Court added further uncertainty when it ruled against President Richard M. Nixon’s claim of EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE in the WATERGATE scandal (UNITED STATES V. NIXON, 418 U.S. 683, 94 S. Ct. 3090, 41 L. Ed. 2d 1039). It is well settled that the federal courts cannot supervise or control the decisions of the president or other executive officials. President Nixon had relied on this fact when he defied congressional subpoenas asking him to release tapes and documents made in the White House. The Court chose, however, not to adhere rigidly to the rule by holding that the demands of a fair trial and criminal justice outweighed the pre- sident’s claim. The subject of the political-question doc- trine’s application al so arose following the Court’s decision in Bush v. Gore, (531 U.S. 98, 121 S. Ct. 525, 148 L. Ed. 2d 388 [2000]). In a PER CURIAM decision, the Court decided that the State of Florida violated the EQUAL PROTECTION clause by ordering a manual recount of certain Florida counties following the highly contested 2000 presidential election. Critics of the decisions have argued that the Court should have ruled that the issue was a political question and left the issue to be resolv ed by state election officials. FURTHER READINGS Arnhart, Larry. 2003. Political Questions: Political Philosophy from Plato to Rawls. 3d ed. Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press. Pushaw, Robert J., Jr. 2002. “The Presidential Election Dispute, the Political Question Doctrine, and the Four- teenth Amendment.” Florida State Univ. Law Review 29 (winter): 603–23. Tushnet, Mark V. 2002. “Law and Prudence in the Law of Justiciability: The Transformation and Disappearance of the Political Question Doctrine.” North Carolina Law Review 80 (May): 1203–35. CROSS REFERENCES Apportionment; Constitutional Law; Dorr, Thomas Wilson; Judicial Review; Warren Court. POLITICAL TRIAL A trial that addresses political questions, involves political officials, or serves political agendas. In certain circumstances, the term is used in a pejorative sense to criticize a particular trial or proceeding as unfair or unjust. Although it is sometimes difficult to distin- guish political trials from ordinary LEGAL PROCEEDINGS , political trials generally fall into one of four categories. The most familiar type of political trial is a partisan trial, which consists of criminal legal proceedings instituted by the government to solidify its power, extinguish its opposition, or flex its muscle. Such political trials, though taking place in a courtroom, have little to do with justice. Instead, partisan trials serve to prom ote the ideology of those holding the reins of power. In many countries, partisan trials are easy to identify because the prosecutors, judges, and defense attorneys are chosen by the government based on their allegiance to the regime’s poli- tical philosophy. In other countries, the govern- ment may exert subtle pressure upon judges and attorneys to influence the outcome of a case. In either situation, such proceedings rarely produce a resu lt that is fair or impartial. Some of the most notorious partisan tri als took place in Adolf Hitler’s Germany and Joseph Stalin’s Soviet Union, where many of the judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys served as instruments of terror and propaganda for their totalitarian leaders. A second familiar type of political trial involves the prosecution of religious and political dissenters. Since time immemorial, gov- ernments have been confronted by persons who disobey the law for reasons of conscience. Such disobedience, which can take the form of active or passive resistance, presents a dilemma for most governments. On the one hand, governments must pro- secute persons who disobey the law, to maintain the integrity of the legal system. Yet, if the prosecution takes place in a public forum, a religious or political dissenter is likely to question the propriety of a particular law or policy and challenge the legitimacy or compe- tency of the existing government. On the other GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION POLITICAL TRIAL 17 . 20 08 ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION 12 POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEE one of. and Laws. Huntington, N.Y.: Nova Science. Baran, Jan Witold. 20 08. The Election Law Primer for Corporations. 5th ed. Chicago: American Bar Association. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD. office. In 1944 the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), 1979 80 1 983 84 1 987 88 1991–92 1995–96 1999–00 2003–04 2007– 08 Contributions (in millions) $60 $113 $159 $ 189 $217 $260 $310 $413 0