Gale Encyclopedia Of American Law 3Rd Edition Volume 2 P51 pptx

v COCHRAN, JOHNNIE L., JR. JOHNNIE L. COCHRAN Jr. built a reputation as a tough, uncompromising litigator by working on both sides of the courtroom. He has been the third-highest-ranking official of the Los Angeles County district attorney’s office, and he has fought numerous cases in private practice. The recurrent theme of his career is social justice: Cochran specializes in representing African American clients he believes have been treated unfairly by the law. His work on behalf of ordinary citizens in police-brutality cases achieved spectacular success in the 1980s and 1990s, ultimately leading to significant changes in Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) policy. High-profile cases for celebrity clients—including Michael Jackson and O. J. (Orenthal James) Simpson—have tended to overshadow his less glamorous accomplish- ments, for which he has won numerous citations, awards, and courtroom victories. His controversial stewardship of Simpson’s defense team in 1995 made him a household name. Growing up in Shreveport, Louisiana, where he was born on October 2, 1937, Cochran had strong role models in his parents. His mother, a homemaker, ran an Avon business. His father and namesake, Johnnie L. Cochran, Sr., sold policies for Golden State Mutual Life Insurance, a large, black-owned company. Cochran’s father moved the family to Los Angeles in 1943, where he was promoted to chief of Golden State’s training program. Cochran went on to attend the University of California, Los Angeles, and then Loyola University School of Law. His father remained a great influence and, even in the 1990s, lived in the mansion home of the younger Cochran and his wife. “I think Johnnie got a lot of his ideas about justice from seeing me as he grew up,” his father said. “… I tried to make my children sensitive to racism. But we also didn’t want them to get consumed by anger.” The anger—outrage that became the cornerstone of the young lawyer’s career—came later. Upon graduation from law school in 1962, Cochran wanted to further social justice. Joining the Los Angeles city attorney’s office allowed him to do so. As a deputy PROSECUTOR, he represented African-Americans who had been brutalized by Los Angeles police officers. Cases of mistreatment were rife and were getting worse; in 1965, long-simmering racial tensions erupted in widespread rioting in the Watts section of the city. Cochran left for private practice that year and soon had the pivotal case of his young career. He represented the family of Leonard Deadwyler, a young African-American who was shot dead by police officers while rushing his pregnant wife to the hospital. Although Cochran’s client lost, the case had lasting personal and professional importance for him. The televised trial made him immediately recognizable in Los Angeles. Moreover, his courtroom performance helped to establish him as a figure whom African- Americans trusted; he later said that the case taught him the importance of police-abuse issues to minority communities. Cochran had found his cause. He spent much of the next decade in private practice fighting cases involving excessive force or SEXUAL ABUSE by police officers. Most of his clients had little or no money, but, winning time and again, Thomas Reade Rootes Cobb 1823–1862 ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ 1823 Born, Jefferson County, Ga. 1833 Slavery abolished in the British Empire 1841 Graduated from University of Georgia 1842 Admitted to Georgia bar 1851 Published A Digest of the Statute Laws of the State of Georgia 1858 Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery published 1858–61 Participated in organization of Georgia criminal code 1860 South Carolina seceded from the Union 1861 Civil War began, supported secession, helped draft new Georgia state constitution 1862 Fatally wounded at Battle of Fredericksburg, Va 1865 Civil War ended; President Lincoln assassinated; Thirteenth Amendment ratified, abolishing slavery in U.S. ▼▼ ▼▼ 18251825 18751875 ◆ ◆ ◆ 18501850 GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 488 COCHRAN, JOHNNIE L., JR. Cochran could afford to take their cases. One loss in court, howev er, proved to be another turning point in his life. The case of Elmer (“Geronimo”) Pratt tested Cochran’s faith in the justice system, changed him politically, and troubled him for decades. Pratt was a member of the BLACK PANTHER PARTY for SELF-DEFENSE,a radical, African American political organization of the late 1960s. In 1968 the Santa Monica, California, police accused Pratt of shooting to death a white, female teacher in a tennis court ROBBERY. Pratt had an apparently strong alibi: He claimed to have been in Oakland at the time of the killing, attending a high-level Black Panther party meeting. The alibi was strengthened by the previous identification of a different suspect by the victim’s husband. Nevertheless, Pratt was convicted of MURDER in 1972. Pratt’s conviction shocked Cochran, who attributed it to institutional racism. “It taught me that you can work within the system and believe in it, but if the government wants to get you, they can go out and get you,” he told Time Magazine in 1995. “It also taught me that you never stop fighting.” Cochran continued to fight for Pratt’s release for nearly 25 years, although at least a dozen efforts failed to win parole for