This is in fact the proper field of stylistics. It comes as no surprise, then, that CDA and its underlying framework of functionalism have mainly researched this vari- ation-bound ideology. Prominent objects of analysis are grammatical means that lend themselves to hiding agency, in particular passivization and nominalization (see, e.g., Simpson 1993: chapter 4), and that may thus encode specific ideological perspectives. From a cognitive linguistic point of view, we can go much further and claim that ideology may enter at any level of grammatical conceptualization, even the most abstract ones. We already saw an example in Botha’s discussion of ideo- logical deixis at the beginning of section 3. The present section focuses on two additional instances, one from the area of tense (Grundy and Jiang 2001) and one from the area of declension (Nesset 2001). Grundy and Jiang’s (2001) analysis ex- emplifies the link between grammatical constructions and underlying ideological models against a sociocultural background, thus establishing the bond with the notion of Cultural Models (see Dirven, Wolf, and Polzenhagen, this volume, chap- ter 46), and Nesset’s (2001) study makes a cognitive linguistic contribution to a feminist critique of sexism in language. Grundy and Jiang (2001) analyze some specific features in Hong Kong English, in particular the nonconventional use of the bare past. Against the background of mental space theory (Fauconnier 1997), Grundy and Jiang discuss the represen- tation of ‘‘anomalous’’ sentences which are found especially in public address mes- sages in Hong Kong, such as (3), with a past perfect instead of the expected present perfect form: (3) Last bus had departed. In the present perfect form (The) last bus has departed, the present of the reader would be set as the reference time from which the event (the departure of the bus) is viewed. The past perfect form in (3), by contrast, prompts the reader to locate the event relative to a past viewpoint space. Yet this past viewpoint space remains completely unspecified; no material is provided or inferable for its interpretation, and it is impossible for the reader to recover the reference time. Note that ‘‘non- anomalous’’ uses of the past perfect, such as (4) (4) When we arrived, the last bus had (already) departed. contain linguistic material (here, when we arrived) which makes the past reference time recoverable for the reader and provides the contents of the viewpoint space, thus establishing the Ground in relation to which the Figure (here, the departure of the bus) is in focus. Grundy and Jiang (2001: 122) observe that (3) presents the departure of the bus and the posting of the message as distinct events. It ‘‘hides’’ the person from whom the message originates, and it enables this person to reject an involvement in the inconvenient event which he or she reports and to decline responsibility for it. Grundy and Jiang argue that this ‘‘hiding oneself’’ strategy is an expression of a ‘‘how-can-I-act-in-order-to-ensure-that-no-blame-attaches-to- me’’ mentality, which is an inherent part of Hong Kong ideology. 1230 rene ´ dirven, frank polzenhagen, and hans-georg wolf In a wider context, virtually all the debates in the Hong Kong government center around deciding who is to take the blame and who is not for the situations that arise. A recent example is the debate on their handling of the SARS outbreak. The outcome of the work by a commission set up to investigate the government’s crisis management was captured by a headline-like advertisement at a newspaper stand saying ‘‘Faults found, but no one to blame’’ (personal observation). As Grundy and Jiang (2001) argue, the deeper cause of this ‘‘no-blame-attaches-to- me’’ ideology is in all likelihood the typical historical and political situation of the British Crown Colony and its present relation to the People’s Republic of China. Although Hong Kong citizens enjoy economic opportunities and domestic free- doms, they are constantly reminded that they are not responsible for the political structure they are part of and the decisions it makes for them. In such a climate of alienation, individuals protect themselves from the consequences of decision mak- ing in a context where it is not for them to be decision makers. An even more abstract grammatical area is the system of declensions. Nesset (2001), working on Russian, investigated the class II or a-declension class for nouns, which includes short forms of given proper names, nonfeminine common nouns, and nouns denoting female persons. Short forms of given names instantiate a familiarity schema, for ‘‘persons who stand out from the multitude by virtue of their intimate relationship to the speaker’’ (Nesset 2001: 214). An example would be Dima (< Dimitrij). Nonfeminine common nouns in the a-declension class have an underlying marginality schema, which involves an evaluation scale (while eval- uation is absent in the masculine Ø-declension class); that is, this declension class includes persons ‘‘who stand out from the multitude by being placed at an end point of a scale’’ (Nesset 2001: 214). Examples from the extreme ends of the scale would be voevoda ‘commander of army in medieval Russia’ and sluga ‘servant’. The two subcategories share the semantic component ‘persons who stand out from the