Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 3 P35 potx

in various prison conditions and in the general operation of the Federal Bureau of Prisons that had been established in 1930 to oversee the 11 federal prisons that then existed. With public fear escalating over the 1932 kidnapping of the baby son of national hero Charles Lindbergh, an expanding list of “public enemies,” and mob violence at a peak, Cum- mings also advocated for the establishment of a maximum security prison for the nation’s most dangerous criminals. He chose Alcatraz Island, located in the San Francisco Bay, to house the country’s most dangerous criminals. Nick- named “Uncle Sam’s Devil’s Island,” the prison opened in 1934 and quickly entered the public imagination as a symbol of the tough punish- ment to be dealt out to the worst offenders. In 1935 Cummings merged the Justice Department’s Bureau of Investigation (BI), the Prohibition Bureau, and the Bu reau of Identifi- cation into the newly renamed FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI), all under the control of BI Director J. Edgar Hoover. In 1937, after the conservative U.S. Su- preme Court had overturned much of Roose- velt’s NEW DEAL legislative reforms that focused on moving the country back on the road to economic prosperity, Cummings drafted a proposal that came to be known as the court- packing plan. Enthusiastically endorsed by Roosevelt, the plan would have given the president the power to appoint a new judge for each INCUMBENT judge who was 70 or older. Because six of the nine justices were over the age of 70, the new law would have meant a Supreme Court with 15 members. Whereas the president and his attorney general saw the proposal as a way to get around the fact that Supreme Court justices have lifetime tenure, such a drastic change in the composition of the court was too much even f or the Democratic Congress, and the bill failed. Chief Justice CHARLES EVANS HUGHES and Associate Justice OWEN ROBERTS began to vote more often with the more liberal justices, however, thus allow- ing Roosevelt to proceed with many of his economic reform measures. Many saw the failed prop osal as having been the stimulus for Justice Hughes’s changed voting pattern. Cummings remained as attorney gene ral until his retirement in 1939. He d ied on S eptember 10, 1956, in Stamford, Connecticut. Homer S. Cummings. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. ▼▼ ▼▼ Homer Stille Cummings 1870–1956 18751875 19251925 19501950 19751975 19001900 ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ 1870 Born, Chicago, Illinois 1893 Received LL.B. from Yale; admitted to Connecticut bar 1908 Elected mayor of Stamford, Conn., for the first of three terms 1914–18 World War I 1939–45 World War II 1956 Died, Stamford, Conn. 1937 Drafted President Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan 1933–39 Served as U.S. attorney general 1934 Instrumental in establishment of Alcatraz Prison 1935 Formed the FBI from three other government bureaus GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 328 CUMMINGS, HOMER STILLE FURTHER READINGS Justice Department. 1985. Attorneys General of the United States, 1789–1985. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office. Available online at http://www.usdoj. gov/ag/attygeneraldate.html; website home page: http:// www.usdoj.gov (accessed July 8, 2009). Swisher, Carl B., ed. 1939. The Selected Papers of Homer Cummings, Attorney General of the United States 1933– 1939. New York: Scribner’s. Vile, John R. 2001. Great American Lawyers. Denver, Colo.: ABC-CLIO. CUMULATIVE EVIDENCE Facts or information that proves what has previously been established by other information concerning the same issue. Cumulative evidence is synonymous with corroborative evidence. CUMULATIVE SENTENCE Separate consecutive terms of imprisonment imposed upon a defendant who has been convicted of two or more distinct offenses; any term of imprisonment that becomes effective subsequent to the expiration of a prior one. A cumulative sentence is also known as a from and after sentence. CUMULATIVE VOTING A method of election of the board of directors used by corporations whereby a stockholder may cast as many votes for directors as he or she has shares of stock, multiplied by the number of directors to be elected. A plan used for the election of members to the lower house of the Illinois legislature by which voters, each of whom is given three votes, may cast all of the votes for one candi date or allocate them among two or three candidates. The purpose of cumulative voting is to facilitate the representation of minority stock- holders on the board. The stockholder may cast all of his or her votes for one or more, but not all, of the directors on the ballot, which therefore promotes representation of small shareholders. Cumulative voting is mandatory under the corporate laws of some states and is allowed in most states. CUNNILINGUS An act in which the female sexual organ is orally stimulated. At COMMON LAW, cunnilingus was not a crime. It is presently a crime in some jurisdic- tions and is usually treated as SODOMY. CURE The act of restoring health after injury or illness. Care, including medical and nursing services rendered to a sailor throu ghout a period of duty, pursuant to the principle that the owner of a vessel must furnish maintenance and cure to a sailor who becomes ill or is injured during service. The right of a seller, under the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (UCC), a body of law governing commercial transactions, to correct a delivery of goods that do not conform to contractual terms made to a buyer within the period specified by the contract in order to avoid a breach of contract action. The actual payment of all amounts that are past due in regard to a default in such payments. CURFEW A curfew is a law, regulation, or ordinance that forbids particular people or particular classes of people from being outdoors in public places at certain specified times of the day. Juvenile Curfews Local ordinances and state statutes may make it unlawful for minors below a certain age to be on public streets, unless they are accompanied by a parent or an adult or on lawful and necessary business on behalf of their parents or guardians. For example, a Michigan state law provides that “[n]o minor under the age of 12 years shall loiter, idle or congregate in or on any public street, highway, alley or park between the hours of 10 o’clock p.m. and 6 o’clock a.m., unless the minor is accompanied by a parent or guardian, or some adult delegated by the parent or guardian to accompany the child” (MCLA § 722.751; MSA § 28.342[1]). Curfew laws in other states and cities typically set forth different curfews for minors of different ages. Curfew laws and ordinances have been sustained as necessary to control the presence of juveniles in public places at nighttime with the attendant risk of mischief (In re Osman, 109 Ohio App. 3d 731, 672 N.E.2d 1114 [1996]). Courts have found that curfew ordinances promote the safety and good order of the community by reducing the incidence of juvenile criminal activity (Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843 [4th Cir. 1998]). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CURFEW 329 Curfew laws have generally been upheld against constitutional challenges on FIRST AMEND- MENT and due process grounds (Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 175 F. Supp. 2d 1132 [S.D. Ind. 2001]). One federal court held that minors have no FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT to freedom of movement or travel that protects them from restrictions imposed by curfew laws (Hutchins v. District of Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, [D.C. Cir. 1999]). However, a juvenile curfew ordinance that exempted minors who had graduated from high school was found to violate the EQUAL PROTECTION Clause of the FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT to the U.S. Constitution (In re Mosier , 59 Ohio Misc. 83, 394 N.E.2d 368, 13 O.O.3d 290 [Ohio Com. Pl. 1978]). In some instances, courts will find particular language in a juvenile curfew law to be impermissibly vague under the “void for vagueness” doctrine (a FIFTH AMENDMENT doc- trine that requires all laws to be sufficiently clear that persons of average intelligence will under- stand in advance which conduct is prohibited). If possible, courts will simply delete offending language from the law so that what remains passes constitutional muster. For example, one curfew law allowed the city’s mayor to issue permits for minors to use public streets during prohibited ti mes if the mayor found that such use was “ consistent with the public interest.” A California state court held that that language failed to provide any standards by which the mayor could lawfully exercise the discretion to grant permits. The court deleted the language but said the mayor could still grant permits when to do so would be consistent with the purposes of ordinance as expressly set forth therein (Bykof sky v. Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242 [M.D. Pa. 1975]). Curfew as a Condition of Probation State laws typically allow courts to impose curfews on criminal defend ants as a condition of pre-trial release, and on probationers as a condition for successful discharge from PROBA- TION . Defendants and probationers who are subject to curfews can be ordered to pay the cost of monitoring their compliance with the terms of the order. Curfew violations can result in the revocation of probation or termination of the pre-trial release bond. However, curfew orders themselves must be reasonable, and courts must be careful to explain the rationale underlying them. Orders imposing curfews that are harsh or excessive, for example, have been invalidated (People v. Braun, 177 A.D. 2d 981, 578 N.Y.S.2d [1991]). Similarly, orders that cite no justification for a curfew have also been overturned (People v Sztuk, 126 A.D. 2d 950, 511 N.Y.S.2d 720 [1987]). Adult Curfews & Strict Scrutiny Curfews directed at adults touch upon funda- mental constitutional rights and thus are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The U. S. Supreme Court has ruled that “[t]he right to walk the streets, or to meet publicly with one’s friends for a noble purpose or for no purpose at all—and to do so whenever one pleases—is an integral component of life in a free and ordered society” (Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 US 156, 164, 31 L. Ed. 2d 110, 92 S. Ct 839 [1972]). To satisfy strict-scrutiny analysis, a government-imposed curfew on adults must be supported by a compelling STATE INTEREST that is narrowly tailored to serve the curfew’s objective. Courts are loath to find that an interest advanced by the government is compel- ling. The more justifications that courts find to uphold a curfew on adults, the more watered- down becomes the fundamental right to travel and to associate with others in public places at all times of the day. The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that this right may be legitimately curtailed when a community has been ravaged by flood, fire, or disease, or when its safety and welfare are otherwise threatened (Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 85 S. Ct. 1271, 14 L. Ed. 2d 179 [1965]). The California Court of Appeals cited this ruling in a case that reviewed an order issued by the city of Long Beach, California, which declared a state of emergency and imposed curfews on all adults (and minors) within the city’s confines after widespread civil disorder broke out following the RODNEY G. KING beating trial, in which four white Los Angeles police officers were acquitted of using excessive force in subduing an African- American motorist following a high-speed traffic chase (In re Juan C., 28 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919 [Cal. App. 1994]). “Rioting, looting and burning,” the Califor- nia court wrote, “pose a similar threat to the safety and welfare of a community, and provide a compelling reason to impose a curfew.”“The right to travel is a hollow promise when members of the community face the possibility GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 330 CURFEW of being beaten or shot by an unruly mob if they attempt to exercise this right,”the court contin- ued, and “[t]emporary restrictions on the right…are a reasonable means of reclaiming order from anarchy so that all might exercise their constitutional rights freely and safely.” CURIA [Latin, Court.] A judicial tribunal or court convened in the sovereign’s palace to dispense justice. A court that exercised jurisdiction over civil matters, as distinguished from religious matters, which were determined by ecclesiastical courts, a system of courts in England that were held by authority of the sovereign and had jurisdiction over matters concerning the religion and ritual of the established church. In England the tribunal of the king’s justice was the CURIA REGIS, so named because the king originally presided over its proceedings. CURIA REGIS [Latin, The King’s Court.] The Anglo-Saxon kings of England regularly summoned the b ishops and great men o f t he kingdom to a c ouncil (Witenagemot), which advised t he king an d o ccas ionally served as a court of justice. Building upon this fo undation, the Norman kings aft er the Conquest in 1066 developed more e ffect ive ways of cent ralizing royal government. By the end of the eleventh century the king was entrusting business to his CURIA,a body of officials appointed from the ranks of the highest noblemen, church le aders, and of ficers of the royal court. With the king, t he Curia Regis administered all of the king’sbusiness—financial, legislative, and judicial. From the Curi a Regis developed the COMMON-LAW COURTS, the Chancery, and e ven the Parliament. CURRENT ACCOUNT A detailed financial statement representing the debit and credit relationship between two parties that has not been finally settled or paid because of the continuous, ongoing dealings of the parties. CURTESY An estate to which a man is entitled by common- law right on the death of his wife, in all the lands that his wife owned at any time during their marriage, provided a child is born of the marriage who could inherit the land. COMMON LAW provided that upon marriage a husband acquired a right, sometimes called a FREEHOLD estate, to the use and profits of his wife’s lands. His estate jure uxoris (Latin for “in the right of the wife”) continued only during the marriage and terminated upon the death of either spouse or upon theirdivorce. At early common law in England, an absolute DIVORCE could be obtained only by an Act of Parliament. Consequently, for practical purposes, the husband acquired a right to the use and profit of the land during the joint lives of the parties. This estate was subject to sale or mortgage by the husband and could be reached to satisfy the claims of his creditors. The estate jure uxoris virtually disappeared with the enactment of Married Women’s Acts, which gave married women a right to manage their own separate estates. Pursuant to common law, upon the birth of a child capable of inheriting the land, a husband acquires a LIFE ESTATE, or property interest, the duration of which is limited