his client. Then in 1994 he uncovered new evidence that suggested that Pratt might have been framed by the FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) in its notorious Counterintelligence Pro- gram (COINTELPRO), which once was aimed at disrupting the Panthers and other radical groups. Cochran alleged that the FBI had wiretapped his telephone and used informants to weaken Pratt’s defense, and that it even had lied in court— all illegal efforts. The evidence convinced the Los Angeles district attorney’s office to review the case. Cochran’s ultimate success in winning review of Pratt’s case was partly due to the influence that he had accumulated more than 30 years in Los Angeles. “He deals effectively with everyone, from presidents to common people,” John Mack, president of the Los Angeles Urban League, told Time Magazine, “and he knows everyone in between.” If Cochran is well-connected, it is owing not only to his affability but also to the unique course that his career has taken. Following a decade of Johnnie L. Cochran Jr. 1937–2005 ▼▼ ▼▼ 1930 2000 1975 1950 ❖ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆ ◆❖ ◆ ◆ 2002 A Lawyer's Life published 1997 Joined legal team in Abner Louima lawsuit, settled for record $8.7 million 1996 Journey To Justice published 1994–95 Served as lead attorney on O.J. Simpson's defense team; Simpson acquitted 1989–90 Won acquittal for actor Todd Bridges on attempted murder 1993 Helped settle singer Michael Jackson's civil case 1981 Ron Settles jailed for speeding, found hanged in jail cell; led to $760,000 jury award for police abuse 1978–81 Served as asst. district attorney for L.A. County 1963–65 Served as deputy city attorney for city of Los Angeles 1962 Earned J.D. 1943 Family moved to California 1937 Born, Shreveport, La. 1939–45 World War II 1950–53 Korean War 1961–73 Vietnam War 1972 Elmer "Geronimo" Pratt sentenced to life for murder of a white schoolteacher 2005 Died, Los Angeles, Calif. Johnnie Cochran. CORBIS. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3 RD E DITION COCHRAN, JOHNNIE L., JR. 489 successful private practice, he briefly returned to public service as chief administrator of the Los Angeles County district attorney’s office in the late 1970s. He was third in command. Working beneath Cochran was Gil Garcetti, who later became DISTRICT ATTORNEY . Returning to private practice in 1981, Cochran soon took a case that epitomized his professional and moral concerns: It involved a dead African American and disavowals of responsibility by police officers. Ron Settles, a black football player from California State University, had been arrested and jailed for speeding; soon afterward, he was found hanged in his cell. The LAPD called his death a suicide, but Cochran convinced the family to have Settle’s body exhumed for a new autopsy— which revealed that Settles had died from being choked. At the time, choke holds were com- monly use d by Los Ange les police officers when making arrests. In a WRONGFUL DEATH suit, Cochran persuaded a jury that Settles had been choked to death by officers, winning an award for the family of $760,000. He later noted ironically that when he had begun practicing law, “you would be almost held in contempt of court if you said a police officer was lying.” The suit helped to bring about an important reform of LAPD policy: Shortly thereafter, the depart- ment banned the use of the choke hold. Prominent clients flocked to Cochran. He won a dismissal of RAPE charges brought against football great Jim Brown in 1985. He also secured an acquittal for actor Todd Bridges, star of the television comedy show Diff’rent Strokes. Bridges had been accused of attempted murder, attempted MANSLAUGHTER, and ASSAULT with a deadly weapon, but even the testimony of four eyewitnesses did not stop Cochran from winning the case in 1989. Cochran’s work for pop singer Michael Jackson achieved only mixed success. After Jackson was accused of sexual molestation of a 13-year-old boy in 1993, Cochran managed to keep the case from going to court. He arranged a controversial private settlement with the boy’s family, which report- edly totaled $10 million. Even when he represents white citizens, race is often an issue. After the epochal Los Angeles riots in 1992, Cochran represented Reginald Denny, a white truck driver whose near- fatal beating by black assailants was broadcast live on television. During the 1993 criminal trial of two suspects, Denny suddenly embraced the defen- dants’ mothers. The spontaneous display of compassion—and apparent lack of any resentment—stunned onlookers. Praising his client, Cochran observed, “I guess he’s a lot kinder than you and I.” Both defendants were acquitted in a controversial VERDICT, but Cochran subsequently pursued a separate civil suit against the city of Los Angeles based on a novel legal claim: The suit alleged that police officers violated Denny’s CIVIL RIGHTS by failing to come to his aid during the beating because they had chosen not to enter a predominantly black neighborhood. The preparation of O. J. Simpson’sdefense initially began without Cochran’s participation. Charged in the double murder of Nicole Brown Simpson and Ronald Lyle Goldman, Simpson brought in Cochran only after hiring Los Angeles defense attorney ROBERT SHAPIRO. As the new leader among several prominent attorneys, Cochran attacked the prosec ution for “a classic rush-to-judgment