it, was a war measure. Therefore, the Court reasoned, power to detain a concededly loyal citizen could not be implied from a power to protect the war effort from espionage and sabotage; it afforded no basis for keeping loyal U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry in custody on grounds of community hostility. Interestingly, the U.S. government, appre- hending an unfavorable decision in Endo, announced the end of the exclusion order just the day before the Supreme Court issued its opinion. The last of ten major detention camps, Tule Lake, closed in March 1946. The Movement to Redress Victims Though the move to evacuate and detain Japanese Americans on the West Coast enjoyed substantial support from most U.S. citizens, it incited significant protests as well. Some criti cs, such as Eugene V. Rostow, professor and later dean of the Yale Law School, contended that the evacuation program was a drastic blow to civil liberties and that it was in direct contradiction to the constitutional principle that punishment should be inflicted only for individual behavior, not for membership in a particular demographic group. Others, such as Lieutenant Commander Kenneth D. Ringle, of the Office of Naval Intel- ligence, questioned the validity of De Witt’s assertions concerning the disloyalty of Japanese Americans. In a memoran dum written in February 1942 that became known as the Ringle Report, Ringle estimated that the highest number of Japanese Americans “who would act as saboteurs or agents” of Japan was less than 3 percent of the total, or about 3500 in the United States; the most dangerous of these, he said, were already in custodial detention or were well known to the Naval Intelligence service or the FBI. In his summary Ringle concluded that the “Japanese Problem” had been distorted largely because of the physical characteristics of the people and should be handled based on the individual, regardless of ci tizenship, and not on race. The Ringle Report was known to De Witt, who thus knew that Naval Intelligence estimated that at least 90 percent of the army’s evacuation of Japanese Americans was unnecessary. In addition, the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE knew of the Ringle Report’s conclusions when it filed its briefs in the Hirabayashi and Korematsu cases. A senior JUSTICE DEPARTMENT official, Edward Ennis, had sent a memo to SOLICITOR GENERAL Charles Fahy warning, “I think we should consider very carefully whether we do not have a [legal] duty to advise the Court of the existence of the Ringle memorandum … It occurs to me that any other course of condu ct might approximate the suppression of evidence.” But Fahy chose not to mention the Ringle Report in the government’s brief, instead asserting that Japanese Americans as an entire class had to be evacuated because “the identities of the poten- tially disloyal were not readily discoverable,” and it would be “virtually impossible” to determine loyalty on the basis of individualized hearings (205). After the end of the war, some Japanese Americans began to seek financial redress for the losses they had suffered as a result of the government’s evacuation program. In 1948 Congress passed the American Japanese Evacu- ation Claims Act (Pub. L. No. 80-886, ch. 814, 62 Stat. 1231 [codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1981 (1982)])tocompensateevacueesfor property damage. The Justice Department re- ceived more than 26,500 claims, and the federal government ultimately paid out approximately $37 million. Because the act required elaborate proof of property losses, the amount paid out wasmuchlessthanfullcompensationforlosses sustained. By the 1970s and 1980s, the movement to achieve redress had won additional victories. In 1976 President GERALD R. FORD formally revoked Executive Order No. 9066 and proclaimed, “We know now what we should have known then— not only was [the] evacuation wrong, but Japanese Americans were and are loyal Americans” (Proclamation No. 4417, 3 C.F.R. 8, 9 [1977]). In 1980 Congress established the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians, whose report, released in 1983, concluded that 9066 was not justified by military necessity and that the policies of detention and exclusion were the result of racial prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership. The commission recommended several types of redress. In 1988 Congress passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988 (50 U.S.C.A. app. § 1989 [1988]), which provided for a national apology and $20,000 to each victim to compensate for losses suffered as a result of the evacuation program. A final major development in the redress movement has been the use of CORAM NOBIS,the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 18 JAPANESE AMERICAN EVACUATION CASES common-law writ of error, to reopen the Korematsu, Yasui, and Hirabayashi convictions. A writ of CORAM nobis allows one who has served time for a criminal conviction to petition the court for a vacation of that conviction. Vaca- tions are granted if there is evidence of prosecutorial impropriety or if there are special circumstances or errors that resulted in a MISCARRIAGE OF JUSTICE. In 1983 U.S. district court judge Marilyn Hall Patel granted a vacation in the Korematsu case. Patel based her decision on the newly discovered evidence that “the Government knowingly withheld information from the Courts when they were considering the critical question of military necessity in this case” (Korematsu, 584 F. Supp. 1406 [N.D. Cal. 1984]). Yasui’s and Hirabaya- shi’s convictions were also vacated on this basis (Yasui, No. 83-151 [D. Or. Jan. 26, 1984]; Hirabayashi, 828 F.2d 591 [9th Cir. 1987]). FURTHER READINGS Bettelheim, Adriel. 