multitude’, which constitutes a general nonprototypicality schema, in- stantiated by the two more specific schemas. The third subcategory, nouns de- noting female persons, is related to the other two in conclusive ways. Nesset argues that in the grammatical system of Russian, men are conceptualized as the multitude or the unmarked case, while reference to women needs additional specification of the sex (also see Howard 2001). He points out that multitude should not be un- derstood numerically, but rather in a representational sense of what is normal or unmarked in a society. Thus, it becomes evident that the three subcategories constitute a well-defined category, as all three instantiate the general nonproto- typicality schema (Nesset 2001: 217–18). Furthermore, Nesset suggests that the subcategories in the a-declension class interrelate in even closer ways. First, he con- nects the subcategory of female persons to that of nonfeminine common nouns with its evaluational and polar scale. To that purpose, Nesset draws on Simone de Beauvoir’s idea of the category woman being associated with ‘‘extreme’’ qualities, which he condenses in terms of metaphors—or, perhaps better, metonymies, since these qualities are associated in the underlying cultural model as attributes to the ideology and critical discourse analysis 1231 category—that relate sin and vice and virtue to woman. Second, Nesset holds that there exists a relationship between the subcategory for female persons and that for short forms of given names (which, as will be recalled, instantiates a famil- iarity schema), thus making the internal coherence of the a-declension class come full-circle. Applying Lakoff’s (1987: 93) ‘‘domain-of-experience-principle,’’ which states that ‘‘if there is a basic domain of experience associated with A, then it is natural for entities in that domain to be in the same category as A,’’ Nesset finds that both subcategories pertain to the ‘‘private sphere.’’ The private domain of expe- rience is that of home and of relationships to family and friends, whereas the public domain is that of broader social structures. Therefore, Nesset argues, the belief that ‘‘woman’s place is in the home’’ is implied in and perpetuated through grammatical categorization, which always applies to any occurrence of the given category. Thus, there is no stopping the sexist bias laid down in the Russian declension system. Nesset (2001: 224) concludes ‘‘that sexist ideologies may be so deeply entrenched in the grammar of a particular language as to pervade inflectional classes—an area which is traditionally viewed as devoid of semantic structure.’’ Nesset’s analysis demonstrates the descriptive and explanatory power of Cognitive Linguistics in explorations into ideologies hidden in grammatical categories. 5. Ideology at the Level of Scientific Discourse Ideology abounds not only in the most abstract area of language, which is grammar, but also in the most abstract type of discourse, which is scientific discourse, here especially by means of conceptual metaphor. The role of metaphor in scientific writing and thinking has, of course, long been noticed, and it has been assessed in different ways. One position has it that metaphor is redundant in scientific writing: at best it is seen as illustrative, at worst as deceptive, and therefore to be avoided. Evidently, this position correlates with the view that what may be conveyed met- aphorically can also be expressed literally. Conversely, there is the position that metaphors have a constitutive role in scientific theories. Evidently, this position correlates with the view that human conceptualization is largely metaphorical. Ja ¨ kel (1997: chapter 8), for instance, provides a cognitive linguistic analysis of what he calls the ‘‘science scenarios,’’ that is, different models of scientific theory, of leading Western philosophers and identifies their respective dominant conceptual meta- phors. Most importantly, he observes that the critique of a competing scientific theory is often directed against the criticized theory’s metaphorical model. Para- digmatic changes in science generally go along with a rejection of old metaphors and the introduction of new ones. Finally, midway between the positions of met- 1232 rene ´ dirven, frank polzenhagen, and hans-georg wolf aphor as either redundant or constitutive is the view that it is a useful and valuable heuristic tool, with a limited scope. Significantly, various sciences use each other’s fields as source domains in the metaphorical conceptualization of their own domains as target domains. One ex- ample is provided by the collective volume by Naumann, Plank, and Hofbauer (1992) on the osmosis between linguistics and geology in the nineteenth and twen- tieth centuries. Another example is Maasen, Mendelsohn, and Weingart’s (1995) collective volume—with the telling title Biology as Society, Society as Biology—which discusses the case of biology and the social sciences using each other’s scientific field as a metaphor for their own field of research. The most prominent example of a mapping from biology to the social sciences is certainly Darwinism, in all its various elaborations (see, e.g., Weingart 1995 for a discussion). In turn, biologists were in- spired by models in the social sciences (see Bowler 1995 on social