case.” Cochran’s work for Simpson divided critics. Legal analysts praised his eloquent OPENING STATEMENT and occasionally brilliant tactics that undermined the prosecutors’ lengthy and re- petitive case. But Cochran was criticized when the defense began presenting its own case, particularly for calling WITNESSES whose testi- mony backfired. Despite the opinions of critics, Cochran’s role in the Simpson trial was pivotal. Simpson’s acquittal was a resou nding victory for Cochran. Shortly after the bombing of a federal office building in Oklahoma City in 1995, several families of victims retained his services in anticipation of bringing their own lawsuits. Like MARCIA CLARK, his adversary in the Simpson trial, Cochran found fame and fortune on the lecture circuit. He gave speeches, moderated pane l discussions, and hosted on Court TV. In 1996, Cochran published his autobiography, Journey to Justice which recounted his life story and a number of the significant legal cases in which he was involved, including the O.J. Simpson trial. After the Simpson trial, Cochran focused his law practice on civil rights and PERSONAL INJURY cases. He represented clients as diverse as ROSA PARKS and Sean “P. Diddy” Combs. In 2002 I THINK RACE PLAYS A PART OF EVERYTHING IN AMERICA, LET ALONE THIS TRIAL . —JOHNNIE COCHRAN JR. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 490 COCHRAN, JOHNNIE L., JR. representatives of Rev . Al Sharpton’s National Action Network announced that it had retained Cochran to represent workers who had been laid off from the Enron Corporation. In 2005 Cochran died at the age of 67. He suffered from an inoperable brain tumor. FURTHER READINGS Cochran, Johnnie and David Fisher. 2002. A Lawyer’s Life. Darby, PA: Diane Publishing Co. “Johnnie Cochran to Represent Rosa Parks In Outkast Appeal.” MTV. Available online at www.mtv.com/ news/articles/1432968/20000809/outkast.jhtml; website homepage: www.mtv.com (accessed August 17, 2009). Sales, Robert J. “Johnnie Cochran to be MLK Speaker.” MIT. Available online at web.mit.edu/newsoffice/tt/ 2001/jan10/cochran.html; website homepage: www. web.mit.edu (accessed August 17, 2009). CROSS REFERENCES Bailey, Francis Lee; Clark, Marcia Rachel. v COCKBURN, SIR, ALEXANDER JAMES EDMUND Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn was an eminent British jurist. He was born December 24, 1802. He graduated in 1829 from Trinity Hall, Cambridge, England. In 1847 Cockburn began his career in Parliament as a liberal. He served in the British government as attorney general from 1851 to February 1852 ; he resumed these duties in December of 1852 and continued until 1856. In that same year, he presided as chief justic e of the Court of COMMON PLEAS . In 1859 he was appointed Lord Chief Justice of England. The nineteenth century British jurist is known for successfully defending Daniel M’ Naghten, who killed British Prime Minister Sir Robert Peel’s secretary (thought by M’ Nag hten to be the prim e minister himself). In the M’Naghten case of 1843, Cockburn established the customary tes t of insanity in Anglo-American criminal proceedings, which states the DEFENDANT is so mentally disturbed that he is unable to fully realize that what he did was actually wrong. Cockburn died November 21, 18 80, in London. CODE A systematic and comprehensive compilation of laws, rules, or regulations that are consolidated and classified according to subject matter. Many states have published official codes of all laws in force, including the COMMON LAW and statutes as judicially interpreted, that have been compiled by code commissions and enacted by legislatures. The U.S. CODE (U.S.C.) is the compilation of federal laws. CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS The NEW DEAL program of legislation enacted during the administration of President FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT established a large number of new federal agencies, which generated a shapeless and confusing mass of new regulations. There was no one place for a person affected by the regulations to examine them until 1935 when Congress created the FEDERAL REGISTER, a daily publication of the rules and federal documents produced by the EXECUTIVE BRANCH of the federal government and by the agencies. By 1937 this chronological compi lation of regulations was effective in informing the public of new regulations, but it did not help a researcher who wanted to locate a regulation promulgated earlier. A publication that organized the regulations by subject was needed. ▼▼ ▼▼ 18251825 Sir Alexander James Edmund Cockburn 1802–1880 18001800 18501850 18751875 19001900 ◆◆◆◆ ◆ ◆ ❖ ❖ 1802 Born, London, England 1829 Graduated from Trinity Hall, Cambridge 1837 Queen Victoria began her 64-year reign 1847 Began career in Parliament 1861–65 U.S. Civil War 1812–14 War of 1812 1851–56 Served as attorney general 1856 Presided as chief justice of the Court of Common Pleas 1859 Appointed Lord Chief Justice of England 1872 Served as British representative in arbitration of Alabama case at Geneva 1880 Died, London, England GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS 491 To meet this need, Congress created the CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS (C.F.R.) as a more permanent and better organized source of federal regulations. The original methods employed in compil- ing the code are still used. Documents are selected from the