would be necessary to recompense the injured party for the amount of losses incurred through breach of contract. The injured party should be placed in the position that he or she would have occupied if the contract had been performed, and they are entitled to receive the benefit of the bargain, the net gain that would have accrued to them under the contract. The injured party is not, however, to be put in a better position than he or she would have occupied had perfor- mance taken place. Damages for anticipatory repudiation are ordinarily assessed as of the scheduled perfor- mance dates that are fixed by the breached contract. The measure of damages for the breach of an installment contract is determin ed at the time each installment is due. When the parties have included a LIQUIDATED DAMAGES clause in a contract, it generally will be enforced. Such clause is a prior agreement by the parties as to the measure of damages upon breach. Additional damages may not be claimed. Partial Performance When the DEFENDANT has failed to complete performance of an agreement according to its terms, the plaintiff may recover such damages as will compensate him or her to the same extent as though the contract had been completely performed. The customary measure of damages is the reason- able expense of completion. Completion refers to a fulfillme nt of the same work, if possible, which does not involve unreasonable economic waste. The injured party is not automatically entitled to recover the difference between the contract price and the amount it would cost to have the work completed when a contract is breached after partial performance; he or she will be entitled to recover that amount only if completion is actually accomplished at a greater cost. A provision in a building contract that allows the owner, in the event of a default by the contractor, to complete the job and to deduct the expenses from the contract price does not preclude the owner’s recovering damages also where the contractor intentionally leaves the work undone. A plaintiff may also recover the monetary value of materials that are lost through a breach of contract. A plaintiff contractor who subsequently performs the work upon breach of a contract will ordinarily recover the reasonable value of the labor and materials that he or she has furnished, with the contract price used as a guideline. The award may not properly exceed the benefit that the owner received in the properly completed work, and it will be reduced by the amount of damages that the owner incurs as a result of the contractor’s failure to complete performance of the contractual obli- gation. If the value of the work performed exceeds the contract price, the contractor will not receive the excess. Where a contract for the performance of services exists with payment to be made in installments, and the obligation to pay for each installment constitutes an independent promise, the individual who is entitled to payment may recover only the installments that are due when the suit is brought. Defective Performance Damages for defec- tive performance of a contractual agreement are measured by calculating the difference in value between what is actually tendered and what is required as performance under the agreement. If the performance tendered is either of no value or unsuitable for the purpose that the contract contemplated, the proper measure of damages is the sum that is necessary to repair the defect. If a defect can be easily remedied through repairs, the measure of damages is the price of the repairs performed. Generally, the total contract price may not be recovered for substantial performan ce. If the plaintiff furnished materials for items that were manufactured for the plaintiff in such a manner as to be rendered worthless, the proper measure of damages ordinarily has been held to be the discrepancy between the co ntract price and the market price of such items if they had been manufactured according to the contract terms. When a building or construction contract is defectively performed, the proper measure of damages is the difference between the value of the property with the defective work, and its value had there been strict compliance with the contract. Where the contractor deliberately deviates from the contractual agreement, but there has been no substantial performance, damages are determined by the actual expense of reconstructing the building according to the terms of the contrac t. Delay in Performance The loss precipitated by the wrongful delay of the performance of a GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 188 CONTRACTS contract is calculated by fixing the rental or use of the property or interest as a result of the loss incurred through increased material and labor expenses, as distinguished from what the value would have been had the contract been performed on time. Reformation Reformation is an EQUITABLE REM- EDY that is applied when the written agreement does not correspond to the contract that was actually formed by the parties, as a result of fraud or mutual mistake in drafting the original document. Quasi-contractual relief for the reasonable value of services rendered is also available, although it applies only when there is no enforceable contract. Rescission Rescission terminates the contract, and the parties are restored to the position of never having entered into the contract in the first