Darwinism). In the following, we outline a particular instance of biology and linguistics making recourse to each other’s domains: the life is language metaphor in bi- ology and its converse language is an organism in linguistics. The former is paradigmatic in the recent biosemiotic approach in biology, which develops a full- fledged semiotic view of biology (see Sebeok, Hoffmeyer, and Emmeche 1999, for a comprehensive overview). Two advocates of this approach, Emmeche and Hoff- meyer (1991), discuss salient linguistic metaphors in biology and outline more spe- cifically the history and application of the life is language conceptualization in its different forms. An early manifestation thereof is the theologically motivated nature as the great book metaphor, which has a history as old as theology itself and had its climax in the late Middle Ages: in nature, one can read the eternal power and divinity of the Almighty. Modern manifestations range from life as a memory system and life as learning to organisms as information processing sys- tems, which are traced by Emmeche and Hoffmeyer in different theories of evo- lutionary and molecular biology. Specifically, they provide a detailed critical dis- cussion of proposed analogies between living beings and the Saussurian model of language. Here, similarities are assumed between, among other things, langue and genotype, parole and phenotype, new words and new mutations, linguistic commu- nication and genetic communication, signifiant and DNA triplets, and morpheme and gene. Emmeche and Hoffmeyer (1991) show the advantages and limits of this particular mapping. If, for instance, the gene is seen in analogy to a morpheme as the smallest meaning-bearing unit, this fails to account for the substantial and not abstract nature of a gene and misses the fact that a gene is only truly meaningful through and in the process of its biochemical interpretation. Without the appro- priate interpretation device, it is no more than a DNA sequence. In their own biosemiotic approach, Emmeche and Hoffmeyer thus advocate a Peircean rather than a Saussurean perspective on language, which includes the indispensable in- terpretant. The gene is seen, correspondingly, as a triadic sign (see figure 47.2). Emmeche and Hoffmeyer’s arguments show that, when applied uncritically, the transfer of entire models developed elsewhere faces the inherent risk of yielding one-sided or even inappropriate perspectives on the envisaged target field. This ideology and critical discourse analysis 1233 may become even more crucial when scientific discourse is used and referred to in the presence of a nonspecialist public. A relevant study is that by Nerlich and Dingwall (2003), who examine the rhetoric during the announcement of the de- ciphering of the human genome in June 2000. They provide a critical analysis of the metaphors employed by leading politicians (Clinton and Blair), by scientists, and by the media. The most pervasive metaphor drawn upon was dna is a code, which is highly conventional in genetics. Like Emmeche and Hoffmeyer (1991), Nerlich and Dingwall point to the limits of this conceptualization. It suggests, among other things, a genetic determinism which is clearly untenable, as a living being cannot be reduced to its genome—indeed, genetic processes involve a multitude of other components in that they are highly context-sensitive. Nerlich and Dingwall (2003: 403) note that the code metaphor itself reflects a reductionist and outdated model of human communication and that the genetic discourse has retained linguistic analogies which stem from the 1960s. The code metaphor, specifically, evokes the ideology of control: that ‘‘faulty’’ genes may simply be eliminated and that the ge- netic code can be easily ‘‘reprogrammed.’’ In addition to the related ethical prob- lems, this image conveys a false picture of genetic processes and is thus potentially misleading for nonspecialists. Nerlich and Dingwall argue that modern cognitive and contextual models of language may yield far more appropriate analogies. The life is language metaphor in biology has a well-known counterpart in linguistics, language is an organism, with a long tradition in linguistic discourse. Its impact is, first of all, evident in the present established linguistic terminology: tone groups have heads, bodies, and tails, morphology speaks of stems and roots, phrase structures are trees, creole languages have a life cycle, sociolinguists con- ventionally speak of language death and language revival, to give just a few examples. As a full-fledged model of language, however, language is an organism evolved in the nineteenth-century romantic tradition, alongside the newly developed evo- lution theory (see e.g., Kucharczik 1998). As Haugen (1972: 326) rightly observes, the biological model was rejected in mainstream twentieth-century linguistic the- ory and replaced by differentmetaphors, in particular language is an instrument (with the rise of Prague School functionalism) and language is a structure Figure 47.2. The sign relation of the gene 1234 rene ´ dirven, frank polzenhagen, and hans-georg wolf (with Bloomfieldian structuralism). The biological model and its metaphors were, however, maintained, to various degrees, in linguistic theories which have affinities to the romantic Humboldtian tradition. Whorf (1956: 84), for example, draws on it in the following passage: The relatively few languages of the cultures which have attained to modern civ- ilization promise to overspread the globe and cause the extinction of the hun- dreds of diverse exotic linguistic species, but it is idle to pretend that they represent any superiority of type. And within a very recent trend in linguistics—ecolinguistics—the organism met- aphor is again paradigmatic and merges with a full readaptation of the biological model (e.g., Mu ¨ hlha ¨ usler 1996). Again, it is important to notice that the perspective inherent in scientific mod- els may have significant ideological implications, beyond the immediate scientific discourse. Geeraerts (2003) analyzes this dimension with respect to views of lin- guistic standardization, a highly controversial political issue. He distinguishes two ‘‘cultural models’’ under which the different views on standardization may be sub- sumed: the Rationalist Model, grounded on Enlightenment thinking, and the Ro- mantic Model, rooted in the eighteenth- and nineteenth- century romantic tradi- tion. The linguistic-philosophical basis of the Rationalist Model favors a view of language as an instrument and sees standard and global languages, against this background, as neutral media of social participation and emancipation. This model clearly dominates past and contemporary language policy. The Romantic Model, by contrast, sees language primarily as a medium of expressing one’s identity (see Kristiansen 2003 for a cognitive linguistic approach to this issue). Geeraerts (2003: 38–39) rightly places contemporary critical approaches such as the ‘‘linguistic human rights’’ movement (e.g., Skutnabb-Kangas 2000; Maffi 2001) in the broader Romantic Model. In this specific instantiation of the model, standard and global languages are regarded as media of social exclusion and a threat to local identities (see Geeraerts 2003: 40, 55), on the basis of the language-as-identity view, and often against the background of the biological model of language. From a critical per- spective, both the scientific basis and the political impact of a model need to be scrutinized, or as Geeraerts (2003: 27) concludes: cultural models in thesocial sphere, including science, ‘‘may be ideologies in two different respects: either when their idealized character is forgotten (when the difference between the abstract model and the actual circumstances is neglected), or when they are used in a prescrip- tive and normative rather than a descriptive way (when they are used as models of how things should be rather than of how things are).’’ And evidently, such criticism, in turn, depends on one’s own scientific and ideological position (see Silverstein 1979: 193). ideology and critical discourse analysis 1235 6. Conclusion The overall aim of this chapter has been to illustrate that the theoretical appara- tus developed in Cognitive Linguistics may elegantly account for the expression of ideology in language, by relating the ideological dimension of linguistic phenom- ena to general conceptual principles. It is a particular strength of the cognitive linguistic approach that it makes it possible to describe these phenomena, diverse as they may appear, against a common theoretical background. As the above sections have shown, this approach explicitly analyzes linguistic expressions against the background of their underlying sociocultural, group-specific models. Here, lin- guistic patterns are taken as a strong but not sufficient indicator of ideological patterns; that is, they need to be related to a wider social context. When pursued systematically, this commitment to an integrative analysis should make the critical approach relatively robust against possible overinterpretations or even misinter- pretations of linguistic data (see, however, the criticism in Hutton 2001). The critical perspective, however, goes beyond the merely descriptive level. This becomes particularly apparent in the various applications of conceptual metaphor theory instantiated in several sections of this chapter. True to the thought expressed by Lakoff in the quote in the introductory section regarding the unconscious use of metaphors, the cognitive linguistic analysis may contribute to raising a critical awareness of how discourse domains are conceptualized. Being conscious of the metaphors we use, and hence their ideological nature, may enable and encourage us to continually search out models that capture and develop alternative views of the target domain in question. 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In Rene ´ Dirven, Roslyn Frank, and Martin Pu ¨ tz, eds., ideology and critical discourse analysis 1239 . makes the past reference time recoverable for the reader and provides the contents of the viewpoint space, thus establishing the Ground in relation to which the Figure (here, the departure of the. perfect instead of the expected present perfect form: (3) Last bus had departed. In the present perfect form (The) last bus has departed, the present of the reader would be set as the reference. presents the departure of the bus and the posting of the message as distinct events. It ‘‘hides’’ the person from whom the message originates, and it enables this person to reject an involvement in the