2.5. Subjectification: Langacker versus Traugott Langacker (1990, 1991a, 1999, 2003) views the English modals as ‘‘grounding pred- ications,’’ irrespective of whether they have a root or an epistemic meaning. As such, the distinction between these types of modality can be said to be independent of the status of the English modals as grounding predications. Goossens (1996), however, criticizes Langacker’s uniform characterization of the English modals as grounding predications; he shows, among other things, that in the case of root modality the potency relation is not always as subjectively construed as Langacker would have it. 26 Goossens therefore accepts the inherent grounding status of the epistemic modals, whose semantics by necessity involves the speaker (conceptu- alizer) as an implicit reference point, but he considers root modals to be grounding only ‘‘in the case of deontic modalities where the authority for the permission or obligation is clearly in the ground, as a rule, when the speaker has or assumes authority’’ (Goossens 1996: 28). This distinction between the speaker (implicitly) assuming authority or not can be linked to Achard’s notion of a stronger speaker role, which Achard also links to a ‘‘subjective realignment of the modal force’’ (Achard 1998: 154)—and hence to subjectification. This use of the notion sub- jectification, however, seems to be more in line with Traugott’s use of the term than with Langacker’s (for further discussion of the notion subjectification, see also Verhagen, this volume, chapter 3, and Athanasiadou, Canakis, and Cornillie 2006). 3. Mood in Cognitive Linguistics As was already mentioned, cognitive accounts of modality have to a large extent concentrated on the modal verbs, whereby the (typically highly grammaticalized) category of mood has largely been neglected. 27 Still, a number of cognitive solutions for the interpretation of mood phenomena in languages such as French, German, and Spanish have been proposed, which unfortunately lack a common core. Figure 33.3. Langacker’s dynamic evolutionary model 880 tanja mortelmans Probably the most elaborated model dealing with the semantics of mood from a cognitive linguistic perspective is the one proposed by Achard (1996a, 1998, 2002) for the French moods indicative, subjunctive, and conditional. 28 These three moods are all taken to contribute to the grounding of a finite clause, their selection being ‘‘determined by the evaluation of the status of the conceptualized event with respect to reality’’ (Achard 2002: 197). In Achard’s view, only an indicative clause presents a fully grounded instance of a process type, whereby the conceptualized process is precisely located with respect to reality—by means of the tense mor- phemes (present, past, and future). The conditional and subjunctive, on the other hand, each locate the state of affairs outside reality (and thus lack tense predica- tions), but in different ways. The conditional, whose main territory seems to be the apodosis of (hypothetical and counterfactual) conditionals, 29 is taken to impose restrictions on the conditions of occurrence of the event it is attached to, to the extent that the event is construed as an alternative to reality. The conditional thus marks a prediction of the speaker, based on the speaker’s knowledge of the struc- ture of reality and his or her conception of its evolutionary momentum (with the speaker assuming that the evolutionary momentum of reality will take another course than the one marked by the conditional). This characterization of the meaning of the French conditional is compatible with my analysis (Mortelmans 2000) of the semantics of the German past subjunctive (or Konjunktiv II), which in its prototypical use is taken to signal a speaker’s negative epistemic stance so that the state of affairs is typically located within irreality (the German Konjunktiv II shares the French conditional’s preference for conditional constructions). (4) French: Si je la connaissais, j’irais lui parler tout de suite. German: Wenn ich sie kennen w € uurde, w € uurde ich gleich zu ihr gehen und mit ihr reden. ‘If I knew her, I would go and talk to her right away.’ The French subjunctive, which most often occurs in subordinate clauses follow- ing verbs of volition and emotional reaction, is taken to signal that the event is only considered with respect to a very local and specific mental space (the subject’s de- sires, for instance, in the case of verbs of volition) and not with respect to reality as such. 30 (5)a.Le patron veut que vous reveniez tout de suite. ‘The boss wants you to come back right away.’ b. Je suis heureux que vous soyez sorti de ce pi eege. ‘I am happy that you got out of that trap.’ (examples and glosses are taken from Achard 2002) The subjunctive is said to represent an arbitrary instance of a process type, con- jured up for a specific purpose, but not represented as part of reality. The prototypical function of the German present subjunctive (Konjunktiv I), on the other hand, resides in the marking of indirect speech. 31 It can therefore be taken to signal a shift in vantage point, as it is not the original speaker, but the modality in cognitive linguistics 881 reported one who has assessed the reported state of affairs as factual (Diewald 1999: 182). It should be noted that the aforementioned past subjunctive in German can also take up this function without the speaker necessarily distancing himself or herself from the content of the reported utterance (pace Wierzbicka 1988). In the latter case, the meaning of the past subjunctive merges with that of the present subjunctive. (6) ‘‘Der Kinderarzt sagte, er ha ¨ tte [KonjunktivII] selten ein so pra ¨ chtiges Baby gesehen,’’ sagte Delia stolz. ‘ ‘‘The pediatrician said that only rarely had he seen such a beautiful baby,’’ Delia said with pride.’ In terms of the level of reality that is addressed, the French subjunctive can be said to attach to events which are conceptualized with respect to basic reality, whereas the indicative situates an event with respect to elaborated reality. 32 With the latter level, the event is construed as a proposition and as such provided with a putative address in reality (by means of the tense morphemes). The observation that the subjunctive in Spanish has a slightly different distribution—verbs of thought and belief (which in French typically take the indicative) allow both in- dicative and subjunctive, whereas verbs of emotional reaction (taking subjunctive complements in French, as in avoir peur ‘to be afraid’, e ˆ tre content ‘to be glad’, and d eetester ‘to hate’) are also compatible with indicative marking—does not pose any problems for Achard’s analysis: this distribution is explained in terms of construal flexibility (Achard 1998: 264), whereby Spanish speakers simply have the choice to construe the complement as either a proposition or an arbitrary instance. 4. Conclusion and Outlook In order to arrive at a better understanding of modality, modal markers in lan- guages other than English ought to be thoroughly analyzed, and in a next step, new empirical findings should be confronted with the main theoretical models that have been established up to now. For one thing, the observation that the root-epistemic polysemy in modal verbs is a typical trait of languages in Europe, but is less com- mon in other languages (see van der Auwera and Ammann 2005), points to im- portant conceptual differences between root and epistemic meanings which tend to be downplayed by their similar coding in familiar languages such as English, German, Spanish, or French. Other interesting areas for further research include the status of modal verbs and moods in terms of grounding predications and the possible inclusion of other markers (e.g., mental-state predicates like I believe or evidential markers) in this category. This question crucially involves an assessment of the degree of subjectification of particular meaning elements, which, in its turn, 882 tanja mortelmans makes a proper understanding of the notion of subjectification (on which Lan- gacker and Traugottclearly have different views—seeespecially Traugott and Dasher 2002: 89–99) unavoidable. Overall, however, the cognitive linguistic concepts of force dynamics, on the one hand, and of subjectification (and grounding, which is related, but not iden- tical, to it), on the other, have proved to be highly powerful tools to discover common cores in a wide variety of modal expression types. NOTES 1. This characterization of modality reflects to a certain extent the long-standing, traditional view on modality as a logical category, at the core of which are the notions of possibility and obligation/necessity (for similar definitions of modality, see van der Auwera and Plungian 1998; Achard 1998). This ‘‘logical’’ bias partly accounts for the fact that must denoting necessity and may/can denoting possibility (and their counterparts in other languages) are the most recurrent objects of study in modality research (Sweetser 1990: 52). For criticism, see Diewald (1999: 156) or Wierzbicka (1987). 