have been better off if Thurmond had been elected. The comments, which Lott claimed were lighthearted and intended as a compliment to Thurmon d, soon became the center of a media frenzy and serious debate among mem- bers of Congress. President GEORGE W. BUSH called the comments “offensive” and “wrong.” Lott apologized on a number of occasions, but to no avail. Both Democrat and Republican members of Congress criticized the remarks, including his friends in the Senate. A number of media sources reviewed prior public comments by Lott and discovered that he had made similar remarks in the past. In fact, in 1980 he made a very similar claim endorsing Thurmond after Thurmond had made a speech in support of Ronald Reagan, who was then a candidate for president. In December 2002, Bill Frist (R Tenn.) claimed that he had enough votes to replace Lott as Senate majority leader. However, Lott resigned from the position before any vote took place. Lott retained his seat in the Senate, but the events in 2002 and early 2003 clouded the public’s view of him. In 2006 Lott was re-elected to the U.S. Senate in Mississippi, defeating Democrat Erik R. Fleming, and then was elected minority whip. It was rumored that Lott had wanted to leave the Senate for quite some time, but that he stayed because of Hurricane Katrina and its aftermath. In late 2007 he announced his resignation, stating that he and his wife just wanted to do other things. Lott’s term would’ve ended in 2012. By resigning in 2007, he beat a new law that required former house and senate members to wait two years before working as lobbyists, and only had to wait one year. While serving in Congress, Lott’s ability to mobilize his fellow representatives and senators in support of key legislation was recognized with prominent positions in both houses, as Lott has the distinction of being the first Southerner named House minority whip and the first person elected whip in both houses of Congress. FURTHER READINGS Lott, Trent. 2005. Herding Cats: A Life in Politics. New York: William Morrow. Thornton, Leslie T. 2003. “Race and the Republican Soul.” Legal Times 26 (January 6). Tumulty, Karen. 2002. “Trent Lott’s Segregationist College Days.” Time. Available online at www.time.com/time/ nation/article/0,8599,399310,00.html (accessed Sep- tember 24, 2009). LOTTERY See STATE LOTTERY. LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE See CIVIL LAW. LOUISIANA PURCHASE The Louisiana Purchase of 1803 doubled the size of the United States, gave the country complete control of the port of New Orleans, and provided territory for westward expansion. The 828,000 square miles purchased from France formed co mpletely or in part thirteen states: Arkansas, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Wyoming. President THOMAS JEFFERSON was unsure if the Constitution autho- rized the acquisition of land, but he found a way to justify the purchase. France originally claimed the Louisiana Territory in the seventeenth century. In 1763 it ceded to Spain the province of Louisiana, which was about where the state of Louisiana is today. By the 1790s U.S. farmers who lived west of the Appalachian Mountains were shipping their surplus produce by boat down rivers that flowed into the Gulf of Mexico. In 1795 the United States negotiated a TREATY with Spain that permitted U.S. merchants the right of deposit at New Orleans. This right allowed the merchants to store their goods in New Orleans without paying duty before they were exported. In 1800 France, under the leadership of Napoléon, negotiated a secret treaty with Spain that ceded the province of Louisiana back to France. President Jefferson became concerned that France had control of the strategic port of New Orleans, and sought to purchase the port and West Florida. When France revoked the right of deposit for U.S. merchants in 1802, Jefferson sent JAMES MONROE to Paris to help ROBERT R. LIVINGSTON convince the French government to complete the sale. These states- men warned that the United States would ally itself with England against France if a plan were not devised that settled this issue. Monroe and Livingston were authorized by Congress to offer up to $2 million to purchase GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 408 LOTTERY the east bank of the Mississippi; Jefferson secretly advised them to offer more than $9 million for Florida and New Orleans. Napoléon initially resisted U.S. offers, but changed his mind in 1803. He knew that war with England w as imminent, and realized that if France were tied down with a European war, the United States might annex the Louisiana Territory. He also took seriously the threat of a U.S English alliance. Therefore, in April 1803 he instructed his foreign minister, Charles- Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord, to negotiate with Monroe and Livingston for the United States’ purchase of the entire Louisiana Territo- ry. Acting on their own, the U.S. negotiators agreed to the price of $15 million, with $12 million paid to France and $3 million paid to U.S. citizens who had outstanding claims against France. The purchase agreement, dated April 30, was signed May 2 and reached Washington, D.C., in July. President Jefferson endorsed the purchase but believed that the Constitution did not provide the national government with the authority to Y e l l o w s t o n e R . M i s s o u r i R i v e r Pacific Ocean Gulf of Mexico L a k e S u p e r i o r L a k e M i c h i g a n M i s s i s s i p p i R . M i s s i s s i p p i R . O r e g o n ( C o l u m b i a ) R . Fort Mandan St. Louis Hidatsa and Mandan Villages Fort Clatsop British Possession Spanish Possession Louisiana Purchase Oregon Country M O U N T A I N S R O C K Y 0 0 300 kilometers 300 miles LOUISIANA PURCHASE Map showing area of Louisiana Purchase and surrounding areas. ILLUSTRATION BY CHRISTINE O’BRYAN. GALE GROUP. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION LOUISIANA PURCHASE 409 make land acquisitions. He pondered whether a CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT might be needed to legalize the purchase. After consultations Jeffer- son concluded that the president’s authority to make treaties could be used to justify the agreement. Therefore, the Louisiana Purchase was designated a treaty and submitted to the Senate for ratification. The Senate ratified the treaty October 20, 1803, and the United States took possession of the territory December 20, 1803. The U.S. government borrowed money from English and Dutch banks to pay for the acquisition. Interest payments for the 15-year loans brought the total price to more than $27 million. The vast expanse of land, running from the Mississippi River to the Rocky Moun- tains and from the Gulf of Mexico to the Canadian border, is the largest ever added to the United States at one time. The settling of the territory played a large part in the debate over SLAVERY preceding the CIVIL WAR,asCongress grappled with the question of whether to allow slavery in new states, such a s Missouri and Kansas. FURTHER READINGS Cerami, Charles. 2004. Jefferson’s Great Gamble: The Remarkable Story of Jefferson, Napoleon and the Men Behind the Louisiana Purchase. Naperville, IL: Source- books. Kukla, Jon. 2004. A Wilderness So Immense: The Louisiana Purchase and the Destiny of America. Garden City, NY: Anchor. Levasseur, Alain A., and Roger K. Ward. 1998. “300 Years and Counting: the French Influence on the Louisiana Legal System.” Louisiana Bar Journal 46 (December). Ward, Roger K. 2003. “The Louisiana Purchase.” Louisiana Bar Journal 50 (February). CROSS REFERENCES Kansas-Nebraska Act; Missouri Compromise of 1820. LOW-TIDE ELEVATION Offshore land features such as shoals, rocks, or reefs that are exposed at low tide but submerged at high tide are referred to as low-tide elevations. If a low-tide elevation lies at least partially within the normal breadth of the TERRITORIAL WATERS of a nation, the low-water line of that elevation may be used as a baseline for measuring the ultimate reach of the territorial sea of that nation. Those low-tide elevations lying totally outside the usual breadth of the territorial sea do not expand the reach of the territorial sea of a nation. LOYALTY OATH An oath that declares an individual’s allegiance to the government and its institutions and disclaims support of ideologies or associations that oppose or threaten the government. Loyalty oaths are required of government officials, such as the president, members of Congress and state legislatures, and members of the judiciary. Naturalized citizens are required to pledge their allegiance to the United States, as are members of the ARMED SERVICES. Employees in sensitive government positions may also be required to take a loyalty oath. (See U.S.C.A. § 1448; U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 7; U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 3.) Requiring an employee to promise to support the government as a condition of employment is constitutional as long as the requirement is reasonably related to the employee’s fitness for the particular position. Loyalty oaths that infringe on a person’s ability to exercise a constitutional right must be narrowly focused to achieve a legitimate government objective. If an oath is overly broad or vague, it may be found unconstitutional. Loyalty oaths have played a role in Ameri- can history since the settlement of the colonies. The Puritans in New England required citizens to pledge their support of the commonwealth and to report any individuals who advocated dissent against the government. To ensure unity the CONTINENTAL CONGRESS and the legislatures of the first states all enacted laws requiring citizens to pledge their allegiance to the U.S. government. Loyalty oaths are often invoked during times of stress, such as wars, or when the government perceives an outside threat to security. For example, after the CIVIL WAR, some states enacted statutes that excluded from certain professions those who had been disloyal to the United States and had sympathized with the CONFEDERACY. One STATUTE that required an oath of prior loyalty for admission to the bar was found unconstitutional because it imposed a legislative punishment for past acts. (See Ex parte Garland, 4 Wall. 333, 71 U.S. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366 [1866]; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U.S. 277, 18 L. Ed. 356 [1866].) The period after WORLD WAR II was the high- water mark in the history of loyalty oaths. Fear of Communist subversion affected many aspects of life in the United States. There was particular GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 410 LOW-TIDE ELEVATION concern that Communist sympathizers were obtaining employment in the government and in public schools. Thus the majority of states enacted statutes that required public employ- ees, public school teachers, and university professors to sign a loyalty oath as a condition of employment. Under some of the statutes, schools were permitted to discharge teachers who were thought to be disloyal to the government. Most of the statutes required employees to pledge their support of the state and federal constitutions. Some also required teachers to promise to promote patriotism, pledge not to teach or advocate the forcible overthrow of the government, and swear that they did not belong to the Communist party or any other organization that advocated the overthrow of the government. Most loyalty oaths required of public employ- ees have been struck down by the Supreme Court, usually on the ground that they violate due process because they are vague and susceptible to wide interpretation. In Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 84 S. Ct. 1316, 12 L. Ed. 2d 377 (1964), the Court invalidated Washington’s statute requiring teachers and state employees to take a loyalty oath. This oath stated that the employee promised to support the federal and state constitutions and promote respect for the flag and reverence for law and order. The Court held that the oath was unduly vague, uncertain, and broad. The Court found further that it violated due process and infringed on the teachers’ FREEDOM OF SPEECH.(See also Cramp v. Orange County, Florida, 368 U.S. 278, 82 S. Ct. 275, 7 L. Ed. 2d 285 [1961].) The Court expressed a particular interest in protecting ACADEMIC FREEDOM from infringements imposed by loyalty oaths, in Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1967). In declaring a New York loyalty statute unconstitutionally vague, the Court in Keyishian called academic freedom a “special concern of the First Amendment.” It also expressed its belief that loyalty statutes that attempt to prescribe what a teacher can say threaten to “cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom.” Some loyalty oath statutes have been invali- dated on the ground that they unconstitutionally infringe on freedom of association. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216 (1952), the Court held that Oklahoma’s loyalty oath offended due process because it indiscriminately penalized innocent association or membership in Communist or other subver- sive groups. That oath required public employees to deny any past affiliation with such organiza- tions. Similarly, in Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 86 S. Ct. 1238, 16 L. Ed. 2d 321 (1966), the Court invalidated Arizona’spublicemployee loyalty oath on the ground that it infringed on the employees’ freedom of association. To satisfy the Constitution, such statutes may penalize only those who join a subversive organization with knowledge of the group’s illegal objectives and SPECIFIC INTENT to further them. The Arizona statute denied public employment to anyone associated with a subversive organization, wheth- er or not the person knew of the group’s objectives or subscribed to them. In some cases the Court has upheld loyalty oaths for government emplo yees if the oaths meet certain requirements. The oaths may not infringe on freedo m of speech or association and may not be unduly vague. According to the Court, requiring a public employee to promise to uphold and defend the Constitution and oppose the illegal overthrow of the government does not unduly burden freedom of speech or association. (See Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 92 S. Ct. 1332, 31 L. Ed. 2d 593 [1972].) In 1994 a loyalty oath as a prerequisite for public employment was challenged on the ground that it violated religious freedom. In Bessard v. California Community College, 867 F. Supp. 1454 (E.D. Cal. 1994), the plaintiffs, who were Jehovah’s Witnesses, stated that Enlistees in the U.S. Navy take a loyalty oath during a re- enlistment ceremony aboard the USS John C. Stennis in 2002. Armed services members are required to pledge their allegiance to the United States. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION LOYALTY OATH 411 proclaiming loyalty to the government is pro- hibited by their RELIGION. They argued that under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA) (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000bb et seq.), the state could not require them to take the loyalty oath as a condition of employment unless it could prove that it had a compelling interest that could not be served except by requiring the oath. The court held that the RFRA applied to the case, that the loyalty oath unconstitutionally infringed on the plaintiffs ’ religious freedom, and that the DEFENDANT must make reasonable accommodations for the plaintiffs. The court further noted that the defendant could ensure the plaintiffs’ loyalty by having them sign a statement that they would not act contrary to the defendant’s interests. In City of Boerne v. Flores, 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997), the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as exceeding Con- gress’s authority to safeguard rights under the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT. The Court held that RFRA was an unconstitutional ENCROACHMENT on state power. Government attempts to condition the receipt of certain benefits on a declaration of loyalty have generally been found unconstitu- tional. In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 78 S. Ct. 1352, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1460 (1958), the Court held that requiring veterans to take a loyalty oath as a precondition to receiving a veterans’ property tax exemption impinged on their free speech rights. Justice William J. Brennan Jr., writing for the majority, reasoned, “To deny an exemption to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such speech.” Brennan’s opinion went on to state that the requirement would have a chilling effect on the claimant’s exercise of free speech. FURTHER READINGS Hyman, Harold. M. 1982. To Try Men’s Souls: Loyalty Tests in American History. Westport, CT: Greenwood. Kalvern, Harry. 1988. A Worthy Tradition: Freedom of Speech in America. New York: Harper & Row. Kutler, Stanley I. 1982. The American Inquisition: Justice and Injustice in the Cold War. New York: Farrar Straus & Giroux. Levinson, Sanford. 1986. “Constituting Communities through Words That Bind: Reflections on Loyalty Oaths.” Michigan Law Review 84 (June). Scanlan, John A. 1988. “Aliens in the Marketplace of Ideas.” Texas Law Review 66 (June). Senhauser, William B. 1987. “Education and the Court: The Supreme Court’s Educational Ideology.” Vanderbilt Law Review 40 (May). Sullivan, Kathleen M. 1989. “Unconstitutional Conditions.” Harvard Law Review 102 (May). CROSS REFERENCES Chilling Effect Doctrine; Cold War; Communism; Compel- ling State Interest; Due Process of Law; Void for Vagueness Doctrine. L.S. An abbreviation for locus sigilli, Latin for “the place of the seal, ” signifying the place within a written contract where a seal is affixed in order to bind the agreement. Because the use of seals is decreasing, the use of this abbreviation has declined. LUMP-SUM SETTLEMENT The payment of an entire debt all at once rather than in installments; the payment of a set amount of money to satisfy a pecuniary obligation that might otherwise continue indefinitely. Lump-sum alimony, for example, is the payment of a large sum of money upon the dissolution of a MARRIAGE in order to circumvent the obligation to pay a certain amount, fixed or fluctuating, on a regular basis, for an indefinite period of time. This type of PROPERTY SETTLEMENT is also known as alimony in gross. v LURTON, HORACE HARMON Horace Harmon Lurton epitomized late- nineteenth-century judicial conservatism. Wheth- er he was o n the state or federal BENCH, restraint characterized Lurton’s opinions. After a suc- cessful period in private practice in the 1860s and 1870s, Lurton won election to the Tennes- see Supreme Court in 1886. He was its chief justice in 1893; a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati, from 1893 to 1909; and a professor and eventually law school dean at Vanderbilt University starting in 1898. In 1910, at age sixty- six, he became the oldest justice ever appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court. Lurton was born in Newport, Kentucky, on February 26, 1844. The son of an itinerant physician-turned-preacher, he spent a humble childhood in Tennessee. The defining moment in his life came while he was a 16-year-old undergraduate studying at Douglas University, in Chicago. When the CIVIL WAR broke out, Lurton immediately left school to join the Confederate army. After refusing discharge for a lung condition, he was captured; escaped; and then, while helping conduct guerrilla raids on GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 412 L.S. Union forces, imprisoned aga in. He was thought to be near death in the last months of the war when his mother successfully appealed to President ABRAHAM LINCOLN to release him for health reasons. The experience of war gave Lurton new priorities. Rather than returning to finish his degree in Chicago, he chose to pursue law at Cumberland University Law School, in Leba- non, Tennessee. After graduating in 1867, he distinguished himself in private practice as a diligent, detail-oriented attorney. In 1875 he was appointed to fill a vacated judges hip in the Sixth Chancery Division of Tennessee, where he served for three years before financial pressures made him return to practicing law. The judgeship cemented his reputation, and his practice flourished over the next decade. In 1886 he ran for a seat on the Tennessee Supreme Court. Lurton won. For the next seven years, he was regarded