mother tongue. The sensitive period for discriminating consonant sounds in for- eign languages ends even before the end of the first year of life. As can be seen from figure 46.2, English babies of ten months old can dis- criminate Hindi sounds, but at eleven months this ability begins to disappear. Later in adult life, discrimination performance remains very weak. Evidence has also become available now that the decline in perceptual abilities is not sensory in nature, but rather due to reorganization of attention. This means that the child’s mind, which is initially open to all possible human speech sounds and language phe- nomena, narrows down its attention to the one or two, perhaps three, languages in his or her social and ecological environment. This also means, as is now clear from a fairly large number of studies, that the initial abilities are not lost due to some kind of attrition, but can be reaccessed in adults. Furthermore, Johnson and Newport (1989) have shown that the critical period for the kinds of abilities tested by them, especially the ability to give correct judgments about the grammaticality of sentences, ends at the age of seven, long before puberty. Thus, apart from refuting Lenneberg’s theory of a biological foundation of language and supporting the experientialist basis of language acquisition, the above facts simultaneously confirm Zlatev’s (1997) critique of Lakoff and Johnson’s understanding of ‘‘embodiment.’’ In his view, Lakoff and Johnson see the human body and bodily experiences as divorced from the social context and the environment in which they operate. Zlatev’s correction is the notion of ‘‘situated embodiment’’: the human body and our bodily as well as other expe- riences are by necessity situated in an environment, including a physical and a social or cultural environment. Up to the tenth month, the sound-discriminating baby may live in a universalist limbo, but from then onwards his or her cultural envi- ronment makes the baby rapidly focus exclusive attention on the facts of this cultural environment. Figure 46.2. Discrimination performance of various age and language groups for the Hindi dental-retroflex contrast in Werker and Tees (1984). 1210 rene ´ dirven, hans-georg wolf, and frank polzenhagen 3.3. Universal and Culture-Specific Aspects in Models of anger in English and Chinese Lakoff and Johnson (1980) developed the theory of (partially) universal conceptual metaphors in human thought which underlie many different linguistic metaphors. Ko ¨ vecses (1986, 1995b, 2002: chapters 12–13) and Lakoff and Ko ¨ vecses (1987)applied this theory to the area of emotions. One of the conceptual metaphors for the ex- pression of the notion ‘anger’ in English is anger is heat or anger is a hot fluid in a container.Yu(1998) adopted this model and tested it out in a comparison between English and Chinese metaphors and metonymies of emotion. His conclu- sion is that Chinese and English see anger in a similar way; however, instead of associating ‘anger’ with heat, Chinese stresses the cause of heat, namely fire, which is most of all linked to one of the many internal organs, as seen in the English glosses for Chinese emotion terms such as fire head, liver fire, heart fire, belly fire (Yu 1998: 53–54). Instead of the liquid metaphor, Chinese utilizes the hot gas metaphor, which is again linked to the container holding it: spleen gas, heart gas, liver gas, belly gas (55). Central, then, to the Chinese conceptualization of anger are the internal organs, which are the location for both the fire and the gases—almost of necessity, one might say, since in the logic of the metaphor gases need a closed container and the im- mediate presence of the fire for the heating of the contents in the container to expand and eventually to explode. This particular view of the human body is in line with traditional Chinese medical thought and practice, more particularly with the highly specialized art of mastering internal pressures and blockages in the body structure, known as acupuncture. Now, the interesting and remarkable phenomenon is that even though Chinese medical tradition may have strongly shaped the concrete lin- guistic metaphors for anger, these nevertheless go back to the same conceptual metaphors as English metaphorical expressions. Instead of relativizing or weakening the Lakoff and Johnson approach, Yu’s findings strengthen it, as they show that the different medical ‘‘ideology’’ and philosophy in Chinese culture have not had any fundamental influence on the basic conceptual metaphors for emotions. Thus, Yu’s survey of the many concrete instances in the Chinese linguistic expression of general conceptual metaphors shows both the universal character of the Chinese concep- tualization of abstract domains such as emotion, or of other domains such as time and event structure, while simultaneously showing the uniquely concrete way of ex- pressing or ‘‘framing’’ the respective conceptual metaphors. While the Chinese lan- guage views the world in a more concrete way, since it exploits bodily experience and its