2. An excellent survey of evidentiality and the relevant literature is given in Floyd (1999: 13–39). Compare also Wierzbicka (1994), where the data from Chafe and Nichols’s (1986) volume on evidentiality are reanalyzed in terms of universal semantic primitives. 3. Note that the German paradigm of modal verbs codes both epistemic and evidential distinctions—the modals sollen and wollen in their nonroot sense present the complement as ‘reported’: e.g., Er soll krank sein ‘He is said to be ill’ (Diewald 1999). 4. Lee (1993) mainly offers a discourse-pragmatic (in terms of informativeness, im- mediacy, and factuality) analysis of factors influencing the use of three evidential markers in Korean, which all mark newly perceived information. Although these markers are termed ‘‘epistemic’’ by the author, they mainly pertain to evidential qualifications. 5. The term root modality is used by Sweetser (1990), Langacker (1990, 1991a, 1991b), and Achard (1998) to refer to the obligation, permission, ability, and volition meanings of the modals. The traditional term ‘‘deontic’’ as a cover term for the full range of nonepi- stemic meanings has been criticized as being too narrow and even misleading (see, e.g., Sweetser 1990: 152; Diewald 1999: 74). Other terms (agent-oriented modality, participant internal/participant external modality, nondeictic modality) will not be used here, as they are liable to criticism as well or presuppose a particular theoretical stance. 6. The use of the same items to express both root and epistemic meanings can be observed in a large set of languages (Palmer 1986; Sweetser 1990: 49, 152). The findings in van der Auwera and Ammann (2005), however, caution against overgeneralizing this ten- dency. In fact, high or (near-)total overlap between expressions of root and epistemic modality is found to be almost (but not exclusively) confined to Europe. Outside Europe, languages with no overlap seem to dominate quantitatively. 7. It should be noted that Talmy only seems to regard negated can as expressing a force-dynamic configuration. At first sight, the use of can expressing positive ability is problematic in an analysis that is based on forces and counterforces (compare also Lampert and Lampert 2000: 243). Achard (1998: 143) and Johnson (1987: 52), however, do not have any problems incorporating positive ability (enablement) in a force-dynamic account. modality in cognitive linguistics 883 8. Talmy (1988) views the modality expressed by must, have to, need, and ought to in terms of barriers, restricting the Agonist’s scope of action, whereas Sweetser prefers an analysis of these verbs in terms of positive forces (‘‘positive compulsion rather than neg- ative restriction’’; Sweetser 1990: 52). Sweetser’s view is also adopted by Johnson (1987: 51), who regards the root sense of must as ‘‘denoting a compelling force that moves a subject towards an act.’’ 9. This integration of lexical expressions into a discussion of modality is rather unique: Sweetser, Achard, Langacker, and Johnson, for instance, all restrict themselves to the (English or French) core modals. For a cognitive-pragmatic account of other (epi- stemic) markers, see Nuyts (2001). 10. It should be noted that force dynamics is generally conceptualized as primarily pertaining to physical interaction; as far as modality is concerned, however, Talmy (1988: 79) contends that reference to the psychosocial/interpersonal domain is basic. 11. For a radically different view, see Heine (1992), who claims that the distinction between root and epistemic modality is based on the presence versus absence of a modal force. Heine equates the notion of force with an element of will, exerted by an entity who has an interest in the event either occurring or not occurring. 12. Another problem for Sweetser is the ‘‘pure future’’ meaning of will indicating ‘‘a completed path to an action or intention’’ (Sweetser 1990: 55); this meaning hardly fits into a force-dynamic analysis. This might be due to the fact that Sweetser takes the pure future meaning of will as the source domain for the metaphorical mapping (John will come, glossed as ‘The present state of affairs will proceed to the future event of John’s arrival’). Langacker’s example of root will (not), however, features elements of volition and resolve (as in He absolutely will not agree to it). Here, the force dynamic nature is clear: the sentient subject he opposes some kind of force which tries to make him agree. Lan- gacker treats the pure future use of will as a limiting case of epistemic will, in which the notion of evolutionary momentum—the ‘‘force’’ in the epistemic use of will—has faded away (Langacker 1991a: 278). 