2002. “The Camps Experience: End of Exclusion.” Excerpted from Exploring Japanese Intern- ment. Available online at http://www.asianamericanme- dia.org/jainternment/camps/end.html; website home page: http://www.asianamericanmedia.org (accessed August 2, 2009). Executive Order No. 9066. 1942. Federal Register (February 19). Available online at http://historymatters.gmu.edu/ d/5154; website home page: http://historymatters.gmu. edu/ (accessed August 2, 2009). Headquarters Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, Office of the Commanding General, Presidio of San Francisco, California 1942. Final Report: Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast 1942. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Available online at http://www.sfmuseum.org/war/dewitt1.html; website home page: http://www.sfmuseum.org (accessed Au- gust 2, 2009). Irons, Peter. 1993. Justice at War: The Story of the Japanese- American Internment Cases. Berkeley: Univ. of California Press. Morris, Arval A. 1984. “Justice, War, and the Japanese American Evacuation and Internment.” Washington Law Review 59 (September). Nash, Philip T. 1985. “Moving for Redress.” Yale Law Journal 94 (January). Robinson, Greg. 2003. By Order of the President: FDR and the Internment of Japanese Americans. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press. Tateishi, John. 1999. And Justice for All: An Oral History of the Japanese American Detention Camps. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press. Weglyn, Michi. 1996. Years of Infamy: The Untold Story of America’s Concentration Camps. Rev. ed. Seattle: Univ. of Washington Press. CROSS REFERENCES Coram Nobis; Discrimination; Prejudice; Vacate. v JAWORSKI, LEON Leon Jaworski, like RICHARD M. NIXON, came from a poor, dee ply religious background. In the Watergate scandal, Jaworski’s rise to national prominence almost seemed to parallel Nixon’s descent. Watergate is the name given to the scandal that began with the bungled BURGLARY in June 1972 of the Democratic National Committee’s headquarters in the Watergate apartment complex in Washington, D.C., by seven employees of the Committee to Re-Elect the President (CREEP). A lifelong Democrat who twice voted for the Republican N ixon, Jaworski was responsible for bringing to light many damaging facts of the Watergate break-in and subsequent cover-up, ultimately leading to the only resignation ever by a U.S. president. When Nixon appointed him to the post of special prosecutor on the case November 1, 1973, Jaworski expected to find wrongdoing and possible criminal activity by Nixon’s aides, but the possibility that the president was involved never occurred to him. Jaworski was born in Waco, Texas, on September 19, 1905, to an Austrian mother and a Polish father. He was christened Leonidas, after a king of ancient Sparta who courageously gave his life for his beliefs. Jaworski’s father, an evangelical minister, instilled in him from an early age a deep and abiding Christian faith and sense of duty. By the time he was 14, he was the champion debater at Waco High School. He graduated at age sixteen and enrolled in Baylor University. After one year of undergraduate work, he was admitted to the law school. He graduated at the top of his class in 1925, and became the youngest person ever admitted to the Texas bar. In 1926 Jaworski obtained a master of laws degree from GEORGE WASHINGTON University, in Washington, D.C., and then returned to Waco to practice. Prohibition was at its height, and Jaworski began his career defending moon- shiners and bootleggers. His flair in the court- room developed early. In one capital MURDER case, he concealed a stiletto in his pocket. During the trial he whipped it out and tried to hand it to a juror, exhorting the jury to kill the DEFENDANT immediately instead of sending him to the electric chair later. In 1931 he joined the Houston firm of Fulbright, Crooker, Freeman, and Bates. The firm, eventually known as Fulbright and Jaworski, grew to be one of the ONE OF THE THINGS THAT THE NEXT GENERATION WILL LEARN FROM WATERGATE IS THAT THE PRESIDENT IS SUBJECT TO THE LAWS HE IS SWORN TO ADMINISTER .HIS POWERS ARE NOT ABSOLUTE . —LEON JAWORSKI GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JAWORSKI, LEON 19 largest in the United States. It was the first in Houston to hire black and Jewish staff. Jaworski enlisted in the Army in 1942, and was commissioned as a captain in the JUDGE ADVOCATE General’s Corps, the legal branch of the Army. One of the first prosecutors of WAR CRIMES in Europe, Jaworski successfully brought action against a German civilian mob that stoned to death six U.S. air men, and employees of a German sanatorium who participated in the “mercy killing” of more than 400 Poles and Russians. He was also in charge of the war crimes investigation of the Dachau concentra- tion camp, which led to proceedings in which all forty defendants were convicted and thirty- six were sentenced to death. The Colonel, as he became known after his Army