contact with the world more systematically and more profoundly, this bodily self- experience does not relativize the reality of very general, universal conceptualizations. As such, Yu offers evidence both for the correctness of Lakoff and Johnson’s universal claims (at least to the extent that that they are confirmed in other languages) and for the great, colorful variety of culture-specific realizations of universal conceptual metaphors. But as we saw for language acquisition, the cultural factor may equally well be dominant. This is also the case in environmental deixis, as we will see now. cognitive linguistics and cultural studies 1211 4. Environment or Speaker as Deictic Center? Two Models of Deixis As embodied beings, we are, using Zlatev’s (1997) terms again, not just bodily beings, but situated bodily beings, implanted in our environment and the world at large. This two-sided reality is the basis for two models of deixis. 4.1. Corporeal and Environmental Deixis Models As the Ifaluk’s handling of emotions (see section 2.3) has shown, a central factor in culture is interactive discourse. In discourse, the participants position themselves, and all the entities in their perceived or conceived world, with respect to a deictic origo, which is the speaker’s position in space, time, the discourse progression, and his or her whole cultural world. Languages may have a multitude of expressions for spatial deixis, time deixis, person deixis, and so on. With regard to spatial deixis in particular, the speaker must locate things according to a certain reference point or reference framework. Languages can organize the link between the deictic origo and the other entities in the world in essentially two different ways: in terms of cor- poreal and environmental deixis. In line with the strong bodily orientation of human experience, the form of spatial deixis which is probably most frequent is bodily or corporeal deixis. Given the central position of the human body in the metaphor systems of languages (see section 2.3), it is only natural that also in the structuring of deixis the human body is taken as the organizing principle. The two axes of horizontality (in front of, behind) and verticality (above/up, under/down) and the left-right axis all cut through the speaker’s body as the deictic center. The principle of corporeal deixis is even so self- evident that it has been considered by most linguists, including cognitive linguists, as the default case, if not the universal one (Talmy 1983 ). But it is far from universal. A number of languages take a different model of spatial deixis, in which speakers’ highly salient geographical environment constitutes the organizing principle. This is known as environmental deixis. Since this model may well be the nondefault instance, it will be discussed in more detail. The discovery of noncorporeal principles of deixis organization is to a large extent the merit of the Cognitive Anthropology research group at the Max Planck Institute in Nijmegen, The Netherlands (Hill 1996; Levinson 1997; Senft 1998; Bickel 2000; etc.). For reasons of economy and coherence, we will only concentrate on Bickel’s (2000) analysis of a Nepalese community, the Belhare, who live in the Himalayas foothills. This physical/geographical environment is so strongly pro- nounced that it is hardly surprising that it has overridden the centrality of the human body as the organizing principle for spatial deixis. Giving this sloping environment, the horizontal and vertical dimensions are conflated so that the main 1212 rene ´ dirven, hans-georg wolf, and frank polzenhagen orientations are the equivalents of down(hill) and up(hill). The third dimension is ‘across (the hill)’. Belhare also makes a distinction between locating things and persons either directly from the deictic center (expressed by -u forms) or indirectly from a second reference point (expressed by -o forms). The forms used in Belhare can be diagrammed as follows whereby f represents the direct link to the deictic center, and f’ the indirect link (based on Bickel 2000: 169). Direct link Indirect link ff’ tu to ‘above’, i.e., behind mu mo ‘below’, i.e., in front of yu yo ‘across’, i.e., on the same level, i.e., left or right It is remarkable that this system of environmental space is not only an orga- nizing principle for spatial deixis, but also for temporal deixis. Furthermore, this deixis model needs to be used to locate entities both indoors and outdoors, even inside a room in the dark. As such, one has to decide which side of a table is ‘uphill’ and which one is ‘downhill’. When having a drink in a pub with one’s friends, one can only draw the waiter’s attention to a friend’s empty glass by explicitly locating this friend’s position and shouting ‘‘Hey! Up there, his/her (glass) is finished’’ (Bickel 2000: 177). Here, the speaker locates the friend with the empty glass in the direction of a path leading to the top of the hill. Various social practices in the Belhare community reflect these ‘up’ and ‘down’ trajectories. In mat-weaving, one begins by orientating