13. Note that the French modal class is not as easily delimited as the English one (Achard 1998: 124–31). 14. It should be stressed that in their root and epistemic usages, too, the French modals behave like main (lexical) verbs: they have not acquired the same degree of formal grammaticalization as their English counterparts (Achard 1996b: 5). 15. The modal force remains primarily associated with the subject, however, because of the subject’s inherent intentionality. 16. In fact, Pelyva ´ s(1996: 146) links the epistemic meaning to the original (but now extinct) ‘ability’ sense of may. However, there seems to be an intermediary root possibility stage, out of which the epistemic meaning has developed. 17. As main verbs, the predecessors of the present-day English modals are said to profile the potency relation between a trajector (the subject) and a landmark process— an option still available for can (Can she lift it?), as is remarked by Langacker (1991a: 273). 18. Note, however, that with root modality the subject can still function as a target of potency—a possibility ruled out for epistemic modals. 19. Langacker (1999) introduces a slightly adapted characterization of the process of subjectification, which views subjectification in terms of the objective component fading away and leaving only a subjectively construed relationship behind: ‘‘the subjective rela- tionship was immanent in the objective one.’’ (299). This alteration, however, does not seem to affect the ‘‘grounding’’ analysis in a crucial way. 884 tanja mortelmans 20. The fact that Langacker refrains from a detailed description of the meaning of the English modals should be understood in this vein: ‘‘Grounding expressions tend to be abstract and schematic semantically.’’ Moreover, their characterization pertains to fun- damental cognitive notions whose import is not unreasonably described as ‘‘epistemic’’ (Langacker 1993: 48). 21. Interestingly, Langacker assumes that the verb following a modal is not an (atemporal) infinitive, but an uninflected simple verb representing the same semantic class as the modal (Langacker 1991a: 248). 22. Equating the locus of potency with evidence driving the speaker metaphorically along a deductive path would, in Langacker’s (1991a: 274) view, violate the request of maximal subjectivity. 23. Unlike Sweetser, Langacker is able to integrate future will rather easily in a force- dynamic account: ‘‘If not rerouted by an unforeseen input of energy, reality is compelled by its evolutionary momentum to pursue a course such that the process does take place’’ (Langacker 1991a: 278). 24. It should be stressed that in spite of the semantic similarities between the En- glish and French modals—especially with regard to their epistemic meanings—Achard does not consider the French modals as grounding predications. On the other hand, I assess the grounding status of the German modals in a more qualified way, depending on the degree of grammaticalization of the respective modals (Mortelmans 2001). A similar stance is taken by Cornillie (2005a, 2005b) with regard to the Spanish modals, which in their epistemic readings are taken to function as grounding predications as well. 25. It should be noted that passive and aspect markings are also possible with the ‘obligation’ and ‘possibility’ senses of devoir and pouvoir, respectively. Even in the case of a weak speaker role (with devoir expressing obligation, for instance), the subject of de- voir lacks the initial impulse or initiative toward the complement process. Voice and aspect markers are ruled out, however, for pouvoir expressing ability and savoir (Achard 1998: 139). 26. In the case of the ‘‘remote’’ forms would and could, Goossens (1996) points out that they can still express past volition and past ability/possibility, which implies that the modal relationship itself is grounded—by tense, and hence is not maximally subjective. 27. For a more general introduction to the subjunctive, see Bybee, Perkins, and Pagliuca (1994: 212–36) and Givo ´ n(1994). 28. It should be noted that Achard (1998) only considers the use of indicative and subjunctive in finite complements. A more general approach, which also takes main clause and other uses into account, can be found in Achard (2002). 