stint, returned to Houston and quickly became enmeshed in representing bankers and big business. LYNDON B. JOHNSON became a client and friend. In 1960 Jaworski handled litigation that challenged Johnson’s right to run simulta- neously for the Senate and the vice presidency. The case was resolved in Johnson’s favor a few days before his inauguration as VICE PRESIDENT. In 1962 U.S. attorney general ROBERT F. KENNEDY appointed Jaworski special prosecutor in a contempt case against Mississippi governor Ross Barnett. The segregationist Barnett had defied a federal order to admit the first black student, JAMES MEREDITH, to the University of Mississippi. It was a volatile time of highly unpopular, court-ordered desegregation in the South, and Jaworski endured some vicious criticism by colleagues, clients, and southerners for prosecuting the case. Following President John F. Kennedy’s ASSASSINATION in Dallas in 1963, Jaworski worked with the WARREN COMMIS- SION , as the Commission investigated Kennedy’s assassination, acting as liaison between Texas agencies and the federal government. In October 1973 Watergate special prosecu- tor ARCHIBALD COX was fired in the so-called Saturday Night Massacre when he tried to force Nixon into supplying tapes pursuant to a SUBPOENA. In response to pressure from Cox, Nixon ordered Attorney General ELLIOT RICHARD- SON to fire Cox; Richardson refused because Cox and Congress had received assurances that the special prosecutor would not be fired except for Leon Jaworski. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Leon Jaworski 1905–1982 ❖ ❖ ◆ 1905 Born, Waco, Texas ◆ 1925 Became youngest person ever admitted to Texas bar 1960 Represented Lyndon Johnson in litigation that challenged his right to run for Senate and vice president simultaneously 1914–18 World War I 1982 Died near Wimberly, Texas 1926 Earned LL.M. at George Washington University; began private practice 1961–73 Vietnam War 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War ▼▼ ▼▼ 19001900 19501950 19751975 19251925 1942–46 Enlisted in U.S. Army JAGC ◆ ◆◆ ◆◆ 1977 Served as special counsel in the Tongsun Park investigation 1979 Confession and Avoidance published 1963 Joined Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's assassination 1962 Appointed special prosecutor in case against Miss. Gov. Ross Barnett 1973–74 Appointed special prosecutor in Watergate investigation GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 20 JAWORSKI, LEON gross improprieties. Richardson resigned rather than fire Cox. Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus also resigned after refusing to fire Cox. Nixon’s order was finally carried out by SOLICITOR GENERAL Robert Bork. Jaworski accept- ed Cox’s vacated position, on the condition that he would not be dismissed except for extraor- dinary impropriety and that he would have the right to take the president to court if necessary. His new office was in charge of collecting evidence, presenting it to the Watergate grand juries, and directing the prosec ution in any trials resultin g from GRAND JURY indictments. His job was separate from, although in many respects parallel to, that of the House Judiciary Committee, which was conducting its own investigation. Jaworski’s integrity was never questioned, but his appointment was greeted with suspicion. Some felt he was too much in awe of the presidency to execute the job whatever the consequences. Almost immediately, however, he began showing his mettle. He soon learned of an eighteen-minute gap on a crucial tape that had been subpoenaed but had not yet been turned over to the special prosecutor’s office. The White House wangled for a delay in informing federal judge John J. Sirica of the apparent erasure. Jaworski pushed forward, and Sirica ordered that all subpoenaed tapes be turned over within days. Shortly thereafter the tapes were submitted, and Jaworski and his staff listened in disbelief to one from March 21, 1973, in which the president and White House counsel John W. Dean III discussed BLACKMAIL, payment of hush money, and PERJURY in con- nection with the cover-up of Watergate. As Jaworski and his staff sifted throu gh evidence and presented it to the grand jury, Jaworski was forced to decide whether a sitting president could be indicted for offenses for which the grand jury had heard evidence. He concluded that the Supreme Court might well find such an action to be unconstitutional, that the nation would suffer great trauma in the interim, and that the impeachment inquiry by the House of Representatives was the appropri- ate forum for determining whether Nixon should be removed from office. Carefully wield- ing a prosecutor’s influence with the grand jury, he convinced the jurors to name Nixon as an unindicted coconspirator. This information was not to be made public until the trial of the grand jury’s other indictees. At Jaworski’s prompting, and with Judge Sirica’s approval, evidence heard by the grand jury regarding Nixon’s involvement was forwarded to the House Judiciary Commit- tee and was kept from the public until later. In the spring of 1974, Jaworski subpoenaed 64 more tapes. The White House sought to quash the subpoena, and made a desperate attempt to curry public support by releasing edited transc ripts of some tapes. The White House claimed that as unsettling as the tran- scripts were, they contained no