to the life of the party holding it or to that of some other person, in the lands his wife owns. This estate is designated as curtesy initiate, which replaces the husband’s estate jure uxoris under early common law. The husband can sell or mortgage the land, and it can be reached to satisfy the claims of his creditors. Upon the death of the wife, it becomes curtesy consummate. In some states, due to the Married Women’s Acts, the birth of a child does not give the husband a vested interest in his wife’s property. Until the death of the wife, the husband has a right of curt esy, which is not a present right, but which might develop into a legally enforceable right if not barred, extinguished, or divested. This interest cannot be subjected to the claims of the husband’s creditors. The right of curtesy rests upon proof of a legally recognized marriage, as distinguished from a GOOD FAITH marriage or a DE FACTO marriage, one in which the parties live together as HUSBAND AND WIFE, but the union has no legal effect due to defects in form, such as an invalid license. A voidable marriage, one that is valid when entered into and that remains valid until either party obtains a lawful court order dissolving the marital relationship, suffices for purposes of curtesy if the marriage is not rendered null before the right to the estate arises. Curtesy has gradually lost much of its previous significance in the law. In some GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CURTESY 331 jurisdictions, curtesy attaches only to the REAL ESTATE that the wife owns at death, rather than to therealestateownedbythewifeduringthe marriage. In others, curtesy has been abolished and replaced by a statutory ELECTIVE SHARE in the wife’s estate. A few jurisdictions have enacted statutes that em body the basic principles of common-law curt esy but with some modification . Common law provides that an absolute divorce bars a claim of curtesy. A legal separation—sometimes called a divorce, or A MENSA ET THORO “from bed and board”—does not terminate the marital relationship. In the absence of an express statute, such a divorce will not bar curtesy. This is also true in regard to aninterlocutory decree of divorce, a temporary, interim order of the court. Statutes in some states provide that curtesy can be denied upon proof of certain types of misconduct, such as ADULTERY, voluntary sexual intercourse of a married person with a person other than one’s spouse. Several states have statutes preserving curtesy if a divorce or legal separation was obtained because of the fault of the wife. Statutes in many states provide that a murderer is not entitled to property rights in the estate of the victim. Some decisions apply these statutes to cases involving curtesy. In other states, these interests are barred upon the principle that a person must not be permitted to profit from his or her own wrong. In accor- dance with this theory, a CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST will be declared in favor of the heirs or devisees of the deceased wife who is murdered by her husband. CROSS REFERENCE Husband and Wife. CURTILAGE The area, usually enclosed, encompassing the grounds and buildings immediately surrounding a home that is used in the daily activities of domestic life. A garage, barn, smokehouse, chicken house, and garden are curtilage if their locations are reasonably near to the home. The determina- tion of what constitutes curtilage is important for purposes of the FOURTH AMENDMENT to the Constitution, which prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures of a person and of his or her home or property. Courts have construed the word home to include curtilage so that a person is protected against unlawful searches and seizures of his or her curtilage. v CURTIS, BENJAMIN ROBBINS BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS served as an associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court from 1851 to 1857. A native of Massachusetts, Curtis wrote a famous dissent in DRED SCOTT V. SANDFORD,60 U.S. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857), a case that upheld the legitimacy of SLAVERY and denied free African Americ ans U.S. citizenship. Curtis was born in Watertown, Massachu- setts, on November 4, 1809. He graduated from Harvard College in 1829 and Harvard Law School in 1832. Curtis established a law practice and became active in the WHIG PARTY. In 1851 he was elected to the Massachusetts House of Representatives and later that year was nomi- nated to the U.S. Supreme Court by President MILLARD FILLMORE. During his brief tenure on the U.S. Supreme Court, Curtis made a lasting impact with his dissent in Dred Scott and his majority opinion in Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 13 L. Ed. 996 (1851). Curtis was one of two dissenters Benjamin Robbins Curtis 1809–1874 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 18751875 18501850 18251825 ◆◆◆◆◆◆ ❖❖ 1829 Graduated from Harvard College; began attending Harvard Law School 1809 Born, Watertown, Mass. 1851 Elected to Mass. Legislature; nominated to U.S. Supreme Court by President Fillmore 1834 Joined law partnership with cousin Charles Curtis in Boston 1857 Wrote dissenting opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford; resigned from the Court 1854 Reports of Cases in the Circuit Courts of the United States published 1868 Served as lead defense counsel at President Andrew Johnson's impeachment trial 1861–65 U.S . Civil War 1874 Died, Newport, R.I. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 332 CURTILAGE in Dred Scott, which the majority opinion viewed as the final word on the legal merits of slavery and the issue of citizenship for African- Americans. Chief Justice Roger Taney’s majority opinion concluded that at the time of the ratification of the Constitution, there were no African-American citizens in the United States. Therefore, the Framers never contemplated that African-Americans could be U.S. citizens. Curtis refuted this conclusion, pointing out that there were African American citizens in both northern and southern states at the time of ratification. They were part of the “people of the United States” that the Constitution described. In addition, Curtis stated that “every free person born on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of that State by force of its Constitution or laws, is also a citizen of the United States.” The majority opinion also held that the Missouri Compromise was unconstitutional because Congress did not have the power to legislate policies on slavery in the federal territories. Curtis countered this finding by noting 14 instances where Congress had legislated on slavery prior to the Missouri Compromise. He concluded that this demon- strated that Congress had the power to regulate slavery in the territories. In Cooley v. Board of Wardens, Curtis enunciated an enduring principle concerning the COMMERCE CLAUSE of the Constitution. Prior to Cooley, the Supreme Court had failed to resolve the issue of state power to regulate interstate commerce. In his majority opinion, Curtis held that the Commerce Clause did not automatically bar all state regulation in this field. At issue in this case was the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania law requiring ships entering or leaving the port of Philadelphia to hire local harbor pilots. Although this was a regulation of interstate commerce, Curtis upheld the law. He reasoned that the term commerce covered many topics, some requiring national uniformity, others calling for diversity of local control. The distinction between local and national aspects of interstate commerce was a major contribution to constitutional interpretation. Cooley is regarded as one of the most significant Com- merce Clause cases of the nineteenth century. Curtis left the Supreme Court shortly after the Dred Scott decision. The decision so polarized the Court that Curtis did not feel comfortable serving with the other members. He returned to Boston and resumed his law practice. Curtis was pulled back into the national arena in 1868, w hen he served as defense counsel at the IMPEACHMENT trial of President ANDREW JOHNSON . He made a lasting contribution to the theory of impeachment by convincing the Senate that impeachment is a judicial trial, not a political proceeding. This meant that impeach- ment required evidence of misconduct rather than a finding of no-confidence in the president. As an author, Curtis gained prominence for his publications Reports of Cases in the Circuit Courts of the United States (1854), Digest of the Decisions of the Supreme Court (1856), and his posthumously published Memoirs (1879). Curtis died on September 15, 1874. FURTHER READINGS Curtis, Benjamin R., ed. 2002. A Memoir of Benjamin Robbins Curtis, LL.D.: With Some of His Professional and Miscellaneous Writing. Clark, N.J.: Lawbook Exchange. Maltz, Earl M. 1996. “The Unlikely Hero of Dred Scott: Benjamin Robbins Curtis and the Constitutional Law of Slavery.” Cardozo Law Review 17 (May). “Supreme Court History: The First Hundred Years, Biographies of the Robes.” 2007. The Supreme Court. New York: Educational Broadcasting Corporation. Available online at http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supreme- court/antebellum/robes_curtis.htm; website home page: http://www.pbs.org (accessed September 1, 2009). v CUSHING, CALEB CALEB CUSHING was a la wyer, politician, diplomat, and statesman who served as attorney general of the United States under President FRANKLIN PIERCE . Cushing was the nation’s first full-time Benjamin Robbins Curtis. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS. AT THE TIME OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, ALL FREE NATIVE -BORN INHABITANTS OF … [FIVE STATES], THOUGH DESCENDED FROM AFRICAN SLAVES , WERE NOT ONLY CITIZENS OF THOSE STATES, BUT … POSSESSED THE FRANCHISE OF ELECTORS … —BENJAMIN ROBBINS CURTIS GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CUSHING, CALEB 333 attorney general; he is credited with institution- alizing and expanding the office. Cushing was born January 17, 1800, in Salisbury, Massachusetts, descending from a family with roots in colonial Massachusetts. A gifted student, he tutored classmates in mathe- matics and philosophy, and he graduated from Harvard at the age of seventeen. He studied law in Boston and was admitted to the Massachu- setts bar in 1821. The same year, he moved to Newburyport, Massachusetts, and established his first practic e. Although he represented a number of clients and interests as a young lawyer, he spent most of his time in public service. Cushing also had a long-standing love of literature and devoted his free time to a variety of literary pursuits. His political career began in 1825 when he was elected, as a Republican candidate, to the lower house of the Massachusetts Legislature; in 1826, he was elected to the state senate. His formal writing career also began in 1826 with the publication of his first two books, History of the Town of New buryport and The Practical Principles of Political Economy. Encour- aged by interest in these texts and eager to develop his talent, Cushing resigned his state senate office and moved to Europe in 1829. He devoted the next two years to writing. His two- volume Historical and Political Review of the Late Revolution in France and his Reminiscences of Spain were published in 1833. Returning to the United States, Cushing ran for Congress in 1832. In his first effort, he was defeated—largely because of divisions within the REPUBLICAN PARTY.In1834hewaselectedasa Whig candidate from the Essex North District of Massachusetts. He served the district in Congress for four consecutive terms. He also continued to write. His Growth and Territorial Progress in the United States was published in 1839. In 1840 Cushing supported the successful candidacy of WILLIAM H. HARRISON for president. To aid the campaign, he authored a biographical booklet called The Life of William H. Harrison. When Vice President JOHN TYLER succeeded to the presidency after Harrison’sdeathin1841,Cush- ing was one of the few northern Whigs to support him. During the Tyler administration, a break in the WHIG PARTY occurred, and Cushing became allied with th e Democrats—making his third change of party affiliation in a decade. Cushing’s support of Tyler was rewarded in 1843 with a ▼▼ ▼▼ Caleb Cushing 1800–1879 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 18251825 ◆◆◆◆◆◆◆ ❖❖ 1800 Born, Salisbury, Mass. 1812–14 War of 1812 1825 Elected to Mass. Legislature 1826 Elected to Mass. Senate; published first two books 1834–42 Served in U.S. House of Representatives 1844 Negotiated the Treaty of Wanghia, the first U.S China trade treaty 1847 Led volunteer regiment in Mexican War 1853–57 Served as first full-time U.S. attorney general under President Pierce 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1873 Ties to Jefferson Davis resulted in withdrawal of nomination a s chief justice of the Supreme Court; The Treaty of Washington published 1860 Served as chair of Democratic National Convention 1874 Served as minister to Spain 1879 Died, Newburyport, Mass. Caleb Cushing. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 334 CUSHING, CALEB nomination as secretary of the treasury. But, suspicious of his party hopping, the Senate would not confirm him. Nevertheless, several months later, he was confirmed by the Senate as the new U.S. commissioner to China. During the early 1840s, U.S. traders had asked the U.S. government for help in easing the restrictive trade conditions in China. Congress responded by setting up a commission to negotiate a trade agreement with China’s representatives; Cushing was selected to head the commission. His work in China, known as the Cushing Mission, resulted in the first trade treaty between China and the United States— the Treaty of Wanghia (Wangxia, Wangsia, Wang-Hsia), signed in 1844. After completing his mission in China, Cushing returned to serve in the Massachusetts state legislature until the outbreak of the Mexican War. In 1847 he raised a volunteer regiment at his own expense and traveled to Mexico to participate in the conflict. He attained the rank of brigadier general. While still in Mexico, Cushing was drafted as a gubernatorial candidate by Massachusetts’s DEMOCRATIC PARTY. He lost the election, and subsequent bids for the governor’s seat in 1847 and 1848. He served a term in the Massachu- setts state legislature from 1850 to 1852, and was then appointed an associate justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Court. One year later, Cushing was named attorney general of the United States by President Pierce. Cushing had been a personal friend of the new president’s for more than twenty years, and he was one of the most influential members of the Pierce cabinet. According to biographer Claude M. Fuess, “Cushing had a part in nearly every matter of significance arising during the next four years in Washington.” When Cushing accepted the job of attorney general, it was a part-time position with a substantially smaller salary than those of other cabinet positions. Cushing’s appointment coin- cided with a move by Congress to increase the attorney general’s salary, and to enforce a residency requirement that had been routinely