Federal Register and arranged in a scheme of fifty titles, some of which are the same as the titles used to organize federal statutes in the U.S. Code. Each title is divided into chapters, parts, and sections. A particular provision can be cited by reference, first to the title and then to the section where it is found. For example, standards promulgated by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration to promote safe workplac es are cited as 29 C.F.R. 1910. This means that they are found in Part 1910 of Title 29 in the Code of Federal Regulations. Title 29 contains regulations relat- ing to labor. The Code of Federal Regulations is kept up-to-date by a complete revision each year. New pamphlets are issued containing all the regulations in force at the time of publication. One-fourth of the pamphlets are revised at the end of each q uarter of the year. For example, revisions of Titles 1 to 16 are issued as of January 1. Each volume contains a list of sections that have been affected by changes since January 1, 1964. There is a separate list covering changes made between 1949 and 1964. Revised pamphlets, however, do not cover changes that were made and then discarded or modified again during the year. To facilitate research, one volume of the C.F.R. contains both a general index and a finding aid. A general index helps researchers find regulations by looking up the name of the agency issuing them or the subject covered by them. The finding aid helps a researcher convert information from one source of law to a parallel reference in the Code of Federal Regulations. It shows how to locate a regulation in the C.F.R. after discovering a reference to it in the U.S. Code. It is necessary to have the Code of Federal Regulations to use along with the daily issues of the Federal Register because the Federal Register announces changes in federal regulations by listing them according to the parts in the C.F.R. that are affected. CODE OF HAMMURABI The Code of Hammurabi was a comprehensive set of laws, considered by many scholars to be the oldest laws established; they were handed down four thousand years ago by King Ham- murabi of Babylon. Although the Code of Hammurabi was essentially humanitarian in its intent and orien- tation, it contained the “eye for an eye” theory of PUNISHMENT, which is a barbarian application of the concept of making the punishment fit the crime. The Code of Hammurabi recognized such modern concepts as that of CORPORATE PERSONALITY . CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT The Code of Judicial Conduct is a collection of rules governing the conduct of judges while they serve in their professional capacity. The Code of Judicial Conduct was formu- lated by the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (ABA) in 1972. The code itself does not have the force of law, but federal and state governments have adopted it and use violations of its rules as the basis for punitive action against judges. History of the Code The first rules governing the conduct of judges in the United States were the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which were written in 1924 by an ABA This stele shows King Hammurabi (c. 1780 B.C.) standing before Shamash, a Sumerian sun god associated with justice. The law code is set out in cuneiform writing below the figures. GIANNI DAGLI ORTI/CORBIS. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 492 CODE OF HAMMURABI committee chaired by WILLIAM HOWARD TAFT, then chief justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. Prior to the promulgation of these canons, no cohesive framework existed to inform judges of the ethical obligations of their position. Judges were subject to removal, but only through the cumbersome, politicized procedures of congres- sional IMPEACHMENT, address, or recall. A judge’s leadership as the commissioner of professional baseball helped provide the inspi- ration for the Canons of Judicial Ethics. In 1919, eight members of the Chicago White Sox conspired to lose the 1919 World Series in exchange for payments from bookmakers. To restore public faith in the professional baseball league, the owners of the teams, on November 12, 1920, asked prominent federal judge KENESAW MOUNTAIN LANDIS to be the game’s new commissioner. Landis accepted the position, which he subsequently filled while simulta- neously serving as a U.S. district court judge in the Northern District of Illinois. Landis helped restore professional baseball’s integrity, but his highly pu blicized role as the sport’s commis- sioner damaged the integrity of the JUDICIARY. The ABA considered his simultaneous service as a federal court judge a CONFLICT OF INTEREST, and it voted to CENSURE Landis in 1921 . Landis resigned from the bench on March 1, 1922. In 1924, in part as a response to the Landis affair, the ABA promulgated the Canons of Judicial Ethics to regulate the activity of judges. The Canons of Judicial Ethics were criti- cized as being too vague to provide guidance in resolving important questions. Eve n the pream- ble revealed the canons to be nothing more than an ABA wish list: The American Bar Association, mindful that the character and conduct of a Judge should never be objects of indifference, and that declared ethical standards tend to become habits of life, deems it desirable to set forth its views respecting those principles which should govern the personal practice of