evidence of crime, and that they represented all the relevant tapes possessed by the White House. The prosecutors found many important omissions from the transcripts. Moreover, the White House claimed that a key tape from June 23, 1972 (six days after the Watergate break-in) was unac- countably missing. When Judge Sirica ordered the White House to turn over the subpoenaed tapes, it immediately appealed to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Jaworski then had to decide whether to attempt to bypass the court of appeals and ask the Supreme Court to review Sirica’s order. A special rule permitted such a bypass in cases that required immediate settle- ment in matters of “imperative public impor- tance.” Jaworski’s decision would be crucial because it was unclear whether the Supreme Court would bypass the court of appeals, some- thing it had done only twice since the end of WORLD WAR II. If the Supreme Court refused to accept the case, trials against defendants already indicted would be delayed and momentum in the investigation would be lost. Jaworski decided to seek review in the Supreme Court. Jaworski’s gambit paid off. The Supreme Court agreed to hear the case. On July 24, 1974, it ruled 8–0, with Justice WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST abstaining, that the special prosecutor had the right and the power to sue the president, and that the president must comply with the subpoena. Within days of the ruling, the tapes started trickling in to the special prosecutor’s office, including one of a conversation between President Nixon and H. R. Haldeman on June 23, 1972. This tape became known as the smoking gun, because it proved decisively that the president not only knew of the Watergate cover-up but also participated in it, only six days after the br eak-in. This was contrar y to earlier assertions that President Nixon first learned of the cover-up in March 1973. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JAWORSKI, LEON 21 On July 27, 1974, the House Judiciary Committee passed a first article of impeachment, charging that President Nixon had obstructed justice in attempting to cover up Watergate. Within days the Judiciary Committee passed two more ARTICLES OF IMPEACHMENT, charging abuse of PRESIDENTIAL POWERS and defiance of subpoenas. The committee’s action, in conjunc- tion with Jaworski’s win in the Supreme Court and a concomitant public release of the tapes, finally left Nixon facing almost certain im- peachment. On August 9, 1974, he resigned from the presidency. Nixon’s resignation did not end the matter for the sp ecial prosecutor. Most of Jaworski’s staff pushed hard for an indictment of the former president. Public sentiment seemed to favor indictment. Jaworski studied the issue, but he considered the problem of getting the president a fair trial to be paramount and almost insurmountable. On September 9, 1974, President GERALD R. FORD pardoned Nixon of all possible federal crimes he may have committed while serving as president. The special prosecutor’s office then examined whether the pardon could be attacked in court, on the ground that it preceded any indictment or conviction. Jaworski concluded that Ford was acting within his CONSTITUTIONAL powers in granting the pardon. He declined to precipitate a court challenge by indicting Nixon after the pardon, as some called for him to do. Jaworski resigned as special prosecutor on October 25, 1974. Watergate prosecutions con- tinued for some time thereafter under a new special prosecutor. In 1977 Jaworski reluctantly agreed to serve as special counsel to the House Ethics Commit- tee’s investigation to determine whether mem- bers of the House had indirectly or directly accepted anything of value from the govern- ment of the Republic of Korea. The investiga- tion, known as Koreagate or the Tongsun Park investigation, potentially involved hundreds of members of Congress and their families and associates, and charges of bribery and influence peddling sought by way of envelopes stuffed with $100 bills. Tongsun Park was a central figure in the Korean lobbying scandal, but exactly who he was remains unclear. U.S educated, at times he may have posed as a South Korean ambassador and may have been employed by the Korean CIA or been an agent of the Korean government. He was found trying to enter the United States with a list containing the names of dozens of members of Congress including information regarding contributions. Jaworski’s work was thwarted by difficulties getting key Korean figures to testify under oath, as well as the difficulties inherent when a body investigates itself. Jaworski was disappointed with the fruits of his labor. Only two former members of Congress faced criminal charges, two private citizens were indicted and con- victed, and three members of Congress were reprimanded. Jaworski died of a heart attack at his beloved Circle J Ranch, near Wimb erly, Texas, on December 9, 1982, while chopping wood , a favorite pastime. Married for fifty-one years, he had three children and five grandsons. FURTHER READINGS Jaworski, Leon. 1979. Confession and Avoidance: A Memoir. Garden City, NY: Anchor Press. ———. 1982. Crossroads. New York: Bantam. ———. 1979. The Right and the Power: The Prosecution of Watergate. New York: Reader’s Digest Press. Woodward, Bob, and Carl Bernstein. 