ignored by previous appointees. Cushing interpreted Congress’s actions as a mandate to relinquish his private practice and serve as attorney general full-t ime. His decision to abandon his practice was controversial. The old tradition of continuing a private practice while in office was though t by many to be essential in maintaining sharp legal skills and keeping abreast of current law. In defense of his action, Cushing wrote, Within the last few years … the condition of the country has undergone changes, occasion- ing a vast augmentation in the amount of administrative business … and it would not be possible now … for the Attorney General … to be frequently absent from the seat of government, attending to private professional pursuits, nor could he find much leisure to prepare and argue private causes even before the Supreme Court. With the barriers of low pay and part-time status removed, the attorney general became an equal member of the cabinet, and the office became more visible and more constant than in previous administrations. The changes had the cumulative effect of stabilizing and institution- alizing the office. As a full-time cabinet officer, Cushing had both the time and the personal inclination to be active in a broad range of government activities. He assumed responsibility for several functions previously overseen by the secretary of state, such as pardons, legal and judicial appoint- ments, and EXTRADITION cases. In keeping with his lifelong love of writing, Cushing wrote frequently about the office of attorney general and his duties and responsibili- ties. In an 1856 TREATISE on the office, Cushing described his role as the administrative head of the government’s legal business. He also took his opinion-writing function seriously. An opinion, he wrote, “is in practice final and conclusive,— not only as respects the action of public officers in administrative matters … but also in questions of private right, inasmuch as parties, having concerns with the government, possess in general no means of bringing a controverted matter before the courts of law.” Following his term as attorney general, Cushing continued to play a conspicuous role in both local and national politics until the end of his life. He returned to the Massachusetts state legislature from 1857 to 1859. In 1860 he served as chairman of the Democratic National Convention in Charleston, South Carolina, but he gave loyal support to Republican President ABRAHAM LINCOLN and the Union during the Civil War. THE SPIRIT OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE SENTIMENT OF NATIONALITY , THE FEELING OF EMOTION AND AMERICANISM, IS THE TRUE UNION, THE ONLY UNION WORTH HAVING , THE ONLY UNION POSSIBLE TO KEEP . —CALEB CUSHING GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CUSHING, CALEB 335 In 1866 he was named to a commission charged with revising and codifying the laws of Congress. In 1868 he served on a diplomatic mission to Bogota, Colombia. And in 1872 he was appointed counsel for the United States at the Geneva conference for the settlement of the Alabama claims, where arbitrators deter- mined the amount of the award in a dispute concerning the construction and release of confederate cruisers by Great Britain. In 1873 he was nominated by President ULYSSES S. GRANT as chief justice of the Supreme Court. With the memory of the Civil War still fresh, Cushing’s opponents questioned his cordial relations with Jefferson Davis (based upon his Democratic connections) and forced the withdrawal of his nomination. The Treaty of Washington, Cushing’s last work—and said to be his most important—was published in 1873. In 1874 he was nominated and confirmed as minister to Spain; he finished his term abroad in 1877. Cushing died at his Newburyport home on January 2, 1879, just two weeks short of his 79th birthday. FURTHER READINGS Baker, Nancy V. 1992. Conflicting Loyalties: Law and Politics in the Attorney General’s Office, 1789–1990. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas. Donahue, William J. 1982. The Caleb Cushing Mission. Modern Asian Studies, 16, no. 2. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press. Fuess, Claude Moore. 1965. The Life of Caleb Cushing. Reprint. Hamden, Conn.: Archon. Hodgson, Sister Michael Catherine. 1955. Caleb Cushing, Attorney General of the United States, 1853–1957. Washington, D.C.: Catholic Univ. of America. Welch, Richard E., Jr. 1957. “Caleb Cushing’s Chinese Mission and the Treaty of Wanghia: A Review.” Oregon Historical Quarterly 58 (December). v CUSHING, LUTHER STEARNS Luther Stearns Cushing achieved prominence as a legal educator, author, and jurist. He was born June 22, 1803, in Lunenberg, Massachusetts. Cushing graduated from Harvard University with a bachelor of laws degree in 1826 . From 1826 to 1832, Cushing was an editor for The American Jurist and Law Magazine. For the next twelve years, he served in the state government system as clerk of the Massachu- setts House of Representatives. Cushing entered the judicial phase of his career in 1844, presiding as judge of the Boston Court of COMMON PLEAS for a four-year period. In 1848 he became a reporter for the Massa- chusetts Supreme Court, performing these duties until 1853. In 1848 Cushing returned to his alma mater, Harvard University, and presented a series of lectures on ROMAN LAW at the Harvard Law School until 1851. As an author, Cushing is famous for several publications, including A Manual of Parliamen- tary Practice, also known as Cushing’s Manual, published in 1844, and Elements of the Law and Practice of the Legislative Assemblies in the United States, published in 1856. Cushing died June 22, 1856, in Boston, Massachusetts. v CUSHING, WILLIAM William Cushing was born March 1, 1732. He graduated from Harvard College in 1751, and received an honorary master of arts degree from Yale University in 1753 and an honorary doctor of laws degree from Harvard University in 1785. Luther Stearns Cushing 1803–1856 ▼▼ ▼▼ 18001800 18751875 18501850 18251825 ❖❖ 1803 Born, Lunenberg, Mass. 1826 Earned LL.B. from Harvard 1832–44 Served as clerk of the Mass. House of Representatives 1856 Elements of the Law and Practice of the Legislative Assemblies in the United States published; died, Boston, Mass. 1844–48 Served as judge in the Boston Court of Common Pleas 1848–53 Served as reporter of the Mass. Supreme Court 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1826–32 Worked as editor of The American Jurist and Law Magazine ◆ ALL LANGUAGE, NOT ADDRESSED TO THE HOUSE , IN A PARLIAMENTARY COURSE , MUST BE CONSIDERED NOISE AND DISTURBITIVE . —LUTHER CUSHING GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 336 CUSHING, LUTHER STEARNS After his ADMISSION TO THE BAR in 1755, Cushing began his judicial career in Lincoln County, Massachusetts (now a part of Maine), as judge for the PROBATE Court of that county during 1760 and 1761. In 1772 he served as a justice for the Massachusetts Superior Court, followed by a term as chief justice of that court from 1777 to 1789. In 1779 Cushing was a member of the first Massachusetts Constitutional Convention. In 1788 he acted as vice president at the Massa- chusetts Convention, a convention that endor- sed the U.S. Constitution. Cushing returned to the bench in 1789 as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court, rendering decisions until 1810. In addition to his legal and judicial career, Cushing was active in the establishment of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and was a fellow of that institution from 1780 to 1810. Cushing died September 13, 1810, in Scituate, Massachusetts. CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION Questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his or her freedom in any significant way, thus requiring that the person be advised of his or her applicable constitutional rights. In the landmark decision MIRANDA V. ARIZONA, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court set standards for law enforcement officers to follow when attempting to interrogate suspects whom they hold in custody. Suspects who are subject to custodial interrogation must be warned that they have the right to remain silent; that any statements that they make may be used as evidence against them; that they have the right to an attorney; and that if they cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for them prior to any questioning, if they so desire. Under Miranda, unless those warnings are given, no evidence obtained during the interrogation may be used against the accused. William Cushing. COLLECTION OF THE SU- PREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES WHERE [STATES’ RIGHTS HAVE] BEEN ABRIDGED , IT WAS THOUGHT NECESSARY FOR THE GREATER , INDISPENSABLE GOOD OF THE WHOLE . —WILLIAM CUSHING ▼▼ ▼▼ William Cushing 1732–1810 17251725 17751775 18001800 18251825 17501750 ◆◆◆◆◆ ❖❖ 1732 Born, Scituate, Mass. 1755 Admitted to the Massachusetts bar 1751 Graduated from Harvard College 1760–61 Served as judge for the Lincoln County Probate Court 1772–77 Served as associate justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court 1779 Attended the first Mass. Constitutional Convention 1780 Helped establish the American Academy of Arts and Sciences 1775–83 American Revolution 1777–89 Served as chief justice of the Massachusetts Superior Court 1788 Endorsed the U.S. Constitution as part of Mass. Convention 1789–1810 Served as associate justice of the U.S. Supreme Court 1810 Died, Scituate, Mass. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CUSTODIAL INTERROGATION 337 . order of the community by reducing the incidence of juvenile criminal activity (Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 8 43 [4th Cir. 1998]). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CURFEW. estate arises. Curtesy has gradually lost much of its previous significance in the law. In some GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CURTESY 33 1 jurisdictions, curtesy attaches only to. Died, Newport, R.I. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 33 2 CURTILAGE in Dred Scott, which the majority opinion viewed as the final word on the legal merits of slavery and the issue of citizenship