uphill. Metaphorically, when weaving downwards, one weaves for a corpse. When making sacrifices on an altar, the building-up phase uses leaves pointing to the top of the Himalayas; after the sacrifice, ritual food is thrown away downhill, to the south. Inside the house, the hearth, which has a strong sacred value, is placed uphill, to the north, farthest away from the entrance, thus marking where ‘up’ is in the house. Moreover, these deictic structurings apply not only to a familiar background of clearly structured space, but also to unknown territory. For instance, when visiting the Nepalese capital, Kathmandu, soccer players from Belhare on a playground used a sudden inclination in the landscape to locate the ‘downhill’ side and ‘uphill’ side of the field (Bickel 2000: 181). What Bickel’s anal- ysis has shown is the strong connection between Whorfian patterns of behavior in the Belhare country and their patterns of linguistic structure. In other words, ‘‘in eastern Nepal the cultural formality of social practices does indeed show ‘affi- nities’ to linguistic patterns’’ (Bickel 2000: 161). 5. Cultural Variation: Different Cultural Models in One Language Given that English has developed into various first- and second-language varieties around the world—labeled World Englishes by sociolinguists—one can expect that cultural specifics and different cultural models in the cognitive systems of their cognitive linguistics and cultural studies 1213 speakers should be reflected in the respective varieties of English (see Eggington 1997: 30). Evidence of this environmentalization of English in the particular cultural settings all over the world is provided, for example, by Wolf (2001), Wolf and Simo Bobda (2001), and Wolf and Polzenhagen (forthcoming) with respect to the cul- tural model of ‘‘community’’ in African English, which is critically at odds with the Western model of self (see Wolf 1994). One linguistic manifestation of conceptu- alizations of the African community model consists of the particular African En- glish use of kinship terms, which differs markedly from that in Western varieties. Metaphorical and metonymic use of kinship terms can be found in both Western and African varieties of English. The following examples taken from computer corpora of British English (FLOB) and American English (FROWN) are representative of the Western cultural model: 1 (1) a. The father of sociology, Adam Ferguson. (FLOB) b. Lynden Pindling, the founding father of Bahamian independence. (FROWN) c. The most influential figure in this process was Tony Pastor, often called the father of American vaudeville. (FROWN) d. Hawthorne was a true son of clerical New England in his formal and even stately style. (FROWN) It is the conceptual metaphor of procreation that underlies these expressions; here, academic disciplines (1a), historic-political events (1b), or cultural genres (1c) are metaphorically structured as being the child of a person important to their for- mation. In turn, in (1d), a person is metaphorically conceived as the child of a particular region at a particular point in history on the basis of characteristics associated with both that person and that region, making use of the metonymy that certain characteristics stand for the whole person. These metaphors are based on and reflect a biological kinship model centering in the notion of ‘descent’ (see Turner 1987 for a detailed account of Western kinship metaphors). Importantly—reminding us of Lutz’s characterization of Western thought as ‘‘individualistic’’—they occur as individual entities in isolation rather than being tied to an interrelated network of community metaphors. In sharp contrast with this, in African English, kinship-based conceptualizations are part of a broad and full-fledged community model; that is, they have a different range and different elaborations, to use the terms proposed by Ko ¨ vecses (2002: 183–84) with respect to cultural variation of metaphor and metonymy. Due to the interchangeable conceptual metonymy community for kinship/kinship for community, African thought concentrates on social group awareness, as is evidenced below (see Wolf 2001: 279–80, for references): (2) a. I greet my fathers. b. The family head of the Bakweri community. c. Three policemen molesting their grandson (i.e., a member of the wider Cameroonian community). d. My child, daughter of our people. 1214 rene ´ dirven, hans-georg wolf, and frank polzenhagen The members of all kinds of communities are readily conceptualized as children, brothers, sisters, fathers, and so on, depending on the specific relationship between them. Examples include political parties as well as ethnic and regional groups, and the nation as a whole, as illustrated in the examples in (3) from Cameroon and Nigerian English: (3) a. The Santa CPDM [a political party in Cameroon] is planning a mass decamping because none of their sons was appointed into the new government. (Ntoi, cited in Wolf 2001: 280) b. In as much as the Igbo nation is trying to unite with itself and with its South-South brothers because the Igbo people know that they cannot do without neighbouring brothers, non-Igbo brothers and non-brothers believe they cannot do without us. There must be a kind of marriage or rethinking between these two brothers. (Chijioke Nwosu 2000) These examples raise the problem of cultural perspective and cultural pre- supposition as a crucial element in the notion of cultural model. This problem is interwoven with the problem of assigning the descriptive label ‘‘metaphor’’ or ‘‘metonymy’’ to these examples and the interpretation of the cognitive domains involved. Whereas the conceptualizations underlying the kinship references above in British, respectively American English, go across domain boundaries and are thus clearly metaphorical, the matter is less straightforward in the case of the African English examples. One could argue that in a traditional village setting, community and kinship are indeed one domain and that this ‘‘traditional’’ understanding is used to structure and explain more complex forms of ‘‘modern’’ social organiza- tion. Yet this still does not mean that in African thought, the domains of ‘com- munity’ and ‘kinship’ are as clearly demarcated as in the West. The range of different kinship-based cultural models is, however, but one aspect of cultural variation in this context. Another aspect is the phenomenon of highly complex cultural modes, consisting of the blending of various single cultural mod- els. This becomes manifest, for instance, in the expression son of the soil, which is pervasive in African English. This and similar expressions are based on a complex model of spiritual and social existence (see Wolf 2001) and evoke the image of a plant nurtured by the soil (Medubi 2003). Indeed, the understanding of a com- munity as a family is closely tied to the concept of nurture; roughly speaking the family is expected to provide nurture and care. Thus, one crucial part of the African kinship model is that it is built on a reciprocal eating and feeding pattern. In a nonmetaphorical sense, the father of a family is expected to provide the food for the family members, while he is the first in line to draw on the available food, an un- derstanding that exists in various cultures. Yet this pattern is extended to any kind of community and is elaborated in various ways (see Schatzberg 2001). Linguisti- cally, this illustrates the second type of cultural variation distinguished by Ko ¨ vecses: different elaborations of conceptual metaphors and metonymies. It is the notion of nurture that is central to the African kinship-based model, rather than the notion of descent, which was found to be primary in the Western model (see above). cognitive linguistics and cultural studies 1215 Consequently, eating-related metaphors, which highlight the aspect of nur- ture, are pervasive in the community domain and in political discourse (see, e.g., Bayart 1993; Geschiere 1997; Schatzberg 2001). One such elaboration is the meta- phor leadership is eating and feeding, coupled with the metonymy food for resources, as in the examples in (4): (4) a. Leadership positions are for some synonymous with ‘‘license to eat’’. (Kaigarula, cited in Schatzberg 2001: 41) b. AD [Alliance for Democracy, a political party] would openly campaign for Obasanjo’s PDP [Peoples Democratic Party] to triumph. What kind of democracy is that? Back stabbing democracy for a meal of por- ridge. Democracy of protecting and promoting self interest which we called YCIC [You Chop I Chop, chop being the Pidgin English word for ‘eat’] arrangement. (Ayetigbo 2002) c. They have given him plenty to eat. [said in Cameroon when a new gov- ernment official is appointed] d. They have taken food off his plate. [said in Cameroon when a government official is dropped] The salience of these and various related cultural models in African English becomes evident in an elicitation of keywords (see above, and Wierzbicka 1999)in computer corpora of African varieties of English (in comparison to corpora of native Western varieties of English). Not only do numerous lexical items from the domains of ‘community’, ‘wealth’, ‘money’, and ‘food’ appear as key words there, but they form collocative clusters as well, significantly signaling the culturally deeply entrenched structural mapping within or across the domains involved (see Wolf and Polzenhagen, forthcoming). Such findings support a moderate version of linguistic relativity. They speak, however, against strong deterministic claims about the impact of language on thought and culture, as the various varieties of English reflect the respective socio- cultural patterns rather than rigidly transferring Western models of thought. From a critical perspective, this kind of contextualization—or environmentalization—of English can be understood as a ‘‘counter-penetration of the new varieties found in Africa and Asia’’ (Brutt-Griffler 2002: 178) into conceptualizations dominant in Western native varieties of English (see Eggington 1997). 