2005. The Final Days. New York: Simon & Schuster. CROSS REFERENCE Nixon, United States v. v JAY, JOHN John Jay was a politician, statesman, and the first chief justice of the Supreme Court. He was one of the authors of The Federalist,a collection of influential papers written with JAMES MADISON and ALEXANDER HAMILTON prior to the ratification of the Constitution. Jay was born in New York City on December 12, 1745. Unlike most of the colonists in the New World, who were English, Jay traced his ancestry to the French Huguenots, His grandfa- ther, August Jay, immigrated to New York in the late seventeenth century to escape the persecution of non-Catholics under Louis XIV. Jay graduated from King’s College, now known as Columbia University, in 1764. He was admitted to the bar in New York City in 1768. One of Jay’s earliest achievements was his participation in the settlement of the boundary line between New York and New Jersey in 1773. During the time preceding the Revolutionary War, Jay actively protested against British treatment of the colonies but did not fully GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 22 JAY, JOHN advocate independence until 1776, when the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE was created. Jay then supported independence wholeheartedly. He was a member of the CONTINENTAL CONGRESS from 1774 to 1779, acting as its president from 1778 to 1779. In 1776 Jay was a member of the Provincial Congress of New York and was instrumen tal in the formation of the constitution of that state. From 1776 to 1778 he performed the duties of New York chief justice. Jay next embarked on a foreign service career. His first appointment was to the post of minister plenipotentiary to Spain in 1779, where he succeeded in gaining financial assistance for the colonies. In 1782 Jay joined BENJAMIN FRANKLIN in Paris for a series of peace negotiations with Great Britain. In 1784, Jay became secretary of foreign affairs and performed these duties until 1789. During his term, Jay participated in the arbitration of various international disputes. Jay recognized the limitations of his powers in foreign service under the existing govern- ment of the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, and this made him a strong supporter of the Constitu- tion. He publicly displayed his views in the five papers he composed for The Federalist in 1787 and 1788. Jay argued for ratification of the Constitution and the creation of a strong federal government. In 1789, Jay earned the distinction of becoming the first chief justice of the United States. During his term, which lasted until 1795, Jay rendered a decision in CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440 (1793), which subsequently led to the enactment of the ELEVENTH AMENDMENT to the Constitution. This 1793 case involved the ability of inhabitants of one state to sue another state. The Supreme Court recognized this right but, in response, Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment denying the right of a state to be prosecuted or sued by a resident of another state in federal court. During Jay’s tenure on the Supreme Court, he was again called upon to act in foreign service. In 1794 he negotiated a treaty with Great Britain known as Jay’s Treaty. This agreement regulated commerce and navigation and settled many John Jay. PAINTING BY STUART GILBERT. NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION John Jay 1745–1829 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17501750 18001800 18251825 17751775 ❖ ◆◆ 1745 Born, New York City ❖ 1775–83 American Revolution 1764 Graduated from King's College (now Columbia University) 1768 Admitted to New York bar ◆ 1774 Served in First Continental Congress 1829 Died, Bedford, N.Y. 1778–79 Served as president of Second Continental Congress 1787–88 Wrote Federalist Papers with Hamilton and Madison 1798 Eleventh Amendment outlawed suits between states previously permitted by Chisholm decision ▼▼ 1789–95 Presided as first chief justice of the Supreme Court 1795–1801 Served as governor of New York 1794 Negotiated Jay's Treaty, regulating commerce and navigation with Great Britain 1793 Wrote Chisholm v. Georgia decision ◆◆ ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JAY, JOHN 23 outstanding disputes between the United States and Great Britain. The treaty, under which disputes were resolved before an international commission, was the origin of modern inter- national arbitration. In 1795 Jay was elected governor of New York. He served two terms, until 1801, at which time he retired . He died May 17, 1829. FURTHER READINGS Jay, William. 1833. The Life of John Jay: With Selections from His Correspondence and Miscellaneous Papers. 2 vols. New York: Harper. Monaghan, Frank. 1935. John Jay: Defender of Liberty. New York: Bobbs-Merrill. Morris, Richard B. 1975. John Jay: The Making of a Revolutionary. New York: Harper & Row. Morris, Richard B., ed. 1985. Witnesses at the Creation: Hamilton, Madison, Jay, and the Constitution. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston. Pellew, George. 2009. John Jay—1898. Ithaca, NY: Cornell Univ. Library. Rossiter, Clinton Lawrence. 1964. Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World. Sirvet, Ene, and R.B. Bernstein. 1996. “Documentary Editing and the Jay Court: Opening New Lines of Inquiry.” Journal of Supreme Court History 2 (annual). ———. 1996. “John Jay, Judicial Independence, and Advising Coordinate Branches.” Journal of Supreme Court History 2 (annual). CROSS REFERENCES Constitution of the United States; Federa list Papers; New York Constitution of 1777. J.D. An abbreviation for Juris Doctor, the degree awarded to an individual upon the successful completion of law school. v JEFFERSON, THOMAS Thomas Jefferson served as an American Revolutionary and political theorist and as the third PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. Jefferson, who was a talented architect, writer, and diplo- mat, played a profound role in shaping U.S. government and politics. Jefferson was born April 13, 1743, at Shadwell, in Albemarle County, Virginia. His father was a plantation owner and his mother belonged to the Randolph family, whose mem- bers were leaders of colonial Virginia society. Jefferson graduated from the College of William and Mary in 1762, and worked as a surveyor before studying law with GEORGE WYTHE. He was admitted to the Virginia bar in 1767. His interest in colonial politics led to his election to the Virginia House of Burgesses in 1769. In the legislature he became closely aligned with PATRICK HENRY, Richard Henry Lee, and Francis Lightfoot Lee, all of whom espoused the belief that the British Parliament had no control over the American colonies. He helped form the Virginia Committee of Correspondence, which protested legislation imposed on the colonies by Great Britain. In 1774 Jefferson wrote A Summary View of the Rights of British America, a pamphlet that denied the power of Parliament in the colonies and stated that any loyalty to England and the king was to be given by choice. He attended the Second CONTINENTAL CONGRESS in 1775 and drafted the Reply to Lord North, in which Congress rejected the British prime minister’s proposal that Parliament would not tax the colonists if they agreed to tax themselves. After the Revolutionary War began, Jeffer- son and four others were asked to draft a DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE. Jefferson actually wrote the Declaration of Independence in 1776, which stated the arguments justifying the posi- tion of the American Revolutionaries. It also affirmed the natural rights of all people and affirmed the right of the colonists to “dissolve the political bands” with the British government. Jefferson served in the Virginia House of Delegates from 1776 to 1779 and became governor of Virginia in 1779. He was responsi- ble for many changes in Virginia law, including the ABOLITION of religious persecution and the end to entail (inheritance of land through a particular line of descent) and PRIMOGENITURE (inheritance only by the eldest son). Jefferson also disestablished the Anglican Church as the state-endorsed RELIGION. Jefferson’s term as governor expired in 1781, the same year the British invaded Virginia. He was at first blamed for the state’s lack of resistance but later cleared after an official investigation. From 1783 to 1784 he was a member of the Continental Congress, where he contributed a monetary program, and secured approval of the TREATY OF PARIS, which ended the Revolu- tionary War. As a member of that congress he also drafted a decree for a system of government for the Northwest Territory, which lay west of the Appalachian Mountains. This decree was A DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE MARK OF ITS LEGITIMACY , IS THAT IT OWES ITS EXISTENCE TO THE ACT OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE WHO CREATED IT . —JOHN JAY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 24 J.D. later incorporated into the NORTHWEST ORDINANCE of 1787. Jefferson served as minister to France from 1784 to 1789. In 1790 he reentered politics as secretary of state in the cabinet of President GEORGE WASHINGTON. Jefferson soon became embroiled in conflict with ALEXANDER HAMILTON, the secretary of the treasury. Jefferson did not share Hamilton’s Federalist views, which he believed favored the interests of business and the upper class. Jefferson, a proponent of agri- cultural interests, disliked the Federalist’s desire to expand the power of the federal government. The chief dispute between them was over the BANK OF THE UNITED STATES, which Hamilton approved of and Jefferson attacked as unconsti- tutional. Hamilton won the issue, and Jefferson and his supporters began to form a group known as Republicans, which evolved into the current DEMOCRATIC PARTY. In 1791 editor Philip M. Freneau published Republican views in the National Gazette, which increased the agitation between Jefferson and Hamilton. Jefferson resigned his position in 1793. After JOHN ADAMS was elected president in 1796, Jefferson served as his VICE PRESIDENT and presiding officer in the Senate. In 1798 he opposed Congress’s adoption of the ALIEN AND SEDITION ACTS (1 Stat. 570, 596), which provided for the deportation or imprisonment of any citizen or alien judged dangerous to the U.S. government. As a result Jefferson and JAMES MADISON drafted the Kentucky Resolutions, which denounced the constitutionality of these acts. These resolutions, which were adopted by the Kentucky and Virginia legislatures, declared that the federal government could not extend its powers over the states unless the Constitution expressly granted authority. The resolutions were the first affirmation of states’ rights and were central to Jefferson’s belief that state and local governments were the most democratic political institutions. The presidential election in 1800 ended in a tie between Jefferson and AARON BURR. The House of Representatives decided the election. Hamilton, who despised Burr even more than Jefferson, lobbied the Federalists in the House Thomas Jefferson. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS Thomas Jefferson 1743–1826 ▼▼ ▼▼ 17501750 18001800 18251825 17751775 ❖ ◆ 1743 Born, Shadwell, Va. ❖ 1775–83 American Revolution 1762 Graduated from the College of William and Mary ◆ 1769 Elected to Va. House of Burgesses 1826 Died, Monticello, near Charlottesville, Va. 1775 Attended the Second Continental Congress 1779–81 Served as governor of Va. 1797–1801 Served as vice president under John Adams ▼▼ 1776 Wrote Declaration of Independence; elected to Virginia House of Delegates 1819 Helped found the University of Virginia; designed the original campus 1790–93 Served as secretary of state under Washington ◆◆ 1784–89 Served as minister to France 1801–09 Served as third president of the United States 1803 Approved Louisiana Purchase from France; Supreme Court decided Marbury v. Madison ◆◆ 1812–14 War of 1812 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JEFFERSON, THOMAS 25 to elect Jefferson. Jefferson won the election and became the first president to be sworn into office in Washington, D.C. As president, Jefferson reduced spending and appointed Republicans to assume former Federalist position s. He made a lasting contri- bution to legislative procedure when he com- posed in 1801 A Manual of Par liamentary Practice, which is still used in the early twenty- first century. He approved the LOUISIANA PUR- CHASE from France in 1803, and supported the Lewis and Clark Expeditio n to explore the West from 1803 to 1806. He supported the repeal of the Judiciary Act of 1801, which would have created federal courts of appeals and would have encouraged appeals from state courts. Jefferson also expressed concern about the decision in MARBURY V. MADISON, 5 U.S. 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803), which declared that the Supreme Court could review the constitution- ality of acts of Congress. The concept of JUDICIAL REVIEW , which is not described in the Constitu- tion, expanded the power of the judiciary. Jefferson and the Republicans worried that Federalist-appointed judges would use judicial review to strike down Republican legislation. After he was reelected in 1805, Jefferson encountered the problem of attacks on indepen- dent U.S. ships by England and France, which were engaged in war. To discourage these attacks, Congress passed the Nonimportation Act of 1806 (2 Stat. 315), forbidding the importation of British goods, and the EMBARGO ACT of 1807 (2 Stat. 451), prohibiting the exportation of U.S. goods to England and France. These measures proved to be detrimental to U.S. commerce. After the end of his second presidential term, Jefferson retired to his estate, Monticello. He served as president of the American Philosophi- cal Society from 1797 to 1815 and helped found the University of Virginia in 1819. Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, published in 1784 and 1785, remain an impor- tant historical resource. Written to a French correspondent, the book contains social, poli- tical, and economic reflections that show Jefferson to be a person committed to rational thought. The book also reveals that Jefferson, a slaveholder, believed that African Americans were inferior to whites. Throughout his life Jefferson defended the institution of SLAVERY, casting a cloud over his professed belief in human dignity. Jefferson died July 4, 1826, at Monticello, near Charlottesville, Virginia. FURTHER READINGS Bernstein, R.B. 2003. “Wrestling with Jefferson: The Struggles of a Biographer.” New York Law School Review 46. Bernstein, R.B. 2005. Thomas Jefferson. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. Dougherty, Richard J. 2001. “Thomas Jefferson and the Rule of Law: Executive Power and American Constitu- tionalism.” Northern Kentucky Law Review 28, no. 3 (summer). Reiss, David. 2002. “Jefferson and Madison as Icons in Judicial History: A Study of Religion Clause Jurispru- dence.” Maryland Law Review 6 (winter). Schwartz, Bernard, with Barbara Wilcie Kern and R. B. Bernstein. 1997. “Thomas Jefferson and Bolling v. Bolling: Law and the Legal Profession in Pre-Revolutionary America.” San Marino, CA: Huntington Library. CROSS REFERENCE Marshall, John. JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY See DEMOCRATIC-REPUBLICAN PARTY. JEOPARDY Danger; hazard; peril. In a criminal action, the danger of conviction and punishment confronting the defendant. A person is in jeopardy when he or she is placed on trial before a court of competent jurisdiction upon an indictment or information sufficient in form and substance to uphold a conviction, and a jury is charged or sworn. Jeopardy attaches after a valid indictment is found and a PETIT JURY is sworn to try the case. CROSS REFERENCE Double Jeopardy. JETSAM The casting overboard of goods from a vessel, by its owner, under exigent circumstances in order to provide for the safety of the ship by lightening its cargo load. JIM CROW LAWS The Jim Crow Laws emerged in southern states after the U.S. CIVIL WAR. First enacted in the 1880s by lawmakers who were bitter about their