place. Restitution Restitution is a remedy that is designed to restore the injured party to the position that they occupied prior to the formation of the contract. Specific Performance Specific performance is an equitable remedy by which a contracting party is required to execute, as nearly as practicable, a promised perfor mance when monetary damages would be inadequate to compensate for the breach. A contract to sell land is specifically enforceable because land is considered to be unique and not compensable by money. In addition, property that has sentimental value, as well as antique, heirloom, or one-of-a-kind articles, are viewed as unique, and therefore it would be impossible to estimate damages. A personal-service contract or an employment contract, however, cannot be specifically enforced because the THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution prohibits SLAVERY. If, however, the contract proscribes a person from performing some act, breach of that NEGATIVE COVENANT may be specifically enforced. Parol Evidence Rule Tentative terms discussed in preliminary nego- tiations are subsumed by the provisions of the contract executed by the parties. The PAROL EVIDENCE rule governs the admissibility of evidence other than the actual agreement when a dispute arises over a written contract. When parties memorialize their agreements in writing, all prior oral and written agreements, and all contemporaneous oral agreements, merge in the writing, which is also known as an integration. The written contract may not be modified, altered, or varied by parol or oral evidence, provided that it has been legally executed by a person who intends for it to represent the final and complete expression of his or her under- standing of the contract. This is not the case, however, where there has been some mistake or fraud in the drafting of the document. The parol evidence rule effectuates the presumed intention of the parties; achieves certainty and finality as to the rights and duties of the contracting parties; and prevents fraudu- lent and perjured claims. It has no application to subsequent oral contracts that modify or discharge the written contract, however. Ambiguity Ambiguity in the terms of a contract exists when the court cannot, after applying the rules or tools of interpretation, give a meaning to the language use d in an agreement or document. The PLAIN-MEANING RULE is often applied judi- cially to ascertain whether a contract is ambiguous. If the contract appears to the trial judge to be clear and unequivocal on its face, then there is no need for parol evidenc e. However, when a writing is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissable only to elucidate, not to vary, the instrument as written. Courts have used other rules to resolve ambiguous terms. Where neither party knows, or has reason to know, of the ambiguity, or where both parties know or have reason to know of it, the ambiguous term is given the meaning that each party intended it to convey. As a practical matter, this means that if the parties give the equivocal expression the same meaning, then a contract is formed; but if they give it a different meaning, then there is no contract, at least if the ambiguity pertains to a material term, as there is no meeting of their minds. Where one party knows, or has reason to know, of the ambiguity, and the other does not, it conveys the meaning given to it by the latter—which means, in essence, that there is a contract predicated upon the meaning of the party who is without fault. Contracts for the Sale of Goods The nature of a transaction determines the type of contract law that applies. General contract GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CONTRACTS 189 law described above applies to such transactions as service agreements and sales of real property. Contracts for the sale of goods, however, are governed by Article 2 of the UCC, which has been adopted, at least in part, in every state. The UCC defines “goods” as all things that are movable at the time of the sale. The drafters of the UCC adhered to a more liberal view of contracts, so some o f its provisions differ significantly from those that are found in general c ontract law. A contract for t he sale of goods may be made in any manner that is sufficient to s how agreement, a nd courts may consider the conduct of the parties when making this determination. An offer to sell goods may be made in any manner that invites acceptance. Courts also may consider the COURSE OF PERFOR- MANCE between the parties when determining whether a contract for the sale of goods exists. The UCC provides for, and recognizes, certain warranties that relate to the goods being sold. For example, an affirmation of fact or a promise made by the seller to the buyer creates an express warranty. Sales also create implied warranties, such as the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose. Remedies and other damages for breach of a sale-of-goods contract are also governed by the UCC. In addition to monetary damages, buyers and sellers may take several actions when the other party breaches a sales contract. For example, a seller who has been injured by a breach of contract may withhold delivery of the goods; resell the goods that are subject to the contract; or recover monetary damages. A buyer may seek to “cover” by making a good-faith purchase of substitute goods from a different seller, and then may recover from the original seller any difference between the substitute contract and the original contract. FURTHER READINGS Collins, Hugh. 2004. Regulating Contracts. New York: Oxford Univ. Press. DiMatteo, Larry A. 1998. Contract Theory: the Evolution of Contractual Intent. East Lansing: Michigan State Univ. Press. Hare, J.I. Clark. 2003. The Law of Contracts. Clark, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange. Marsh, P.D.V. 2001. Contract Negotiation Handbook. Burlington, Vt.: Gower. CONTRAVENTION A term of French law meaning an act violative of a law, a treaty, or an agreement made between parties; a breach of law punishable by a fine of fifteen francs or less and by an imprisonment of three days or less. In the U.S. legal system, a breach or violation of the provisions of a contract, statute, or treaty. CONTRIBUTING TO THE DELINQUENCY OF A MINOR Any action by an adult that allows or encourages illegal behavior by a person under the age of 18, or that places children in situations that expose them to illegal behavior. Contributing to the delinquen- cy of a minor can be as simple as keeping a child home from school and thus, making the child a truant. It also can manifest itself in more serious behavior. For example, an adult who commits a crime in the presence of a child can be charged with contributing to the delinquency of a minor, as can an adult who serves alcoholic beverages to anyone under the legal drinking age. Still more egregious is sexual exploitation, which could include having sexual relations with minors or engaging in the production or trafficking of child pornography. CROSS REFERENCES Battered Child/Spouse Syndrome; Child Abuse; Child Pornography; Children’s Rights; Domestic Violence. CONTRIBUTION In maritime law, where the property of one of several parties with interests in a vessel and cargo has been voluntarily sacrificed for the common safety of the vessel—as by casting goods overboard to lighten the vessel—such loss must be made up by the contribution of the others, which is labeled “general average.” In civil law, a partition by which the creditors of an insolvent debtor divide among themselves the proceeds of the debtor’s property in proportion to the amount of their respective credits. The right of a defendant who has paid an entire debt, or common liability, to recoup a proportionate share of the payment from another defendant who is equally responsible for the payment of that debt or liability. Certain principles apply when contribution is sought in contractual situations. Where the parties are severally (individually) liable for a specific portion of a debt, one person who pays in excess of his or her proportionate share has no LEGAL RIGHT to contribution from the others for the excess. Where the parties are jointly liable (as a unit) for the payment of a debt, GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 190 CONTRAVENTION a party who pays in excess of his or her ratable share can seek contribution from the others for the amount of his or her overpayment. If the parties are jointly and severally liable for a debt, both as a unit and as individuals, any party who pays in excess of his or her proportionate share can seek contribution. To entitle a person to contribution, the payment of the debt or liability must arise from a legal obligation to pay. The payment of the entire debt or liability is unnecessary, but the payment must have exceeded the share of the person seeking contribution. A PLAINTIFF who procures a judgment (a final court decision that resolves a controversy and determines the rights and obligations of the parties) against two or more joint tortfeasors (those who together commit a civil wrong) can collect that judgment from all, any one, or less than all of them. The English and early U.S. COMMON LAW held that if one such DEFENDANT did in fact pay less than a proportionate share of the judgment, that defendant should reimburse the other defendant(s) who paid more, except in cases of intentional torts or acts of the defendant that did not justify the court’s assistance. During the past century, however, the majority of jurisdictions in this country expanded this exception and denied all com- mon-law contribution among joint tortfeasors regardless of the basis of liability, including cases of NEGLIGENCE and STRICT LIABILITY. Statutes—some of which are patterned after the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act—supersede the common law in more than half the states and provide for contribution in some form. Several jurisdictions continue to permit contribution by judicial decision, never having adhered to the majority rule disallowing it, although some states still generally deny contribution. Of those states allowing contribution, the majority allocate the damages among the defendants in proportion to their relative fault. In the remainder, which includes almost all those without a statute, the damages are divided equally. Certain defendants, such as an employ- er and his or her employee, are aggregated and assessed a single share. Contribution is still generally but not universally denied to willful tortfeasors. If the plaintiff has sued and obtained a judgment against fewer than all joint tortfeasors, some statutes prohibit contribution from one against whom there is no judgment. Other statutes permit contribution in this instance, subject to satisfactory proof of liability. It is generally held, unless there is a statute requiring otherwise, that a TORTFEASOR who settles prior to trial—and therefore against whom there is no judgment—can nevertheless obtain contribution from other joint tortfea- sors, but must prove the liability to the plaintiff of the other tortfeasors, the amount of the damages, and the reasonableness of the prior settlement. In an action for contribution, the party seeking it must ordinarily establish that the tortfeasor from whom contribution is sought was subject to liability to the injured plaintiff, if no judgment has been obtained determining that liability. Certain defenses usually bar contribution, such as automobile GUEST STATUTES and the immunity granted to employers under the workers’ compensation acts, w hich only the defendant in the action for contribution could have asserted against the injured person. There is some authority to the contrary, however. CROSS REFERENCE Joint and Several Liability. CONTROLLER The key financial officer of a state, private, or municipal corporation, who is charged with certain specific responsibilities related to its financial affairs. CROSS REFERENCE Comptrolle r. CONTROVERSY An actual dispute between individuals who seek judicial resolution of their grievances that have arisen from a conflict of their alleged legal rights. A controversy describes only civil litigation, which is intended to protect and enforce private rights. In contrast, the term case applies to both a CIVIL ACTION and a criminal prosecution, designed to enforce and safeguard the rights of the general public. The JUDICIAL power of a court to provide REDRESS of wrongs exists only when issues arise in a given situation that can be categorized as a case or controversy. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CONTROVERSY 191 CONTROVERT To contest, deny, or take issue with. A claim of reckless driving alleged in a plaintiff’s complaint that initiates a lawsuit for NEGLIGENCE is controverted by the statements made in the defendant’s answer that he or she was driving at a speed below the speed limit and was observing the rules of the road. CONTUMACY Willful disobedience. The intentional failure of an individual to obey a summons to appear in court to defend against a charge or to obey an order rendered by the court. Contumacy is a sufficient basis for finding an individual in CONTEMPT of court. CONVENTION An agreement or compa ct, particularly an international agreement, such as the Geneva Convention. An accord between states or nations, which resembles a treaty: ordinarily applied to agreements prior to an execution of an official treaty or which serve as its foundation; or to international agreements for the regulation of international affairs of common interest not within the ambit of commercial transactions or politics, such as international postage. An agree- ment between states concerning finance, trade, or other matters considered less significant than those usually governed by a treaty. An assembly or meeting of representatives or members of legisla- tive, political, or fraternal organization s. A constitutional convention is an assembly of representatives or delegates of the people of a state or nation, convened for the purpose of framing, altering, or amending its constitution. Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides that a constitutional convention may be convoked on application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states. A judicial convention is an assembly of judges of the superior courts (courts of GENERAL JURISDICTION ), empowered in some states to meet during specified periods to adopt uniform rules of practice. The powers of the convention are restricted to making necessary rules that conform to the provisions of the relevant statute. Revision or ABROGATION of any rule of practice established by statute is prohibited. A legislative convention is a congregation of representatives or delegates selected by the people for extraordinary and special legislative objectives, such as the framing or alteration of a state constitution. A political convention is an assembly of delegates designated by a political party to nominate candidates for a pending election. CONVENTIONAL Derived from or contingent upon the mutual agreement of the parties, as opposed to that created by or dependent upon a statute or other act of the law. A conventional home mortgage is one in which the interest rate is agreed upon by the parties to it: the borrower and the lender. CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN EUROPE TREATY The United States, the Soviet Union, and twenty other member countries of the NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact signed the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty on November 19, 1990. The most complex and comprehensive conventional arms control treaty in history, the CFE limits levels of conventional—that is, nonnuclear—weapons and equipment with the purpose of creating greater military stability in Europe. The CFE played a crucial stabilizing role during the breakup of the Sov iet Union and its satellite states in Eastern Europe during the late 1980s and early 1990s. It also made possible steep reductions in U.S. troop and equipment levels in Europe. In a period of remarkable historical change that transformed the political map of Europe, the treaty’s provisions enabled a “velvet” rather than a violent revolution. The CFE grew out of arms control negotia- tions between the United States and the Soviet Union during the 1980s. In partic ular, treaty negotiations were prompted by a 1986 call for conventional arms control by Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, and a 1989 proposal by U.S. president GEORGE H. W. BUSH to limit the United States and the Soviet Union to 275,000 troops each in Europe. However, as the Soviet satellites gained independence in the late 1980s and early 1990s and large numbers of U.S. and Soviet troops were transferred out of Europe, the initial level of troops proposed by Bush GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 192 CONTROVERT proved needlessly high, and subsequent nego- tiations focused on armaments alone. By November 1990 a treaty had been completed. Meeting in Paris, Bush, Gorbachev, and other leaders signed the CFE that month. The U.S. Senate approved it on November 25, 1991, by a vote of 90–4. The treaty placed limits on five types of conventional armaments deployed between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains: tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles (such as armored personnel carriers), aircraft, and heli- copters. It divided the area covered by the agreement into subzones, each having its own equipment limits. The agreement limited NATO and the Warsaw Pact each to 20,000 tanks, 30,000 armored combat vehicles, 20,000 artillery pieces, 6,800 combat aircraft, and 2,000 attack helicopters. The treaty did not address naval forces. As originally designed, the CFE was meant to stabilize relations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. NATO, for its part, sought to relocate Soviet forces eastward from the German border and to prevent their concentration in the Soviet Union west of the Urals. After the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact on July 1, 1991, and the breakup of the Soviet Union into 15 separate nations in December 1991, the CFE began to change its focus from management of the COLD WAR standoff to management of the effects of the Cold War’s conclusion. Later amendments adapted the treaty to the changing European political situation. On May 15, 1992, the Commonwealth of Independent States—the 15 successor states of the Soviet Union—ratified armament limits in their terri- tories as specified by the CFE limits for the Warsaw Pact nations. All adherents to the treaty met subsequent arms reduction targets, though Russia continued to negotiate changes owing to unrest in Chechnya and other regions within its borders. By September 1994 the CFE had resulted in the destruction of more than 18,000 pieces of military equipment, including 6,000 by the Russian Federation. The CFE enjoys widespread support in Europe and appears likely to rem ain in force for some time. CFE supporters argue that its armament limits and inspection requirements prevent an arms race and enhance the exchange of information between European countries, allowing each member nation to easily assess the military capabilities of its neighbors. FURTHER READINGS Croft, Stuart, ed. 1994. The Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty: The Cold War Endgame. Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth. Falkenrath, Richard A. 1995. Shaping Europe’s Military Order: The Origins and Consequences of the CFE Treaty. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. McCausland, Jeffrey D. 1995. “The CFE Treaty: Building European Security.” Strategic Forum, no.48 (October). Storming Media. Peters, John E. 1997. CFE and Military Stability in Europe. Santa Monica, CA: Rand. Available online at http:// www.sinfo.state.gov/journals/itdhr/0802/ijde/calabrese. htm; website home page: http://www.sinfo.state.gov (accessed July 16, 2009). Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE): Briefing of the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 1997. Paris, France: The Commission. ———. 2000. The Changing Quality of Stability in Europe: The Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty Toward 2001. Santa Monica, CA: RAND. Available online at http:// www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/2009/MR1104. pdf; website home page: http://www.rand.org (accessed July 16, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Arms Control and Disarmament; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty; Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. CONVERSION Any unauthorized act that deprives an owner of personal property without his or her consent. The wrongdoer converts the goods to his or her own use and excludes the owner from use and enjoyment of them. The English COMMON LAW early recognized such an act as wrongful and, by the middle of the fifteenth century, allowed an action in TROVER to compensate the aggrieved owner. German Foreign Minister Hans- Dietrich Genscher looks on as President George H.W. Bush signs the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty on November 19, 1990. The treaty, which has been amended to reflect changes in the European political system since its original adoption, limits levels of conventional weapons in order to ensure military stability in Europe. REUTERS NEWMEDIA INC./CORBIS. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION CONVERSION 193 The earliest cases allowing a lawsuit for conversion were based on claims that the PLAIN- TIFF had possession of certain items of PERSONAL PROPERTY , then casually lost them, and the DEFENDANT had found them and had not returned them but instead “converted them to his own use.” This phrase was picked up, and it gave a name to a tort that originally was a kind of ACTION ON THE CASE , a form of TRESPASS. As time passed, the plea that the plaintiff had lost his or her goods and the defendant had found them came to be considered a LEGAL FICTION (that is, a decision was made in the case as if the plea were true, and it did not have to be proved). The defendant was not allowed to dispute the allegations but could answer only the claim that the plaintiff had a right to possession of the goods and the defendant had refused to restore them to the plaintiff. In the early twenty-first century the word conversion is still applied to the unlawful taking or use of someone else’s property. The type of property that can be converted is determined by the original nature of the CAUSE OF ACTION.It must be personal property, because real property cannot be lost and then found. It must be tangible, such as money, an animal, furniture, tools, or receipts. Crops or timber can be subject to conversion after they are severed from the ground. The rights in a paper—such as a life insurance policy, a stock certificate, or a pro- missory note—can be converted by one who appropriates the paper itself. A thief, a trespasser, or a bailee may be guilty of conversion because the action may be maintained whether or not the property was lawfully acquired at the outset. For example, a dry cleaner who mistakenly delivers a suit to the wrong customer has converted it. Moving some- one’s property without his or her permission might constitute a conversion if the inconve- nience is substantial: for example, having some- one’s car towed away in order to take the parking place. Unauthorized use is a conversion—such as a mechanic who, without permission, borrows a sports car that he or she is supposed to repair. Misuse of property can also be a conversion. If a neighbor lends his or her hedge trimmer to a friend, it is a conversion for the friend to use the hedge trimmer to cut down a tree. CONVEYANCE The transfer of ownership or interest in real property from one person to another by a document, such as a deed, lease, or mortgage. CONVICT To adjudge an accused person guilty of a crime at the conclusion of a criminal prosecution, or after the entry of a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere. An individual who has been found guilty of a crime and, as a result, is serving a sentence as punishment for the act; a prisoner. CONVICTION The outcome of a criminal prosecution which concludes in a judgment that the defendant is guilty of the crime charged. The juncture of a criminal proceeding during which the question of guilt is ascertained. In a case where the perpetrator has been adjudged guilty and sentenced, a record of the summary proceedings brought pursuant to any penal statute before one or more justices of the peace or other properly authorized persons. The terms conviction and convicted refer to the final judgment on a VERDICT of gui lty, a plea of guilty, or a plea of NOLO CONTENDERE. They do not include a final judgment that has been deleted by a pardon, set aside, reversed, or otherwise rendered inoperative. The term summary conviction refers to the consequence of a trial before a court or magistrate, without a jury, which generally involves a minor misdemeanor. v COOLEY, THOMAS MCINTYRE As a jurist, scholar, and educator in the late nineteenth century, THOMAS MCINTYRE COOLEY greatly influenced the development of U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. In particular, Cooley’s writings shaped later interpretation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. His ideas were used, and sometimes misused, by others to help define a laissez-faire approach to constitu- tional law that sought to minimize the power of government over private and commercial life. (Laissez-faire is French for “let [people] do [as they choose].”) Cooley’s most important books include A Treatise on the Constitutional Limita- tions Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union (1868) and A Treatise on the Law of Torts (1879, 3d ed. 1906), both of which became the leading texts in their respective fields. In his writings, Cooley consis- tently defended constitutional government and its ability to protect the rights of individuals from arbitrary actio ns by the state. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 194 CONVEYANCE Cooley had a distinguished career on the Michigan Supreme Court between 1864 and 1885. From the 1870s onward, he was consid- ered a leading candidate for a seat on the U.S. Supreme Court; however, he never received a nomination. Cooley was also a founding member of the University of Michigan ’slaw department in 1859, remaining there as a professor until 1884. As an indication of the complexity of Cooley’s brand of conservatism, he served as the first chairman of the INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMMISSION (ICC), the body that regulates interstate transportation. He was instrumental in the establishment of the ICC as the federal government’s first regulatory commission. A descendant of seventeenth-century New England settlers, Cooley was born January 6, 1824, on a farm near Attica, New York, the eighth of his mother’s thirteen children. He had a very basic education in local schools and did not attend college. In 1842, he began studying law under Theron R. Strong, a politician and lawyer from Palmyra, New York. After moving to Adrian, Michigan to explo re life on the frontier, Cooley earned ADMISSION TO THE BAR in 1846. In that same year, he married Mary Horton. Cooley’s frontier experiences in Michi- gan had a profound effect on him and shaped much of his later thought. He learned the benefits of frugality and self-reliance, and he took great prid e in being one of the state’s pioneers. He later wrote of the way in which Michigan had been transf ormed before his very eyes: “It was a state almost lost in its woods … but the magic touch of industry plied by vigorous hands speedily transformed the scene; the woods opened to the building of many beautiful and prosperous towns.” Cooley was influenced in his youth by the history and traditions of his New England forebears, as well as the values of Jackso nian Democracy, so named for ANDREW JACKSON, President of the United States from 1829 to 1837. The Jacksonians lay claim to the legacy of THOMAS JEFFERSON, and, like Jefferson, they had a bias in favor of an agrarian society rather than a commercial one. The Jacksonians were, therefore, suspicious of big government and big Thomas McIntyre Cooley. COURTESY OF THE MICHIGAN SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY. ▼▼ ▼▼ Thomas McIntyre Cooley 1824–1898 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ◆◆◆◆ ❖❖ 1824 Born, Attica, N.Y. 1846 Admitted to Michigan bar 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1859–84 Founding member of University of Michigan's law department 1868 Treatise on Constitutional Limitations published 1864–85 Served on Michigan Supreme Court 1876 A Treatise on the Law of Taxation published 1880 The General Principles of Constitutional Law in the United States published 1887–91 Served as chairman of the new Interstate Commerce Commission 1898 Died, Ann Arbor, Mich. THE VALUE OF GOVERNMENT TO ANY MAN IS PROPORTIONED TO THE COMPLETENESS OF THE PROTECTION IT EXTENDS TO ALL MEN . —THOMAS COOLEY GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION COOLEY, THOMAS MC INTYRE 195 business, and saw both as a potential danger to the common individual. Cooley’s constitutional philosophy grew out of the Jeffersonian and Jacksonian ideals of self-reliance, free trade, equal rights, limited government, and maxi- mum personal liberties such as FREEDOM OF SPEECH . During the 1840s and 1850s, Cooley was a member of the radical wing of the DEMOCRATIC PARTY . He was, for example, a Free-Soiler, believing that territories and new states should remain free of SLAVERY. In 1854 he accepted the Democratic nomination to run for district judge of COMMON PLEAS in Toledo, but he lost the election. His views on slavery led him to join the REPUBLICAN PARTY shortly after its inception in 1854, and he remained a member of it for the rest of his life. After a difficult decade spent moving about and trying to get his legal career underway, in 1855 Cooley formed a law partnership in Adrian with Cha rles M. Croswell, who later became governor of Michigan. Two years later, the state legislature chose Cooley to compile the state statutes. He performed this task so ably that in 1858 he was appointed the official reporter of the state’s supreme court, an office he held through 1865 and in which he edited volumes 5 through 12 of Michigan Reports. Cooley became one of the three founding professors of the law department at the University of Michigan in 1859, and later he served as its dean. In 1884, he gave up his position with the law department to serve as professor of U.S. history and co nstitutional law in the literary department, a position he held until his death on September 12, 1898. Largely because of his excellent work editing the Michigan Supreme Court’s reports, Cooley was elected to the Michigan Supreme Court in 1864. Not long afterward, he began to prepare a book based on his lectures on constitutional law. A Treatise on Constitutional Limitations made Cooley a nationally recognized authority on the Constitution. FURTHER READINGS Carrington, Paul D. 1997. “The Constitutional Law Scholarship of Thomas McIntyre Cooley.” American Journal of Legal History 41 (July). Available online at http://eprints.law.duke.edu/629/1/41_Am._J._Legal_H- ist._368_(1997).pdf; website home page: http://eprints. law.duke.edu (accessed July 16, 2009). Cooley, Thomas M. 200 Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations Which Rest upon the Legislative Power of the States of the American Union. Clark, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange. Fleener, William J., Jr. 2000. “Michigan Lawyers in History—Thomas McIntyre Cooley: Michigan’s Most influential lawyer.” Michigan Bar Journal 79 (February). Available online at http://www.michbar.org/journal/ article.cfm?articleID=53&volumeID=3; website home page: http://www.michbar.org (accessed July 16, 2009). Jacobs, Clyde E. 2001. Law Writers and the Courts: The Influence of Thomas M. Cooley, Christopher G. Tiede- man, and John F. Dillon upon American Constitutional Law. Clark, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange. Jones, Alan R. 1960. The Constitutional Conservatism of Thomas McIntyre Cooley: A Study in the History of Ideas. Ph.D. diss. Reprint, 