6. Conclusion Culture, language, and thought are not abstract entities, but basic patterns of behavior, discourse, and reasoning in a given community. They co-occur in each concrete instance of interaction between members of that community. The cultural 1216 rene ´ dirven, hans-georg wolf, and frank polzenhagen and linguistic forms express, and are in turn interpreted on the basis of, cultural models. These are knowledge structures representing the collective wisdom and experience of the community, acquired and stored in the individual minds of the community’s members. Given the situatedness of humans as ‘‘bodies in the mind’’ within a specific environment, it is predictable that cultural studies will meet with and be subject to a set of tensions and contradictions. a. The existence of cultural models either in the form of a conceptual unit, that is, a proposition, or else in the form of a conceptual metaphor. The propositional view is Quinn’s postulate and as such is as respectable as any other pos- tulate. The metaphorical view is Ko ¨ vecses’s and is almost a necessary consequence of Lakoff and Johnson’s cognitive metaphor theory: human abstract thought feeds on conceptual metaphors, which themselves are rooted in bodily based image schemas. Future research will always be torn between the propositional or nonmetaphorical view and the metaphori- cal view of cultural models. b. The tension between the social and the individualistic nature of cultural models. The ‘‘social’’ view seems to dominate in the research of non- Western models; it is found, for instance, with Ifaluk emotion theory or can be observed in African interpretations of kinship metaphors reflecting the social bonds and the union of the group. The ‘‘individualist’’ view is characteristic of Western models of emotional experience and can be observed in the use of kinship metaphors focusing on the individual ‘procreation’ aspects, which are ideally geared to conceptualizing inven- tions (as individual achievements of a singular mind), the creation of new trends, or currents. c. The tension between the universal and the cultural-specific. The universalist view of cultural models finds support in (potentially) universal concep- tual metaphors, as found for the domains of emotion, time, event structure, and many more. The cultural-specific view is substantiated in the concrete linguistic realizations of underlying conceptual metaphors. Here the two poles seem to be in harmony. But the culture-specific may also tend to dominate as in the process of language acquisition by closing down the perceptual apparatus for universal sound patterns and focusing on the sound patterns (and life patterns more generally) of one’s own cultural environment. d. The tension between two possible types of bodily experience. In the individ- ualist Western conception, each single body is experienced as the center of the universe and serves as the basis of spatial orientation, which is reflected in corporeal deixis. Given the universality of human bodily ex- perience, it is not astonishing that corporeal deixis should constitute the default case. But as a more refined conception of embodiment, the notion of situated embodiment incorporates and integrates man’s physical and social environment in his or her holistic bodily experience. This type of cognitive linguistics and cultural studies 1217 bodily experience makes room for a different type of deixis: environmental deixis. This latter type of deixis requires a continued effort on the part of language users to find ‘‘environmental’’ reference points so that their behavioral thought and linguistic practice strongly determine one another in a mildly linguistic-relativity sense, thus supporting the Humboldtian and Whorfian view of the inseparable unity between culture, language, and thought. NOTES 1. The Freiburg-LOB Corpus of British English (FLOB) and the Freiburg-Brown Corpus of American English were compiled at the English Department of the University of Freiburg, under the supervision of Christian Mair. Both corpora are on the New ICAME Corpus Collection CD-Rom, version 2, 1999 (http://helmer.aksis.uib.no/icame/ newcd.htm). REFERENCES Ayetigbo, Ayodele. 2002. Back stabbed, frontally bruised Nigeria/Africa will survive: The U.S. African Voice. http://www.usafricanvoice.com/back_stabbed.htm (accessed July 8, 2003) Bayart, Jean Franc¸ois. 1993. The state in Africa: The politics of the belly. London: Longman. Bickel, Balthasar. 2000. Grammar and social practice: On the role of ‘culture’ in linguistic relativity. In Susanne Niemeier and Rene ´ Dirven, eds., Evidence for linguistic relativity 161–91. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Bohn, Ocke-Schwen. 2000. Linguistic relativity in speech perception: An overview of the influence of language experience on the perception of speech sounds from infancy to adulthood. In Susanne Niemeier and Rene ´ Dirven, eds., Evidence for linguistic rela- tivity 1–28. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Brutt-Griffler, Janina. 2002. World English: A study of its development. Clevedon, UK: Multilingual Matters. Chijioke Nwosu, Brady. 2000. Let’s leave everything to posterity. This Day Online. http:// www.thisdayonline.com/archive/2001/10/25/20011025pol08.html (accessed February 22, 2002). D’Andrade, Roy. 1987. A folk model of the mind. In Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, eds., Cultural models in language and thought 112–47. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press. Eggington, William. 1997. The English language metaphors we plan by. In William Eg- gington and Helen Wren, eds., Language policy: Dominant English, pluralistic challenges 29–46. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 1218 rene ´ dirven, hans-georg wolf, and frank polzenhagen Geschiere, Peter. 1997. The modernity of witchcraft: Politics and the occult in postcolonial Africa. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr. 1994. The poetics of mind: Figurative thought, language, and un- derstanding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Gibbs, Raymond W., Jr. 1999. Taking metaphor out of our heads and putting it into the cultural world. In Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., and Gerard J. Steen, eds., Metaphor in cognitive linguistics 145–66. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hill, Deborah. 1996. Distinguishing the notion ‘place’ in an Oceanic language. In Martin Pu ¨ tz and Rene ´ Dirven, eds., The construal of space in language and thought 307–28. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Holland, Dorothy, and Naomi Quinn, eds. 1987. Cultural models in language and thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Holland, Dorothy, and Debra Skinner. 1987. Prestige and intimacy: The cultural model behind Americans’ talk about gender types. In Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, eds., Cultural models in language and thought 78–111. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- versity Press. Johnson, Jacqueline S., and Elissa L. Newport. 1989. Critical period effects in second language learning: The influence of maturational state on the acquisition of English as a second language. Cognitive Psychology 21: 60–99. Joseph, John. 1996. The immediate sources of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis. Historiographia Linguistica 21: 212–21. Kay, Paul. 1987. Linguistic competence and folk theories of language: Two English hedges. In Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, eds., Cultural models in language and thought 66–77. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keesing, Roger M. 1987. Models, ‘‘folk’’ and ‘‘cultural’’: Paradigms regained? In Dorothy Holland and Naomi Quinn, eds., Cultural models in language and thought 369–93. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Keesing, Roger M. 1992. Anthropology and linguistics. In Martin Pu ¨ tz, ed., Thirty years of linguistic evolution 593–609. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Koerner, Konrad E. F. 2000. Towards a ‘full pedigree’ of the ‘Sapir-Whorf hypothesis’: From Locke to Lucy. In Martin Pu ¨ tz and Marjolijn Verspoor, eds., Explorations in linguistic relativity 1–24. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Ko ¨ vecses, Zolta ´ n. 1986. Metaphors of anger, pride, and love: A lexical approach to the study of concepts. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Ko ¨ vecses, Zolta ´ n. 1995a. American friendship and the scope of metaphor. Cognitive Lin- guistics 6: 315–46. Ko ¨ vecses, Zolta ´ n. 1995b. Anger: Its language, conceptualizations, and physiology in the light of cross-cultural evidence. In John R. Taylor and R. A. MacLaury, eds., Language and the cognitive construal of the world 181–96. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Ko ¨ vecses, Zolta ´ n. 1999. Metaphor: Does it constitute or reflect cultural models? In Ray- mond W. Gibbs, Jr., and Gerard J. Steen, eds., Metaphor in cognitive linguistics 167–88. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Ko ¨ vecses, Zolta ´ n. 2002. Metaphor: A practical introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ko ¨ vecses, Zolta ´ n. 2005. Metaphor in culture: Universality and variation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ko ¨ vecses, Zolta ´ n, and Gary R. Palmer. 1999. Language and emotion concepts: What ex- perientialists and social constructionists have in common. In Gary B. Palmer and Debora J. Occhi, eds., Languages of sentiment: Cultural constructions of emotional substrates 237–62. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. cognitive linguistics and cultural studies 1219 . are the location for both the fire and the gases—almost of necessity, one might say, since in the logic of the metaphor gases need a closed container and the im- mediate presence of the fire for the. 1995b, 2002: chapters 12–13) and Lakoff and Ko ¨ vecses (1987)applied this theory to the area of emotions. One of the conceptual metaphors for the ex- pression of the notion ‘anger’ in English is. about the grammaticality of sentences, ends at the age of seven, long before puberty. Thus, apart from refuting Lenneberg’s theory of a biological foundation of language and supporting the experientialist