29. In independent sentences, the conditional is found to have an attenuating effect, often making the utterance more polite. Note that Achard does not discuss the use of the conditional as a marker of indirect speech (cf. Dendale 1993). 30. Compare also Mejı ´ as-Bikandi (1996), who offers a compatible account of the meaning of the Spanish subjunctive, which is said to close a particular mental space M, ‘‘so that information contained in it cannot flow to higher spaces’’ (Mejı ´ as-Bikandi 1996: 175). 31. See also Wierzbicka (1988: 140–61), who claims that, from a cross-linguistic per- spective, the subjunctive not only has an anticognitive (‘I don’t say: I know this’), but also an antiassertive component (‘I don’t say: I say this’). The scope of the anticognitive component in German seems to be much smaller than in French: in German, the use of the modality in cognitive linguistics 885 present subjunctive (and to some extent even that of the past subjunctive) is mainly governed by the antiassertive aspect of the subjunctive. 32. I put forward a similar claim for the German moods Konjunktiv I and II (Mor- telmans 2003). REFERENCES Achard, Michel. 1996a. Complement construal in French: A cognitive perspective. In Eugene H. Casad, ed., Cognitive linguistics in the Redwoods: The expansion of a new paradigm in linguistics 569–607. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Achard, Michel. 1996b. French modals and speaker control. In Adele E. Goldberg, ed., Conceptual structure, discourse and language 1–15. Stanford, CA: CSLI Publications. Achard, Michel. 1998. Representation of cognitive structures: Syntax and semantics of French sentential complements. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Achard, Michel. 2002. The meaning and distribution of French mood inflections. In Frank Brisard, ed., Grounding: The epistemic footing of deixis and reference 197–249. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Athanasiadou, Angeliki, Costas Canakis, and Bert Cornillie, eds. 2006. Subjectification: Various paths to subjectivity. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Bybee, Joan L., Revere D. Perkins, and William Pagliuca. 1994. The evolution of grammar: Tense, aspect, and modality in the languages of the world. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Casad, Eugene H. 1992. Cognition, history, and Cora yee. Cognitive Linguistics 3: 151–86. Chafe, Wallace, and Johanna Nichols, eds. 1986. Evidentiality: The linguistic coding of epistemology. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Cornillie, Bert. 2005a. Agentivity and subjectivity with Spanish prometer ‘to promise’ and amenazar ‘to threaten’: A study of constructional and diatopical variation. Revista Internacional de Ling € uu ııstica Iberoamericana 3: 171–96. Cornillie, Bert. 2005b. Reference point and subjectification in grounding predications: The case of the Spanish modals. Annual Review of Cognitive Linguistics 3: 56–77. Dendale, Patrick. 1993. Le conditionnel de l’information incertaine: Marqueur modal ou marqueur e ´ videntiel? In Gerold Hilty, ed., Actes du XXe Congr ees International de Linguistique et Philologie Romanes, Universit ee de Zurich 164–75.Tu ¨ bingen: A. Francke Verlag. Diewald, Gabriele. 1999. Die Modalverben im Deutschen: Grammatikalisierung und Poly- funktionalita ¨ t.Tu ¨ bingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag. Floyd, Rick. 1999. The structure of evidential categories in Wanka Quechua. Dallas, TX: Summer Institute of Linguistics. Foolen, Ad. 1992. Review From etymology to pragmatics, by Eve Sweetser. Lingua 88: 76–86. Givo ´ n, Talmy. 1982. Evidentiality and epistemic space. Studies in Language 6: 23–49. Givo ´ n, Talmy. 1994. Irrealis and the subjunctive. Studies in Language 18: 265–337. Goossens, Louis. 1992. cunnan, conne(n), can: The development of a radial category. In Gu ¨ nter Kellermann and Michael D. Morrissey, eds., Diachrony within synchrony— Language history and cognition: Papers from the international symposium at the Uni- versity of Duisburg, 26–28 March 1990 377–94. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag. 886 tanja mortelmans Goossens, Louis. 1996. English modals and functional models: A confrontation. Antwerp Papers in Linguistics (APiL), no. 86. Antwerpen: University of Antwerp. http:// webhost.ua.ac.be/apil/list.html. Goossens, Louis. 1999. Metonymic bridges in modal shifts. In Klaus-Uwe Panther and Gu ¨ nter Radden, eds., Metonymy in language and thought 193–210. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Goossens, Louis. 2000. Patterns of meaning extension, ‘‘parallel chaining,’’ subjecti- fication, and modal shifts. In Antonio Barcelona, ed., Metaphor and metonymy at the crossroads: A cognitive perspective 149–70. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Heine, Bernd. 1992. Agent-oriented vs. epistemic modality: Some observations on German modals. In Joan L. Bybee and Suzanne Fleischman, eds., Modality in grammar and discourse 17–53. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Hopper, Paul J., and Elizabeth Closs Traugott. 1993. Grammaticalization. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (2nd ed., 2003) Johnson, Mark. 1987. The body in the mind: The bodily basis of meaning, imagination, and reason. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Lampert, Gu ¨ nther, and Martina Lampert. 2000. The conceptual structure(s) of modality: Essences and ideologies. A study in linguistic (meta-)categorization. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag. Langacker, Ronald W. 1990. Subjectification. Cognitive Linguistics 1: 5–38. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991a. Foundations of cognitive grammar. Vol. 2, Descriptive appli- cation. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Langacker, Ronald W. 1991b. Concept, image, and symbol: The cognitive basis of grammar. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 1993. Deixis and subjectivity. In S. K. Verma and V. Prakasam, eds., New horizons in functional linguistics 43–58. Hyderabad, India: Booklinks Cor- poration. Langacker, Ronald W. 1994. Remarks on the English grounding systems. In Ronny Boo- gaart and Jan Noordegraaf, eds., Nauwe betrekkingen: Voor Theo Janssen bij zijn vijf- tigste verjaardag 137–44. Amsterdam: Stichting Neerlandistiek. Langacker, Ronald W. 1999. Grammar and conceptualization. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Langacker, Ronald W. 2003. Extreme subjectification: English tense and modals. In Hubert Cuyckens, Thomas Berg, Rene ´ Dirven, and Klaus-Uwe Panther, eds., Motivation in Language: Studies in honor of G € uunter Radden 3–26. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Lee, Hyo Sang. 1993. Cognitive constraints on expressing newly perceived information, with reference to epistemic modal suffixes in Korean. Cognitive Linguistics 4: 135–67. Matlock, Teenie. 1989. Metaphor and the grammaticalization of evidentials. Berkeley Linguistics Society 15: 215–25. Mejı ´ as-Bikandi, Errapel. 1996. Space accessibility and mood in Spanish. In Gilles Fauconnier and Eve Sweetser, eds., Spaces, worlds, and grammar 157–78. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2000. Konjunktiv II and epistemic modals in German: A division of labour. In Ad Foolen and Frederike van der Leek, eds., Constructions in cognitive linguistics 191–215. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2001. An introduction to Langacker’s grounding predications: Mood and modal verbs in German. In Heinz Vater and Ole Letnes, eds., Modalita ¨ t und mehr / Modality and more 3–26. Trier, Germany: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag. modality in cognitive linguistics 887 Mortelmans, Tanja. 2002. ‘Wieso sollte ich dich ku ¨ ssen, du ha ¨ sslicher Mensch!’: A study of the German modals sollen and m € uussen as ‘grounding predications’ in interroga- tives. In Frank Brisard, ed., Grounding: The epistemic footing of deixis and reference 391– 432. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Mortelmans, Tanja. 2003. The ‘subjective’ effects of negation and past subjunctive on deontic modals: The case of German d € uurfen and sollen. In Friedrich Lenz, ed., Deictic conceptualisation of space, time and person 153–82. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Nuyts, Jan. 1994. Epistemic modal qualifications: On their linguistic and conceptual structure. Antwerp Papers in Linguistics (APiL), no. 81. Antwerpen: University of Antwerp. http://webhost.ua.ac.be/apil/list.html. Nuyts, Jan. 2001. Epistemic modality, language and conceptualization: A cognitive-pragmatic perspective. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Nuyts, Jan. 2002. Grounding and the system of epistemic expressions in Dutch: A cog- nitive-functional view. In Frank Brisard, ed., Grounding. The epistemic footing of deixis and reference 433–66. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Palmer, Frank R. 1986. Mood and modality. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Pelyva ´ s, Pe ´ ter. 1996. Subjectivity in English: Generative grammar versus the cognitive theory of epistemic grounding. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang Verlag. Pelyva ´ s, Pe ´ ter. 2000. Metaphorical extension of may and must into the epistemic domain. In Antonio Barcelona, ed., Metaphor and metonymy at the crossroads: A cognitive perspective 233–50. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Pelyva ´ s, Pe ´ ter. 2001. The development of the grounding predication: Epistemic modals and cognitive predicates. In Eniko ¨ Ne ´ meth and Ka ´ roly Bibok, eds., Pragmatics and the flexibility of word meaning 151–74. Amsterdam: Elsevier. Sanders, Jose ´ , and Wilbert Spooren 1996. Subjectivity and certainty in epistemic modality: A study of Dutch epistemic modifiers. Cognitive Linguistics 7: 241–64. Sweetser, Eve. 1982. Root and epistemic modals: Causality in two worlds. Berkeley Lin- guistics Society 8: 484–507. Sweetser, Eve. 1984. Semantic structure and semantic change: A cognitive linguistics study of modality, perception, speech acts, and logical relations. PhD dissertation, Uni- versity of California at Berkeley. Sweetser, Eve. 1990. From etymology to pragmatics: Metaphorical and cultural aspects of semantic structure. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Talmy, Leonard. 1976. Semantic causative types. In Masayoshi Shibatani, ed., Syntax and semantics, vol. 6, The grammar of causative constructions 43–116. New York: Academic Press. Talmy, Leonard. 1985. Force dynamics in language and thought. Chicago Linguistic Society 21, vol. 2 (parasession): 293–337. Talmy, Leonard. 1988. Force dynamics in language and cognition. Cognitive Science 12: 49–100. Talmy, Leonard. 2000. Toward a cognitive semantics. Vol. 1, Concept structuring systems. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1989. On the rise of epistemic meanings in English: An example of subjectification in semantic change. Language 65: 31–55. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs. 1995. Subjectification in grammaticalisation. In Dieter Stein and Susan Wright, eds., Subjectivity and subjectivisation: Linguistic perspectives 31–54. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, and Richard B. Dasher. 2002. Regularity in semantic change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 888 tanja mortelmans Traugott, Elizabeth Closs, and Ekkehard Ko ¨ nig. 1991. The semantics-pragmatics of grammaticalization revisited. In Elizabeth Closs Traugott and Bernd Heine, eds., Approaches to grammaticalization 189–218. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. van der Auwera, Johan, and Andreas Ammann. 2005. Overlap between situational and epistemic modal marking. In Matthew Dryer, David Gil, Martin Haspelmath, and Bernard Comrie, eds., World atlas of language structures 310–13. Oxford: Oxford University Press. van der Auwera, Johan, and Vladimir A. Plungian. 1998. Modality’s semantic map. Lin- guistic Typology 2: 79–124. Verhagen, Arie. 1995. Subjectification, syntax, and communication. In Dieter Stein and Susan Wright, eds., Subjectivity and subjectivisation in language 103–28. Cam- bridge: Cambridge University Press. Verhagen, Arie. 1996. Sequential conceptualization and linear order. In Eugene H. Casad, ed., Cognitive linguistics in the Redwoods: The expansion of a new paradigm in lin- guistics 793–817. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter. Wierzbicka, Anna. 1987. The semantics of modality. Folia Linguistica 21: 25–43. Wierzbicka, Anna. 1988. The semantics of grammar. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Wierzbicka, Anna. 1994. Semantics and epistemology: The meaning of ‘evidentials’ in a cross-linguistic perspective. Language Sciences 16: 81–137. modality in cognitive linguistics 889 . represented as part of reality. The prototypical function of the German present subjunctive (Konjunktiv I), on the other hand, resides in the marking of indirect speech. 31 It can therefore be taken. German, the use of the modality in cognitive linguistics 885 present subjunctive (and to some extent even that of the past subjunctive) is mainly governed by the antiassertive aspect of the subjunctive. 32 the speaker assuming that the evolutionary momentum of reality will take another course than the one marked by the conditional). This characterization of the meaning of the French conditional is