members of the Judiciary in the administra- tion of their office. The Association accord- ingly adopts the following Canons, the spirit of which it suggests as a proper guide and reminder for judges, and as indicating what the people have a right to expect from them. A majority of states adopted the canons or wrote their own based on the ABA version. Other states had their supreme courts write advisory opinions informed by the canons. Nevertheless, the canons were roundly criticized as ineffective and were replaced by the ABA in 1972 with the Code of Judicial Conduct. The Current Code The preface to the code stands in sharp contrast to the weak preamble of the canons. According to the preface, the Code of Judicial Conduct “states the standards that judges should observe. The canons and text establish mandatory standards unless otherwise indicated. It is hoped that all jurisdictions will adopt this Code and establish effective disciplinary procedures for its enforcement.” The code borrows much from the original canons. However, it is more specific and thus more enforceable. There had been 36 separate original canons, “a curious mixture of general- ized, hortatory admonitions and specific rules” (Sutton, 1972 Utah L. Rev. 355, 355-356). The code trimmed the number of canons to seven and supplied each canon with subsections and comments. In 1990 the code was amended by the ABA. Two canons were deleted, leaving in a total of five canons, and the wording of the remaining canons was changed to achieve gender NEUTRAL- ITY . Changes and additions were also made to the subtext and comments accompanying each remaining canon. Canon 1 A judge shall uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. Canon 1 addresses the need for impartiality in judicial proceedings and the importance of judicial independence. This canon is a catchall; it holds, in part, that judges should “participate in establishing, maintaining and enforcing high standards of conduct” and “personally observe those standards.” Canon 2 A judge shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of the judge’s activities. Canon 2 broadly prohibits conduct that would impair, or appear to impair, judicial impartiality. A judge must comply with the law and avoid favoritism and the appearance of favoritism. For example, a judge may not be a member in an organization that invidiously discriminates on the basis of race, sex, RELIGION, or national origin. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 493 Canon 3 A judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially and diligently. Canon 3 contains rules regarding conduct in the judge’s official capacity. The most compre- hensive, this canon addresses the judge’s duties in general, public comments, administrative responsibilities, disciplinary responsibilities, and disqualification. Canon 3 also contains a variet y of rules designed to eliminate bias and preju- dice. Canon 4 A judge shall so conduct the judge’s EXTRAJUDICIAL activities as to minimize the risk of conflict with judicial obligations. Canon 4 reaches far into the judge’s private life. Although the first comment acknowledges that a judge is not expected to live in isolation, comment 2 directs that a judge should refrain from, for example, jokes or remarks that may demean individuals “on the basis of their race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.” The canon prohibits a judge from appearing at a public hearing before, or consulting with, an executive or legislative body or official. An exception is made if the appearance concerns the law, the legal system, the administration of justice, or the judge or the judge’s interests. A judge is prohibited, through this canon, from accepting appointment to a government committee, commission, or position if the committee, commission, or position is concerned with issues other t han the improvement o f t he law, the legal system, or t he administration of justice. Exceptions to t his p rohibition are made for historical, educational, and cultural activities. This canon also prohibits judges from practicing law (except on the judge’s own behalf or to give uncompensated advice), accepting employment or service in organizations that would ordinarily come before the judge, and engaging in business dealings that would be perceived as an exploitation of the judge’s position. Financial interests, gifts, and the reporting of financial assets are also covered in Canon 4. Canon 5 A judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity. Canon 5 prohibits public political activity by a judge. A judge may not, for example, act as a leader or hold an office in a political organization, publicly endorse a political candidate, or make speeches on behalf of a political organization. Under this canon, a judicial candidate may not promise any judicial conduct except the faithful and impartial performance of official duties. A judicial candidate may not authorize or knowingly permit another person to act in violation of Canon 5, but a judicial candidate may establish a campaign committee to carry out advertising and fund-raising. Canon 5 also identifies which provisions of the code do not apply to retired, part-time, and te m porary judges. Each state has crafted its own interpretation of Canon 5 and the boundaries of political campaigns f or judgeships. Some states are more permissive than others in terms of what a candidate may say or whether a political party may endorse a candidate. In many states judicial elections have been nonpartisan and lackluster, as candidates cannot disclose their political or legal view without risk of being disciplined under the professional conduct rules for attorneys. Minnesota’s restrictions on political speech for judicial candidates tri ggered a lawsuit that led to a landmark Supreme Court decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 122 S. Ct. 2528, 153 L. Ed. 2d 694 (2002). Since 1974, judicial elections in Minnesota had been subject to a legal restriction providing that a “candidate for a judicial office, including an INCUMBENT judge,” shall not “announce his or her views on disputed legal or political issues” (Minn. Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 5[A] [3][d], [i], 2000). This prohibition, promulgated by the Minnesota Supreme Court, was known as the “announce clause.” Incumbent judges who violated the an- nounce clause were subject to discipline, including removal, censure, civil penalties, and suspension without pay (Minn. Rules of Board on Judicial Standards, 4[ a], [6],11[d], 2002). Lawyers who ran for judicial office also had to comply with the announce clause (Minn. Rule of Professional Conduct, 8.2[b], 2002). Lawyers who violated the announce clause were subject to disbarment, suspension, and PROBATION (Rule 8.4[a]; Minn. Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility, 8-14, 15[a], 2002). GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 494 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT In 1998, Gregory Wersal, a candidate for associate justice of the Minnesota Supreme Court, sought an ADVISORY OPINION from the Minnesota Lawyers Board, asking the board whether it planned to enforce the announce clause. The lawyers board responded equivocal- ly, stating that, although it had significant doubts about the constitutionality of the provi- sion, it was unable to answer his question because he had not submitted a list of the announcements he wished to make. Unsatisfied, Wersal filed suit in federal district court, seeking a declaration that the announce clause violated the FIRST AMENDMENT and an injunction against its enforcement. The U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota upheld the validity of the Judicial Canon, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed. Wersal appealed. In a 5–4 decision, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down Minnesota’s announce clause as a violation of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. In his majority opinion, Justice ANTONIN SCALIA said that the announce clause attempted to regulate speech based on content and that placed an unconstitutional burden on an important category of expression, which made it subject to strict judicial scrutiny. The canon was not “narrowly tailored” to achieve the goals of preserving the impartiality and the appearance of impartiality of the judiciary, Scalia wrote. Minnesota could permissibly ban a candidate from promising to deliver particular outcomes in cases the candidate might decide if elected, Scalia said, without banning the candidate from making any political statements whatsoever. Judicial impartiality in the sense of “having no views on the law,” Scalia empha- sized, was not a compelling interest because “a judge’s lack of predisposition regarding the relevant legal issue s in a case has never been thought a necessary compo nent of equal justice.” In a dissenting opinion, Justice RUTH BADER GINSBURG said the majority had failed to take into account basic distinctions between judicial elections and elections for executive and legisla- tive office. Judges are not “political actors,” she said. “They do not sit as representatives of particular persons, communities or parties; they serve no faction or constituency.” Justice Gins- burg said it was no comfort that the Court left undisturbed Minnesota’sbanagainstpromising particular outcomes. It would be easy, she said, for a candidate to make a promise while avoiding a particular verbal formula. Officials of the American Bar Association responded to the White decision by saying that the code would have to be redrafted to meet the Court’s First Amendment concerns. State su- preme courts would have to follow suit by modifying their rules as well. The Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in White did not put an end to the case. On REMAND, Wersal next challenged the “partisan activities” clause in Canon 5 (52 M.S.A., Code of Jud. Conduct, Canon 5, subd. A[1][a], [d ], B[1][a]). This section of Canon 5 prevented judicial candidates from identifying themselves as members of political organization, attending political gatherings, or accepting political endorsements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit ruled that the partisan- activities clause violated judicial candidates’ First Amendment freedom of association, which includes a person’s right to join political groups of his or her choosing. The court found that the partisan-activities clause was not a narrowly tailored means of addressing Minnesota’s com- pelling STATE INTEREST in protecting litigants from biased judges, inasmuch as it restricted association with political parties only during judicial campaigns and not during non-election years. Nor did the clause restrict association with interest groups. Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 416 F.3d 738 (8th Cir. 2005). Enforcement of the Code Forty-seven states and the District of Columbia have adopted the code in whole or in part. Montana, Rhode Island, and Wisconsin have not adopted it, but each has fashioned its own set of regulations based largely on the code. The JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES adopted the Code of Judicial Conduct in 1973, thus subjecting federal judges to its rules. In 1980, Congress enac ted the Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act (28 U.S.C.A. §§ 331, 332, 372, 604 [1982]). This act authorized each of the 13 federal circuits to esta blish a judicial council to review complaints against federal judges. The judicial council, comprising judges, was also authorized to order sanctions for violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 495 When the judicial council of a federal circuit receives a complaint of judicial misconduct, the chief judge of the CIRCUIT COURT of appeals conducts an initial review of the complaint. The chief judge may dismiss the complaint as baseless. If the chief judge finds that the complaint has merit, she or he assembles a special committee, which makes findings and refersthecomplainttotheentirejudicialcouncil. If the council finds that the judge in question has violated the Code of Judicial Conduct, it may suspend the judge from office, or it may publicly or privately reprimand the judge. The aggrieved judge may appeal the judicial council’s order to a review committee known as the U.S. Judicial Conference Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders. The decision of this committee is final and may not be appealed. Every state maintains a similar process to govern its state court judges. A federal circuit judicial council may not remove a judge on its own. If removal is considered by the judicial council, the matter is referred to the Judicial Conference of the U.S. Courts. If the Judicial Conference finds cause for removal, it refers the matter to the U.S. House of Represe ntatives, which holds hearings on the proposed removal. Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Con- duct is considered a matter of public concern. In In re Complaints of Judicial Misconduct, 9 F.3d 1562 (U.S. Jud. Conf. 1993), the U.S. Judicial Confere nce Committee to Review Circuit Council Conduct and Disability Orders held that a proceeding on a complaint of judicial misconduct or disability need not satisfy the standing requirements necessary in most judicial proceedings. (Standing is the doctrine that the person seeking relief of the court must be the person aggrieved by the alleged conduct.) Essentially, the committee’s holding meant that any person may lodge a complaint of judicial misconduct against a judge, with the appropri- ate JUDICIAL REVIEW council. FURTHER READINGS Baker, Thomas E. 1989. The Good Judge: Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task Force on Federal Judicial Responsibility. New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, Priority Press. Baran, Jan Witold. 2002. “Judicial Candidate Speech after Republican Party of Minnesota v. White.” Court Review (spring). Martineau, Robert J. 1972. “Enforcement of the Code of Judicial Conduct.” Utah Law Review 1972. Morgan, Thomas D., and Ronald D. Rotunda. 1993. 1993 Selected Standards on Professional Responsibility. West- bury, NY: Foundation Press. Shaman, Jeffrey M., Steven Lubet, and James J. Alfini. 1994. Judicial Conduct and Ethics. 1994 cum. supp. Charlot- tesville, Va.: Michie. ———. 1990. Judicial Conduct and Ethics. Charlottesville, VA: Michie. CROSS REFERENCES Ethics, Legal; First Amendment; Freedom of Association and Assembly; Freedom of Speech. CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE See MILITARY LAW. CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY See PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. CODE PLEADING A statutory scheme that abolished the ancient common-law forms of action and replaced the overly technical system of common-law pleading with simplified provisions for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit and a defendant to answer the claims alleged against him or her. As the COMMON LAW developed in England after the Norman Conquest in 1066, a PLAINTIFF could start a lawsuit only by obtaining a WRIT from the king or the king’s chancellor. In time these writs took on fixed forms and a plaintiff could obtain one only if the words of the claim fit one of the established FORMS OF A C TIO N . There was no room for variation in the words of the p laintiff’s complaint or the defendant’s response. By the fourteenth century the forms of action had become quite rigid and they took on the same overly technical characteristics under the common law in the United States. Frequently a worthy claim was tossed out of court because of some miscalculation or misstatement in the pleadings and justice was ill-served. In 1848 New York enacted a new code to govern PLEADING in the courts of that state. It was called the Field Code after DAVID DUDLEY FIELD, the man who devised it. A number of other states followed the lead of New York. This pattern of pleading a CAUSE OF ACTION or a response came to be called CODE PLEADING. COMMON-LAW PLEADING had required reduc- ing every case to one claim and one response. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 496 CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE Since grievances did not always fit into common-law forms, code pleading abandoned it. All the old forms of action were abolished and the extreme formality of common-law pleading was abandoned. Under code pleading the plaintiff has only to make a statement of facts that, if true, justify legal relief. The only requirement is that those facts fit the general pattern of some established LEGAL RIGHT and that they state a claim on which relief can be granted. Furthermore, the plaintiff can present alternative or even inconsistent sets of facts and leave it to the trier of fact to establish which are correct. This is allowed when the plaintiff does not know all the facts affecting the claim, so long as the pleading is made honestly and in GOOD FAITH . More than one cause of action can be alleged but they must be stated as separate counts. For example, some states allow a simplified form of pleading of a breach of contract. The plaintiff may simply state that money is owed but has not been paid or services have been rendered but payment has not been made. Code pleading solved many of the problems associated with common-law pleading but it also spawned a new controversy. The require- ment that a plaintiff set out a claim by reciting facts justifying relief left open the question of what facts might be included. It has often been said that a plaintiff need plead ULTIMATE FACTS, not legal conclusions. Case after case has been fought on this point. The distinction primarily concerns how much detail must be given. A plaintiff must be able to show that he or she has a legal right, the DEFENDANT breached or violated that right, and the plaintiff thereby suffered some harm. CODICIL A document that is executed by a person who had previously made his or her will, to modify, delete, qualify, or revoke provisions contained in it. A codicil effectuates a change in an existing will without requiring that the will be reexe- cuted. The maker of the codicil identifies the will that is to be changed by the date of its execution. The codicil should state that the will is affirmed except for the changes contained therein. The same formalities that are necessary for the valid execution of a will must be observed when a codicil is executed. Failure to do so renders the codicil VOID. CODIFICATION The collection and systematic arrangement, usually by subject, of the laws of a state or country, or the statutory provisions, rules, and regulations that govern a specific area or subject of law or practice. The term codification denotes the creation of codes, which are compilations of written statutes, rules, and regulations that inform the public of acceptable and unacceptable behavior. U.S. law is often described as a COMMON LAW system of JURISPRUDENCE. This means that it relies on previous cases, or precedents, to determine procedures and to decide the outcome of cases. U.S. jurisprudence also involves the interpreta- tion of written laws, including constitutions, regulations, ordinances. Codification rearranges and displaces prior statutes and case decisions. Codification of an area of law generally constitutes the whole source that is relied upon for a legal question in that area. Thus, when a state codifies its criminal laws, the statut es contained within the new code SUPERSEDE the laws that had been in place prior to the codification. The re are exceptions to this general rule, however. For example, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled in 1994 that Dr. JACK KEVORKIAN could be prosecut- ed under Michigan common law for assisting patient with SUICIDE, despite the absence in Michigan’s criminal code of a statut e that prohibits such action law (People v. Kevorkian, 447 Mich. 436, 527 N.W.2d 714). Public demand for written laws can be traced to the dawn of recorded history. The first known codification of laws is attributed to Ur-Nammu, king of Ur, in the twenty-fifth century B.C. Lipit-Ishtar, king of Isin, in ancient Sumer, promulgated a written code around 2210 b.c. Hammurabi, a monarch in Babylonia, codified laws in the eighteenth century b.c. Both Lipit-Ishtar and Hammurabi announced in the prologues of their respective codes that these compilations established justice. Ancient Greek and Roman civilizations continued the practice of codification. However, their written codes were not always helpful. The Roman emperor Caligula wrote his laws in small characters and hung them high on pillars in order to ensnare the public. Julius Caesar attempted codification, but he was unable to reduce the enormous body of ROMAN LAW to its essentials. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CODIFICATION 497 . Rules of Board on Judicial Standards, 4[ a], [6],11[d], 20 02) . Lawyers who ran for judicial office also had to comply with the announce clause (Minn. Rule of Professional Conduct, 8 .2[ b], 20 02) . Lawyers who. and PROBATION (Rule 8.4[a]; Minn. Rules on Lawyers Professional Responsibility, 8-14, 15[a], 20 02) . GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION 494 CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT In 1998, Gregory Wersal,. violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct. GALE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW, 3RD E DITION CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT 495 When the judicial council of a federal circuit receives a complaint of judicial