1987. New York: Garland. v COOLIDGE, CALVIN Born John Calvin Coolidge—after his father— on July 4, 1872, in Plymouth, Vermont, he shortened his name to CALVIN COOLIDGE after leaving college. Coolidge became the 30th president of the United States upon the death of President WARREN G. HARDING. He was educated at Amherst College, where he received a bachelor ▼▼ ▼▼ Calvin Coolidge 1872–1933 18501850 19001900 19251925 19501950 18751875 ◆ ◆◆◆◆◆ ❖❖ 1872 Born, Plymouth, Vt. 1897 Established practice in Northampton, Mass. 1899 Elected to city council in Northampton 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II 1912–15 Served in Mass. Senate 1918 Elected governor of Mass. 1933 Died, Northampton, Mass. 1923–28 Coolidge administration 1923 President Harding died in office; Coolidge sworn in as president 1921 Became vice president of the United States 1929 Stock market crashed; the Great Depression began 1910 Elected mayor of Northampton ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 196 COOLIDGE, CALVIN of arts degree in 1895 and a doctor of laws degree in 1919. He also received doctor of laws degrees from several other institutions, including Wesleyan University and Tufts University. In 1897 Coolidge was admitted to the bar and established his legal firm in Northampton, Massachusetts, where he practiced until 1919. He became councilman in Northampton in 1899, then city solicitor from 1900 to 1901, clerk of courts in 1904, and member of the General Court of Massachusetts from 1907 to 1908. In 1910 he was elected mayor of North- ampton, a post that he held for one year. Coolidge served in the Massachusetts Senate from 1912 to 1915, acting as president during 1914 and 1915. He was the lieutenant governor of the state from 1916 to 1918 and the following year became governor. As governor, he gained public recognition for his strong policy regarding the Boston police strike of 1919, regarding which he denied the right of any individual or group to strike if the public welfare is jeopardized. With such extensive experience in state government, Coolidge was a natural choice for a federal position. In 1921 he was elected to the vice presidency of the United States. On August 2, 1923, President WARREN G. HARDING died suddenly and Coolidge became presi dent. He was sworn in by his f ather, a NOTARY PUBLIC,onAugust3, 1923, at 2:47 A.M. in his hometown of Plymouth, Vermont. In the next presidential election, held in 1924, Coolidge was elected, and so his admi- nistration lasted for five years. As president, Coolidge adopted policies that favored business and discouraged government intervention in the economic system. He influenced the speculative activity of the STOCK MARKET toward the end of the 1920s, which, some believe, precipitated the crash of 1929. When Coolidge left office in that year, the country was on the brink of economic disaster. Coolidge spent his last years in retirement, writing articles. His Autobiography was pub- lished in 1929. He died January 5, 1933, in Northampton, Massachusetts. FURTHER READINGS Coolidge, Calvin. 1929. The Autobiography of Calvin Cool- idge. New York: Cosmopolittan. Available online at http://www.archive.org/details/autobiographycal011459 mbp; website home page: http://www.archive.org (accessed September 1, 2009). Gilbert, Robert E. 2003. The Tormented President: Calvin Coolidge and the Trauma of Death. Santa Barbara, Calif.: Praeger. Sobel, Robert. 2000. Coolidge: An American Enigma. Washington, D.C.: Regnery. CROSS REFERENCES Harding, Warren Gamaliel; Hoover, Herbert Clark. COOLING-OFF PERIOD An interval of time during which no action of a specific type can be taken by either side in a dispute. An automatic delay in certain jurisdic- tions, apart from ordinary court delays, between the time when divorce papers are filed and the divorce hearing takes place. An amount of time within which a buyer is permitted to cancel a contract for the purchase of consumer goods— designed to effect consumer protection. A number of states require that a three-day cancellation period must be allowed purchasers following door-to-door sales. A cooling-off period is frequently used in labor disputes. There might, for example, be a period of one month following the filing of a grievance by a union or company against the other, during which neither the union nor the company is allowed to take retaliatory actions against each other. Calvin Coolidge. ª HARRIS & EWING, THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PERHAPS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MY ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN MINDING MY OWN BUSINESS . —CALVIN COOLIDGE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION COOLING-OFF PERIOD 197 . early 1990s and large numbers of U.S. and Soviet troops were transferred out of Europe, the initial level of troops proposed by Bush GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 192 CONTROVERT proved. president of the United States 1929 Stock market crashed; the Great Depression began 1910 Elected mayor of Northampton ◆ GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 196 COOLIDGE, CALVIN of arts. THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS PERHAPS ONE OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF MY ADMINISTRATION HAS BEEN MINDING MY OWN BUSINESS . —CALVIN COOLIDGE GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION COOLING-OFF