as an eminently fair, patient, and courteous judge. Not the least of his admirers were his colleagues on the Tennessee high court: by a unanimous vote, they made him the court’s chief justice in 1893. While on the court he also taught law at Vanderbilt University. No sooner had Lurton been made chief justice of the Tennessee Supreme Court than President GROVER CLEVELAND tapped him for the federal bench. Lur ton resigned from the Ten- nessee Supreme Court and took his seat on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Cincinnati. On the appellate court, Lurton continued to pur sue the conservative legal philosophy that had guided his earlier caree r. He placed extreme importance on the SEPARA- TION OF POWERS , preferring to have legislatures make laws and abhorring modification of the law by the courts. In 1905 Lurton served as dean of the Vanderbilt University law school. He was nearly appointed to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1906 by the reform-minded President THEODORE ROOSE- VELT . The Republican president’s selection was a measure of the respect that the Democratic judge had garnered. Roosevelt only backed off from appointing Lurton when he was persuaded to choose a Republican instead. In December 13, 1909, President WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT had no qualms about appointing a Democrat, or about appointing the oldest candidate in Supreme Court history. Some opposition was raised over Lurton’s age; more complaints were directed at the narrowness of his outlook. Nevertheless, the Senate approved the nomination and Lurton received his com- mission only one week later. There proved to be Horace H. Lurton. PHOTOGRAPH BY VIC BOSWELL/GREGORY STAPKO. COLLECTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. ▼▼ ▼▼ Horace Harmon Lurton 1844–1914 18251825 18751875 19001900 19251925 18501850 ❖ 1844 Born, Newport, Ky. 1861–65 Joined Confederate Army during U.S. Civil War 1875–78 Held judgeship on the Sixth Chancery Division of Tennessee ◆ 1867 Graduated from Cumberland University Law School 1886–93 Served on the Tennessee Supreme Court 1893–1909 Served on U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati 1905–09 Served as dean of Vanderbilt University Law School 1909–14 Served on U.S. Supreme Court ◆ ❖ 1914 Died on vacation, Atlantic City, N.J. 1914–18 World War I 1911 Joined unanimous decisions in Standard Oil v. U.S. and American Tobacco Co. v. U.S. antitrust cases 1861–65 U.S. Civil War THE DUTY OF THE COURT IS LIMITED TO THE DECISION OF ACTUAL PENDING CONTROVERSIES . —HORACE LURTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION LURTON, HORACE HARMON 413 no reason for worry: As an ASSOCIATE JUSTICE , Lurton largely followed the lead of the majority. Commentators are generally at a loss to find much of note in Lurton’s tenure on the Court, which lasted four years until his death. It was the Progressiv e Era, and the Court was often concerned with the issue of government regulatory power, particularly in antitrust, the area of law devoted to enforcing fair competi- tion in business. Although he had always resisted so-called judge-made law, Lurton joined in the Court’s unanimous decisions in groundbreaking antitrust cases such as Standard Oil v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 31 S. Ct. 502, 55 L. Ed. 619 (1911), and American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 106, 31 S. Ct. 632, 55 L. Ed. 663 (1911). Lurton died July 12, 1914, in Atlantic City, New Jersey. FURTHER READINGS Friedman, Leon, and Fred L. Israel, eds. 1995. The Justices of the United States Supreme Court, 1789–1969: Their Lives and Major Opinions. New York: Chelsea House. Long, R ober. 1994. “The Plain Truth Was Too Plain for Horace Lurton.” Civil War Times Illustrated 33 (Nov/Dec). Tucker, David M. 969. “Justice Horace Harmon Lurton: The Shaping of a National Progressive.” American Journal of Legal History 13. LYNCHING Violent punishment or execution, without due process, for real or alleged crimes. The concept of taking the law into one ’s own hands to punish a criminal almost certainly predates recorded history. Lynching (or “lynch law”) is usually associated in the United States with punishment directed toward blacks, who made up a highly disproportionate number of its victims. (While the origins of the term “lynch” are somewhat unclear, many sources cite William Lynch, an eighteenth-century plantation owner in Virginia who helped to mete out vigilante justice.) Lynching acquired its association with vio- lence against blacks early in the nineteenth century. It was used as a punishment against slaves who tried to escape from their owners. Sometimes, whites who openly opposed SLAVERY were the victims of lynch mobs as well. Perhaps not surprisingly, lynching did not become a pervasive practice in the South until after the CIVIL WAR .ThepassageoftheFOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the Constitution granted blacks full rights of citizenship, including the right to DUE PROCESS OF LAW . Southern whites had been humiliated by their loss to the North, and many resented the thought that their former slaves