loss to the North and the end of SLAVERY, the statutes separated the races in all walks of life. The resulting legislative barrier to equal rights THAT GOVERNMENT IS THE STRONGEST OF WHICH EVERY MAN HIMSELF FEELS A PART . —THOMAS JEFFERSON GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 26 JEFFERSONIAN REPUBLICAN PARTY created a system that favored whites and repressed blacks, an institutionalized form of inequality that grew in subsequent decades with help from the U.S. Supreme Court. Although the laws came under attack over the next half century, real progress against them did not begin until the Court began to dismantle segregation in the 1950s. The remnants of the Jim Crow system were finally abolished in the 1960s through the efforts of the CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT . The term “Jim Crow” laws evidently ori- ginated from a minstrel show character devel- oped during the mid-nineteenth century. A number of groups of white entertainers applied black cork to their faces and imitated Negro dancing and singing routines. Such acts became popular in several northern cities. One of the performers reportedly sang a song with the lyrics, “Weel about and turn about and do jis so, Eb’ry time I weel about I jump Jim Crow.” The moniker Jim Crow later became synonymous with the segregation laws. The origins of Jim Crow lie in the battered South of the mid-nineteenth century. The Civil War had ended, but its antagonisms had not; the war of values and political identity contin- ued. Many whites refused to welcome blacks into civic lif e, believing them to be inferior and resenting northern demands in the era of Reconstruction, especially the requirement that southern states ratify the THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT, which would abolish slavery. Southern states initially resisted by passing so-called BLACK CODES, which prohibited former slaves from carrying firearms or joining militias. More hostility followed when Congress enacted the CIVIL RIGHTS Act of 1875 (18 Stat. 335), which guaranteed blacks access to public facilities. As the federal government pressed the South to enfranchise blacks, a backlash developed in the form of state regulations that separated whites from blacks in public facilities. In the late nineteenth century, southern states took comfort from two U.S. Supreme Court decisions. First, in 1883, the Court struck down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 as unconsti- tutional, in the so-called CIVIL RIGHTS CASES, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835. It ruled that Congress had exceeded its powers under the Reconstruction amendments. This decision encouraged southern states to extend Jim Crow restrictions, as in an 1890 Louisiana statute that required white and “colored” persons to be furnished “separate but equal” accommodations on railway passenger cars. In fact, that law came under attack in the Court’s next significant decision, the 1896 case of PLESSY V. FERGUSON, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256. In Plessy, the Court upheld the Louisiana law, ruling that establishing separate-but-equal public accom- modations and facilities was a reasonable exercise of the POLICE POWER of a state to promote the public good. Plessy kept the principle of SEPARATE BUT EQUAL alive for the next 60 years. By the start of WORLD WAR I, every southern state had passed Jim Crow laws. Becoming entrenched over the next few decades, the laws permeated nearly every part of public life, including railroads, hotels, hospitals, restau- rants, neighborhoods, and even cemeteries. Whites had their facilities; blacks had theirs. The white facilities were better built and equipped. In particular, white schools were almost uniformly better in every respect, from buildings to educational materials. States saw to it that their black citizens were essentially powerless to overturn these laws, using poll taxes and literacy tests to deny them the right to vote. Jim Crow even extended to the federal govern- ment: Early in the twentieth century, discrimi- natory policies were rife throughout federal departments, and not until the KOREAN WAR (1950–53) did the armed forces stop segregating personnel into black and white units. Opposition to the policy of Jim Crow came chiefly from African Americans. Early leader- ship was provided by the Afro-American In the southern states, Jim Crow laws permeated nearly every part of public life. Dr. Charles N. Atkins and family stand outside the Santa Fe Depot waiting rooms in Oklahoma City in 1955. AP IMAGES GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION JIM CROW LAWS 27 . a result of the evacuation program. A final major development in the redress movement has been the use of CORAM NOBIS,the GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 18 JAPANESE AMERICAN. DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER OF THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, THE MARK OF ITS LEGITIMACY , IS THAT IT OWES ITS EXISTENCE TO THE ACT OF THE WHOLE PEOPLE WHO CREATED IT . —JOHN JAY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E. British treatment of the colonies but did not fully GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 22 JAY, JOHN advocate independence until 17 76, when the DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE was created. Jay then