were now on an equal footing with them (relatively speaking). Groups such as the KU KLUX KLAN and the Knights of the White Camelia attracted white Southerners who had been left destitute by the war. These groups promoted violence (sometimes indirectly) as a means of regaining white supremacy. Part of the APPEAL of groups such as the Ku Klux Klan was their white supremacy focus. But these groups also played on the fears of Southern whites—that blacks would be able to compete with them for jobs, that blacks could run for political office, and even that blacks could rebel against whites. Lynchings were carried out because of these fears. Whites believed that lynchings would terrorize blacks into remaining subservient while allowing whites to regain their sense of status. Lynchings became even more widespread beginning in the 1880s and would remain common in the South until the 1930s. Between 1880 and 1930, an estimated 2,400 black men, women, and children were killed by lynch mobs. (During the same time period, roughly 300 whites were lynched.) Most lynchings occurred in the Deep South (i.e., Mississippi, An African American victim of a 1928 lynching. Between 1880 and 1930, an estimated 2,400 black men, women, and children were killed by lynch mobs. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 414 LYNCHING Georgia, Louisiana, Alabama, and South Car- olina). Border Southern states—Florida, Ten- nessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, and North Carolina also had a noteworthy number of lynchings. A partial list of “crimes” that prompted lynch mobs during these years underscores a chilling disregard for life: gambling, quarreling, arguing with a white man, attempting to vote, unruly remarks, demanding respect, and “acting suspiciously.” Lynchings were often carried out against those suspected of more serious crimes, but they were carried out without allowing a fair trial. It is no exaggera- tion to state that any black man, woman, or child in the South during these years was in danger of being lynched for any real or imagined improper behavior. Often, the victim of a lynching would be dragged from his or her home; not infrequently, a lynch mob would drag a victim from a jail cell where supposedly he or she was to be awaiting a fair trial. The typical lynch mob would be made up of local citizens; a core group would actually carry out the crime, while many of the town’s residents would look on. The spectators often included “respectable” men and women, and children were often brought to lynchings. A lynching victim might be shot, stabbed, beaten, or hanged; if he was not hanged to death, his body would often be hung up for display. Local police, and even members of the armed forces, either could not or would not intervene to stop a lynch mob from taking the law into its own hands. Not infrequently, a lynching would conclude with a loud, rowdy demonstration among the assembled crowd. The clear message in each lynching was that the mob was in control. One of the most common crimes answered by lynch mobs was rape—particularly the RAPE of a white woman by a black man. Often, all that a black man had to do to be accused of rape was to speak to a white woman or ask her out. Lynchers justified their actions by saying that they needed to protect women from dangerous men. In response, a group of prominent women from seven Southern states met in 1930 to form the Association of Southern Women for the Prevention of Lynch- ing. This group deplo red no t only the act of lynching itself, but also the fact that lynchings were frequently witnessed by women and children. They were ang ered by claims that lynching was a means of protecting white women. During the 1930s they worked to eliminate lynchings throughout the South. Efforts by politicians to end lynchings were weak at best. Efforts to move anti-lynching legislation through Congress in the early 1900s and again in the 1930 s proved futile, in part because Southern representatives and senators carried significant political weight. The first politician to take a visible stand against lynching was President HARRY S. TRUMAN, in 1946. Shocked by a lynching in Monroe, Georgia, in which four people—one a WORLD WAR II veteran— were pulled off of a bus and shot dozens of times by a mob, Truman launched a campaign to guarante e CIVIL RIGHTS for blacks, including a push for federal anti-lynching laws. Lynchings by Race, 1882 to 1964 Year Number of Lynchings 1882 1886 1890 1894 1898 1902 1906 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1964 64 64 11 58 19 7 3 9 8 1 1 1 2 Whites Blacks SOURCE: University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law, Professor Douglas Linder’s Famous Trials Homepage, Sheriff Shipp Trial, Lynching Statistics. 0306090 120 150 49 74 85 134 101 85 62 67 53 20 4 1 1 ILLUSTRATION BY GGS CREATIVE RESOURCES. REPRODUCED BY PERMISSION OF GALE, A PART OF CENGAGE LEARNING. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION LYNCHING 415 Truman was able to realize part of what he wanted, but the powerful Southern lobby managed to maintain much of the STATUS QUO. Although large-scale lynchings were no longer staged, blacks in the South still faced vigilante retribution. The MURDER of Emmett Till, in 1955, put enormous pressure on the South to condemn such barbarism. Till, a 14-year-old from Chicago, was visiting relatives in rural Mississippi, where he made suggestive remarks to a white woman. The woman’s husband and brother-in-law tracked Till down, shot him, and threw his body in a river. Although (perhaps because) they were acquitted of the murder, the case added momentum to the growing CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT . People across the nation were genuinely shocked at the trial’s outcome, and new civil rights legislation was introduced in Congress. By the time the Civil Rights Act of 1965 was signed into law, there were still racial tensions—and elements of racial discord con- tinue into the twenty-first century—but the era of the free-for-all lynch party in which entire communities participated had effectively come to a close. FURTHER READINGS Branch, Taylor, 2006. Parting the Waters: America in the King Years, 1954–63. New York: Peter Smith. Ginzburg, Ralph, ed., 1998. One Hundred Years of Lynchings. Baltimore: Black Classic. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. 1973. Thirty Years of Lynching in the United States, 1889–1918. New York: Ayer. CROSS REFERENCES Civil Rights Movement; Slavery; Vigilantism. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 416 LYNCHING v MACKINNON, CATHARINE ALICE Catharine A. MacKinnon is a law professor, author, and a leading scholar and legal theorist known for her ideas on SEXUAL HARASSMENT, PORNOGRAPHY, and equality. She is one of the most widely cited English-speaking legal scho- lars. In 1982 her controversial proposal for giving CIVIL RIGHTS to victims of pornography was enacted by the city council of Indianapolis, but the ordinance was ultimately overturned by a federal appeals court. The Supreme Court of Canada, however, largely adopted her analysis of equality, hate propaganda, and pornography, in LITIGATION with the Women’s LEGAL EDUCATION and Action Fund. MacKinnon was born in 1946 in Minnesota. Her father, George E. MacKinnon, was a pro- minent REPUBLICAN PARTY leader who served one term in Congress and later became a federal appeals court judge. MacKinnon graduated from Smith College in 1969. She received her law degree in 1977 from Yale Law School and a Ph.D. in political science from Yale in 1987. MacKinnon was admitted to the Connecti- cut bar in 1978, and the following year she published her first book, Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination. She served as co-counsel for Mechelle Vinson in the groundbreaking U.S. Supreme Court case concerning sexual harassment in the workplace: Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S. Ct. 2399, 91 L. Ed. 2d 49 (1986). The Court agreed with MacKinnon that sexual harassment, and specifically a “hostile work environment,” was actionable under the 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq.) as SEX DISCRIMINATION. The Court established sexual harassment as sex discrimination for the first time in history, rejecting a narrow reading of the law that would have restricted sexual-harassment claims to discrimination of an economic charac- ter. Under this restrictive reading, an employer would not be held liable for harassment unless the employee’s salary and promotions were affected by the actions. Between 1979 and 1989, MacKinnon was a visiting professor at a number of prominent law schools, including her alma mater, Yale. Al- though she was a prolific writer and a popular teacher, her views and her actions concerning pornography made her a controversial public figure. Her radical feminist theories challenged the legitimacy of the legal system and main- stream liberal thought. She argued that men, as a class, have socially dominated women, creating gender inequality. According to MacKinnon, this inequality is the consequence of a systematic subordination rather than a simple product of irrational discrimination. Thus, heterosexuality is a social arrangement in which men are dominant and women are subordinate. For radical femin- ists, gender is a question of power. In Mac Kinnon’s view, pornography is a powerful tool of the dominant male class, subordinating women and exposing them to RAPE and other sexually abusive behavior. In M PORNOGRAPHY SETS THE PUBLIC STANDARD FOR THE TREATMENT OF WOMEN IN PRIVATE AND THE LIMITS OF TOLERANCE FOR WHAT CAN BE PERMITTED IN PUBLIC . —CATHARINE MACKINNON 417 . by Congress to offer up to $2 million to purchase GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 408 LOTTERY the east bank of the Mississippi; Jefferson secretly advised them to offer more than. L. Ed. 366 [1 866 ]; Cummings v. Missouri, 4 Wall. 277, 71 U.S. 277, 18 L. Ed. 3 56 [1 866 ].) The period after WORLD WAR II was the high- water mark in the history of loyalty oaths. Fear of Communist. U.S. and American Tobacco Co. v. U.S. antitrust cases 1 861 65 U.S. Civil War THE DUTY OF THE COURT IS LIMITED TO THE DECISION OF ACTUAL PENDING CONTROVERSIES . —HORACE LURTON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN